THE CRESCENT AND THE RISING SUN

INDONESIAN ISLAM UNDER THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION 1942-1945

By

HARRY J. BENDA

Assistant Professor of History
The University of Rochester

W. van Hoeve Ltd. - The Hague and Bandung
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UNIVERSITY of ROCHESTER

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To Eva

Peter and Susan

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Foreword

Every new period in the history of civilization obliges a religious community to undertake a general revision of the contents of its treasury", wrote Professor Snouck Hurgronje in 1916, referring to the Islamic reform movement which at that time was shaking broad sections of the Muslim world.

In the same way one could argue that every new period in history obliges the student of religious movements to undertake a general revision of the concepts used by his predecessors.

Ironically enough it is Snouck Hurgronje's own interpretation of Indonesian Islam which is shown by the author of the present volume to be inadequate in the light of later historical developments. And it is especially a lack of understanding for the basic importance of the Islamic reform movement which, in Dr. Benda's view, reduced twentieth century Islamic policy of the Netherlands Indies government to impotence.

Dr. Benda's main contribution to the historiography of Indonesia consists of a well-documented account of Islam under Japanese rule. Anything like a full-scale history of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia is still unwritten; worse still, the field has hardly been explored. A few doctoral dissertations, defended either in the Netherlands (Zorab and Aziz) or in the United States (Poppe), are no more than first attempts based on very restricted materials and, especially in the case of Dr. Zorab's study, rather limited in scope. To these dissertations may be added Elsbree's book covering the whole of Southeast Asia, and Piekaar's significant study of Acheh in wartime. A thorough study of the innumerable documents, pamphlets and periodicals, both in Indonesia and abroad, has still to be begun.

The author has been able to draw mainly on papers and periodicals to be found in collections at Cornell University and the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation in Amsterdam. In so doing he has set an example for Indonesian historians, so much better equipped by their personal acquaintance with Indonesian developments during the Japanese occupation. Though Dr. Benda was in Indonesia at that time, his situation as an inmate of Japanese camps prevented anything like a personal observation of what was going on outside the barbed wire. It is a great satisfaction to me that a tentative suggestion made in one of our common camps, to the effect that he should embark upon an academic career as a sociologist after the war, has been rewarded by this accomplished study.

This book benefits from the combination of careful historical research and sociological insight to provide a lucid analysis and vivid picture of a specific aspect of the Japanese occupation – the overlord's Islamic policy. The author has, moreover, been enabled to draw upon a wealth of published and unpublished materials by his mastery of at least five languages in addition to his mother tongue, which was unfortunately of no avail for the present study. Perhaps the fact that the author is not a national of any of the countries directly involved in the historical developments studied by him has contributed to a certain detachment in his outlook.

This detachment has also been instrumental in enabling him to present a significant reinterpretation of pre-war Indonesian Islam under Dutch colonial rule – his second achievement deserving our gratitude. He has, no doubt, benefited from his intimate knowledge of what happened later, during the Japanese occupation and after. It was this later development which opened his eyes to the paramount significance of the *kiyayi* or *ulama* as the key figures in the Javanese countryside. The historian who knows the end of the drama is better equipped to interpret the preceding acts.

It is the grass-roots concept of rural Islam which, in the hands of Dr. Benda, has become a tool for a better understanding of prewar developments. It is this concept, derived from later

experiences, which has enabled him to discover certain fallacies in Dutch pre-war policy.

The author has also benefited from the fact that he did not 'belong' – was not a member either of the Dutch administration or of the Indonesian Dutch-educated elite. This circumstance has helped him to free himself from some preconceptions of Dutch or, for that matter, Indonesian authors – for instance, the conception that the Leiden school of thought represented a unity, and that the exponents of this school constituted about the most progressive wing within the European pre-war community in the Indies. Dr. Benda's hypothesis that there was a rift, within Leiden, between the Department of Islamic Studies and what he calls the Adat Law School, is, for the moment, no more than a challenge worth closer study. His contention that the contrasts between the schools of Leiden and Utrecht had tended to fade away and even in the long run to become virtually irrelevant, and his theory that the Adat Law admirers from Leiden had, in spite of their liberal political orientation (they were the ones who inaugurated the liberal and progressive *Stuw* movement in the early thirties), in fact been helpful to conservative policy makers, and had prevented the government from formulating an adequate Islamic policy, are also still open to question.

But it is a significant contribution to historiography when a historian is able to raise new questions and suggest new answers in the light of a more recent past.

And while the recent past or the present may contribute to a better understanding of history, the study of history, in its turn, may likewise provide a clue to an answer to problems of the present.

"Any true history is a history of today", to borrow the words of Benedetto Croce.

There is in my opinion one paramount lesson for today to be drawn from Dr. Benda's study. Whatever Islamic policy may be pursued by a non-Muslim power, its outcome will always be quite different from what that power intended to achieve. Again, world

powers are attempting to make use of Islam to further their own political ends. Again, they will experience that they are, in their turn, being used by Muslim politicians to further ends which may be quite different from theirs.

The Rising Sun attempted in vain to draw the Crescent permanently into its orbit. The Crescent is too big to become anybody's innocuous satellite, a mere Sputnik.

W. F. WERTHEIM

Amsterdam, 10 January, 1958

Acknowledgments

This book grew out of a doctoral dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty of Cornell University in 1955. I owe a lasting debt of gratitude to my erstwhile advisers in that University, especially to Professors George McT. Kahin and John M. Echols, who steered my interest in the direction of Indonesian Islam and generously provided counsel and encouragement. Through their cooperation I was enabled to use a unique collection of primary source materials relating to the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. While studying at Cornell University, I also had the good fortune of being a student of the late Haji Agus Salim's, 'Grand Old Man' of the Indonesian independence movement and veteran leader of Indonesian Islam. I learned much from him in lectures and seminars, and perhaps more still from the many conversations in which he freely shared his unrivalled first-hand knowledge and experiences with me. The many Indonesian visitors to the Cornell campus, as well as my fellow students there, Indonesians and others, did much to sharpen my judgment. I am, finally, indebted to the staff of the Cornell University Library, who unfailingly and courteously helped me through all stages of my research.

I had hoped to be able to undertake a study trip to Holland and Japan, and to re-visit Indonesia, where I had previously spent seven years of my life, including the years of the Japanese occupation. Only such an extended study tour could have provided me with personal contacts, and thus with the answers to some, at least, of the many gaps that remained after completion of my research in printed sources. Unfortunately, I had neither the time nor the financial resources to accomplish these

goals, and had to content myself with a brief sojourn in the Netherlands in the spring of 1955. In spite of its brevity, this proved to be an invaluable stay. I had the benefit of the most generous scholarly advice and constructive criticism from several Dutch experts who graciously directed me to errors of fact and judgment in the original manuscript. I am especially grateful to Professor W. F. Wertheim of the University of Amsterdam, whom I had the privilege of befriending in Indonesia several years ago, and whose warm interest in my work was one of my most rewarding and inspiring experiences in the Netherlands. Dr. Wertheim's research associates have been kind enough to check some data for me since my departure from Holland, an assistance much appreciated by me. I am, furthermore, indebted to Dr. G. F. Pijper, formerly Adviser on Native Affairs to the Netherlands Indies' government and now professor of Arabic in the University of Amsterdam, who spent several hours in discussion with me and continued his help by means of correspondence after I had returned to the United States.

Dr. C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, a noted Dutch Islamic scholar, now attached to the Institute of Social Studies at The Hague, has earned my gratitude by devoting likewise a great deal of time to my work. I am, furthermore, happy to record my indebtedness to Mrs. H. A. Joustra, head of the Indonesian Collection of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation in Amsterdam, and to her colleagues, who, particularly during my few weeks in Amsterdam, greatly assisted me with information. Col. A. G. Vromans (Capt. R.N.N., ret.), of the same Institute, has been one of the most patient and painstaking critics of my work.

Though unable to visit Japan and Indonesia, I have benefited from written and oral comments from some Japanese and Indonesian students of Indonesian Islam. Messrs. S. Nishijima and K. Kishi of Tokyo, both affiliated to the Okuma Institute of Social Sciences of Waseda University, have readily made invaluable information, based on personal knowledge and intensive research in Japanese sources, available to me. Several Indonesian

scholars in the Netherlands and in this country have similarly been most helpful in making important suggestions.

Some of the methodological and theoretical assumptions of my discussion of the Islamic and non-religious elites in Indonesia were tested at an Inter-University Seminar devoted to the comparative study of Southeast Asian elites, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and held at Princeton University in the summer of 1955. I am grateful to the Council for providing me with the opportunity of participating in this highly stimulating venture, and to my colleagues in the Seminar – Professors Lucian W. Pye, Douglas S. Paauw, Fred Riggs, Robert Van Niel, Paul van der Veur, and the late Richard Wohl – for helping me to refine and reformulate some of my original judgments.

While I am highly appreciative of all the counsel, criticism and advice so generously proffered in this country and abroad, it goes without saying that my gratitude should not involve my friends, counsellors and critics in responsibility for the final product. Though it has greatly benefited from their help, its remaining shortcomings must be squarely laid at my own doorstep.

The writing of this book would have been impossible without the generous financial support I received from the University of Rochester in the course of the past two years. I wish to record my especial indebtedness to Professors Glyndon G. Van Deusen, Chairman of the Department of History and Associate Dean of Graduate Studies, and Lewis W. Beck, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy and past Chairman of the Committee on Grants in Aid, who were instrumental in making the award of funds possible. I should also like to express my appreciation of the fine cooperation extended to me by the staff of our University Library, who never seemed to tire of satisfying my incessant requests for literature and other information.

Mr. F. P. Thomassen, of the publishing firm W. van Hoeve Ltd. at The Hague, with his enthusiasm and good cheer, no less than his patience, gave me the kind of encouragement that is every

young author's dream. He shares honors with Mr. William L. Holland, Secretary General of the Institute of Pacific Relations in New York, without whose cooperation publication would have remained highly problematical, to say the least.

I have also been more than fortunate in securing the editorial and secretarial help of Mrs. Eleanor C. Macfarlane of Rochester, who has spent long hours in the dual – and at times doubtless harrowing – task of correcting my English and preparing the final draft of this work. I could not have wished for a more courteous, intelligent, efficient and interested assistant.

More than anyone else, however, my wife may lay claim to my lasting gratitude. Not only did she materially help in the original research work and in the preparation of the many versions through which the manuscript has gone during the last four years, but, no less important, she has been a most gracious companion, who patiently endured the long spells of absent-mindedness, if not of actual absences from the family circle, that apparently are the inevitable lot of authors. This book is, therefore, dedicated to her and to our children. I solemnly promise them a vacation from writing – a long overdue vacation to which they are more than entitled.

In parts of the present book, I have drawn on materials previously presented in articles which appeared in *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. XXIV (1955), *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXVIII (1955), and *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. XV (1956). I am indebted to the editors of these journals for permission to make use of some of these materials, and to The University of Chicago Press for permission to re-publish the greater part of a forthcoming article in *The Journal of Modern History* in Chapter One of this work.

H. J. B.

The University of Rochester

September, 1957

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Author's Preface

The political history of modern Indonesia, especially that of the Indonesian nationalist movement of the past half-century, has in recent years received increasing attention from Indonesian as well as Western scholars. The history of Indonesian Islam, on the other hand, has been relatively neglected in most of their works, which not infrequently accord Islamic movements a minor place in the growth of Indonesian nationalism. This treatment has tended to obscure not only the importance of Indonesian Islam as such, but also the very profound divisions between Muslim leaders and other Indonesian social and political groups, whether traditional or modern, in colonial times.

This book attempts to trace the evolution of Indonesian Islam and the complex role it has played in the modern era of Indonesia's political history under foreign rule. In Part One, this evolution is studied in the context of Dutch colonial rule, with especial emphasis on Dutch Islamic policy and Muslim organizational life in the twentieth century. To some extent it was unavoidable to cover ground more or less familiar to students of Indonesian history, since for all their intrinsic importance, neither Dutch Islamic policy nor Islamic history could be divorced from either the overall direction of colonial administration or the political maturation of Indonesian society as a whole. An endeavor has, nonetheless, been made to view even the generally better known landmarks from the specifically Islamic angle, and to avoid repetition wherever possible.

While most of the materials for the first part of the study were derived from secondary sources, Part Two, which is devoted to the brief yet highly important Japanese interregnum – still a largely unexplored chapter in Indonesian history – has been

documented from primary sources, especially from the Indonesian-language daily and periodical press of those years. The difference in source materials, as well as the discrepancy in the quantity of the literature written on the two periods, has dictated the adoption of a different treatment and pace for each part. In the pages dealing with Dutch rule, the text is largely expository and analytical; in those devoted to the occupation era, ample verbatim quotations have been included in the text for purposes of careful documentation. Where the first part traverses several decades, if not centuries, in a broad sweep, the second consists of a detailed account of forty eventful months.

For all these basic differences, however, both parts suffer from similar inadequacies. For one thing, it has been impossible to consult the official records of the Dutch governmental agency in charge of Islamic affairs, and also those of its Japanese successor. Dutch archives in the colony – inaccessible to pre-war scholars as far as twentieth century documents were concerned – were largely destroyed during the war. Those in the Netherlands, if they are now available to students, could not be consulted for lack of time. Again, not only is it very probable that most of the Japanese records in Indonesia were lost during or shortly before the Indonesian revolution, but the writer's ignorance of the Japanese language would, in any case, have precluded proper use of these materials or of archives still intact in Japan.

These serious limitations have adversely affected at least two facets of the present study. First, the available information concerning Indonesian developments could not be adequately checked with official sources which by their very nature must be expected to be far more detailed and comprehensive than the incidental data contained in secondary works. There is, second, a lamentable lack of information concerning economic, political, military – and, indeed, religious – forces in the metropolitan countries which doubtless were of prime significance in determining Dutch as well as Japanese colonial, and Islamic, policies. For these reasons, the picture presented in this essay cannot claim to aspire to more than tentative results. It will have to be

supplemented by much further research in the Netherlands and in Japan. In the latter country, at any rate, this work fortunately appears to be under way.

An additional word of caution must be added regarding the Japanese period. Though the account in Part Two is based on 'primary' sources, these sources bear, of course, the mark of rigid censorship and minute regulation. Propagandistic overemphasis of many important points, and silence on perhaps no less important events, pose serious and often vexing problems. It is, for example, impossible to know whether speeches reported in the press are truthful accounts of what had, in fact, been said, or whether articles were actually written in the final version bearing the author's name. Thus the published utterances of some of the leading Indonesian figures, Muslims and others, during the occupation cannot always be taken at face value.

Furthermore, it is difficult for an outsider to assess the internal structure of the Japanese military administration, and of the various groups – military personnel proper, the military police, militarized bureaucrats, and civilians – that doubtless contended for influence in the making and execution of Japanese policies in the Indies. The printed record understandably enough gives little, if any, indication of disagreements among these various forces, but such disagreements may account for some of the important shifts in occupation policy noted in the second part of this study. Thus the motivations underlying Japanese Islamic policy could only rarely be determined with certainty. Only too often speculation, based on careful sifting of the printed record, and on the hazardous task of reading between the lines of that record, had to take the place of more authoritative analysis.

Wherever possible, recourse has been had to information from post-war sources, in an endeavor to check and correct the picture which had emerged from the study of occupation records. Unfortunately this search has yielded very inadequate results. Unlike the period of Dutch colonialism, the Japanese occupation of Indonesia in general, and Islamic developments during those

years in particular, have so far received very scant treatment at the hands of Indonesian, and other, writers.

In the main, this book deals with Islamic developments on the island of Java only. This regrettable limitation of scope was in a large measure determined by the availability of source materials. Especially for the Japanese period, printed records from the other islands were, with some minor exceptions, beyond the reach of the author. While the effects of the Japanese occupation on Indonesian Islam in Acheh, one of the most staunchly Islamic areas of Sumatra, have been the subject of an excellent Dutch monograph*, the fate of the Islamic community in other parts of the archipelago, particularly in the important West Coast Residency of Sumatra, remains to be studied in detail. In Part One, the present writer has included brief references to that area, wherever this seemed appropriate by way of comparison and contrast to the situation on Java; but he has unfortunately not been able to continue this part of his inquiry into the Japanese era.

These limitations notwithstanding, the story of Indonesian Islam on Java – the most populous island and the center of administration in colonial times as well as now – is nonetheless of crucial significance. Though Islam in the other areas has undeniably played – and continues to play – a leading role in the political evolution of Indonesia, it is on Java that is has found its most important organizational expression. It is there, also, that Islamic groups have been most directly involved in the shaping of Indonesian politics in general.

Since the political aspect of Indonesian Islam forms the principal subject of this book, schematic generalization has been unavoidable. This treatment has of necessity involved disregard of the regional differences besetting Islam even in the limited context of the island of Java, whose political ramifications – especially in Banten Residency of West Java – would deserve separate attention.

This study is devoted to a socio-historical analysis of the Islamic

* A. J. Piekaar, *Atjèh en de oorlog met Japan* (The Hague/Bandung, 1949).

elite and, to a lesser extent, of competing, non-religious elites in the Indonesian political scene under alien domination. It revolves around an examination of the place accorded to the leaders of the Muslim community by two successive colonial masters, and to the resulting power constellation involving Muslim leaders, the Indonesian aristocracy, and the spokesmen of the 'secular' Indonesian nationalist movement in this century.

PETA NEGARA KESATUAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA



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Peta ini menggambarkan wilayah kedaulatan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia di darat dan laut, baik berupa laut teritorial dan perairan kepulauan, maupun perairan pedalaman, serta wilayah yurisdiksi di laut yang berbatasan dengan 10 (sepuluh) negara, yaitu India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapura, Vietnam, Filipina, Palau, Papua Nugini, Australia, dan Timor Leste.

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Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Politik dan Keamanan, Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian, Kementerian Dalam Negeri, Kementerian Luar Negeri, Kementerian Pertahanan, Kementerian Hukum, Kementerian Keuangan, Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, Kementerian Perhubungan, Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan, Kementerian Agraria dan Tata Ruang/Badan Pertanahan Nasional, Badan Intelijen Negara Republik Indonesia, Badan Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia, Badan Informasi Geospasial, Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional, Pusat Hidro-Oseanografi TNI Angkatan Laut.

NUMERICAL

1. Keputusan Presiden RI Nomor 126 Tahun 2025 tentang Penetapan Data Geospasial Dasar dan Peta Rupabumi Indonesia Edisi Tahun 2025.
2. Keputusan Presiden RI Nomor 209 Tahun 2025 tentang Penetapan Garis Pantai Untuk Wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia Edisi Tahun 2025.
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10. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 7 Tahun 2012 tentang Pengesahan United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Konvensi Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa tentang Hukum Laut).
11. Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2014 tentang Pelayaran.
12. Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 81 Tahun 2017 tentang Penetapan Pulau-pulau Kecil Terluar

NEGARA KESATUAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA

Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI) merupakan Negara Kepulauan (Archipelagic State) yang berbatasan dengan 10 (sepuluh) negara, yaitu India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapura, Vietnam, Filipina, Palau, Papua Nugini, Australia, dan Timor Leste.

I. WILAYAH DARAT NKRI

Wilayah darat NKRI terdiri atas daratan pada asmus pulau yang berada di sebelah dalam garis pangkal Kepulauan Indonesia. Bhasa di D. Kalimantan, P. Sebatik, P. Papua, dan P. Timor berbatasan dengan perbatasan antarpulau/darat.

1. Batas negara dengan Malaysia di P. Kalimantan dan Sebatik merupakan bagian perjanjian batas antara Pemerintah Inggris dan Pemerintah Belanda tanggal 20 Juni 1891 dan 28 September 1915 serta Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Malaysia tanggal 12 Mei 1973 dan Nomor 44 Tahun 2019 untuk area 4 (4c) SEKIDO - B 2500 dan area B (C2) 1000 – 1500, Mo) antara Pemerintah Indonesia dan Pemerintah Malaysia Nomor 22 Tahun 2020 untuk Area F (B1) KEYSI - KEYSI dan Nomor 34 Tahun 2020 untuk area Sebuk Ciasan di Pulau Sebatik.
2. Batas negara dengan Papua Nugini di P. Papua merupakan bagian Perjanjian antara Inggris dan Australia mengenai garis-garis Batas Tertentu antara Indonesia dan Papua Nugini tanggal 12 Februari 1973. Yang disahkan dengan Undang-undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1973.
3. Batas negara dengan Timor Leste merupakan bagian Perjanjian antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Timor Leste (RDTL) mengenai titik Koordinat Batara Darat, Maritim, dan Dasar Laut tanggal 2 Mei 2019.
4. Batas negara dengan Australia merupakan bagian Perjanjian antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Australia tentang Penetapan Batas Maritim Tertentu antara Indonesia dan Australia serta Perjanjian antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Australia tentang Kerja Sama di Area Tertentu di Celah Timor tanggal 14 Maret 1997.

II. WILAYAH ZAM ZOM/ PERAIRAN NKRI

Indonesia memiliki kedaulatan di wilayah perairan pedalaman, perairan kepulauan, dan laut teritorial serta memiliki hak berdaulat di zona tambahan, zona ekonomi eksklusif, dan landas kontinen.

Besar Kekuasaan berkaitan zona perairan NKRI adalah:

1. Undang-Undang Nomor 3 Tahun 1983 tentang Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif Indonesia.
2. Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 1985 tentang Pengesahan United Nations Convension on the Law of the Sea (Konvensi Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa tentang Hukum Laut).
3. Undang-Undang Nomor 4 Tahun 1996 tentang Perairan Indonesia.
4. Undang-Undang Nomor 43 Tahun 2008 tentang Wilayah Negara.
5. Peraturan Presiden Nomor 62 Tahun 2017 tentang Pengelolaan Kawal dan Penegakan Hukum di Wilayah Perairan dan Yurisdiksi Indonesia.
6. Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1996 tentang Perairan Indonesia.

III. WILAYAH DARAT NKRI

1. Batas negara dengan Malaysia di P. Kalimantan dan Sebatik merupakan bagian perjanjian batas antara Pemerintah Inggris dan Pemerintah Belanda tanggal 20 Juni 1891 dan 28 September 1915 serta Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Malaysia tanggal 12 Mei 1973 dan Nomor 44 Tahun 2019 untuk area 4 (4c) SEKIDO - B 2500 dan area B (C2) 1000 – 1500, Mo) antara Pemerintah Indonesia dan Pemerintah Malaysia Nomor 22 Tahun 2020 untuk Area F (B1) KEYSI - KEYSI dan Nomor 34 Tahun 2020 untuk area Sebuk Ciasan di Pulau Sebatik.
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6. Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1996 tentang Perairan Indonesia.

V. BATAS LAUT WILAYAH (TERITORIAL)

1. Undang-Undang Nomor 3 Tahun 1971 tentang Perjanjian Antara Republik Indonesia dan Malaysia tentang Penetapan Garis Batas Laut Wilayah Kedua Negara di Selat Malaka.
2. Undang-Undang Nomor 4 Tahun 1973 tentang Perjanjian Antara Indonesia dan Australia Mengenai Garis-garis Batas Tertentu antara Indonesia dan Papua Nugini.
3. Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 1973 tentang Perjanjian Antara Indonesia dan Singapura tentang Penetapan Garis Batas Laut Wilayah Kedua Negara di Selat Singapura.
4. Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1982 tentang Pengesahan Perjanjian Antara Republik Indonesia dan Republik Singapura tentang Penetapan Garis Batas Laut Wilayah Kedua Negara di bagian Timur Selat Singapura.

B. Batas Wilayah Yurisdiksi

1. Undang-Undang Nomor 10 Tahun 2007 tentang Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Republik Sosialis Demokratik Sri Lanka tentang Penetapan Batas Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif Kedua Negara.
2. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 26 Tahun 1969 tentang Persetujuan Antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Malaysia tentang Penetapan Garis-garis Landas Kontinen antara Kedua Negara.
3. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 42 Tahun 1971 tentang Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Commonwealth Australia tentang Penetapan Batas-batas Dasar Laut Tertentu.
4. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 89 Tahun 1969 tentang Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, Pemerintah Malaysia, dan Pemerintah Kerajaan Thailand tentang Penetapan Garis-garis Batas Landas Kontinen Dalam Zona Batal Melaka.
5. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 21 Tahun 1972 tentang Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Kerajaan Thailand mengenai Penetapan Batas-batas Dasar Laut Tertentu di Laut Andaman dan Laut Utara Pulau Langkawi.
6. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 42 Tahun 1972 tentang Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Commonwealth Australia tentang Penetapan Batas-batas Dasar Laut Tertentu di Laut Timor dan Laut Arafura.
7. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 1 Tahun 1977 tentang Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Republik India mengenai Garis Batas Landas Kontinen antara Kedua Negara.
8. Memorandum Saling Pengertian antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah kerajaan Thailand tentang Penetapan Batas-batas Landas Kontinen antara Kedua Negara.
9. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 1 Tahun 1977 tentang Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Kerajaan Thailand tentang Penetapan batas-batas Dasar Laut antara Kedua Negara di Laut Andaman.
10. Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1996 tentang Perairan Indonesia dan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Republik India tentang Penetapan Garis Batas Landas Kontinen Tahun 1974 di Laut Andaman dan Samudera Hindia.
11. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 24 Tahun 1978 tentang Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, Pemerintah Republik India, dan Pemerintah Kerajaan Thailand mengenai Penetapan Titik Pertemuan Batas Landas Kontinen di Laut Andaman dan Andaman.
12. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 21 Tahun 1997 tentang Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Papua Nugini tentang Batas-batas Maritim antara Republik Indonesia dan Papua Nugini dan Kerjasama tentang Masalah-Masalah yang Berkaitan.
13. Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1997 tentang Persetujuan antara Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Australia Mengenai Kunjungan Kapal-kapal Pengerukan Pertukaran dan Pengerukan Pekerjaansesungai 28 Oktober 1991.
14. Undang-Undang Nomor 10 Tahun 2017 tentang Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Australia tentang Penetapan Batas Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif dan Batas Laut Tertentu ditandatangani tanggal 14 Maret 1997.
15. Undang-Undang Nomor 5 Tahun 2017 tentang Pengesahan Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Republik Demokratik Timor Leste tentang Batas Maritim di Wilayah Laut Timor.
16. Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission made by Indonesia in respect of the area North West of Sumatra on 15 June 2008 (Rekomendasi Komisi Batas Landas Kontinen tentang submisi yang disampaikan oleh Indonesia sehubungan dengan wilayah di sebelah Barat Laut Sumatra pada tanggal 15 Juni 2008) Diterima pada tanggal 28 Maret 2011. Atas dasar hal tersebut luas wilayah yurisdiksi landas kontinen Indonesia diperkirakan seluas 4.209.423

Simbol :

P.	Pulau	Sel.	Selat
Kep.	Kepulauan	S.	Sungai
Tg.	Tanjung	K.	Kanal
Mk.	Semenanjung/Leher Laut	T.	Teluk
Pg.	Pegunungan	G.	Gunung
Sg.	Sungai	W.	Waduk
D.	Dalam		
Ki.	Kiri		

Skala Ketinggian :

	>3500 m
	2501 - 3500 m
	2001 - 2500 m
	1501 - 2000 m
	1001 - 1500 m
	501 - 1000 m
	201 - 500 m
	101 - 200 m
	51 - 100 m
	21 - 50 m
	0 - 20 m

Kedalaman :

	0 - 50 m
	51 - 100 m
	101 - 150 m
	151 - 200 m
	201 - 500 m
	501 - 1000 m
	1001 - 2000 m
	2001 - 3000 m
	3001 - 4000 m
	4001 - 5000 m
	5001 - 6000 m
	>6000 m

Part One

The Colonial Legacy

"Existe-t-il dans la population javanaise des forces latentes suffisantes pour lui permettre d'atteindre à une civilisation propre? C'est là une question à laquelle je réponderai affirmativement, et je crois que cette transformation aura pour cause essentielle un réveil de l'Islam..." (From an anonymous article, "L'Avenir de l'Islam à Java," *Revue Économique Internationale*, 1 [1905], p. 514).

Chapter One

Indonesian Islam and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy

The Islamization of the islands of the Indonesian archipelago covers a period of several centuries. It is, indeed, a process which has even today not been entirely completed. A Muslim principality appears to have existed in northern Sumatra as far back as the beginning of the thirteenth century. In due course it was followed by the conversion of other ruling dynasties on that island, among which Acheh has come to play a prominent role in Indonesian history. By the early fifteenth century, Islam had established itself at Malacca, the nerve-center of Southeast Asian trade routes, whence the new faith radiated to other parts of Indonesia.

By the middle of the century, Islam had already reached the Moluccas in the east and, more important still, some of the trading towns on the northern litoral of the island of Java, center for many centuries of a flourishing Hindu-Javanese empire, Majapahit. Majapahit succumbed under the armed onslaughts of its rebellious, Islamized vassals, leaving the interior of Java in political chaos. In the latter part of the sixteenth century, however, a new dynasty, that of Mataram, gained prominence in central Java, and ultimately succeeded in subjugating the coastal principalities. With the conversion of the ruler of Mataram to Islam the victory of the new faith was well-nigh complete over the greater part of Indonesia at the beginning of the seventeenth century, which marked the first Dutch involvements in Indonesian affairs.[1]

This victory was the more remarkable since the carriers of Islam had not, as in some other parts of the world, been Muslim conquerors, but in the main peaceful traders from India, where Islam had established itself during preceding centuries. Attracted

to Southeast Asia by the lucrative Indonesian spice trade as well as by the flourishing transit commerce, these Indian traders, as well as Muslims from other parts of the world, had settled in many riparian and coastal cities of the archipelago, such as Malacca, where they came to form Muslim colonies which were often marked by their wealth as much as by their proselytizing zeal.

Thus at the outset, Indonesian Islam was by and large an urban phenomenon, which counted among its first converts Indonesian traders, soon followed by city dwellers of both higher and lower social strata. The basic equality preached by Islam may have held a strong appeal to the latter, while Indonesian aristocrats, by contrast, may have found conversion both economically attractive and politically advisable in the situation prevailing in Indonesia at that time. Their acceptance of Islam, that is to say, provided them with a weapon against external and internal enemies.

The external danger stemmed from the entry into Southeast Asia of a Western commercial and religious aggressor, the Portuguese, who appeared as a power factor in Southeast Asia early in the sixteenth century. Bent on winning Christian converts no less than on depriving Muslims of the monoply of the Asian spice trade – which after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 had become progressively barred to Western traders – the Portuguese succeeded in establishing fortified trading posts in India and China, carrying their bloody struggle against the 'Moors' into Asian waters. The fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511 brought the threat of Portuguese commercial and religious aggression to the very doorstep of adjacent Indonesian principalities. Paradoxically enough, this Portuguese success speeded the conversion of Indonesian princes to Islam.[2]

On a lesser scale, the appearance of another Western intruder, the Dutch East India Company, a century later may have had similar effects. Unlike the Portuguese, whom they bitterly fought and ultimately evicted from Malacca and other strongholds in Indonesia, the Dutch were not so much concerned with religious

conquests as with commercial gains. But in the measure that their commercial pursuits necessitated involvement in political Indonesian affairs, resistance to Dutch interference not infrequently tended to coincide with a strengthening of Muslim sentiment. It is true, of course, that conversion to Islam did not necessarily bring with it united Indonesian resistance to Western encroachments. In fact, rivalries and dynastic wars among converted Islamic rulers had not infrequently given the Portuguese and the Dutch an opportunity or a pretext for interfering in Indonesian political affairs. Nonetheless, much of the opposition encountered by both Portuguese and Dutch crystallized around Islam, and in some regions of Indonesia, notably in Acheh, Islam continued for centuries to be the prime rallying point against Western encroachments and later against Dutch colonial rule.[3]

To these external factors must be added the internal constellations which in some key areas speeded the expansion of Islam. On Java, in particular, Islam assumed importance in the context of the struggle between the waning central authority of Majapahit and its warring Hindu-Javanese successors on the one hand, and the Islamized coastal dependencies and vassals, on the other. The new faith provided the coastal vassals not only with an ideological weapon, but also with the financial resources of the Islamic trading communities.[4]

The new dynasty of Mataram, which shifted the political center of gravity in the agrarian interior from East Java to Central Java at the turn of the seventeenth century, found itself thus confronted by the combined strength of Islamized principalities claiming suzerainty over the wealthy coastal regions and of the Muslim sultanate of Banten in West Java. The ruler of Mataram in the end chose conversion to Islam as the best means of realizing his ambitions.[5] As a Muslim he conquered his Indonesian opponents and later continued to defy the Dutch East India Company.

But although Islam had established itself fairly rapidly, and on the whole peacefully, in the greater part of the archipelago,

it had done so in a by no means uniform pattern or degree of intensity. Only in those parts of Indonesia which had been least affected by Hindu civilization in past centuries – such as Acheh and the Minangkabau region in Sumatra, and Banten in West Java – did Islam almost from the outset profoundly affect the religious, social and political consciousness of its new adherents. Thus it is in those regions that the new faith has manifested itself in a purer, less conciliatory and at times even aggressive form. In the greater part of Java, on the other hand, Islam had been forced to adapt itself to centuries-old traditions, partly indigenous, partly Hindu-Buddhist, and in the process to lose much of its doctrinal rigidity. Javanese Islam was, indeed, for long of greater political than religious significance. Even though it provided a sense of unity and identity, at the outset at least it did not bring about radical changes in religious and social life on Java.

Partly this may have been due to the fact that Islam reached Indonesia not from its Middle Eastern heartland, but from India, and that this Islam, filtered through the religious experience of India, and studded with mysticism, had found the ground well prepared in Hinduized Java.[6] It was, indeed, Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, rather than Islamic orthodoxy, which for a long time held sway in Java and in parts of Sumatra. But it is at least equally significant that in Indonesia Islam did not lead to the creation of a separate community and to lasting division between Hindus and Muslims, as had been the case in India.[7] It is, therefore, very likely that its success in Indonesia is indicative of a rather superficial degree of Hinduization, particularly in Central Java, and that Javanese Islam in the early centuries was a wedding of Sufi and indigenous mysticism rather than of Islam and Hinduism proper.[8]

The long survival of this syncretic Javanese Islam may, finally, be connected with the establishment of Mataram's hegemony over its coastal adversaries, which brought with it the forceful expulsion of the urban, dynamic and aggressive Muslim settlements from the trading centers of North Java. The concomitant

cessation of Indonesian mercantile activities on Java turned Mataram into an isolated, inland, agrarian state.[9] Deprived of vitalizing contact with the Muslim world, Javanese Islam was thus forced to turn inward and to operate within the framework of traditional religious beliefs. As a result, and in spite of accelerated Islamization of the peasantry, Islam on Java for long remained more stagnant and less 'pure' than elsewhere in Indonesia. For long the real victor was Javanese religion, not Islam; Javanese custom – the *adat* – not the law of the Koran; and Javanese 'feudalism', not an urban, Islamic civilization.

Even then, however, Islam had not only come to stay and to expand its influence; from the very outset it played an enormously important political and ideological role. Just as Islamization had been helped by the Portuguese in its early stages, it was, no less paradoxically, furthered by the progressive expansion of Dutch rule over the islands of Indonesia. For all its 'impurities' and compromises with pre-Islamic practices, Islam came to serve Indonesians as a rallying point of identity, to symbolize separateness from, and opposition to, foreign, Christian overlords. In the course of four centuries, resistance to Dutch rule, whether led by religious fanatics or – less frequently but more formidably – by Indonesian princes unfurling the banner of the Crescent, almost invariably became associated with the Islamic religion.[10] Less conspicuously, it was adherence to Islam which at the grass-roots level rendered the acceptance of colonial rule as a legitimate and lasting form of government impossible in the minds of even the least sophisticated villager.

This political significance of Indonesian Islam, including Javanese Islam, stems in no small measure from the fact that in Islam the borderline between religion and politics is, at best, very thin.[11] Islam is a way of life as much as a religion, and even though in Indonesia Islamization has been, and continues to be, a gradual process, some of its internal political ramifications made themselves felt at a very early stage.

As in other Muslim communities, the teachers and scribes of Islam, the *kiyayi* and *ulama*, constituted from the very beginning

a distinct social element in Indonesian society. Between the *abangan* tradition of the Javanese peasant – rooted in age-old pre-Hindu mysticism with accretions from later, including Muslim, religious elements – and the *priyayi* civilization of the ruling classes – more firmly rooted in aristocratic Hindu-Javanism – the *ulama* constituted the nucleus of yet a third way of life, that of the *santri*, whose traditional abode lay in the heartland of Islam.[12] Outside Java, similar dichotomies came into existence between *santri* and *adat*-chiefs.

The history of Indonesian Islam is, then, the history of this expanding *santri* civilization and its impact upon the religious, social and political life of Indonesia. Its beginnings are coterminous with the introduction of Islam in Indonesia. The newly converted rulers had to rely on the Islamic 'experts', who alone could legitimize them as Muslim princes, introduce Muslim law into the royal domains and, no less important, convert the subjects to the new faith. The *ulama* fulfilled these functions by becoming counsellors, judges and religious teachers, but they could do so only within the restrictions imposed by social, cultural and political reality of sixteenth and seventeenth century Indonesia. In other words, Indonesian courts did not necessarily become Muslim courts; in spite of conversion, they remained centers of a *priyayi* civilization.[13] Again, though Islamic law became the accepted judicial norm, primarily in matrimonial matters, it could not supersede the prevailing customary *adat* in other domains.[14] Finally, while it is true that religious practices came to bear unmistakably Islamic traces, in the eyes of old and young alike village religion and religious education remained part of the *abangan* civilization for centuries to come.[15]

In spite of these limiting factors, the foundations for a gradually expanding *santri* influence in Indonesia had been laid. For one thing, the Muslim judges attached to the courts of Indonesian rulers came to play an increasingly important role, at times far exceeding that of mere judicial advisers. In the measure that Dutch inroads progressively curtailed the political power of the rulers, these Muslim judges came to exert ever greater influence.[16] More

important still, in Indonesia, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, orthodox propounders of the faith tended to come into conflict with secular rulers.[17]

For, indispensable though the *ulama* are to Muslim princes who have embraced Islam, these teachers and propagators of the faith are not all, or always, reliable allies. Apart from those who as judges and advisers enter princely service, there are others who stubbornly uphold the traditional independence of the man of Allah. Standing aloof from secular governments which they in principle condemn as part of a sinful world, the *ulama* often act as the most outspoken and irreconcilable critics of the powers-that-be in Muslim lands. Thus the newly converted dynasty of Mataram, fearing the challenge of Muslim zealots, took strong repressive action against the *ulama* as a group.[18] Doubtless it was largely this fear of Islam which turned the Javanese aristocracy, as well as *adat*-chiefs in other islands, into at best lukewarm and nominal Muslims.

Their conversion to Islam notwithstanding, the *priyayi* thus continued to constitute an aristocratic civilization of their own, which in general opposed the nascent *santri* civilization of the *ulama*. In fact, Indonesian Islam soon developed into two more or less distinct branches. One, the legal and administrative branch, so to speak, became an adjunct of secular rule, centered around the mosque or prayer-house and the religious judge *(penghulu* on Java, *kadi* on the other islands).[19] The other centered around the independent *kiyayi* and *ulama*, who derived their sanctity not from the sanction of secular authority but from their knowledge of Islam and the Holy Language, their Mecca pilgrimage and their distinctly Islamic – indeed not infrequently pseudo-Arabic – way of life.[20] The former became part and parcel of the *priyayi* civilization, while the latter constituted the nucleus of the new *santri* civilization. Not only were the two groups divided by hostility and suspicion,[21] they were also competing for the allegiance of the *abangan* majority of the Indonesian peasants. In this competition, the *penghulu* was almost invariably the loser, partly because of his connection – often, indeed, his

consanguinity[22] – with the *priyayi*-elite, and partly because he ultimately shared in the decline of his princely masters. This decline was, in turn, the inevitable result of the consolidation of Dutch power in Indonesia, which in the course of time turned virtually all Indonesian rulers into – willing or unwilling – tools of a Christian power. The Dutch policy of indirect rule, particularly in the era of the so-called Culture System,[23] deepened and widened the gulf which traditionally had existed between ruler and ruled in the hierarchical, authoritarian Indonesian society.

In the eyes of the peasantry, the age-old pattern of authority moreover lost much of its intrinsic justification when native rulers were being transformed into a hereditary class of officials, acting as the extended arm of the colonial government.[24] Their dependence on the colonial power also accelerated the process of alienation from Indonesian Islam. Dutch support for the native aristocracy was in a large measure based on the existing rift between *priyayi* and *ulama*. *Priyayi* officialdom, eager to please the alien overlords, was careful to avoid any suspicion of religious 'fanaticism', and in so doing not only became a target for the ridicule and hostility of many *ulama*,[25] it also lost touch with Indonesian Islam altogether. *Priyayi* ignorance of matters Islamic[26] actually not infrequently extended to the 'religious' officials entrusted by the aristocracy with the administration of worship and Islamic justice.[27]

At the same time, the pacification and improved communications which were the inevitable concomitants of the *Pax Neerlandica* from the eighteenth century onwards aided the more rapid spread of Islam in rural areas, particularly on Java. As a result of these developments, the *ulama* and *kiyayi*, the expounders and teachers of the Muslim faith, came to play an increasingly important role in rural Indonesia, not only numerically but also psychologically and ideologically. To peasants burdened with forced deliveries of produce, corvée labor and taxation, the man of God served as the only refuge and source of consolation. In him the villager found not only the religious certainties he

craved, but also the sense of belonging to a Muslim community beyond the confines of his often burdensome surroundings. It is true, of course, that village Islam remained for long encrusted by pre-Islamic thought and practices, that Islam, indeed, for long constituted no more than a thin veneer on Indonesian, especially Javanese, religion.[28] Until the nineteenth century, mystical societies – the *tarekats* – predominated, and the teaching of most village *kiyayi* did not extend beyond uncomprehending recitation of Arabic texts. Even then, however, the pervasion of grass-roots religion by Islamic elements was unmistakable.[29]

Before long, moreover, changes took place not only within Indonesian Islam, but also in the more rapid expansion of a *santri* civilization proper within Indonesian society. From the latter part of the nineteenth century onward, Indonesian Islam gradually started to shed its syncretic characteristics. Cut off from Indian Sufism and liberated, as it were, from the isolationism of Mataram by Dutch conquest, it now drew strength from contact with Mecca. Improved sea transportation brought increasing numbers of Indonesian hajis to the Holy City, some of whom spent years in Mecca, thus becoming participants in a specifically Middle Eastern, Muslim way of life;[30] returning to Indonesia, these reforming hajis acted as carriers of a more orthodox Islam.

After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 the number of Mecca-bound pilgrims increased very significantly,[31] while a steady influx of Hadramaut Arabs added to the growth of Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia.[32] Orthodoxy, not without bitter struggles, slowly gained predominance over Muslim mysticism in parts of both Java and Sumatra. While the traditional village schools largely retained their syncretic orientation, orthodox Mecca-trained *kiyayi* founded *pesantren* (theological seminaries) which attracted ever larger numbers of students. These radiating centers of a true Indonesian *santri* civilization formed, as it were, Middle Eastern, Arabic, Muslim microcosms, which stood ideologically, socially, and even

economically apart from, if they did not oppose, both the *priyayi* civilization and the *abangan* way of life.[33]

It was inevitable that the colonial relationship would acerbate the political consequences of the opposition between secular rulers and Islamic fanaticists to whom rule by 'infidels' and the colonial status as such were anathema. Islam, in other words, in addition to its inroads on the social pattern of Indonesia, came to play an increasingly important political role. Not only had centuries of Islamization permeated the perennial *abangan* belief of deliverance from oppressive rule with the more specifically Islamic notion of the *Mahdi*.[34] Far more important still, the more recent wave of orthodoxy turned each *pesantren*, at least potentially, into a center of anti-Dutch sentiment.[35] While this was at no time true of the majority of Muslim teachers and their followers, Muslim agitation did noticeably increase in response to adverse economic and political stimuli. Village unrest, endemic in rural Indonesia, found only too frequent expression in short-lived rebellions under Islamic leadership.

More threatening were the serious and widespread upheavals, most of them fought as 'Holy Wars' in the name of Islam, during the nineteenth century, which witnessed the consolidation of Dutch rule on Java and Sumatra. This was the case in the Banten War in the mid-eighteenth century, the so-called Tjirebon War (1802-06), and especially the Java War (1825–30) in which Prince Diponegoro of Mataram challenged the Dutch under the banner of Islam.[36] In Sumatra, the Dutch intervened in the Padri War (1821–38) on the side of Minangkabau *adat*-chiefs against powerful *ulama*. They encountered their most serious difficulties with Islam in the Sumatran sultanate of Acheh, for long the most stubbornly orthodox Islamic area of Indonesia, where a bitter and protracted war was fought between 1872 and 1908.[37]

The frequency and extent of both Muslim-led village unrest and of 'Holy Wars', toward the end of the last century, caused growing concern among administrators ill-prepared to cope with the increasing militancy of Indonesian Islam. Traditionally, Dutch attitudes toward Indonesian Islam had been shaped by

a contradictory combination of exaggerated fears and hopes, both born of a lack of adequate knowledge, if not of almost total ignorance.

Dutch apprehensions of Islam, especially of Muslim 'fanatics' – the 'priests' and 'popes' of the early Dutch literature concerning the subject – reached back to the first contacts between Dutch and Indonesians in the seventeenth century.[38] Islam was thought of as a tightly-organized religion, similar in many respects to Roman Catholicism, with a hierarchical clergy owing allegiance to the Turkish Caliph, and wielding great powers over Indonesian rulers and their subjects, Muslims whose lives were believed to be regulated by Islamic law. Both in its international ramifications – including the danger of Indonesian appeals to Muslim rulers abroad – and in its hold over native life, Islam thus appeared as a formidable enemy. These fears had helped to shape a policy of alliance with those elements in Indonesian society – particularly the princes and *priyayi* on Java, and sultans, rajahs, and *adat*-chiefs on the other islands – who for political reasons of their own were known to be either lukewarm Muslims or outright enemies of Islamic 'fanaticism'.

On the other hand, in the nineteenth century in particular, many Dutchmen, both at home and in the Indies, had great hopes of eliminating the influence of Islam by rapid Christianization of the majority of Indonesians. These hopes were partly anchored in the fairly widespread, if facile, Western belief in the superiority of Christianity to Islam, and partly in the erroneous assumption that the syncretic nature of Indonesian Islam at the village level would render conversion to Christianity easier in Indonesia than elsewhere in Muslim lands.[39]

While not so closely allied with missionary enterprises as had been the Spaniards and Portuguese, Dutch governments at times stood under strong pressure from religious parties in parliament. The Netherlands constitution allowed Christian missions, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, to operate in Indonesia, and missionary work in the colony was subsidized out of public

funds. In spite of such governmental assistance, Christianity had been able to spread only very slowly, and even then only among Indonesians living in areas which had not previously been Islamized.[40]

If anything, then, the Dutch fears, reinforced by the happenings of the last few decades, tended to predominate over the hopes concerning the future of Indonesian Islam towards the close of the nineteenth century. In the absence of an Islamic policy proper, the colonial government sought to place restrictions on Indonesian Muslims, in particular on Mecca pilgrims, who were held responsible for spreading agitation and rebelliousness in Indonesia. The result of these restrictive actions was, however, entirely negative. Although on Java large-scale rebellion under the banner of Islam had ceased after the Java War, peasant outbreaks under local Muslim leadership had increased in frequency. In Sumatra, the Dutch were involved in drawn-out warfare against the fanatical Achehnese. A new course in matters Islamic thus became imperative for the future of Dutch rule in Indonesia.

It was against this background that in 1889 an outstanding Dutch Arabicist and Islamologist, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, was appointed to the newly-created office of Adviser on Arabian and Native Affairs. In addition to possessing intimate knowledge of Indonesian Islam – a sojourn in Arabia had provided him with unique insights into the Indonesian haji-colony at Mecca – Snouck Hurgronje was one of the truly great colonial statesmen of the Netherlands.

He brought to his office not only unrivalled expertise, indefatigable energy and moral candor, but, at least equally important, a vision for the future evolution of Indonesian society in keeping with the best traditions of nineteenth century liberalism. Snouck's insights into the nature of Indonesian Islam, though open to some questions even at the time of their formulation, were invaluable in steering Dutch Islamic policies along an at least initially successful course. His principal achievement was no doubt the part he played in the political reorientation

which, together with improved military tactics, at long last led to the conclusion of the Acheh War.[41] Beyond this more limited goal, Snouck's fame derived from the more general improvement in the relations between colonial authorities and most Muslim leaders in Indonesia. Especially on Java, a *modus vivendi* came before long to replace the hostility of former times. No wonder that to some of his contemporaries Snouck Hurgronje appeared as the almost legendary architect of a successful Dutch Islamic policy, a man who had inaugurated a new era in Dutch-Indonesian relations. Such, indeed, was his stature that, as professor in Leiden University and as consultant on native affairs to the Ministry of Colonies, he continued to exert a lasting, if ambiguous, influence long after his departure from Indonesia in 1906.

The formulation of an Islamic policy involved, above all, the substitution of sober facts for the motley of fears and hopes which had surrounded Indonesian Muslims for so long. In this respect, Snouck Hurgronje's masterly and scholarly analyses have remained an indispensable guide to the conditions of Indonesian Islam at the turn of the century.[42]

Snouck countered Dutch fears concerning Islam, at both the international and the local level, by arguing, in the first place, that, in the absence of a clerical establishment in Islam, the so-called 'priests' and 'popes' in Indonesia were no more members of a religious hierarchy than they were the executors of commands from the Caliph of Constantinople. Since the Caliphate was not vested with ecclesiastic powers of dictation in matters of dogma, the Caliph was but the well-nigh powerless symbol of the nonexisting unity of all Muslims. Pan-Islam, however dangerous as a vague ideology, was thus not a political reality identifiable with the Caliphate. The Turkish government itself, Snouck made clear, had "deposited the panislamic program in the museum of [its] political antiquities."[43]

Second, not only the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims, but even the 'priests' themselves, were not necessarily and *a priori* fanatics or sworn enemies of 'infidel' rule. Snouck showed that the officials in charge of administering Islamic worship and

religious justice were traditionally the subordinates, rather than the superiors, of native rulers, and that neither they nor their masters were as a rule addicted to Muslim fanaticism. And even the unattached *kiyayi* and *ulama*, far from being as a group engaged in a sinister conspiracy, were – like their counterparts in other Islamic lands – independent and, as it were, other-wordly scribes and teachers most of whom desired nothing better than to serve Allah in peace. Finally, Snouck destroyed the myth, according to which the Mecca pilgrimage transformed thousands of peaceful Indonesian hajis into rebellious fanatics.

Realistically appraising the place of Islam in Indonesian society, Snouck furthermore showed that Indonesians, like other Muslims, did not owe sole allegiance to their religion. He was the first Dutch scholar to recognize both the importance of *adat*, or customary law, and the limitations which it imposed on the influence of Islam in the social and legal life of its Indonesian believers. In these matters Indonesian Muslims, he pointed out, differ in degree rather than in kind from their coreligionists in the Middle East. Everywhere and at all times, the strict law of Islam had had to adapt itself to the traditional customs and mores, as well as to the political realities, governing the lives of its adherents. Thus, while Koranic law had gained acceptance in the realm of marital and family law, in almost all other matters the Indonesian *adat* had prevailed. However great, therefore, the authority exercised by either Islamic judges or independent teachers, in secular and political affairs Indonesians continued to be guided by their *adat* and to obey the traditional bearers of political authority.

On the other hand, however, Snouck insisted that Islam was not to be underestimated either as a religious or as a political force in Indonesia. For one thing, countering the false hopes held by some of his compatriots, Snouck maintained that Indonesians, for all the 'impurities' of the *abangan* religion, considered themselves to be good and devout Muslims, profoundly attached to their own version of the faith. He therefore counselled against the unwarranted and optimistic expec-

tations of large-scale conversions to Christianity.[44] For another, he even anticipated that the Islamization of Indonesia would be furthered, in extent as well as in depth, by the extension of the *Pax Neerlandica*. Not only was Islam likely to spread to hitherto pagan areas, Islamic orthodoxy was equally likely to wage an increasingly successful war against social institutions opposed to its tenets – such as the matriarchal family in the Minangkabau region of Western Sumatra – in succeeding decades.[45] Snouck, in other words, brilliantly diagnosed the Islamic content of the *abangan* religion of the Indonesian peasant as well as the expanding influence of the *santri* civilization in many parts of the archipelago.

Both phenomena raised political considerations of great consequence. While Snouck Hurgronje had insisted on the peaceful nature of the Islamic religion in Indonesia, he was by no means blind to the political potential of Muslim fanaticism. There was always the danger that some dedicated and doctrinaire believers, bent on carrying the demands of Muslim theologians to their literal, political, extremes, might turn into fanatic proponents of Islamic unity and world empire, inciting their followers to Holy War against the infidel rulers of the Indies. There remained, in other words, cause for fear, but fear of a small minority, especially of fanatical *ulama*, dedicated to the notions of pan-Islam. They were the more dangerous because of the Islamic elements in the *abangan* religion of the Javanese peasantry, which had "absorbed [its] ideas just sufficiently to doubt the continued legality of the European administration."[46] The enemy, then, was not Islam as a religion, but Islam as a political doctrine, both in the shape of agitation by local fanatics and in the shape of pan-Islam, whether or not it was in fact inspired by Islamic rulers abroad, such as the Caliph.

Snouck Hurgronje's recommendations for an Islamic policy follow logically from his analysis of Indonesian Islam. Broadly speaking, they envisaged a division of Islam into two parts, one religious, the other political. Towards the former, Snouck counselled in favor of toleration spelled out in terms of neutrality

vis-à-vis religious life. If for no other reason than that the overwhelming majority of Indonesians were, and were likely to remain, Muslims, and convinced that the Islamic religion as such formed no threat to colonial rule, he argued that its toleration was the *sine qua non* for pacification and stability. Suppression was neither wise nor necessary, let alone honorable for a country dedicated to religious neutrality at home. For similar reasons, no barriers should be placed in the way of the Mecca pilgrimage, since such interference would, again, militate against the principle of personal liberty embodied in the Dutch constitution.[47] Yet while the government should respect the religious life of its Muslim subjects, it must not "platonically envisage all those trends that bear, or tend to bear, a political character."[48] Any sign of incitement must, therefore, be resolutely met by force, and all interference in matters Islamic from abroad must be nipped in the bud.

Religious neutrality – including the lifting of all obstacles from the Mecca pilgrimage – would convince not only the majority of religious officials, but also most, if not all, *kiyayi* and *ulama* that they had nothing to fear from the colonial government as long as they abstained from political propaganda. Where Muslim fanaticism had already reared its head or had– as in Acheh – gained the upper hand, Snouck insisted that drastic, if need be military, action would be needed to restore Dutch authority and thus lay the groundwork for religious peace and for a viable *modus vivendi* between the colonial rulers and Indonesian Islam. The determined application of the twin policies of tolerance and vigilance should, finally, go hand-in-hand with Dutch support for, and encouragement of, those social elements least under the sway of Islamic fanaticism, the *adat*-chiefs and rulers of the Outer Islands, and the *priyayi*-elite on Java.[49]

But however important, neither pacification based on firm alliances with *adat*-authority nor the attainment of a workable *modus vivendi* with Indonesian Islam were to Snouck Hurgronje ends in themselves. They were, indeed, no more than the prerequisites for the healthy growth of Indonesian society. This

growth, however, ultimately called for a new and bold colonial policy in Indonesia. Snouck's Islamic policy, that is to say, was only part of a larger scheme which went beyond the immediate needs to a wider vision of the future.

This larger vision was implicitly based on three central considerations. First, while Islam – whether in the syncretic garb of Indonesian village religion or in the more orthodox attire of a nascent *santri* civilization – could be made to accept foreign overlordship, it could at best be expected only to acquiesce in coexistence between Christian rulers and Muslim subjects. In other words, as long as Indonesians, especially their leaders, remained Muslims, the colonial relationship could not give way to a lasting bond between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

Second, though *adat* institutions formed the traditionally most powerful barrier against Islam and though their representatives were thus the obvious allies of the colonial power, the *adat*, because of its intrinsic conservatism as well as local particularisms, could not be expected to stem the expanding influence of the dynamic and universalistic faith of the Prophet. Respect for the *adat* and recognition of its ability gradually to adapt itself to changing conditions had to go hand-in-hand with the sober realization that an accelerated rate of change was eroding its foundations too quickly to guarantee its survival. In short, blind support for the *status quo* of the traditional *adat* pattern, quite apart from inevitably widening the gulf between Muslims and Christian rulers, could not suffice for the long-term purposes of colonial administration. Invaluable though such support might be in the greater part of the Outer Islands, where Western influence and Dutch control were as yet peripheral, it was clearly inadequate for Java and some other parts of the archipelago, where the impact of colonial rule, together with economic and religious forces, had speeded social evolution.

Finally, and most important, in spite of the fact that in many areas of Indonesia Islam had been not only the beneficiary of the changes wrought by this evolution but was in fact expanding its hold at the expense of the *adat*, Islam held no keys to healthy

social growth. It could not, that is to say, generate from within the dynamics of a higher, modern civilization. Thus even if orthodoxy were ultimately to triumph over the syncretism and mysticism of the *abangan* religion, even if it were to displace the Indonesian *adat* in the greater part of the colony, its victory would not constitute a victory for progress so much as for religious medievalism.

Yet – and this was the crux of Snouck Hurgronje's philosophy of colonialism – Indonesia, and Java first of all, would have to make the transition to the modern world of which it was increasingly becoming a part. Since a modern Indonesia, by definition, could not be an Islamic Indonesia nor an Indonesia ruled by the *adat*, it would have to be a Westernized Indonesia. Dutch civilization would have to supersede the traditional *priyayi* civilization and, above all, the *santri* civilization. Dutch rule, then, was to be primarily justified, and ultimately judged, by the degree in which it had aided Indonesia's adaptation to the twentieth century.

The ultimate defeat of Indonesian Islam, the freeing of its adherents from what Snouck Hurgronje called the "narrow confines of the Islamic system,"[50] was to be achieved by the association of Indonesians with Dutch culture. It was only natural that Snouck Hurgronje should focus his attention upon the Javanese nobility, and on the *priyayi*-elite in general, as the first, and most obvious, social class to be drawn into the orbit of Westernization. The aristocracy's higher cultural level, its proximity to Western influences brought about by contacts with the European administration, and, finally, its traditional aloofness from Islam, made it the logical beneficiary of Snouck's assimilationist schemes. The Indonesian nobility, having lost their cultural and political moorings as a result of Dutch conquest, were, according to Snouck, clamoring for participation in Dutch culture. The Netherlands, he declared, had "assumed the moral duty of teaching [them] and of making them partners in our own [i.e., Dutch] culture and social life."[51] Such a partnership would end the gulf between rulers and ruled. No

longer divided by religious allegiances, both would come to share a common culture and a common political allegiance. Though at first this community of interests would embrace only the Javanese elite, Indonesian society – rooted in the *adat* – would prove adaptable enough gradually to follow the path charted by its traditional leadership.

For association to become a reality, Western education had to be made available to ever larger numbers of Indonesians. In the final analysis, then, Western education was the surest means of reducing and ultimately defeating the influence of Islam in Indonesia. In competition with the attractions of Western education and cultural association, Islam could not but be the loser. Indeed, its decline was already observable. Whereas in 1890 Snouck had noted the increase in *pesantren* education, twenty years later he triumphantly observed that Western schools were starting to win the race against their Muslim counterparts.[52] Even then, however, much remained to be done if Western civilization was to win the race against Islam in Indonesia.

Education was only the first step. It would have to be followed by the granting of a steadily increasing share in the management of the colony's political and administrative affairs to the Indonesian beneficiaries of Western education.[53] Snouck was well aware of the fact that such a policy of Indonesianization would involve a sharp departure from past Dutch, governmental no less than private, attitudes towards the education of qualified Indonesians and their employment in the higher ranks of the colonial administration.[54] More than that even, he knew that what was called for was, in essence, a reorientation concerning the future status of the Dutch East Indies. But he was convinced that only such an imaginative break with the past would in the end build a lasting bridge between rulers and ruled.

Snouck prophetically warned that time was running out fast; the social evolution, on Java in particular, had been steadily gaining momentum for decades past and could no longer be halted. The alternative to timely Dutch action, steering this

evolution along an associationist channel, would be that its direction might pass by default into the hands of others, inimical not only to the modernization of Indonesia but, indeed, to the continuance of Dutch rule itself.[55]

An appraisal of Snouck Hurgronje's work can only be meaningful if its positive as well as its negative aspects are viewed in the context of his own times. Thus his lofty and impatient liberalism on the one hand, and his basically low esteem for Islam[56] on the other, were both rooted in nineteenth century Western secular thought. Association itself was a typical product of the era's idealistic and confident hopes for bridging the gulf that separated East and West. Again, the cultural milieu of the nineteenth century was doubtless responsible for Snouck's optimistic, if not arrogant, belief in the superiority of Western civilization and his inability to see the potential for growth in Islam and, though to a lesser extent, in Indonesian traditional culture.

Not only were Snouck Hurgronje's views thus rooted in the temper of his times, they were in fact representative of a new era in Dutch colonial policy, the so-called Ethical Policy, which was officially inaugurated in 1901. The liberal and humanitarian advocates of the new course shared with Snouck the conviction that the Netherlands were charged with a moral responsibility for the material and spiritual welfare of their Indonesian 'wards'. The new policy was to make native welfare its main concern, breaking with a past of colonial exploitation, whether governmental or private.

Like other contemporary Dutch reformers, Snouck optimistically, if not naïvely, believed that economic interests would allow themselves to be subordinated to considerations of welfare policies. Like others, too, his confidence in the possibility of steering Indonesian developments along Western lines made him neglect the serious and disintegrative effects which – as we shall see in the next chapter – even the best-intended liberal reforms were bound to have on Indonesian society. Yet though in many respects Snouck Hurgronje was a typical representative of the

Ethical Era, his courage and vision raised him far above most of his contemporaries. Few foresaw as clearly as he did the ultimate demise of colonialism; fewer still were prepared to draw the logical and inevitable consequences from this insight. In pressing for higher education of the Indonesian elite, for their association with Dutch culture and for the rapid Indonesianization of colonial administration, Snouck virtually stood alone.

It was, indeed, not his associationist principles but his specifically Islamic policies which found immediate acceptance. In matters Islamic Snouck was the recognized and well-nigh unchallenged expert of the Ethical Era.[57] But while there can be little doubt that few Western, if not also Muslim,[58] scholars could match his intimate knowledge of the Islamic faith and its adherents in Arabia and in Indonesia, Snouck's seemingly plausible, yet facile, separation of religion and politics in Islam was, to say the least, unrealistic. It belied the very universalism of the faith which – not unlike medieval Christianity – does not recognize the existence of independent, secular realms of life. Even if this universalism had been frequently forced to compromise with divergent realities in most Muslim lands, its claims remained nonetheless intact. Separation of religion and politics, in other words, was at best a temporary phenomenon of Islam in decline. In an era of Islamic awakening, it could not survive for long, either in independent Muslim lands or in Islamic areas ruled by non-Muslims.

The problematical nature of his neat, but misleading, compartmentalization was perhaps obscured by the fact that it seemed to correspond to the conditions of Indonesian Islam at the turn of the century. It was obscured, that is to say, by the spectacular successes following in the wake of the application of Snouck's Islamic policies. In Acheh vigorous military action against fanatical *ulama*, combined with Dutch support for *adat*-chiefs, at long last brought about the termination of the decades-old war. Freed from this major political and military preoccupation, the Netherlands could now devote their resources and manpower to the pacification of large areas in the Outer Islands, where

they had hitherto exercised no more than nominal control.[59]

More impressive still were the results of the new policy of religious neutrality – in particular, the freeing of the Mecca pilgrimage – on Java. While no major Muslim-led revolt had threatened the center of Dutch power since the suppression of the Java War, the island had been plagued by incessant Muslim restiveness at the village level. The Islamic New Deal proffered by the sagacious Adviser was accepted by many *kiyayi* and *ulama* who, in return for governmental non-interference in matters religious, acquiesced in rule by 'infidels'. This was a major victory for the colonial government, since the new *modus vivendi* with Islamic leaders significantly reduced grass-roots commotion on the island. In fact, Snouck's policies continued to pay dividends, for some of the Muslim scribes and teachers remained dependable allies of the Netherlands until the end of Dutch rule in Indonesia.[60]

Snouck Hurgronje's stature as a colonial statesman thus rested on solid achievements. Even though he was not without bitter and vociferous critics,[61] in the eyes of many of his contemporaries the success of his policies seemed to vindicate the new course which he had, at times against stubborn opposition, so brilliantly and tirelessly advocated. Yet neither the undeniable fact that Snouck's name looms large in the history of the Ethical Era of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, nor the record of the unwavering tributes paid him by so many administrators in the colony and political leaders at home, can be taken as reliable guides in assessing his actual influence on the direction of colonial policy. In spite of his success – if not in part because of it – Snouck's influence may, in fact, have been far more limited, in both scope and duration, than he deserved, and more limited, too, than the panegyrics of his contemporaries and later admirers seem to suggest.

In truth, any assessment of Snouck Hurgronje's role[62] is beset by a perplexing discrepancy between fame and fact. On the one hand, continued invocation of Snouck Hurgronje's name tends to create the impression that his policies were the only

factor to survive, unaltered and unchallenged, the far-reaching administrative and political changes of later decades. On the other hand, the course taken by Indonesian developments – not least among them Islamic developments – as well as the direction given to colonial policy, came before long to deviate so profoundly from Snouck's prognostications and recommendations that both seem to have been rendered largely irrelevant or obsolete as early as the first two decades of the twentieth century.

Chapter Two

The Renaissance of Indonesian Islam

The termination of the Acheh War and the subsequent pacification of the Outer Islands ended the phase of military operations. Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, Dutch control had been consolidated over the entire Indonesian archipelago. Yet the relative tranquillity that resulted from pacification and from the successful application of Snouck Hurgronje's Islamic policy was but short-lived. Before long, the Netherlands found themselves confronted with new, and very vexing, social and political problems in Indonesia. The rapid tide of change, though it came to extend to parts of Sumatra, in the first place appeared on Java, the most populous island in the Indies and the center of Dutch power. Long dormant as a consequence of colonial conquest and domination, Indonesian society, prodded by local forces, but in part also responding to powerful stimuli from the outside, was rapidly coming of age. Indonesian Islam, likewise in the throes of a profound transformation, played an important, and in the initial stages even a leading, role in the birth of the new era.

To no small extent these conspicuous developments were the cumulative result of the impact of the West. Especially during the nineteenth century, Indonesia experienced the effects of Western influence on a rapidly increasing scale. In spite of the three major changes to which Dutch colonial and economic policy was subjected from 1830 onward, these policies yet combined in weakening both the communalism of the Indonesian village and the traditional pattern of political authority.

The forced cultivation of export crops under the so-called Culture System (1830–1870) marked the beginnings of the disintegrative process. Though it strengthened the authoritarian

control of the *priyayi*-elite by turning the Regents into a hereditary class with an economic stake in the governmental produce monopoly, at the same time it started a progressive alienation between *priyayi* and the exploited peasantry, which came to regard the Regent as the tool of foreign rulers.[1]

In 1870, the Liberal Era replaced the Culture System, opening Indonesia to the penetration of private capitalism.[2] Importation of mass-produced consumer goods from Holland, primarily of textiles, on the one hand, and the rapid expansion of Western-style enterprise, such as estate agriculture of coffee, tea, sugar and rubber, on the other, accelerated the undermining of the peasantry's economic life. Employment for wages, however limited in extent, acted as a powerful stimulus to adapt to an individualistic money economy which militated against the age-old communalism of the Javanese *tani*. Primarily serving the interests of Dutch investors, the Liberal Policy, while it sought to protect the peasantry against land alienation to non-Indonesians, ultimately did not prevent the growth of rural indebtedness and a lowering of the standard of living of the peasantry. If anything, the phenomenal increase in the Indonesian population which followed in the wake of improved sanitation and communications during the Liberal Era strongly counteracted whatever benefits might have accrued from a more dynamic economic life.

The new policy makers not only departed from their predecessors in dispensing with the services the Regents had rendered the government as intermediaries in the economic exploitation of the Culture System; true to their liberal principles, they tended to relegate these representatives of a 'backward' and 'feudal' system to political impotence. The resulting decline in *priyayi* prestige was furthered by the fact that Dutch private enterprise, in search of land leases and labor, tended to establish direct contacts with village heads, by-passing the Regents. Thus the *priyayi*, having largely ceased to be heads in their own rights since they were no longer entrusted with tasks befitting them as government officials proper, were increasingly reduced to the

status of powerless ornaments of the colonial administration.[3]

As we saw in the preceding chapter, the strengthening of the local leaders of the Islamic faith was the inevitable result of the progressive political alienation and the increasing economic deterioration which the two, in themselves so different, colonial policies had produced. Decades of growing disintegration and bewilderment made the *ulama* the peasants' only remaining and unchanging haven of refuge. After the suppression of the Java War, rural unrest, almost invariably centering around Muslim leadership, continued to punctuate the later decades of the nineteenth century.

The Ethical Policy, officially inaugurated in 1901, was to replace the *laissez-faire* of liberalism by state intervention in economic affairs and an ambitious program of welfare legislation. It was to create viable social and political conditions in the colony that would counterbalance the disintegrative effects of the Western impact upon Indonesia. Welfare was to take the place of exploitation, and reform was to become the watchword of twentieth century Dutch colonialism.[4] The impatient and optimistic Dutch reformers – Snouck Hurgronje among them – envisaged nothing less than the more or less rapid transition of Indonesian society from a static, Asian pattern to a dynamic, more Western pattern under the benevolent and paternalistic aegis of the Netherlands. The reformist experiment, extending over a period of years, affected almost simultaneously the fields of politics and administration, education, and social welfare.

Administratively, the Ethical Era brought with it a limited measure of autonomy from the mother country, a partial devolution of responsibilities from the central government at Batavia to regional officers, and a selective 'de-tutelization' of the native administrative corps from the close supervision of Dutch officials. Political reform was focussed on the creation of representative assemblies for the population on Java. These included municipal councils with preponderant European membership, Provincial Councils and, most important of all, Regency Councils in rural areas, designed as quasi-democratic

checks on the traditional authoritarianism of the ruling *priyayi*-class.

Education was closely connected with these political and administrative changes, since their success among the Indonesian part of the population would ultimately depend on the growth of native political consciousness and administrative expertise required for the proper functioning of a modern state. Education, finally, as well as ambitious social welfare programs in general, was to carry reform to the peasantry on Java. The government would sponsor, and partly finance, village schools, road construction, rural credit banks, clinics and crop improvement stations, all aimed at freeing the *tani* from the burdensome shackles of the past.

The atmosphere of change and reform generated by the Ethical Policy received additional impetus from developments in other parts of Asia. The 'Awakening of the East' sent its tremors to an Indonesia already in the throes of a new era. The emergence, in the late nineteenth century, of a modernized Japan and its victories over China and Russia in the short span of a single decade, 1894-1905; the overthrow of Manchu rule and the proclamation of the Chinese Republic in 1911; and, closer to home, the end of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines, followed by revolution and American occupation at the turn of the century – all these events did not go unheeded in Indonesia. The first world war, moreover, pushed political reforms in the colony far beyond their orginal confines. The implementation of earlier plans for local and regional councils was overshadowed in importance by the creation of a central advisory body, the *Volksraad* (People's Council) in 1918. A constitutional reform committee set up in the same year before long presented far-reaching recommendations, which seemed to augur the beginnings of real autonomy for the Indies.

The immediate post-war years marked the culmination of political reform, and before long the pendulum started to swing back to a more conservative attitude vis-à-vis political innovation. Even before that time, however, the Ethical experiment had

never been more than half-completed and half-fulfilled. In the Netherlands, reformist enthusiasm had always been checked by the powerful demands of Western private enterprise and by the jealous budgetary scrutiny of parliament. More important still, in the colony itself the impatient zeal of political reformers had encountered stubborn opposition from conservative European administrators, unwilling to share their hitherto well-nigh unlimited powers with representative councils – whether European or Indonesian – or to abdicate their 'tutelage' over the native *priyayi*-corps.

From the middle of the 1920's on, opposition to the early liberalization was gaining strength. It is true that few of the earlier measures were subsequently explicitly rescinded, and that most of the Ethical Era's political and administrative measures remained outwardly intact. It is also true that considerations of native welfare continued to occupy a prominent place in official Dutch pronouncements. But underneath this apparent continuity a gradual reorientation in colonial policy – more fully discussed in the following chapter – was instrumental in changing the character, if not in undermining the *raison d'être*, of some of the institutions created in the early part of the century. The ensuing confusion between form and substance was paralleled by a widening gap between promise and fulfillment, both of which were to last until the end of Dutch rule in Indonesia.

The progressive abandonment of the Ethical Policy was primarily caused by the fact that political and administrative reforms, Western education and welfare legislation, however well intended they had been, had combined in unloosing a whirlwind of unexpected and highly perturbing repercussions which seemed to threaten the very foundations of colonial society. The tides of change, in other words, were running faster than ever before, but they were to all intents and purposes spilling over the banks charted by the proponents of the Ethical Policy.

Political and administrative reforms, by attempting too much in too short a time, furthered the decades-old erosion of traditional

authority without supplanting it by a workable alternative. The creation of representative assemblies, though a welcome step in the direction of democratization, did not in itself substantially alter the rigid authoritarianism of colonial administration. At the provincial and Regency levels, councils suffered both from continuing administrative interference and from parliamentary inexperience. At the central level, the *Volksraad*, in later years granted co-legislative powers, played a far more important role in expressing Indonesian – and European – aspirations. But it suffered from the inevitable paradox inherent in a parliamentary forum which, in the absence of political responsibility, remained limited to the voicing of – constructive or destructive – criticism.

Reform had particularly corrosive effects on the Indonesian administrative corps on Java, traditionally the cornerstone of Dutch colonial policy. On the one hand, the *priyayi* were degraded from their previous status of nominally absolute rulers to that of mere chairmen of Regency Councils, whose members were as often as not far better educated and more adept at quasi-parliamentary debates than was the Regent. On the other, 'de-tutelization' was to enhance their independence by freeing them from the minute control of Dutch officials, long before they could have acquired adequate training for the performance of their duties. At the same time, these duties had increased as a result of the rapid expansion of governmental activities in the fields of education and welfare.

This expansion, again, militated against the principle of administrative decentralization, since the new services were of necessity financed and directed from the center. More than that, even, they were staffed by Dutch and Western-trained Indonesian specialists, who either endeavored to work through the Regents or by-passed them in their impatience to carry reform to the village level. In fact, the positive result of these contradictory innovations was limited. Yet, while the Regents' position did not significantly change on account of either 'de-tutelization' or the Regency Council, the *priyayi* were nonetheless rapidly losing prestige among European reformers, who saw in them

remnants of the outmoded feudalism of indirect rule. They were also, and more fatally, losing touch with the Indonesian peasantry, who viewed them, more than ever before, as tax-collecting officials of the colonial government.[5]

Western education – Snouck Hurgronje's central tenet, as we saw – was, in fact, spreading significantly among Indonesians in response to the increasing demands for trained personnel in the rapidly increasing services of the new welfare state as well as in Western economic enterprises. But though Snouck's prognosis concerning the attractions of education proved to be correct, his hopes for cultural association remained largely disappointed. For one thing, the demand for Western schooling kept exceeding the supply of government schools. More important still, not only was it true that openings for Dutch-trained Indonesians in government service at no time absorbed even the limited number of school graduates,[6] but the concomitant for successful association, the Indonesianization of the higher echelons in the administration, was never seriously attempted.[7]

Indeed, while the half-hearted 'de-tutelization' of the Regents did not involve a conscious effort to extend Western training to the traditional bearers of political authority, the hereditary principle barred Western-trained 'outsiders' from access to the Regency, the highest position in the *priyayi*-hierarchy.[8] In short, association as such did not constitute a cardinal and lasting feature of the Ethical Policy. Before long, it was not so much discarded as in fact rendered obsolete by social and political developments which tended in the opposite direction, that of racial separateness.[9]

In spite of this abandonment of association, even the limited extension of Western education led to profound social and ideological repercussions. As Snouck had expected, it succeeded in alienating most of its beneficiaries from the traditional bases of Indonesian life as well as from Indonesian Islam. A 'middle class' made its appearance in Indonesian rural and urban society, embracing professionally trained men, school teachers as well as thousands of Indonesians employed as clerical workers in government service and private enterprise. In the countryside,

they came to occupy an intermediate position between the *priyayi*-elite and the mass of the rural population, and in the cities they entered into competition with European and Eurasian white-collar workers.

But instead of identifying themselves with their overlords and Dutch culture, the leaders of this new class, torn between the harsh reality of colonialism and the egalitarian and libertarian promises of Western education, turned into vociferous opponents of the colonial *status quo*. It is a moot point whether the implementation of Snouck Hurgronje's associationist principles would have obviated a development whose dire consequences he had so vividly foreseen. In any case, Western education, far from bridging the gulf between rulers and ruled, had actually widened it. The new intelligentsia, clamoring for political responsibility and co-determination, became the spokesmen for an anti-Western Indonesian nationalism.

If education had thus failed to elicit the expected response, the Ethical Policy's welfare measures at the village level proved more disappointing still. In no other area of reform had change, dictated from above, run farther ahead of social demand organically generated from within. The peasantry, already affected by the intrusion of a money economy, found itself subjected to, and taxed for, a plethora of bewildering welfare measures whose importance and desirability it could not comprehend. Equally significant was the further breakdown of *priyayi* prestige which we have already discussed. The Ethical Policy thus unwittingly, and ironically, speeded the erosion of village life and traditional authority. Before long, welfare became a far less conspicuous phenomenon than widespread social *malaise* in the countryside, a *malaise* heightened by progressive rural indebtedness in times of economic adversity.

Not unexpectedly, agrarian unrest on Java, quiescent for some time, gained in intensity after the turn of the century. And with only one notable exception – the so-called Samin Movement – this unrest again crystallized around local Muslim leadership.[10] As so often before, the *ulama* acted as the principal

rallying point of protest in an era of accelerated social disintegration, at a time when the peasant base was ever more rapidly drifting away from its traditional moorings and when, also, *priyayi* values were crumbling under the onslaught of Westernization.

But in the twentieth century the role of Islam was no longer limited to the grass-roots level alone. The reappearance of agrarian unrest, centered around local *ulama*, was only one aspect of the political ferment of the early twentieth century. Far more important and spectacular were urban developments which from the very outset tended in three different directions. In the first place, Europeans and Western-influenced Indonesians took the lead in new political movements partly based on associationist ideas. Second, a variegated group of leaders, only some of them Western-educated, gave birth to an Indonesian party proper in which the Islamic element played a significant part, and which for some years succeeded in welding rural unrest into a mass movement under urban leadership without precedent in the history of Indonesian Islam.

Finally, side by side with these political developments, and to some extent overlapping them, an urban Islamic renaissance was taking place whose evolutionary growth was to outlast the political storms of the early decades of the century, leaving a lasting imprint on the contours of Indonesian Islam under colonial rule.[11] Basically, this renaissance affected both the political and religious aspects of Islam; Indonesian Muslims, whether they chose political or socio-religious organizations, were influenced by identical currents in the Islamic world. But since at the outset political action took the limelight and since, moreover, Islamic political and religious groups remained divided for many years, we will turn our attention briefly to Indonesian political history,[12] before analyzing the Islamic renaissance proper.

It is not surprising that the first organizational response to the Ethical Policy should have occurred among those members of the *priyayi* class who had benefited from Dutch education. *Budi*

Utomo (The Noble Endeavor), founded as a cultural association in 1908, seemed to vindicate the high expectations of the associationist reformers by a program of self-realization based on the fusion of Western and Javanese values. *Budi Utomo*, however, appealing in the main to the Western-educated, professional Indonesians, was pre-political rather than political, and only in later years did some of its founders take a leading part in political activities.

The first political party proper, Douwes-Dekker's *Indische Partij* (Indian Party), was explicitly based on the principle of association and led by Eurasians and Indonesians. Its bellicose demands for autonomy – for the benefit of all racial groups permanently domiciled in the colony – showed quite clearly, however, that the measure of political freedom granted to Indonesia could yield unexpected harvests. The leaders of the *Indische Partij* were exiled by a liberal colonial government, perplexed and frightened by the extraordinary vehemence generated by the coming-of-age of Indonesian political life, whose birthpangs were before long to be reflected in stormy petitions and discussions in the newly-created advisory chamber, the *Volksraad*.

The short-lived vehemence of the *Indische Partij* was soon eclipsed by the meteoric rise of the first truly Indonesian political movement, the *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic League), which, unlike its predecessors, departed from the associationist path. The new party, it is true, shared with *Budi Utomo* and the *Indische Partij* its urban origin as well as the social and educational background of some of its principal leaders, such as Haji Umar Sayyid Tjokroaminoto and Haji Agus Salim, both Western-schooled members of the traditional Indonesian elite on Java and Sumatra, respectively. But for one thing the leadership itself was not limited to Western-trained members, and even they drew inspiration from different, including Islamic, sources. For another, the appeal of *Sarekat Islam* reached much further than the small, Western-oriented part of the urban population. Addressing itself to an exclusively Indonesian audience, it found followers among all classes, urban as well as rural. Muslim traders, workers in cities, *kiyayi* and

ulama, even some *priyayi*,[13] but above all peasants, were drawn into this first – and last – political mass movement in colonial Indonesia.[14]

Sarekat Islam was originally founded in 1912 by Muslim traders in Central Java for the purpose of counteracting Chinese business competition. Soon new leaders effected a widening of its scope beyond this narrow goal, without, at least for some time, losing the support of the strongly Islamic trading community. This Western-educated leadership itself comprised, on the one hand, men like Salim who were influenced by the currents of Islamic reformism, deriving their main support from urban middle-class and white-collar elements. On the other, it comprised young Marxists, strongly influenced by Russian Communism, who sought to steer the movement into radical and revolutionary action, concentrating upon urban and estate workers and the peasantry. At the village level, however, *Sarekat Islam* rested primarily on the traditional leadership of the *kiyayi* and *ulama*, reinforced by the personal charisma of Tjokroaminoto, whose magnetic personality seemed to represent the *Ratu Adil* and the *Mahdi* of the age-old Javanese *abangan* tradition.

The phenomenal rise of the movement – which in 1919 claimed a 'membership' of two million people[15] – was an extremely indicative, if highly perturbing, barometer of the widespread dislocation which economic, social, and political change had wrought in the colony. Its short-lived prominence was not due to political strategy and organization on the part of an inexperienced and heterogeneous leadership. In fact, what had happened was that social *malaise*, urban and, more importantly, rural, had engulfed the leaders, carrying them, to their own surprise, to momentary political prominence. In other words, *Sarekat Islam* flourished because it happened to arise at a time when its ill-defined and manifold appeals could serve to give expression to a multitude of forces at work within Indonesian society. It flourished, and grew increasingly radical, largely because millions of Indonesians, most of them hitherto politically inarticulate, regarded it as their symbol of protest against existing conditions.

Indeed, *Sarekat Islam* occupies a crucial, yet complex, place in the history of both Indonesian nationalism and Indonesian Islam. Ideologically, it preceded a programmatic nationalism expressed in terms of independent nationhood. Religiously, it similarly preceded the formulation of a reformist Islamic program expressed in terms of specifically Islamic social and political values.[16] Yet its vociferous protests against the colonial *status quo*, its loudly voiced economic and social grievances, and its impatient demands for increased autonomy did combine nationalist and Islamic aspirations, however vaguely elaborated, into a uniquely Indonesian, and increasingly militant, political platform.

But the radicalism of this platform is no indication of the ideological content which many followers, especially the vast majority of the peasantry, found embodied in *Sarekat Islam*. The rural following of the party did not flock to its banners because it stood *for* autonomy or social and economic reform, but rather because it seemed to give expression to the peasantry's pent-up revolt *against* changing times, and to do so, moreover, within the framework of an Islamic conservatism which had for decades inspired agrarian restiveness. At the village level, that is to say, party 'membership' was not necessarily an indication of something new – such as real organizational strength – so much as a reaffirmation of something traditional. Disaffection centered around the *laudatores temporis acti*, the *kiyayi* and *ulama*, battling against an 'infidel' government, and above all against the Indonesian *priyayi*-officials of that government, in the eyes of the *tani* the representatives *par excellence* of unwanted social change.[17]

Sarekat Islam thus brought about a quantitative, rather than a qualitative, change in the nature of village Islam on Java. For a few years, it fused the local incidents of Muslim-led disaffection into a nationwide phenomenon under urban leadership. But it did so without steering either *abangan* beliefs or militant orthodoxy into positive and modern paths. Its real significance, then, was not ideological so much as social. Benefiting from the limited

relaxation of Dutch administrative control and from the steady weakening of *priyayi* prestige, the *Sarekat* leadership had breached the seclusion of the Javanese village, making itself the violent spokesman of the social *malaise* of the Javanese *tani* and inciting him, through his traditional religious leaders, to abortive and suicidal rebellion against the powers-that-be.

Once it had served the purpose of thus symbolizing and releasing the accumulated tensions of a decade in explosions of rural unrest and strikes among the urban proletariat, internal divisions and resolute governmental action – largely in the form of repressive vigilance and a strengthening of *priyayi* authority – combined to bring about the rapid decline of *Sarekat Islam* in the early 1920's. The members of the Islamic leadership finally broke their alliance with Communism in 1924 and henceforth turned to pan-Islamic propaganda. The simmering remnants of rural unrest were fanned into one final, large-scale revolt in West Java under Communist instigation late in 1926 – followed by a similar outbreak on the West Coast of Sumatra early in the next year – which the colonial government had no difficulty in suppressing by force.[18]

With the suppression of these revolts, the first, tumultuous stage of the new era, and with it political mass action based on peasant support, came to a close, to give way to new developments in Indonesian nationalism and in Indonesian Islam. As both became more clearly crystallized into ideological and organizational groups, the contours of unity and diversity in Indonesian society became more clearly demarcated. On the one hand, forces emerged tending towards the realization of a modernized Islamic civilization, embracing yet exceeding the *santri*-nucleus of former times. On the other, a Western oriented, urban-centered nationalism came to the fore, in part at least rooted in the *priyayi* milieu which it rejected and superseded at the same time. Muslims and nationalists alike, it is true, opposed colonial domination. But joint opposition to Dutch rule, far from forging enduring alliances, barely obscured the widening rift between 'secular' nationalism and Indonesian Islam whose ultimate goals

were, in large measure, incompatible. It is significant that *Sarekat Islam*, which had foreshadowed and in a measure contained the seeds of both nationalism and modern Islam, found itself progressively imprisoned between the two movements, doomed to a militantly peripheral existence in the years to come.

If the ideological and political currents affecting Indonesia in the early part of the twentieth century had originated abroad, the renaissance of Indonesian Islam likewise owed its origins to developments among Muslims overseas. Like China and Japan, Turkey, the Middle East, and Muslim India were in the grips of a more or less violent reaction to the Western impact. Political and religious ferment soon radiated to other parts of the Muslim world. The revolt of the Young Turks against the Ottoman Sultanate in 1908 was followed by the collapse of Sultanate and Caliphate a decade later. Turkey's defeat in the first world war led to the extension or consolidation of French and British domination in areas like Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and the Lebanon. The conquest of Mecca by the Wahhabi's in the mid-1920's signalled yet another important change in the heartland of Islam itself.

These political developments were paralleled by the rise of Islamic reformism,[19] born at the turn of the century in the Middle East and in India, and of the puritanical Wahhabism[20] in Arabia. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 facilitated increasing and ever closer contact between Indonesia and the Middle East. From Mecca and Cairo's al-Azhar University – and to a lesser extent from Indian Muslim centers such as Lahore, Qadian, and the Islamic College at Aligarh[21] – Indonesian Islam received the inspiration and guidance which were to transform its traditional bases.

Reformism and Wahhabism, though distinct aspects of a worldwide Islamic renaissance, in essence had similar effects on modern Islamic developments.[22] In the religious field proper, they were united in militating against scholastic obscurantism and the concessions which Islam had invariably made to local customs and social institutions antithetical to the teachings of the Prophet.

But reformism proper, whether in Egypt or in India, went far beyond this puritanical attack on religious inertia.[23] Reacting against the debilitating superiority which the West had imposed upon Muslim communities either through political domination or through the sheer technological, scientific, and intellectual preponderance of Western civilization, Islamic reformers like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu in Egypt and Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Sayyid Amir Ali and Mohammad Iqbal in India addressed themselves to the imperative task of reformulating Islamic doctrine in the light of modern Western thought.

A return to the teachings of Muhammad and the Traditions, freed from the accretions of medieval scholasticism, was to provide Islam with a flexible basis to serve this adaptation. Modern Islamic education was to replace the lifeless repetition of theological learning by a program of intelligent study of the faith, combined with a curriculum adapted to the needs of the modern world. Only thus, reformists felt, could Islam be freed from the shackles of an other-wordly orientation, hostile to the forces of change which could not be stemmed in Islamic lands. Only thus, finally, could Muslims gain self-respect and equality with, if not superiority over, the intruding West, enabling them to defend Islam as a living and vital creed against the inroads of Western secularism as well as of Christian missionaries.

Reformism, in short, was to do battle not only against traditional inertia but also against the inferiority imposed upon Islam from the outside. It was inevitable that it should thus combine religious reform with a political program. Among Muslims living under Western domination, in particular, the political concomitants of Islamic reformism were bound to become inextricably commingled with, if not to take precedence over, purely religious reform.[24] Even Wahhabism, by origin outside the reformist trends proper, furthered the political consciousness among those overseas Muslims who not infrequently viewed its doctrinaire puritanism with grave misgivings.

Compared to the dramatic events which had accompanied the

rise of *Sarekat Islam*, Islamic reformism proper started on its Indonesian career without the noticeable sound of fanfares.[25] This was no doubt due to the fact that, its long-term political significance notwithstanding, its organizational beginnings occurred outside the field of politics. Even though reformism, as we saw, had not been without influence on some of the leaders of *Sarekat Islam*, its original and principal proponents were Muslims who stood aloof from politics, and whose inspiration came from the overseas centers of reformism.

It is not without significance that the most important Indonesian reformist organization, *Muhammadiyah*, was founded in 1912, the year which had also witnessed the birth of *Sarekat Islam*, and that both movements originated in the Central Javanese principalities, the center at one and the same time of the *priyayi* civilization of the former Mataram and of a flourishing Islamic trading community. Urban Islam on Java, for the first time since the seventeenth century, received a dynamic impetus from abroad. The Muslim community, threatened commercially by Chinese competition and religiously by heightened activities of Christian missionaries in Central Java in the first decade of the twentieth century,[26] eagerly embraced the new message. For some time, *Sarekat Islam* and *Muhammadiyah* vied for middle class support, but in the measure that radicalism gained the upper hand in *Sarekat Islam* such support tended to swing from the political to the religious organization.[27] From the early 1920's onward, *Muhammadiyah* became the dominant force in Indonesian Islam; in fact, it became the largest and most viable Indonesian association, overshadowing other religious as well as political organizations.[28]

This steady growth testifies both to the energy of *Muhammadiyah's* leadership and to the social demand which its activities were able to meet with conspicuous success. In contrast to the self-imposed isolationism and other-worldliness of the rural *santri* pattern, reformism gave rise to a dynamic, rationalist, individualistic, and this-wordly urban mode of life, which combined acceptance of the modern world and Western organizational

methods with a distinct and self-reliant Islamic orientation.[29]

Muhammadiyah's outstanding success lay in educational activities among old and young. Its schools[30] – including even some with Dutch as the medium of instruction – taught a modern syllabus which incorporated general, Western-style education as well as religious instruction based on the study of Arabic and the exegesis of Islamic scriptures. Friday sermons in the vernacular brought the word of the Prophet to worshippers in an intelligible way, adjusted to the needs of contemporary Indonesia. Systematic missionary work carried the message of this rejuvenated Islam to rural areas. Youth and women's organizations, clinics and almshouses – and the new schools – all showed the extent to which *Muhammadiyah* successfully copied Western methods, in particular those of Christian missions in Indonesia.

Reformism had thus introduced an entirely new element into Indonesian Islam. Where the nineteenth century had witnessed the rise of a rural *santri* civilization of Islamic orthodoxy, the twentieth saw the emergence of its urban, reformist and dynamic counterpart. Before long, Islam in Indonesia started to outgrow the nineteenth century limitations which had served as the basis for Snouck Hurgronje's analysis and policy recommendations.

As elsewhere in Muslim lands under foreign rule, Indonesian reformism battled against four opponents simultaneously. In the first place, it attacked the formalism of Islamic orthodoxy embodied in the *santri* civilization of rural Indonesia, as well as the animistic and Hindu-Buddhist 'impurities' of village Islam, by insisting on a religion purified from scholasticism and mysticism and yet compatible with everyday life. The second area of attack lay in pre-Islamic Indonesian institutions, embodied in the *adat* and the *priyayi* civilization, which had traditionally obstructed the expansion of a true Muslim way of life.

The ultimate aim of both these attacks was to create on Indonesian soil a viable and united Islamic community, governed by the law of the Koran instead of by the particularisms of local *adat* institutions. It thus re-emphasized the centuries-old dichotomy between Islam and the *adat* and reinforced the attacks made

on both *abangan* beliefs and *priyayi* ways by the rural *santri* cells of the nineteenth century. But the reformist onslaught was more formidable than its predecessor in that it was better organized and in that it found powerful support among nascent socio-economic groups in Indonesian society with a vested interest in the expansion of the individualistic Islamic law – in particular that pertaining to property relations – which militated against communal *adat* prescriptions.[31]

Third, Indonesian reformists sought to stem the tide of Westernization by identifying Islam with Indonesian-centered separateness, opposed to the passive surrender to Western – Christian no less than secular – values and norms. Limited though Western education was in extent, and divorced as it was from true associationist policies on the part of the colonial power, reformist leaders saw in Western-schooled Indonesian intellectuals, whatever their political orientation vis-à-vis Dutch rule, the most invidious enemies of Islam. Again, they shared this deep-seated suspicion with orthodoxy. But unlike the *ulama*, they moved to counter ideological Westernization by the Western weapons of organization. The *Jong Islamieten Bond* (Young Muslims' League), founded in the capital city of Batavia by Haji Agus Salim in late 1925, became the politically most important organization in the reformist counter-attack on this alienation among Dutch-trained students.[32] It grew into a training school for an Islamic leadership distinct from the 'secular', Western-oriented Indonesian intellectuals.

Finally, Indonesian reformism was, by its very nature, bound to come into conflict with the colonial *status quo* itself. This was the inevitable concomitant not only of the deepened Islamic consciousness which resulted from its manifold activities among city dwellers and the more prosperous strata of the rural population which came under its influence, but also of the Dutch policy of support of *adat* institutions to which – as will be seen in the following chapter – the colonial government was returning from the late 1920's onward.

It is not surprising that the rise of Islamic reformism, with its

simultaneous challenge to Muslim orthodoxy, *adat*, and Westernized Indonesians, generated animosity and hostility within Indonesian Islam and within Indonesian society at large. Orthodoxy rallied its forces against the onslaught of reformism, and for some years even invoked the support of its traditional foes, *adat*-chiefs and the *priyayi* elite – and indeed the colonial government itself -- against the over-zealous newcomer. Similarly, reformism came into growing conflict with the Western-educated elite, at the outset centered on disagreements as to the organizational means – political or religious-social – best suited to promote Indonesian self-realization, but before long shifting to a more profound division concerning the ends of Indonesian social evolution itself. Dutch colonial policy, moreover, reacting to the alarming tensions created by the spread of reformism, as well as to renewed apprehensions of Islamic developments abroad, for some time tended to acerbate the cleavages within the Islamic camp. At the same time, however, the colonial setting as such tended to blur some of the divisions separating Muslims from 'secular' nationalists until the end of Dutch rule. In the face of these obstacles, the emergence of Islamic reformism as the strongest organizational movement in colonial Indonesia is a noteworthy phenomenon.

In the early 1920's, Islamic orthodoxy felt itself increasingly threatened by the new currents in Indonesian Islam.[33] Egyptian reformism, Wahhabism,[34] and the powerful missionary work of the Indian reformist organization *Ahmadiyah*[35] all seemed to undermine the hold of the unorganized, stubbornly individualistic village Islam of *santri* and *abangan* alike in the countryside. In 1926, some prominent *ulama* in East Java took the initiative in countering these attacks of 'heresy' by organizing an orthodox association, *Nahdatul Ulama*.[36] Though organizationally for a long time less impressive than *Muhammadiyah*, the new movement soon spread throughout Java and in later years forcefully competed with Indonesian reformism in missionary work in the Outer Islands.

While for years to come, Indonesian Islam was consequently

rent by a rift between two hostile camps, an urban-centered reformism on the one hand, and a rural-centered orthodoxy on the other, reformism had actually won a victory for Indonesian Islam as a whole by forcing on its opponents the adoption of organizational techniques which strengthened Islam vis-à-vis other social forces in Indonesian society.[37]

More important still was the fact that the rift – at no time extending to the doctrinal field proper – had no significant basis in socio-economic differentiation. In essence, both were middle-class movements, orthodoxy finding its prime response among well-to-do hajis in the countryside, reformism among urban traders and white-collar people. Increasing social mobility tended to break down the barriers between the rural and urban representatives of Indonesian Islam, thus further narrowing the cleavage between reformism and orthodoxy.[38]

Moreover, the rift was progressively narrowed through external forces impinging upon the Islamic community as a whole soon after the founding of *Nahdatul Ulama*. Thus while orthodox and reformists remained divided until the end of Dutch rule, the division became more and more competitive rather than destructive. On the one hand, *Muhammadiyah*, partly to avoid governmental suspicions and hostility, came to conduct its activities with a notable absence of acrimony against its orthodox adversary. On the other, in matters of organization and even of worship, *Nahdatul Ulama* was driven to copy the methods which had so signally contributed to the success of *Muhammadiyah*, and in doing so it ceased to combat its adversary with the original vehemence. Unity, forged largely by joint opposition to non-Islamic trends and colonial rule, proved in the long run to be of greater importance than the rivalry between rural *santri* and urban Islam.

One may single out four factors which together brought about a growing *rapprochement* between reformism and orthodoxy. The first had its origin in a lessening of the religious controversy itself. Second, orthodoxy and reformism found common ground in combating the influence of *Sarekat Islam* in religious affairs

after 1924. In the third place, the rise of a non-religious, Western-educated political elite tended to unite the two wings of the Islamic movement in defense of Muslim principles. The last factor, finally, can be traced back to actions of the colonial government, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

The purely religious controversy proved to be relatively short-lived. In part this was because the cleavage, originally fanned by the links of Indonesian reformism with overseas Muslim movements – especially with Wahhabism and *Ahmadiyah* – considered 'heretical' by orthodox *ulama*, lost much of its *raison d'être* with the weakening of Wahhabi influence, on the one hand, and with the parting of ways between *Muhammadiyah* and its Indian sister organization, on the other.

The links with Wahhabism dominated Indonesian reformism after the Wahhabi conquest of Mecca in 1924 when, for the first time since the demise of the Caliphate, an energetic and young Muslim ruler had made himself the center of international Islam. The repercussions of this development upon Indonesian reformism, eager for outside support against orthodoxy and a hostile 'infidel' government alike, were profound. Only two years after he had conquered the Holy City, Ibn Saud sent out invitations for an Islamic World Congress, and two Indonesian delegates, representing *Sarekat Islam* and *Muhammadiyah*, respectively, actually left for Mecca.[39] But this revival of pan-Islam was of short duration. Confronted by seemingly insuperable divisions within the Islamic world – in particular among ruling houses in independent Muslim countries – Ibn Saud canceled the Congress.[40]

The eclipse of Wahhabi influence was soon followed by estrangement between *Muhammadiyah* and *Ahmadiyah*. The latter organization found support among the leaders of *Sarekat Islam*, who were largely responsible for welding a measure of at least tactical unity between the two contending factions – reformism and orthodoxy – of the religious movement.[41] The history of Indonesian Islam under colonial rule – as well as under Japanese domination – is, in fact, to a large extent written in terms of the

struggle for supremacy between the *Sarekat's* leaders, bent on employing political strategy, and those of *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama*, whose joint aversion to political action tended to draw them together.

In spite of the fact that, in its early years, *Sarekat Islam* had benefited from Islamic appeals, sparked by a reformist-influenced leadership yet conspicuously successful among traditional Muslim leaders in the countryside, the movement had, as we saw, soon been diverted from its Islamic base into political radicalism. It was only in the early 1920's, when revolutionary initiative had passed to Communist leaders, at first working through the *Sarekat Islam* but, after their expulsion from the party in 1924 in opposition to it, that Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim endeavored to imprint Islamic reformism on the organization and to make Islam the rallying point for its rapidly dwindling mass support.[42]

In 1922, the *Sarekat* leaders, in cooperation with *Muhammadiyah*, succeeded in convening the first so-called al-Islam Congress in West Java, which was intended to provide a unifying platform for orthodox and reformist representatives, as well as a counterbalance to 'secular' nationalism. Ten such congresses were held until 1932,[43] and they rather faithfully registered the decline of *Sarekat Islam*, their original sponsor. While the movement had been inadvertently successful in unleashing the grass roots commotion of earlier years, its failure to adapt itself to changing circumstances proved its undoing.

If the earliest Islamic congresses witnessed fanatical strife between reformists and the as yet unorganized orthodox *ulama*, the third marked the first estrangement between the reformists of *Sarekat Islam* and *Muhammadiyah*, caused by controversy regarding the Caliphate.[44] The fourth, held at Jogja in 1925, showed that the decline of *Sarekat Islam* as a political party was as certain as the fact that it would have to cede leadership of the religious forces to others. After Ibn Saud's Islamic World Congress failed to materialize in 1926, the movement, re-named *Partai Sarekat Islam* in 1923, found itself deprived of international, pan-Islamic backing and thus lost political stature.

The eighth Indonesian al-Islam Congress, held in 1927, only one year after the founding of the orthodox organization, *Nahdatul Ulama*, already saw a measure of cooperation between orthodox spokesmen and *Muhammadiyah* leaders. Together they opposed the spread of *Ahmadiyah* teachings, and together they vetoed an Indonesian Koran translation by Tjokroaminoto, based on the English *Ahmadiyah* version. This widening rift between *Sarekat Islam* and other Islamic groups had in late 1926 already been preceded by open rupture between it and *Muhammadiyah*.[45] After a lapse of four years, two more congresses were convened at the initiative of the *Sarekat* leadership in 1931 and 1932. They marked the end of the *Sarekat's* effective role in the Indonesian Islamic movement proper. It fell to *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama*, rather than to the original sponsor, to resuscitate the al-Islam Congresses after an interval of five years, when Dutch policy – to be discussed in our next chapter – seemed to threaten Indonesian Muslims.

If *Sarekat Islam* was the loser in the competition for Islamic leadership, it found itself simultaneously engaged in a furious but losing battle in the political arena. In the early years of the Ethical Era, it had been almost inevitable that the growing Indonesian national consciousness should have found expression in Islamic terminology, if for no other reason than that Islam had, ever since the imposition of Dutch political control, remained the only major ideological force to separate rulers from ruled.[46] But from the late 1920's onward, when both Islamic agitation and Communist-led rebellion had been suppressed, new forces within Indonesian society came to the fore. It was only then that a conscious and programmatic nationalism was born among Western-educated Indonesians – many of *priyayi* descent – who before long gained supremacy in Indonesian politics.[47]

From 1929 onward, the leaders of *Sarekat Islam*, thwarted in their internationally-oriented, pan-Islamic political ambitions, officially embraced Indonesian nationalism as their goal, symbolizing this change by the party's new name, *Partai Sarekat Islam*

Indonesia. But rather than benefiting from this strategic switch, the progenitors of Indonesian nationalism found themselves relegated to an increasingly impotent role by the new nationalist movement which, from its inception, turned its back on Islam.[48] In the years after 1927, it was the *Partai Nasional Indonesia*, rather than the *Sarekat Islam*, which gave leadership to the ebbing rural unrest which was the legacy of the ill-fated Communist-led rebellions, until the colonial government – as we shall presently see – sealed the Indonesian peasantry off from contacts with urban political agitation.

The rise of a 'secular' nationalism affected not only the *Sarekat Islam;* it posed a serious problem to the entire Islamic movement on Java. Confronted with this vigorous challenge, reformists and orthodox were driven to close their ranks in defense. More important still, impressed by the spectacular decline of *Sarekat Islam* and apprehensive of governmental opprobrium, *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama* espoused a consciously non-political course, leaving Islamic-political action to the declining *Sarekat Islam* and to the small group of young men organized in the *Jong Islamieten Bond*. It was inevitable that this conscious divorce of the principal orthodox and reformist Islamic organizations from politics – seemingly in line with Snouck Hurgronje's dicta – should create a rift between nationalism and Islam, between a Westernized Indonesian civilization and a *santri* civilization.

The Muslim leaders' disinclination to implicate their organizations overtly in the Indonesian nationalist movement, and worse still, their reluctant readiness to accept a modicum of occasional aid from the colonial government, were understandably enough interpreted as acts of treason by both 'secular' nationalists and *Sarekat* spokesmen.[49] But, paradoxically enough, the division between religion and politics was in some respects more artificial than real – and therefore in part local and temporary rather than universal and lasting – while in other respects it was rooted in more fundamental causes which were to inhibit the development of viable Islamic political forces for decades to come.

For all the overt abstention from politics, Indonesian Islam, increasingly influenced as it was by the vigorous currents of reformism, Wahhabism and even of invigorated orthodoxy, could not but contribute to the progressive weakening of the mystique of colonialism.[50] On Java, the Islamic renaissance, in spite of its largely apolitical character, gave rise to a self-conscious *santri* civilization whose growing membership became increasingly aware of the fetters imposed upon Islam by the situational logic of the colonial relationship. Islamic education thus performed a quasi-political task of the first magnitude in creating a literate Muslim citizenry which numerically by far surpassed the few Indonesians versed in Western ways. Quite apart from such considerations, many prominent Muslims, including leading personalities in the reformist camp in particular, as individuals participated actively in political affairs, and multiple membership in religious and political organizations was by no means a rarity. Finally, a nucleus of leaders was being trained in the *Jong Islamieten Bond*, who in later years were to occupy central positions in Islamic political parties.

Outside Java the division between politics and religion proved even less tenable. Especially on Sumatra, Islamic reformism was almost from its very inception drawn into politics, and at times even into virulent radicalism,[51] the misgivings of the central leadership on Java notwithstanding. This was not due to the fact that Sumatran reformism was *sui generis* so much as to the social environment in which it operated. In parts of Sumatra, notably in the Minangkabau region of the island's west coast, a new middle class had arisen which owed its origin almost exclusively to the introduction of export crops – mainly rubber – into the area.[52] While on Java the 'middle class' was predominantly a social, rather than an economic, phenomenon, on Sumatra it was rooted in economic change. Where on Java the Western-educated intelligentsia predominated over the Islamic-oriented trading community, on Sumatra the reverse was true. Thus the political significance of Sumatran reformism was largely the result of the absence of a Western-educated and

Western-oriented political elite on that island. Sumatrans, it is true, benefited from Dutch schooling as much as, if not relatively more than, Javanese and Sundanese. But since higher training, as well as governmental employment, were on the whole available only on Java, Western-trained Sumatrans rather than returning home as a rule remained on Java, where they came to play a significant role in the Java-centered 'secular' nationalist movement.

If, however, Muslims did not and could not remain totally aloof from participation in political affairs in colonial Indonesia, they were yet at a grave disadvantage vis-à-vis their Western-trained and politically-oriented compatriots, from whom they were, at the same time, divided by profound and basic differences. For one thing, while the universalism of Islam does embrace the field of politics as well as all other realms, it has not yet given rise to a coherent and independent science of politics, similar to that which the Western world attained after the breakdown of the medieval unity between church and state and the subsequent rise of secular political power.

Like other Muslims, Indonesian Islamic leaders – reformists hardly less than orthodox – were thus by Western standards not only lacking in political experience, but were, by the nature of their orientation and training, ill-equipped to formulate political goals as such. The *santri* civilization, in other words, is not a political ideal so much as the idealization of a religious community – the *ummah* – which would subsume within its all-embracing confines all walks of life, subordinating the state to the dictates of the Islamic ethic.[53] Even if given political expression in *Dar'ul Islam* – the so-called 'Islamic State' – the political program of Islam is limited to postulating a state which, irrespective of its constitutional form, economic organization and social composition, is to be ruled by Muslims in accordance with Islamic law.

This inherent limitation may be largely responsible for the tardy politicization of Indonesian Islam under Dutch rule, which has, of course, its counterparts in other Islamic lands.[54] For,

within the context of a Western governmental framework, political programs could be meaningful only to the extent that they were expressed in Western political terms and that they utilized the avenues for political action opened up – however hesitatingly and grudgingly – by the colonial power.

On this score, the Western-trained Indonesian elite could more than make up for their small numbers and relatively limited following. Unlike the religious leadership, which found its strongholds in predominantly Indonesian-inhabited centers, most nationalist leaders clustered around Western-style cities, in particular the capital city of Batavia, seat of the colonial government and of the *Volksraad*, which served as the fulcrum for national politics. Well versed not only in the political heritage of Western liberalism and socialism, but also in the quasi-parliamentary political game in representative institutions at the center and in the provinces, the 'secular' nationalists thus came to possess a kind of expertise which to most Muslim leaders remained a *terra incognita.*

If this was true of the leadership, it was equally true of the second-echelon members of their respective following. Since Western training was a prerequisite for government service and employment in Western enterprises, the few Indonesians who had benefited from Dutch education were becoming acquainted with Western administrative and, to a lesser extent, entrepreneurial methods from which most graduates of Islamic schools were *ipso facto* excluded.

Compared to the vagueness of Islamic political goals, Indonesian nationalism could and did offer a coherent critique of colonialism and a program for an Indonesian state, based on representative institutions, dedicated to the principles of nationalism and democracy as well as to the tasks of economic and social – if not socialist – planning, in short to the reproduction of a Western political system under the auspices of the paradoxically anti-Western Westernism so typical of most non-Western areas.

It was unavoidable that the profession of these ideals and goals should alienate the beneficiaries of Western training – in par-

ticular the graduates returning to Indonesia from Leiden and Utrecht, if not from Paris, Berlin and London – from even their most brilliant colleagues who had earned their academic laurels at al-Azhar, Mecca, or Aligarh. While Snouck Hurgronje had been – only partly through his own fault – proved incorrect in assessing the effects of Western education on Indonesians, he was proved more than correct in his assumption that this education would lead most of the new Indonesian intellectuals away from Islam.

Indeed, though there were some few Western-educated Indonesians who succeeded in effecting a bridge between Western civilization and Islamic reformism,[55] the majority of the politically conscious nationalists adopted an attitude of disdainful arrogance vis-à-vis Islam which was quite clearly derived from, and very similar to, prevalent Western attitudes.[56] The secular, modern state which they envisaged would have as little use for the *santri* and the *ulama* as for the *adat* and the *priyayi*.[57] Both, in their eyes, represented intrinsically conservative elements doomed to extinction in the envisaged political evolution of their homeland. Some of these political leaders even saw in Islam the historic destroyer of a greater Indonesian unity of the past, extolling the imperial grandeur of the pre-Islamic empires of Srivijaya and Majapahit as the only true models of the Greater Indonesia of their political aspirations.[58]

The Muslims, on their part, saw in the Western-trained intelligentsia the product of a godless, materialistic West which was cunningly undermining the very basis of Indonesian identity, which to them was coterminous with Islam. Orthodox spokesmen, in particular, countered the very idea of nationalism by the cosmopolitanism of Islam as a world civilization.[59] And even reformists, who were more sympathetic to the idea of a national state, claimed that an independent Indonesian state, as long as it was to be a secular state, might be as great an enemy of Islam as colonial rule by 'infidels'.[60] They abhorred the fact that the ideological inspiration of Indonesian nationalism came from alien sources, when the Prophet Himself had, in His message,

provided an ethical norm which contained, and surpassed, all the barren political speculations of Western thinkers.

These profound differences were only partly muted by the presence of adversaries obstructing both nationalism and Islam. Opposition to colonial rule and to the *adat* and its representatives tended to mitigate the divisions between Muslims and 'secular' nationalists to some extent, at least at the tactical level. But even in colonial times, and in part as a result of Dutch colonial policy itself, the divisions were never completely eliminated. If both warred against the native aristocracy, it must be borne in mind that the nationalists, in the name of democracy and socialism, opposed in them the representatives of 'feudalism', while Muslim leaders fought them as the strongest barriers to the realization of a *santri* pattern of life.

Again, if both nationalists and Muslims came into increasing conflict with Dutch rule, in the case of the nationalists this was due to their growing impatience at the exasperatingly slow rate of change allowed by the colonial power, whereas in the case of the Muslims it was primarily due to the direction which that change was taking. These fateful differences were to leave their imprint on the subsequent history of Indonesia, a history which is, for that matter, still in the making.

Chapter Three

Challenge and Response: Indonesian Islam in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule

The drastic changes which the Indonesian social, religious and political scene had undergone in the brief span of a quarter-century rendered the tasks of colonial administration for more complex than they had been in the days of Snouck Hurgronje's Adviserships in the Indies. The menacing, yet in essence relatively simple, problems posed by Muslim 'fanaticism' during the nineteenth century had given way to the bewildering issues posited by the rise of two entirely new Indonesian elite groups, one Western-influenced, the other Islamic-oriented. Both groups seemed to steer Indonesian developments away from the path envisioned by the originators of the Ethical Policy; both were impatiently clamoring for social if not political prominence at the expense of the traditional Indonesian elite, whose position had been profoundly eroded by the cumulative effects of Western economic forces and political control, and more recently by the Ethical Policy itself.

Indeed, the emergence of these new elites seemed to threaten the very foundation of Dutch colonial rule in the archipelago. The Java War, *ulama*-led village unrest, and even the Acheh War seemed to pale into insignificance compared to the turbulent upsurge of the *Sarekat Islam* in the years during and immediately following the first world war, culminating in the explosive uprisings, under Communist leadership, which shook parts of Western Java and Western Sumatra in the mid-1920's.

Snouck Hurgronje's warning that, in the absence of a concerted Dutch policy of association, forces inimical to the Netherlands might make themselves masters of the colony's political destiny seemed to be borne out by these ominous happenings.

Though the revolts had taken the authorities by surprise, they

were easily enough suppressed. The exiling of over one thousand Indonesian 'ringleaders' – not necessarily limited to Communists – to Dutch New Guinea soon silenced radical agitation in most parts of the archipelago, and similar action taken shortly thereafter against the leaders of the new nationalist organization, *Partai Nasional Indonesia*, ended the first, tumultuous phase of modern Indonesian political history in the early 1930's.[1] But in spite of the successful suppression of open revolt and the subsequent peace, the specter of 1926-27 was not so easily exorcised. The profound shock which the uprisings had created among the European community in the colony, among colonial administrators and, not least, in the Netherlands was of decisive significance for the future course of Dutch colonial policy.

Even before internal peace had been restored and repression and exile had seemingly removed the sources of immediate danger – indeed, to some extent even before violence had erupted – the authorities had embarked on an examination of the causes which could have brought about revolutionary chaos, and of means to obviate its recurrence. It is true that sober counsel was not lacking which correctly interpreted the rebellions as the unfortunate concomitants of the evolutionary growth of Indonesian society and the tardy administrative cognizance of changing times.[2] But it was silenced by the blind fears of European settlers and Dutch economic interests which combined with the wounded pride of colonial bureaucrats to place the Ethical Policy – if not in part also Dutch Islamic policy – on trial. Before long, the greater part of the Ethical Policy, having been found guilty, was quietly interred by policy-makers at home and in the colony, who nonetheless paradoxically continued to profess adherence to its principles in public utterances. As we shall presently see, a similar dichotomy between professed policy and colonial practice came to prevail in the field of Islamic policy.

As we have said, it was undeniably true that the social engineering of the Ethical Era, however restricted it had been, had been instrumental in furthering the process of change taking place in Indonesian society. The intrusion of welfare policies

into the villages, coinciding as it did with the unprecedented economic prosperity of the post-war years, had undoubtedly had a share in preparing the ground for agrarian unrest. Similarly, administrative and political reforms had partly disrupted the bureaucratic centralism of colonial administration and further weakened *priyayi* prestige. Lastly, Western education had bred a new class of politically conscious Indonesians who had either utilized the new platforms provided by political reforms or, bypassing them, had taken a leading part in radical agitation, urban as well as rural.

But however important the part which the Ethical Policy had played in accelerating social disintegration, and whatever its share in preparing the soil for the unforeseen developments of the 1920's, its accusers mistook a contributing factor for the primary cause. In fact, the slow effects of Westernization in the colony, no less than those of political and ideological influences from overseas, had certainly played a far greater role in the birth of the new Indonesia than the reformism of the Ethical Era.

The conservative diagnosis of the causes that had led to the revolts accused Ethical reformism of having willfully breached the traditional pattern of indirect rule and of having thereby torn Indonesian life from its moorings. By weakening Dutch control from the center, by undermining *priyayi* prestige, and by upsetting village life through welfare reforms – so conservatives argued – the Indonesian *tani* had become unhinged from his traditional loyalties and certitudes and had thus fallen easy prey to outsiders.[3] Radical agitators, Communist, nationalist or Islamic, were, in turn, but the natural consequence of spreading Western education indiscriminately and prematurely among Indonesians.[4] Heedless of the long history of pre-Ethical antecedents of the manifold disintegrative processes, colonial statesmen in the mid-1920's found but one remedy for the colony's ills – a sealing-off of the peasantry from such outside interference, coupled with physical removal from the centers of Indonesian life of all those who threatened to arrogate to themselves the

task of revolutionary leadership. By thus reversing the trend of two decades of colonial policy, Dutch authorities, at home and in the colony, believed they would be able to stem the tide of change.

The new pattern of colonial policy was, it is true, unfolding only gradually in the course of the closing years of Dutch rule; nor, for that matter, was it necessarily entirely consistent at all times. Concern for native welfare remained the guiding principle as before. On Java, in particular, many of the Ethical Era's political reforms, embodied in the new constitution of 1925, were outwardly kept intact. Thus representative assemblies, including Regency Councils, remained in existence, and the powers of the *Volksraad*, in particular, were – conservative criticism notwithstanding[5] – enhanced by the granting of co-legislative authority in 1927. In fact, however, not only did the new constitutional order itself – which embodied no significant change in the colonial relationship as such – fall far short of the expections raised by the revisional commission's report,[6] but the new colonial policy departed sharply from the spirit which had inspired the Ethical Policy. Thus the institutions that survived the demise of reform underwent subtle changes which ultimately undermined their *raison d'être*.

The growing stature of the *Volksraad*, for example, was counter-balanced by the fact that its Indonesian majority – an innovation introduced in 1931 – was overwhelmingly recruited from *priyayi* officialdom, and that it therefore served European and Eurasian political interests better than it did those of the indigenous population. This state of affairs was admittedly worsened by the non-cooperative policies pursued by most Indonesian political parties, who boycotted the representative councils until the mid-1930's.

In other respects the perversion of earlier reforms was more clearly noticeable. 'De-tutelization' of the native administrative corps was extended to all Regents, but it was no longer based on schooling and expertise, the original criteria of this emancipation. Rather, the reverse consideration actually inspired this

wholesale extension. Far from opening the road to the advancement of Western-trained candidates, 'de-tutelization' now became the new cloak for a return to the old principle of indirect rule, whose adoption quelled all hopes for an Indonesia progressively entrusted to the care of a Western-schooled Indonesian administration.[7] After a very short interval, the allegedly 'detutelized' Regents, found themselves again the subordinates of junior Dutch officers.[8] And, though in the depression years the European corps was for financial reasons reduced in numbers and in part replaced by an increasing number of Indonesians employed in government service, by the late 1930's it again became obvious that the colonial government had parted company for good with the hopes of the early post-war years.

Especially when administrative reforms, unhampered by the political concomitants which had accompanied them on Java, were at long last introduced in the Outer Islands, the new-old pattern of Dutch colonialism – bureaucratic centralism superimposed upon disparate, nominally autonomous yet virtually powerless *adat*-communities – emerged.[9] Not unexpectedly, resistance to colonial rule was rapidly spreading among younger members of the *priyayi* corps and other, Western-educated, government officials progressively denied advancement in the administrative hierarchy.

The new colonial policy – dictated by conservative Dutch legislators at home and eagerly executed by obedient bureaucrats in the Indies – thus constituted a sharp, though on the whole publicy unacknowledged, break with the reformism of the Ethical Era.[10] For Snouck Hurgronje's ideal of a truly autonomous Indonesia, increasingly to be governed by emancipated Indonesians tied to the Netherlands by bonds of genuine cultural and political loyality, it substituted that of a colony to be governed for an indefinite period by Dutchmen, and for Dutch interests.[11] To the specter of a united Indonesia under the leadership of either Western-educated nationalists or Muslims, it opposed an internally divided Indonesia, united only by Dutch bureaucrats, exercising unquestioned control through the agency of local and

regional *adat*-chiefs in the Outer Islands and a tractable and perpetually subordinate corps of *priyayi* officials on Java.

In short, the positive goal of Ethical reformers, let alone Snouck Hurgronje's continued insistence on the termination of the colonial relationship as such, gave way to the colorless, negative and defensive course of later years.[12] Dutch rule was no longer to be justified by its contribution to the modernization of Indonesian society, but rather by the obstacles it could place in the way of the more radical exponents of this modernization. Where reform had been the watchword of the first two decades of the century, *Rust en Orde* (Tranquillity and Order) were to guide policymakers in the closing years of Dutch rule in Indonesia.

Yet the new policy was not without a scientific or philosophical underpinning which greatly aided its acceptance. It was provided by Dutch scholars of the Indonesian customary law at Leiden University, whose so-called Indological Faculty had since the turn of the century been the academic abode of the Ethical Policy. Such, indeed, had been its influence that Dutch commercial interests, opposed to the liberal tendencies prevalent among colonial administrators imbued with the 'Leiden Spirit', had established a competing Indological Foundation at Utrecht University in 1925.[13] Ironically enough, however, the scientific jurisprudence which increasingly came to emanate from Leiden rendered this duplication in the final analysis unnecessary. Leiden University, in other words, no longer stood for the Ethical Policy only. It came to speak with contradictory voices, and Snouck Hurgronje's, barely audible in later years, was drowned out by a new legal conservatism against which he had uttered prophetic warnings.[14]

The *doyen* of the Adat Law School, professor C. van Vollenhoven, and his talented and outstanding followers,[15] not only soon overshadowed Snouck in stature; far more important and even fateful, their success in steering colonial policy in a direction diametrically opposed to his was far more profound than his had ever been.[16] Thus when in 1928 a leading adat law expert

declared that governmental policy towards the Indonesian community could be summed up in one word, 're-orientation',[17] he bore testimony to the predominance which his school was gaining over the earlier course, only one year after the suppression of the Communist-led insurrections and only one year after the constitutional reorganization act of 1925 had taken effect in the colony.

The thorough and devoted study of the Indonesian *adat* is one of the proudest, and justifiably so, achievements of Dutch oriental scholarship. The painstaking collection, compilation and cautious codification of the *adat* governing the various ethnic groups in the Indonesian archipelago – a field in fact outstandingly pioneered in the late nineteenth century by Snouck Hurgronje himself[18] – resulted in an unrivaled body of information concerning the customs of many Indonesian communities, their underlying unity, and their adaptability to gradual social change.[19] But the importance of the Adat Law School by far exceeded the boundaries of jurisprudence, since its basic assumptions raised the question of the direction in which not only legal reform but overall colonial policy was to move.

Adat law proponents, that is to say, disagreed with the many lawyers who had – with Snouck – envisioned the more or less rapid Westernization of Indonesian life, accompanied by the introduction of a codified, Western legal system for the colony. But in so doing they assailed the vision of assimilation. Instead of working for the ultimate unity of Dutchmen and Indonesians, they strove to emphasize the divisions which separated East and West.[20] Warning against a forced pace of Westernization, and decrying the half-hearted politico-administrative reforms of past decades, and moreover seemingly justified by the tumultuous upheavals of the 1920's, the adat law scholars advocated a gradual social evolution of the Indies by the organic growth of the self-contained, traditional *adat*-communities all over the archipelago, but especially in the Outer Islands, where they had as yet been only peripherally affected by corroding influences from the outside.

The Adat Law School's reaction to the indiscriminate and hasty Westernization of the Ethical Period and its respect for the legal and cultural institutions of Indonesian society could have been a healthy corrective to the bland and naïve optimism of its forerunners. Yet however noble and even liberal the motives which inspired the proponents of the new jurisprudence, the *adat*-policy must have been an invaluable armory to conservative politicians and administrators. To them, it could serve as a rationalization of the indefinite maintenance of the particularisms inherent in the local *adat*, directed against outside influences tending in the direction of Indonesian unification. By the same token, the *adat* policy could be invoked in support of the social and political *status quo*, and of its defense against attacks based on social and ideological forces – religious or secular – hostile to its continuation. Finally, by implication, the policy could justify the maintenance *sine die* of Dutch colonial power, since only Dutch legal and administrative expertise could be expected to keep the balance between essentially autonomous *adat* communities, and to direct, or retard, the speed of social change.

It is within the framework of the new colonial policy, resting on the pillars of administrative conservatism, repressive vigilance, and indirect rule strengthened by the Adat Law School, that Indonesian Islam and Dutch Islamic policy in the last years of colonial rule must be studied. From the 1920's onward, however, this study is rendered increasingly difficult by two factors. First, Islamic developments, in the early period particularly, had, as we saw, to some extent tended to coincide and overlap with other social and political strands in the evolution of Indonesian society. And second, partly as a consequence of this intermingling, specifically Islamic policies came to play a correspondingly smaller part in overall colonial policy. In other words, while at the turn of the century, when Islamic 'fanaticism' had constituted the only major challenge to Dutch control, any policy concerning the 'native problem' had had to be expressed largely in terms of an Islamic policy, the new challenges of later decades seemed to justify the relegation of purely Islamic questions to a secondary place.

Plausible as such an explanation may be for the apparent lack of a new, or at least re-formulated, Islamic policy on the part of the colonial authorities in later years, the absence of such a new course, which the Islamic renaissance in Indonesia should have rendered mandatory, is one of the most puzzling phenomena of later colonial history. Thus the baffling dichotomy between professed policy and administrative practice which besets the unacknowledged abandonment of the Ethical Policy finds its counterpart in an equally confounding disparity between official pronouncements of continuity, on the one hand, and violation and partial abandonment of the oft-proclaimed Islamic principles on the other.

Dutch policy-makers never ceased to pay lip service to Snouck Hurgronje as the architect of Dutch Islamic policy in the Indies while in fact they not only distorted his legacy from the very beginning, but continued to invoke his name in the application of policy recommendations which they even then more often honored in the breach than in observance. This progressive abandonment had actually commenced before Snouck had left Indonesia.[21] Soon the twin principles of religious neutrality and political vigilance that to him had been no more than the prerequisities for a successful Islamic policy became ends in themselves. Association, at no time a guiding principle even of the Ethical course, was finally and irrevocably buried by that policy's enemies in the mid-1920's. Divorced from this central tenet which alone was to have given them ultimate meaning and purpose, Snouck's truncated Islamic principles officially continued to guide the direction of Dutch actions vis-à-vis Indonesian Islam until the end of the colonial regime.[22]

In point of fact, however, even these truncated policies were, temporarily at least, all but abandoned in the face of the unexpected radicalism of Indonesian – including, of course, Islamic – developments in the immediate post-war years. The panicky reaction to these perturbing phenomena not only momentarily obliterated the uniqueness of the Islamic problem as such, it also very vividly demonstrated the grave limitations inherent in

Snouck Hurgronje's compartmentalization of Islam into two separable spheres of religion and politics. For some years, at any rate, the restoration of peace and tranquillity appeared to take precedence over an Islamic policy that had seemingly been rendered obsolete by the faulty logic of its author. Partly resuscitated in later years, when Islam had in the greater part of Indonesia lost its aggressiveness, Snouck's directives were, as we shall see, nonetheless doomed to final and ironic atrophy by administrators and legal advisers dedicated to a colonial policy which militated against the spirit of Snouck Hurgronje as much as against the ever louder demands voiced by the Indonesian Muslim community.

Dutch attitudes towards Islam in the post-war years hardened as a result of the violent upsurge of political agitation in the Indies. We saw that this upsurge had at the outset not been limited to the *Sarekat Islam.* Indeed, governmental repression had initially been far more vehement with regard to Douwes Dekker's *Indische Partij*, whose radicalism had antedated that of the *Sarekat* by several years. In the early period of its existence, *Sarekat Islam*, in spite of serious misgivings among many Dutch officials and European residents, actually enjoyed a measure of support from a liberal governor general and some Ethical administrators.[23] In the same spirit, Snouck Hurgronje, writing from the Netherlands in 1916, welcomed the organization as a healthy indication of Indonesian political maturation, without at that time seeing in it a dangerous, let alone pan-Islamic, threat to colonial rule.[24] But the movement's increasing radicalism, culminating in serious uprisings in 1917, and its subsequent infiltration by Communist elements in West Java understandably enough led to an abrupt change in the government's attitude toward *Sarekat Islam.* The bloody insurrections of the mid-1920's in Banten Residency and on Sumatra's West Coast finally obliterated the vestiges of liberalism in favor of ruthless police and military action.

To some extent repression was certainly in tune with Snouck Hurgronje's prescriptions for political manifestations in Indo-

nesian Islam. At the village level, as we said, *Sarekat Islam* had unquestionably revived the latent grassroots rebelliousness of zealous *kiyayi* and *ulama*, against whom drastic measures seemed to be the only adequate defense. As investigations showed, Communist leaders had likewise known how to exploit this endemic Muslim restiveness for their own purposes when they wrested control over agrarian unrest from the hands of the *Sarekat* leadership.[25]

Even then, however, the situation was far too complex to be met by mere reliance on Snouck Hurgronje's directives. The many-faceted *Sarekat Islam* was, after all, only one aspect of the Islamic renaissance in Indonesia, and as such it was at the outset limited to Java. In spite of the movement's share in preparing the soil for the Communist-led insurrections in part of that island, *Sarekat* members had, in fact, not been directly involved in the uprising in Banten Residency.[26] Equally important, *Muhammadiyah*, the reformist organization *par excellence* on Java, had stood even more aloof from the political upheavals that had shaken Java during the decade or so of its early and slow growth. Yet instead of showing *Muhammadiyah* a measure of tolerance consonant with Snouck Hurgronje's dicta, civil servants had from the very beginning greeted it with suspicious fears, not so much inspired by the content of *Muhammadiyah* teachings as by the fact that its very existence constituted a new and thus perturbing element in Indonesian society.[27]

The culminating paradox of this situation was that, though village rebellion had been fed by orthodox *ulama* rather than by reformist-inspired Muslims, the colonial government, while suppressing rebellious religious teachers, allied itself with orthodox leaders to stem the tide of reformism, anathema to both, if for different reasons. Far from remaining neutral in matters of religion, the Dutch authorities thus for some years actively interfered in the orthodox-reformist controversy.[28]

If Snouck Hurgronje had been betrayed in this respect, his counsel proved inadequate to meet the situation which reformism had brought about in Western Sumatra. While *Muhammadiyah*

on Sumatra's West Coast had, as on Java, encountered violent opposition from Muslim orthodoxy, some of its leaders in addition crossed the line between religion and politics to become involved in the Communist-inspired revolt of 1927.[29] This was, in part at least, the almost inevitable result of the social conditions prevailing in the West Coast Residency, discussed in the last chapter. But the politicization of Sumatran reformism was in no small measure due also to governmental suspicion of an intruding socio-religious force. The alliance between the Dutch administration and Muslim orthodoxy on Java thus found its counterpart in a similar alliance on the west coast of Sumatra, but above all in a strengthening of the historic ties between Netherlanders and *adat*-chiefs in the Minangkabau region.[30]

When in later years, under the influence of the Adat Law School, the administration came increasingly to embrace the *adat* course as the guiding principle of colonial policy, Minangkabau reformism of necessity became ever more deeply identified with political agitation.[31] The vicious circle of cause and effect haunted the colonial government until the end of Dutch rule. On the one hand, it proved Snouck's division meaningless; on the other, it proved the wisdom of his prophetic, but neglected, warnings – echoed by others – against blind reliance on the Minangkabau *adat* as an adequate means of halting social change pioneered by the adherents of Islam.[32]

Dutch apprehensions of Islamic reformism, whatever its manifestations, were deepened by developments in the Middle East that affected the contemporaneous internal events discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The phantom of pan-Islam which had plagued Dutch policy makers before Snouck Hurgronje's arrival in the Indies had, in spite of his endeavors, at no time entirely ceased to cast its distant shadow over administrators or, for that matter, over the Indonesian Muslim community.

If the demise of the Turkish Caliphate at the hands of Kemal Ataturk had for that reason not gone unnoticed in the colony, the mooting of plans for its restoration, first in Cairo and soon thereafter in Mecca, stirred the imagination of the Indonesian

Muslims and re-awakened Dutch fears of pan-Islamic agitation in the Indies. We have already seen that Ibn Saud's conquest of Mecca had a profound effect on Indonesian reformists in both *Sarekat Islam* and *Muhammadiyah*.[33] At the same time, it raised the specter of Wahhabism among orthodox Muslims, fanning open hostility between the two factions in the Islamic camp. Dutch partiality for orthodox leaders in the early years is thus partly explained by revived fears of pan-Islam, which on dogmatic grounds orthodox *ulama* in Indonesia rejected and opposed.

But the *Pax Wahhabica* which rendered Mecca the center of a powerful Arab dynasty radiated a magnetic attraction to Indonesian Muslims, transcending doctrinal disputations. Unprecedented numbers of Indonesian hajis, aided by favorable economic conditions in the colony, flocked to the Holy City in the years after 1925.[34] The pilgrimage, hitherto protected by the observance of Snouck's neutralism, suddenly appeared in an entirely new light.[35] The colonial government – fearing that Muslim 'fanatics' might foster anti-Dutch propaganda abroad and import undesired teachings into the Indies, and desirous of preventing political agitators from using the cloak of the pilgrimage to escape to foreign shores – felt itself forced to abandon the principle of the virtually unrestricted *hajj* in favor of strict control of departing pilgrims.[36] These considerations apparently outweighed the grave risks involved in subjecting the vast majority of peaceful and *bona fide* hajis to cumbersome inspection and control both in Indonesia and at the Dutch consulate in Jiddah – a policy bound to sow restiveness and antagonism among Indonesian Muslims, whether reformist or orthodox.[37]

Even after the collapse of Ibn Saud's short-lived pan-Islamic schemes it took several years before the Dutch authorities at home and in the colony returned to a more sober appreciation of the *hajj*.[38] While overseas Muslims, particularly in Egypt and also in Mecca, continued to view Dutch rule over their Indonesian coreligionists with grave misgivings,[39] official relations between the Wahhabi ruler – whose coffers were so handsomely

filled by the substantial sums spent by Indonesian hajis in his realm[40] – and the Netherlands approached a degree of normalcy and even cordiality in later years.[41] Even then, however, the existence of supervisory controls, however leniently exercised, remained an irksome interference resented by the leaders of Islamic organizations in the Indies.

Other infringements of the former governmental neutrality in religious affairs, likewise the consequence of the turbulence of the post-war years, made even further inroads on the Muslim community and deepened resentment against the colonial government. In 1925 a new statute – the so-called Guru Ordinance[42] – tightened administrative control over Islamic education, hitherto governed by a more lenient ruling promulgated in 1905. The new ordinance affected orthodox and reformists alike, for it imposed upon *pesantren* teachers as well as upon *muballigh's*, *Muhammadiyah's* missionaries, the obligation to register their intention of giving religious instruction to persons outside their immediate family, together with a statement of the texts to be used in such instruction. Six years later, when the authorities had, as we shall see, come to adopt a more favorable attitude toward reformism, especially on Java, *muballigh's* were exempt from the supervision of the ordinance; at the same time, however, it was extended to thousands of humble village instructors engaged in teaching the barest rudiments of the Islamic faith to the young.[43]

Between 1923 and 1925 similar restrictions were imposed on privately sponsored school-education based on more or less Western curricula and organization. These measures, aiming at strict control of the mushrooming growth of non-governmental, 'wild' schools, culminated in 1932 in the new 'Ordinance Regulating the Control of Private Schools.'[44] It is true that the new ordinance was not aimed exclusively at Western-style Muslim education as represented by the expanding network of *Muhammadiyah* schools, but also at another, non-Islamic, education enterprise, the *Taman Siswa* schools – founded in 1922 by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro – which, because of their nationalist orientation, were

even more strongly victimized than Muslim reformist schools.[45]

Governmental intrusion in the fields of the pilgrimage and Islamic education constituted a sharp departure from Snouck Hurgronje's recommendations. If anything, they showed that, even after rebelliousness had subsided, colonial administrators found it increasingly difficult to adhere to Snouck's division between politics and religion. So deep-seated were the fears of Islamic agitation, however, that the restrictive measures were retained in spite of the meager results that they yielded. It is doubtful whether control over Mecca pilgrims considerably lessened the influx of pan-Islamic doctrines into Indonesia[46] or prevented anti-Dutch Muslims, or others, from leaving the colony. As far as the bitterly resented obligatory registration of Muslim teachers is concerned, a competent Dutch observer unequivocally asserted that not a single religious 'agitator' had been apprehended as a result of control measures whose only visible effect had been the multiplication of paper work in administrative offices.[47]

Muslim disaffection over these measures was not only caused by the mere fact of governmental interference as such. It was acerbated by the realization that the new ordinances and regulations invariably placed Regents and their subordinates on Java, and *adat*-chiefs elsewhere, in charge of Muslim affairs. This constituted a significant innovation.[48]

On Java, *priyayi* competency in matters Islamic had traditionally been restricted to the supervision of the officials entrusted with the administration of religious ceremonial, worship and religious jurisdiction. But control over the 'administrative branch' of Indonesian Islam – part of the Indonesian nobility's historical prerogative as heads of Muslim states – had over the decades suffered from the gradual decline of *priyayi* prestige, if not also from their increasing alienation from Islam, seemingly dictated by the disfavor with which Dutch administrators viewed *priyayi* interest in religious affairs.[49] By the twentieth century, it had in fact degenerated into a nominal and almost universally ineffectual function. This state of affairs was also increasingly

reflected in the unsatisfactory status of religious justice and the inferior quality of the personnel attracted to its administration, a point to which we shall presently return.

While, therefore, the accretion of *priyayi* competency in religious affairs could hardly by justified by intrinsic reasons, it was clearly dictated by the principle of governmental support for *adat* and *priyayi* authority, which aimed at isolating the Indonesian peasantry from 'outside' radicalism. Not unexpectedly, Muslim leaders were united in bitterly attacking the new regulations – soon, as we shall see, to be followed by others of greater portent – which subjected Islamic life to the traditional adversary of Indonesian Islam. Orthodox and reformists alike registered angry but fruitless protests against the strengthening of the *adat* and the limitations which the new measures imposed on religious life, even if on Java neither *Muhammadiyah* nor *Nahdatul Ulama* indulged in the strident aggressiveness evident in the criticisms of the *Sarekat* leadership.[50] On Sumatra, by contrast, reformist agitation against the Guru Ordinance, led by *Muhammadiyah* leader Dr. Abdul Karim Amrullah, was far more militant; paradoxically enough, it succeeded in forcing the authorities to suspend the ordinance on the West Coast of Sumatra.[51]

Yet, while on account of the *adat*-policy a basic rift was inevitably developing between the colonial authorities and Muslim leaders, the colonial government was simultaneously in the process of partly relaxing its earlier vigilance against Islamic reformism. This gradual return to normalcy was no doubt inspired by growing recognition of the basically non-political character of *Muhammadiyah's* work, especially on Java. Indeed, reformism on Java was not only to some extent allowed to reap the fruits of Sumatran intransigence when the government proceeded to exempt *Muhammadiyah's* evangelists – but not its other teachers – from the provisions of the ordinance of 1931; it even came to enjoy a limited measure of governmental favor in subsequent years.[52]

One of the most welcome consequences of this reversal was that the government, partly returning to Snouck Hurgronje's neutralism, ceased to throw its tacit support to Indonesian

orthodoxy. The rift between *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama*, already narrowed by internal factors, was thus allowed to heal more rapidly still.[53]

The granting of governmental subsidies to *Muhammadiyah's* Western-style schools in later years marked the culmination of the new trend. Acceptance of this aid was one of the bitterest accusations levelled at *Muhammadiyah* by *Sarekat Islam* and 'secular' nationalists, united in non-cooperative resistance to the colonial authorities.[54] Subsidizing Islamic education constituted, on the other hand, an ironical abandonment of Snouck Hurgronje's abstentionist principle, the only such abandonment to favor Indonesian Islam at that time.

This isolated concession, which at long last placed modern Islamic schools on a legally equal footing with those established by Christian missions, did not suffice, however, to reconcile Muslim leaders to the colorless tolerance accorded to their faith in the colony, which left Islam unprotected against the influence of Westernization, if not also of Christianity. They resented the fact that, in an overwhelmingly Islamic country, Christian schools – which, largely on account of their superior organization, easily qualified for support under the terms of Dutch legislation – received subsidies far in excess of their Islamic counterparts.[55]

Nor could either reformists or orthodox easily forget or forgive the fact that Christian missions were allowed to work in Indonesia,[56] and that the authorities, whenever it suited them, sought refuge behind Snouck Hurgronje's policies in justifying their stubborn refusal to appropriate revenue, largely collected from Indonesians, for the purpose of subsidizing Islamic worship, when Roman Catholics as well as Protestants enjoyed substantial support.[57] They were equally vehement in objecting to the government's unwillingness – again couched in Snouck's neutralism – to extend financial aid to Indonesian hajis stranded penniless in Mecca.[58] Last, but by no means least, Muslims could not but deeply resent the fact that 'infidel' Advisers, non-Muslims, were entrusted by a gentile government with the direction of Islamic affairs.[59]

The protests voiced against the colonial *status quo* were a symptomatic but clear indication that the spokesmen of the expanding *santri* civilization found themselves increasingly at odds with a situational logic inherent in the very existence of alien overlordship. It is doubtful whether concessions, however far-reaching, could have narrowed the growing gulf. In the measure that more and more Indonesians were becoming conscious Muslims, they were bound to feel themselves the victims of discrimination by Christian rulers. It is true that from the 1930's onward Dutch administrators, while maintaining the bulk of the bitterly resented restrictions, progressively returned to the basic principle of noninterference in the purely religious manifestations of Islam. But by placing fewer obstacles in the way of religious work and Muslim missionary activities in most parts of the archipelago, let alone by meagerly subsidizing Islamic education, they were unwittingly encouraging a development which, in the final analysis, could not but place the legitimacy of rule by 'infidels' in jeopardy.

This was the fundamental dilemma which may have inhibited the reformulation of Dutch Islamic policy. Renewed official adherence to Snouck Hurgronje's dicta may thus have constituted a *pis aller*, temporarily saved from its basic inadequacy by the convenient fact that after the 1920's the Islamic movement, especially on Java, was divided between the political *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* and the numerically even less important *Jong Islamieten Bond*, on the one hand, and the outwardly nonpolitical *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama*, on the other.

The small, if vociferous, political groups, especially the *Sarekat*, did not present the colonial authorities with a specifically Islamic problem. They were subjected to the same negative policy of repressive vigilance which the government adopted towards political movements in general, and the *Sarekat* had long since ceased to play a dominant part among them. This policy, as we saw, had sufficed to shatter the Indonesian Communist party after the abortive insurrections of the mid-1920's. In subsequent years, it had placed serious obstacles in the way of political

radicalism, whether espoused by Islamic or 'secular' nationalist parties, which until the mid-1930's were united in an attitude of stubborn non-cooperation with the Dutch government.

Exiling of prominent nationalist leaders, especially of Ir. Soekarno, the charismatic and inspiring leader of the proscribed *Partai Nasional Indonesia*, combined with minute police surveillance of all political action, had sapped the strength of the young nationalist movement.[60] Its decline was furthered by incessant personal and ideological cleavages among nationalists, especially by the bitter hostility between the *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* and 'secular' nationalist parties, which precluded united action against the government.[61]

Finally, political action was inhibited by the disastrous effects of the economic depression, the worst to strike the Indies under Dutch rule. The Indonesian *tani*, forced to devote all his energies to the task of sheer physical survival, and sealed off from political agitation by native and European administrators, no longer provided the urban political leadership, Islamic or nationalist, with a potential electorate.[62]

While generally not too unfavorable to socio-religious activities among the peasantry, the conditions created by economic deterioration and governmental repression tended to restrict political action proper to the institutions which had survived from the Ethical Era, notably the *Volksraad* and the regional and local councils. In the course of time, most Indonesian political groups came to recognize this harsh reality by gradually abandoning their earlier noncooperative platforms. From the mid-1930's onward, this forced readjustment was, significantly enough, spearheaded by the veteran leader of the old *Sarekat Islam*, Haji Agus Salim, who was soon followed by some 'secular' nationalists.[63]

The government's policy had thus achieved a major – if relatively short-lived – victory in forcing Indonesian political life into evolutionary and quasi-cooperative channels. Though even a cooperative nationalism, Islamic or non-religious, was before long to prove its ability to plead vehemently for political con-

cessions, parliamentary agitation at the center stood in sharp contrast to the quiescence of the insulated countryside. 'Tranquillity and Order' had to all intents and purposes won the day. As political factors, Islam and nationalism had seemingly been subdued, at least on Java.

If suppression of Islamic political radicalism – in itself but a very minor aspect of the colonial government's political preoccupations in later years[64] – may have superficially seemed to accord with one of Snouck Hurgronje's principles, the half-hearted and by no means consistent *laissez faire* extended to socio-religious activities should not be mistaken for a viable Islamic policy based on the other part of Snouck's recommendations.

The pious incantation of these principles was, at best, ill attuned to the realities of the Islamic renaissance which had rendered the dicta of the late nineteenth century inadequate if not obsolete. It is admittedly a moot point whether a new Islamic policy could have been formulated, capable of lessening the widening gulf between Western rulers and Muslim subjects. The basic problem posed by the vigorous growth of Indonesian Islam may, as we inferred, have made such a task highly problematical. But two additional factors actually carried the situation far beyond the fundamental problems involved.

In the first place, the nature of colonial administration had radically changed since Snouck Hurgronje's times. In the late nineteenth century, the office of the Adviser on Native Affairs had not only been the most important single agency charged with the formulation of 'native' policy; it had in addition been able to perform its duties through informal, personal, almost intimate, contacts in an atmosphere of relative leisure. The rapid evolution of the colony's political life had changed all this. The Ethical Era itself, but more particularly the storms of the 1920's, had given rise to a large, complicated and increasingly centralized bureaucratic apparatus. Of this impressive establishment, Snouck Hurgronje's successors, progressively shorn of responsibility for the direction of native affairs, formed an increasingly insignificant part.

Indeed, the government, harassed by insurrections and political intransigence, appeared to be placing ever greater reliance on officers of the administrative corps and on the political information service of its police force as the years went by. This, together with the relative insignificance of Islamic political action, appeared to have reduced the usefulness of a specialized agency, no longer entrusted with policy responsibilities, to the point where serious curtailment of the Adviser's administrative independence, if not outright abolition of the office itself, were repeatedly and freely mooted by Dutch observers in the late 1930's.[65] Though the office remained intact, its waning influence on policy makers is well illustrated by this decline in public prestige among the European community.

The second factor was of even greater, and more fatal, significance. Not only had changed political and administrative conditions undermined the stature of the Advisership, its incumbents were seemingly powerless to exert significant influence on the course of colonial policy which, for its overall direction, had to an important extent come to depend upon the directives of the Dutch Adat Law School. Doubtless Advisers still performed useful functions. It is more than probable, for example, that the return to a more abstentionist attitude vis-à-vis Islamic reformism was essentially the result of their suasion. But these were incidental successes rather than symptoms of real influence which, in the light of the accretion of Islamic strength, the Advisers should have been allowed to exert.

The basic inconsistency that resulted from the luke warm toleration of Islamic activities, on the one hand, and the consequenses of the *adat*-policy for the Indonesian Muslim community, on the other, give rise to the suspicion that in later years an Islamic policy proper had disappeared from the agenda of Dutch colonial thinking.[66] In the last decade and a half of the colonial regime, the government's left hand was, as it were, reluctantly bestowing incidental benefits on Indonesian Muslims, while its right hand was at the same time trying to strangulate the dynamic growth of the beneficiaries of this belated governmental largesse.

It is highly improbable – though as yet beyond proof[67] – that the brilliant and impetuous architect of Dutch Islamic policy should have subscribed to the sterile repetition of his erstwhile recommendations that served as the illogical stock-in-trade of official pronouncements in later years. It is, rather, more than likely that Snouck Hurgronje – whose services as consultant to the Ministry of Colonies were terminated only in December 1933 –, as well as his successors in the colony, was fighting a losing battle against the combination of forces which made the reformulation of an Islamic policy proper well-nigh impossible.

The impotence of the Advisership is starkly illuminated by its inability to prevent a series of serious encroachments on Islamic life, especially in the area of the religious law, which the government, prodded by incessant urgings from adat law reformers, planned and in part promulgated between 1929 and 1937. The fact that such intrusions could find their way into the statute book was the most glaring demonstration of the authorities' insensitivity to the existence and growing stature of the Indonesian *santri* civilization. It also betrayed an extreme naïveté concerning the nature of the Islamic faith on the part of colonial administrators and legal experts who to all intents and purposes failed to realize that their tampering with religious law – however justifiable it may have appeared in terms of the historical place of Muslim law in Indonesia, in terms of juridical equity, and even in terms of the intrinsic merit of some aspects of legal reform – could not but raise profound social and political issues.

This lack of comprehension was, furthermore, evidenced by the fact that in the revision of the competence and administration of Islamic law the spokesmen of Islamic organizations were by and large ignored. The reforms not only furthered the trend of subjecting Islamic life to *priyayi* control; their ameliorative measures aimed at enhancing the status of the officials in charge of Islamic worship and jurisdiction, whose competence orthodox and reformist spokesmen had over the years justifiably come to question with ever increasing vehemence.

What the Islamic leadership wanted was, quite clearly, to

divorce all spheres of Islamic life, including those of law administration, from *adat*, and thus ultimately from Dutch, control. What the colonial authorities were embarked upon was, equally clearly, the very opposite. It was therefore inevitable that the *adat*-policy should acerbate the tensions between the government and the Islamic leadership.[68] Unaided by 'secular' nationalists, who were on the whole not unsympathetic to this particular aspect of colonial policy, Indonesian Muslims were fighting a lone, but ultimately not altogether unsuccessful, battle against the colonial authorities.

Review of the competence and administration of law in Indonesia, especially on Java, was by objective standards long overdue. Religious justice in the colony continued to be regulated by statutes dating back to 1882, whose inadequacies and anomalies had been the subject of bitter criticisms from Snouck Hurgronje[69] and later Dutch writers. But in spite of several attempts to correct the unsatisfactory *status quo*, action had been delayed for several decades. In 1922 the colonial government had at long last appointed a commission charged with formulating recommendations for reforms, but it took another four years before these recommendations were submitted to the *Volksraad*,[70] and another five – in one instance another thirteen – years before some of them were in fact embodied in new legislation. By then, however, the context of reform had undergone significant change on account of the influence exerted by the Adat Law School. The new legislation thus went somewhat further than the commission's recommendations.[71]

Quite briefly, the shortcomings of the existing state of affairs were fourfold.[72] To begin with, Dutch legislation provided that Islamic law be administered by collegiate tribunals, the so-called *priesterraden* (priests' councils), whose existence was attributable to two grave misunderstandings of Islamic law. The designation itself was, for one thing, faulty, since there are no 'priests' in Islam. It stemmed from the early Dutch misconceptions regarding Indonesian Islam which we discussed briefly in the first chapter of this study, but more specifically perhaps from the historic

coincidence which had, on Java, led to the merger of two offices – the administration of Muslim worship and that of religious law – which are, as a rule, separated in Islam.

On Java the *penghulu* had traditionally performed the functions of mosque director and Muslim judge, thus earning the appellation of 'priests' in Dutch official nomenclature.[73] Moreover, the originators of the *priesterraden*, mistaking the *penghulu's* assessors for his 'priestly' equals, had created collegiate jurisdiction which as such ran counter to the individual judgeship which is the rule in all Muslim lands.

The second defect was of a more serious nature. It stemmed from the vagueness surrounding the competence of Islamic law. This involved both the delineation of its applicability within the framework of the Indonesian customary law and the place which religious law tribunals were to occupy vis-à-vis other indigenous law courts. The Basic Law of 1855[74] had done no more than to sanction the continued duality between *adat* and religious law within the traditional – but at no time properly defined – boundaries prevailing prior to the enactment of the new provisions. Thus while the 'priests' councils' were held to be competent in the adjudication of family law and inheritance matters, their pronouncements even in these fields, in order to become law, required executory declarations from the regular judges in ordinary native courts.

Strictly speaking, the members of these councils were therefore no more judges than they were 'priests', even in matters pertaining to their alleged jurisdiction. In all other matters, the *penghulu's* judicial competence was actually reduced to that of Muslim adviser to regular indigenous courts, and in this function his advice, based on Koranic law, carried no weight unless the customary *adat*, on which these courts relied, happened to accord with it.

Third, Dutch legislation had opened the doors to nepotism and corruption. Inspired no doubt by the sanctity with which nineteenth century liberalism surrounded the separation of judicial and executive powers, it had legally divorced the administration

of religious justice from the traditional control of the Regents, even though the *priyayi* corps continued to exercise at least nominal – and in later decades rapidly waning – supervisory functions over the *penghulu's* other duties, especially those connected with the maintenance of mosques, direction of subordinate religious officials, and the collection of the *zakat*, or religious tithes. Doubtless well-intentioned, this separation of powers did not necessarily secure legal independence. The *penghulu*, by virtue of their manifold duties and at times also because of their blood relationship with *priyayi*, remained dependent on their superiors, some of whom were not above sharing with the religious officials monies contributed by the faithful to religious establishments.

Corruption was the logical result of yet another anomaly. Unlike ordinary native judges, *penghulu* and their legal associates were not salaried government officials. Only in their capacity as Muslim advisers to the regular courts did *penghulu* receive a governmental stipend, while in their principal functions as marriage clerks and adjudicators in revocations, annulments, divorces and, above all, inheritance matters, they had to depend on fees from litigants. Especially in the twentieth century, when *priyayi* prestige was steadily declining, some of the collegiate tribunals sought to benefit from their statutory independence by holding their clientele, dependent as it was on their services, to ransom with exorbitant tariffs.

Finally, religious justice operated in a legal no-man's-land. However limited their competency, the *priesterraden* nevertheless exercised vast powers over the daily life of the Muslim community. Yet no appeals machinery had been created to review and, where necessary, annul their often arbitrary decisions. Up to 1906, the High Court in the capital city had occasionally handled appeals, but since then even this check to judicial intransigence had been allowed to fall into disuse.

It is no wonder that these factors had combined in adversely affecting the stature of Islamic law in Indonesia, especially on Java, and that this lessened prestige had, in turn, resulted in

attracting a personnel which, in spite of notable exceptions here and there, reflected scant glory on the 'administrative branch' of Indonesian Islam. The government's neglect to provide adequate training for prospective *penghulu* had for decades resulted in a corps of judges, some of whose knowledge of Islamic law could easily be surpassed by many a lesser *ulama* or *kiyayi*.

While the Muslim community and its leaders therefore had as good, if not better, reasons for dissatisfaction with the *status quo* as had its eloquent Dutch critics, Muslim spokesmen differed profoundly from Dutch authorities – especially from Adat Law School advisers – in the solutions they proffered. *Muhammadiyah*, *Nahdatul Ulama* and *Sarekat Islam* had often urged the government to ensure that Islamic tribunals be staffed by properly trained judges. They had, far more significantly, threatened to boycott the 'priests' councils' and organize competing benches of their own, staffed by *ulama* with unquestioned expertise in Islamic law.[75] In short, they desired reform for the sake of improvement, for the sake, also, of enhancing the stature and competency of the religious law, but ultimately and most importantly perhaps for the sake of uniting the 'administrative branch' with the religious movement itself, and of thus bringing Indonesian Islam closer to the realization of the *ummah*, the all-embracing Islamic community.

The government and its legal advisers were doubtless primarily motivated by a desire to rectify the errors and omissions of the past and to provide fair religious justice and a measure of protection against legal abuses for its Muslim subject. But for one thing, largely oblivious of the demands of Islamic spokesmen, the colonial government was firmly convinced of its own prerogative in this long-neglected field; and for another, its remedy for existing malpractices – in line with the overall policy of restoring and strengthening *priyayi* authority – envisioned a partial merger of executive and judicial powers by entrusting the Regents with the supervision of religious law officers. Nor was this all. The adat law experts, from whom the momentum for reform had emanated, were bent on safeguarding the

customary law – sacrosanct in their view – and thus apparently willed nothing less than the diminution of the place of the religious law throughout the archipelago.

These trends were quite clearly expressed in the ordinances which, between 1929 and 1937, were to bring order into the house of Islamic law in Indonesia. The first, the so-called Marriage Ordinance of 1929,[76] declared the *penghulu*, in his capacity of marriage clerk, a government official subject to the Regent's control, and made statutory provisions for the procedures relating to the Islamic marriage, repudiation, divorce, as well as to the fees collectable for the performance of these duties. The ordinance met with the approval of the majority of *Volksraad* members and became law.[77]

Two years later, a more far-reaching ordinance was introduced in that Council.[78] It struck at some of the worst abuses of the old order by abrogating the anomalous collegiate tribunals on Java, which were to be superseded by so-called *penghulu*-courts. The *penghulu* judge, deprived by the previous ordinance of his arbitrary powers relating to his remuneration, was to become a salaried government official. Second, the new bill established a court of appeals in the capital city with competence to review and annul judgments from the *penghulu*-courts.

The depression prevented the immediate promulgation of the 1931 ordinance, whose execution – especially with regard to *penghulu* salaries – would have required the appropriation of fairly substantial public funds. In fact, while the government continued, until the end of Dutch rule, to blame adverse economic conditions for its failure to introduce the *penghulu*-courts,[79] the appeals court – styled *Hof voor Islamietische Zaken* in Dutch, *Mahkamah Islam Tinggi* in Indonesian – came into existence in early 1938. Thus reform remained half-completed. Though corruption and judicial caprice had been effectively blocked, the stature of the still unsalaried *penghulu* and the continuance of the collegiate *priesterraden* remained anomalies in the structure of religious law.

Unimpressed by the intrinsic merits of an appellate court, the

spokesmen of both orthodox and reformist organizations greeted the establishment of the *Mahkamah Islam Tinggi* without enthusiasm.[80] Their cool reception of the new bench was indicative of Muslim misgivings at the direction of legal reform, a reform initiated by an 'infidel' government and anchored in *priyayi* control of religious jurisdiction. It was the third provision of the 1931 ordinance, however, that aroused the Islamic movement's leaders to vehement criticism. Like the 1929 Marriage Ordinance, it had been approved by a *Volksraad* majority in 1932, to become law upon viceregal promulgation five years later.[81]

This provision went far beyond the ameliorative measures contained in the other clauses of the original bill, by removing litigations in inheritance matters from the purview of religious judges. These matters were not only transferred to the regular indigenous courts, but they were henceforth to be adjudicated not according to Muslim law but to the *adat*.[82] The *priesterraden* were thus to be limited to jurisdiction in matrimonial affairs only.

The Adat Law School, invoking the alleged realities of a legal *status quo*, had triumphed in closing the doors to a social evolution which the leaders of Indonesian Islam had made the goal of their endeavors.[83] While in most areas of the archipelago the *adat* had, in fact, continued to prevail over the individualistic inheritance law of Islam, in some parts of the Indies, notably on Sumatra's West Coast, an Islamic middle class had, under the banner of the religious law, for decades been fighting the communalistic, matriarchal *adat* of the Minangkabau. Wherever, in fact, Islam had gained in influence as a result of social change and the Islamic renaissance, the battle had been joined with the *adat*.[84] The abrupt diminution in the competency of the religious law thus constituted a willful challenge to the nascent *santri* civilization in Indonesia. It is, therefore, understandable that Muslim leaders resorted to expressions of unprecedented hostility.[85]

Even though the government's reformist zeal had not yet run its full course, the final installment of legal reform proved that the

vehement Muslim protests provoked by the most recent measures had not gone entirely unheeded by the authorities. Where hitherto prospective measures had been cast in the form of bills introduced by the government spokesman in the *Volksraad*, the next move was launched as a draft-ordinance, proposed by the Department of Justice and submitted by the Adviser on Native Affairs to various Indonesian groupings for preliminary discussions. It is unlikely that the Adviser cherished an assignment bound to sow a whirlwind of Muslim fury, of which he, perhaps alone among Dutch officials, was doubtless well aware. Be that as it may, the draft-ordinance – styled 'Ordinance Concerning Registered Marriages' – invaded the only remaining province of the religious law, by rendering polygamous marriages, permitted in Islam, virtually illegal. The pitiful protection enjoyed by women under Islamic law, even under the more favorable conditions of the Indonesian marriage law,[86] should have made reform appear highly desirable. Indeed, the excessively high divorce rate in Indonesia has been termed one of the country's severest socio-juridical problems.[87] But to Islamic leaders the merits of the proposed legislation were, once again, irrelevant. They, understandably enough, saw in this latest move of the colonial government an unwarranted and intolerable invasion of Muslim affairs.[88] Confronted by indignant protests voiced at stormy meetings called by all Islamic organizations, the Justice Department withdrew its draft ordinance.[89] Thus for the first time in over three decades, Indonesian Islam had succeeded in demonstrating its strength and in calling a halt to governmental interference.

Muslim reaction to the perturbing events of the past years did not remain limited to criticism alone. The threat to Indonesian Islam inherent in the *adat*-policy, no less than the development of Indonesian political life, urgently called for organizational reorientation, if Muslim interests were to be more adequately safeguarded than in the past. It was thus, once again, opposition to external forces that finally narrowed the gap between reformists and orthodox to the point where *Muhammadiyah* and

Nahdatul Ulama could jointly sponsor the creation of a new Islamic federation, the M.I.A.I. *(Madjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia*, or Great Islamic Council of Indonesia), which was set up at Surabaya in September 1937.[90]

Admittedly the M.I.A.I. – soon joined by most of the smaller Islamic associations, Indonesian as well as Arab – was as yet no more than a loosely-organized, voluntary federation rather than a well-disciplined, united movement. In fact, disagreements between orthodoxy and reformism continued in spite of the new alliance.[91] Yet the importance of M.I.A.I. should not be underestimated. Where for many years Indonesian Muslims had been represented by a shrill but increasingly powerless spokesman, the *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*, now the two largest religious organizations, backed by hundreds of thousands of members, had assumed the leadership of Indonesian Islam.

Immediately after its founding, M.I.A.I. convened an al-Islam Congress, the first to be called since 1932, and the first whose agenda was determined by the two largest religious organizations in Indonesia, rather than by the *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*, the original sponsor of the al-Islam Congresses. The *Sarekat's* declining influence in religious affairs, mirrored by disunity among its leadership[92] – initiated by Haji Agus Salim's break with noncooperation in 1936 – could not be stemmed by recourse to even the most violent political agitation conducted in a vacuum. In 1939, when the party joined the M.I.A.I., it was one of the smallest and most vociferously noncooperative Indonesian movements, but no longer the only important Islamic political organization.

The previous year had, indeed, witnessed the founding of a new Islamic political party, the *Partai Islam Indonesia* (P.I.I.).[93] The new party was an offshoot of Islamic reformism, recruiting its leadership from the ranks of the *Jong Islamieten Bond* and from some of the dissident elements forced out of the *Sarekat Islam*. The birth of the *Partai Islam Indonesia* connoted the demise of the artificial division between religion and politics,[94] a demise long foreshadowed by the course of the Islamic renaissance. The

political arm of Indonesian reformism, it is true, resembled the pan-Islamic phantom of Snouck Hurgronje's times as little as the *Sarekat Islam* of thirty-odd years ago. It drew strength, not from agrarian unrest and social *malaise*, but from an increasingly disciplined, largely urban, Muslim community in need of adequate political representation.

From its very inception, the party sought representation in the *Volksraad*. On account of the *Sarekat's* noncooperative policy, adopted in 1924, Muslim interests in that Council had been defended by only one of its sixty members – representing the small *Jong Islamieten Bond* – appointed by the government in 1931. The ludicrous inadequacy of Islamic representation had been forcefully brought home to Muslim leaders in the course of the *Volksraad* debates accompanying the passage of the injurious ordinances of the last few years.

Not only had the chamber's European and *priyayi* members, understandably enough, voted in favor of these measures, but even the 'secular' nationalists, since the late 1930's again increasingly represented in the *Volksraad*, had shown little, if any, sympathy with the cause of Islam.[95]

Ever since the majority of Indonesian nationalists had, in fact, been forced to adopt cooperation as the only realistic avenue to political action, their numbers and parliamentary skills had assured nationalism of an enviable platform which the Islamic movements could not match. This unequal distribution of political power at the center – by no means remedied by governmental re-appointment in 1939 of the former Muslim member, Wiwoho, who was to represent the new Islamic party in the *Volksraad* – was, of course, in large measure the result of the slow political evolution of the Islamic renaissance; it was also due to the inherently inhibiting factors besetting Muslim political action discussed in the last chapter. To a large extent, however, it also emerged from Dutch colonial policy.

As we saw, the authorities had sought to decapitate the nationalist movement by exiling its ablest and most violent noncooperative leaders from Java. But this debilitating blow had

not deprived 'secular' nationalism of all leadership. Even though the absence of the first-echelon political elite had crippled the movement and deprived it of unity and central guidance, Indonesian nationalism was by no means politically dormant. The largest cooperative party, the *Parindra*, in particular, largely representing urban, white collar interests, was ably led and during the depression years had devoted itself to social and economic activities which broadened the base of the nationalist appeal.[96]

Yet the government's *adat*-policy and its minute surveillance of all political activities on the one hand, and the great attractions exerted by city life and 'great' politics on the bulk of the Western-educated political intelligentsia,[97] on the other, had combined to turn the nationalist movement into a highly vocal and skillful club of urban politicians with very slender roots among the Indonesian peasantry. Even among urban groups the movement enjoyed only limited appeal, since both government employees and *priyayi* shunned participation in politics in order to escape official disfavor.

The paradox of the Indonesian political scene, then, was that nationalism, as a predominantly urban phenomenon,commanded the human and at least some of the material resources – primarily a daily and periodical press – which endowed it in the eyes of the colonial and home governments and of the European community in the Indies, if not also of most later historians, with a significance out of proportion to its actual following in colonial times. On the other hand, the belated politicization of Indonesian Islam, demonstrated by the absurdity of its under-representation at the capital city, tended to obscure the basically political significance of Islamic developments of the past three decades or so.[98]

As yet, it was Islam rather than Indonesian 'secular' nationalism that could command a real mass following, predominantly rural as far as Islamic orthodoxy was concerned, and primarily urban in the case of reformism. Admittedly the appeal of nationalism may have been limited by obstacles placed before it by the colonial authorities. Its potential audience may, in other

words, have included thousands of Western-educated Indonesians, the products of government and private schools, especially of Ki Hadjar Dewantoro's *Taman Siswa* training institutes, for long not only a source of irritation to colonial administrators but, in view of their secular orientation – a combination of Western and *priyayi* values – a source of suspicion to many Muslim leaders as well.[99]

Even then, however, these leaders could rightfully claim a truly formidable place in Indonesian society, by virtue of sheer numbers of their followers, as well as their very considerable driving power, intelligence and even political consciousness. A quarter century had sufficed to provide Indonesian Islam with the nucleus of political leadership, emerging from the ranks of the *Jong Islamieten Bond*, but also recruited from among the younger generation representing a rejuvenated orthodoxy.[100] It which was ready to translate the demands of the Muslim community, acerbated by the ill effects of the Dutch *adat*-policy, into viable political programs.

Islamic political strength was primarily nourished by the challenges which the colonial authorities, their *priyayi* protégés, and the bulk of Western-trained Indonesian intellectuals presented to the growth and consolidation of the Indonesian *santri* civilization. Indonesian Islam's internal weakness – largely shrouded as long as Indonesians lived under foreign domination – was that it but rarely involved constructive self-criticism and positive reorientation in either doctrinal or social affairs. In spite of their impressive achievements, Indonesian reformists had paid little heed to the reexamination which the faith had for decades been undergoing elsewhere in the Muslim world.[101] And, though virulent in opposition to alien-dictated reform, both reformists and orthodox had done little to come to grips with some of the most pressing social problems – such as the status of women – besetting the Indonesian Muslim community.[102]

It is not unlikely that the intrinsically political nature of the Islamic renaissance, fostered by the colonial relationship itself and doubtless heightened by the colonial government's reluctance to grant more adequate political representation to Muslim

interests in the *Volksraad*,[103] was diverting attention from other matters. As the Indies threatened to be drawn into the growing world conflict in the late 1930's, political problems moreover continued to claim precedence over other, internal questions.

In the last years of Dutch rule, Indonesian Muslims thus came to play an increasingly important part in the colony's political life, a part which at one and the same time underlined both the similarities and the differences between Islamic and non-religious leaders. On the one hand, it became clear that in their international political orientation most Muslim leaders differed profoundly from their 'secular', nationalist compatriots; on the other, a near-identity of aims with regard to opposition to Dutch colonial rule resulted in the cementing of closer ties between nationalists, Indonesian government employees and Muslims, all three groups alienated by colonial policies intended to thwart their social and political ambitions.

In spite of the vehemence of nationalist criticisms which shortly before the outbreak of the second world war was increasingly uniting cooperators and non-cooperators, Indonesian 'secular' nationalism, ideologically attached to Western liberalism and socialism, was deeply affected by the world-wide political polarization between fascism and its foes. After the outbreak of the war and, more particularly still, after the German invasion of the Netherlands in May 1940, the majority of Indonesian nationalist leaders – including some of those living in Dutch-imposed exile – openly declared their allegiance to the cause of the Western democracies.[104] To some of them this partisanship may have been no more than a useful tactical device, designed to obtain political concessions from the colonial government. There can be little doubt, however, that others genuinely felt that the defense of democracy against its enemies – and thus the defense of the Indies against Japanese aggression – was a matter of life and death to the cause of Indonesian nationalism itself, and that temporarily it had to take precedence over the nationalist struggle against the Netherlands.[105]

By contrast, no ties of intellectual and emotional allegiance

bound most Muslim leaders to the victory of the West. If anything, sentiment in most Muslim countries tended to favor the Axis powers rather than their European opponents, most of whom had a record of colonial domination over Muslims in the Middle East, India and Indonesia. There were such factors as the still remembered Turko-German alliance of the first world war and the increasing friction in Palestine, whose Grand Mufti – a likely claimant to the Caliphate – had only recently sought exile in Berlin, to create pro-Axis sentiment. In Indonesia, furthermore, this sentiment was strengthened by the vague notions about a Japan benevolent to Islam, if not itself on the brink of conversion to the Prophet's faith.[106] All these factors were instrumental in molding a climate of Islamic opinion greatly at variance with that prevailing among most 'secular' nationalists in the colony.

To many 'secular' nationalists democracy was, after all, the ideal in whose name they hoped to wrest last-minute concessions and a measure of codetermination from the colonial authorities, if not from the Netherlands government in exile in London. To most Indonesian Muslims, by contrast, the ideology of Western liberalism and democracy had remained alien. In essence, that is to say, it would have been far easier for the colonial government to win friends among the 'secular' nationalists by a grant of greater political autonomy than to face up to the far more negative challenge represented by a politicized *santri* civilization.[107]

In the light of these considerations it is interesting to note that it was Islamic, rather than nationalist, opposition that the colonial government was seemingly endeavoring to placate in the closing period of Dutch rule. At the outset, at least, these concessions must have stemmed from a realization of Muslim restiveness demonstrated in the recent past, in particular by the strong and unmistakable protests of 1937.

In that year, *Muhammadiyah* had taken the lead in agitating for the establishment of an Islamic University in Indonesia, long felt essential to counterbalance the influence of Western higher

education available in the colony. When these plans began to take on more definite shape, the colonial government surprisingly enough promised to subsidize the new venture. Further measures followed at a somewhat faster rate after the occupation of the Netherlands in May 1940, when the local authorities were freer to take decisions without the jealous control of the strong Christian government coalition parties in the States-General at The Hague. Furthermore, it may have been found advisable to court Muslim goodwill in view of the difficult days ahead.

In November of 1940, the first special training school for *penghulu* was officially and ceremoniously opened at Tjibeureum in West Java.[108] Earlier in the same month, the government had announced – after a previously granted relaxation of exchange restrictions regarding money transfers to Indonesian pilgrims in Mecca – the appropriation of rather considerable public funds to support indigent hajis in the Arabian capital.[109] And a few months before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the colonial government took an equally unprecedented step when it announced the issuance of a series of five special postage stamps with a charity surcharge for the benefit of *Muhammadiyah*.[110]

These in themselves minute concessions showed that, confronted by the prospect of war against Japan, Dutch policy makers had at long last awakened to the necessity of winning friends among the Islamic leadership and of abandoning the cloak of Snouck Hurgronje's abstentionist principles which had, in spite of repeated infringements and violation, continued to provide the official basis of Dutch Islamic policy.

How far these belated efforts at redressing the balance went is difficult to know. Some government spokesmen may have tried to reach important *ulama* and *kiyayi*, some of whom had since Snouck Hurgronje's time shown a favorable attitude towards the colonial authorities, with a view to mobilizing their influence among the peasantry.[111] And though nothing was done to repair one of the most damaging measures of recent years – the withdrawal of inheritance matters from religious jurisdiction – the government was apparently contemplating the revocation of a source

of long-standing and constant friction, the Guru Ordinance of 1925, but events were to more too fast for its implementation.[112]

Significant and no doubt welcome as these belated concessions were, it is doubtful, however, that they sufficed to make Islamic leaders view the continuation of Dutch colonialism with greater benevolence. For one thing, the concessions could not erase the memory of the *adat*-policy which they, even at that late date, did not supersede. For another, and more important perhaps, the heightened pulse of political life in the colony, resulting from the war, irresistibly drew Indonesian Muslims into the political arena, where they found themselves, together with non-Islamic Indonesian groups, in growing opposition to the colonial government.

The political climate prevailing in the colony on the eve of the Japanese invasion was, if anything, deteriorating. The occupation of the Netherlands notwithstanding, Dutch authorities showed little willingness to meet Indonesian demands for political concessions, and this attitude was barely beginning to change after the outbreak of the war in the Pacific. Dutch stubbornness was largely responsible for bringing the cooperative and non-cooperative wings of the nationalist movement ever closer together and for welding greater unity among 'secular' nationalists and Muslims.

In May 1939, a new federation joined by most nationalist parties, the *Gapi (Gabungan Politiek Indonesia*, or Indonesian Political Union)[113] came into existence, to be followed by the creation of an even more ambitious united front of Indonesian groupings seven months later. This body passed through two stages; the rather cumbersome *Kongres Rakjat Indonesia* (Congress of the Indonesian People), which transformed itself into the far more promising *Madjelis Rakjat Indonesia* (Council of the Indonesian People) in September 1941.[114] In this fairly impressive, if loosely organized, federative organization the three prominent elite groups of pre-war Indonesia – the political federation *Gapi*, the Islamic federation M.I.A.I. and P.V.P.N., the association of government employees[115] – temporarily joined hands

in demonstrating Indonesian dissatisfaction with the colonial *status quo*. Shortly before Pearl Harbor, they united in calling for an Indonesian parliament and the adoption of a national language, an anthem and a flag.

Their basic unity had in the course of the past few years been twice highlighted by motions approved by majorities – significantly enough obtained with Eurasian backing – in the *Volksraad*. In 1936, Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo, representing the young generation of *priyayi* officialdom, had petitioned the Netherlands government to convene an imperial conference for the purpose of providing for Indonesian autonomy within a reorganized Dutch empire. In February 1940, three months before Holland was invaded by German troops, Wiwoho, spokesman for the cooperative *Partai Islam Indonesia*, had pressed for similar concessions.[116]

Both petitions were rejected, the first in The Hague, the other in London, only to find unacknowledged acceptance in the Queen's promise to call an imperial conference after victory had been attained, broadcast to Indonesia in May 1941. This was followed, eighteen months later, by the Queen's further promise to entrust the prospected imperial conference with the task of discussing far-reaching constitutional reforms. By then, however, Indonesia was already occupied by the soldiers of the Rising Sun.[117]

Only when the danger of Japanese invasion loomed large and unmistakable on the horizon did the colonial government seek a *rapprochement* with the representatives of the Indonesian elites joined in the *Madjelis Rakjat Indonesia*. A conference was scheduled between its executive and an emissary of the governor general in January 1942, when Japanese troops had already started on their lightning sweep through mainland Southeast Asia, and when the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies were starting to experience the bitter facts of Japanese superiority in aerial warfare.

But the conference never took place, and the all-Indonesian federation whose spokesmen were there to have conducted negotiations broke up a few weeks before the Japanese invasion of

Java, and for reasons which seem, in part at least, to have been conditioned by anticipation of this event. The cancelling of the conference, as well as the shattering of the short-lived unity recently attained by the three Indonesian elites, was the work of the veteran *enfant terrible* of Indonesian nationalism and Indonesian Islam, the *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*, which, apparently smarting from its long decline, opposed this last Indonesian gesture of cooperation with the colonial government by leaving both the *Gapi* and the *Madjelis Rakjat Indonesia* in protest.[118]

On the eve of the Japanese occupation the *Sarekat* was thus, Dutch concessions notwithstanding, endeavoring to steer the Islamic movement in the direction of hostile noncooperation. This action, as well as developments in the early stages of the occupation to be discussed in the following chapter, make it appear very likely that some of the *Sarekat* leaders, at least, had for some time past been receptive to overtures from Japanese agents in the Indies.[119] Gaining the upper hand in the Islamic federation, M.I.A.I., which the party – not without serious and apprehensive criticisms from several Muslim quarters[120] – had joined in 1939, the *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* was arrogating to itself the leading role in the new era dawning for Indonesian Islam.

PANCASILA

KETUHANAN YANG MAHA ESA

KEMANUSIAAN YANG ADIL DAN BERADAB

PERSATUAN INDONESIA

KERAKYATAN YANG DIPIMPIN OLEH HIKMAT KEBIJAK-SANAAN DALAM PERMUSYAWARATAN / PERWAKILAN

KEADILAN SOSIAL BAGI SELURUH RAKYAT INDONESIA

Part Two

The Japanese Occupation

"Java peut être défendue sur terre, à la condition que l'on puisse compter sur le concours des Javanais. Mais je crois que dans l'état actuel des choses, la population native accepterait avec la plus grande indifférence de change du maître..." ("L'Avenir de l'Islam à Java," *op. cit.*, p. 519).

"With Nippon we stand, with Nippon we fall, in the path of Allah, to destroy a tyrannous enemy!" (From a *Masjumi* resolution of October, 1944, reprinted in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, Vol. II, No. 20 [October 15, 1944], p. 2.)

Chapter Four

Trial and Error: April – December 1942

For at least four decades intimate knowledge, derived both from devoted and scientific study and from constant contact with Islamic life in Indonesia, had made of the Netherlands one of the most conscientious and best-informed Western colonial powers controlling the lives of millions of Muslims. Some of the most capable Dutchmen ever drawn into colonial administration had been in charge of Islamic affairs in Indonesia. Even though Snouck Hurgronje's successors could not claim to be their master's equals in either erudition or influence, the Advisers of later years were, largely because of circumstances beyond their control, lacking in authority rather than in knowledge and devotion. They had inherited from Snouck the tradition of careful and painstaking study, which entitled them to the, be it grudging, respect of the Indonesian Muslim community.

The Japanese 'discovery' of Islam, by contrast, dates back only to the mid-1920's. It was patently motivated by the expansionist plans of Dai Nippon, since only a few hundred Muslims lived on Japanese territory at that time.[1]

From the mid-1920's on, institutes devoted to the study of Islam and periodicals dealing with Islamic problems made their appearance in Japan. In 1933, several quarters started an agitation aimed at making Japan the protector of Islam, and two years later the first group of four students was sent to Arabia and Egypt to prepare themselves for propaganda work.[2] At the same time, the Japanese authorities were encouraging Muslim students and teachers, from the Middle East as well as from Asian countries, to come to Japan. A beginning was made with the publication of Arabic-language journals for distribution abroad.

In 1935, the first mosque was built at Kobe, to be followed in 1938 by a more impressive place of worship in the capital city, which was ceremoniously opened in the presence of many foreign guests, including Prince Hussein of Yemen.[3] A Japanese Islamic Association (*Dai Nippon Kaikyō Kyōkai*) was formed in May 1938, with General Senjurō Hayashi – 'Father of Japanese Islam' – as its president.[4]

By September 1939, this new organization officially commenced its activites by inviting overseas Muslims to attend an Islamic Exhibition in Tokyo and Osaka on November 5-29 of the same year. For the first time in the history of Indonesian Islam, its attention shifted from the Near East to the Land of the Rising Sun. A special conference was called by M.I.A.I. at the beginning of October, at which the Tokyo invitation was accepted.[5]

The sponsors of the exhibition made excellent use of the presence of the many Muslim delegations from abroad – whose expenses were paid by the hosts – by arranging for a round table conference which constituted itself the first Islamic World Congress.[6] This was a shrewd move, in view of the fact that a similar congress, planned by Ibn Saud for 1927 had, as we mentioned, failed to materialize. A Japanese Islamic 'expert', professor T. Kanaya, was despatched to the Indies shortly after the Congress, with the aim of strengthening the bonds between Japanese and Indonesian Muslims. He was, however, deprived of the fruits of his mission through the vigilance of the colonial government, which had little reason, indeed, to prefer a Japanese pseudo pan-Islam to its politically far less harmful predecessor.[7]

In the absence of Indonesian comments on the Congress, it is difficult to estimate the impression which this sudden Japanese interest in matters Islamic made on the overseas visitors.[8] No doubt interest in Indonesian Islam – springing from whatever motives – may to some extent at least have been welcomed because of the prestige factor. Japan's anti-Western propaganda may also have struck a sympathetic chord, in particular among some orthodox Muslims.

Although from a purely religious point of view Japan could never successfully aspire to become the real center of the Islamic world,[9] its geopolitical proximity to Indonesia could not be underestimated. In addition, adroit Japanese propaganda had almost certainly been to some extent effective in Indonesia. Stressing alleged similarities between Shintō and Islam, it held out hopes for the eventual conversion of the emperor to the Prophet's faith, and painted a glowing picture of the coming Muslim world empire centering around the Emperor-Caliph of Greater Japan.[10] In the light of earlier Islamic hopes in Indonesia it is not impossible, therefore, that to some Muslim leaders a Japanese liberation from Christian rule may now have appeared to be neither implausible nor altogether undesirable. This factor, together with the international orientation of Indonesian Islam previously discussed, may account for an attitude of hopeful, if very vague, expectation which may have been a partial result of Japan's Islamic offensive in the late 1930's.

As far as can be ascertained from the meager printed pre-invasion record and, more significantly, from the events following in the wake of the occupation, this Japanese Islamic offensive appears to have been more successful in terms of eliciting military support from Indonesian Muslims during the Japanese landings in Sumatra than in the political center of Indonesia, Java. The Indies' government, however, claimed in 1941 that a Muslim organization, as well as a nationalist group on that island, had been 'approached' by Japanese agents.[11] While the only published accusation of pro-Japanese activities was levelled at Husein Thamrin, leader of *Parindra*, the largest pre-war nationalist party, in early 1941,[12] there is, as we said, good reason to believe that some of the principal members of the *Sarekat* leadership had been sympathetic to Japanese overtures in the months preceding the invasion.

In at least two important regions of Sumatra the coming of the Japanese had been facilitated by apparently well-organized Islamic anti-Dutch resistance groups, some of which appear

to have been set up with considerable Japanese aid. In Acheh, traditionally the most fanatical Islamic stronghold, the so-called *Organisasi F* played an important role during the invasion and was well rewarded during the occupation.[13] Two similar groups – *Indonesia Bergerak* and *Islam Raya* – apparently operated in the Minangkabau region of Western Sumatra, which, as we have seen, had led the opposition to the *adat*-policy in recent years.[14]

Although we must be cautious in taking contemporary statements at their face value, the following testimony of one of the most noted leaders, writing of the situation in Eastern Sumatra before the landings, may have some significance:

> ...In spite of all the [Dutch] prohibitions and obstacles we always clandestinely listened to the broadcasts from Nippon, so that we might know when they [the Japanese] would come here... [And when they did come], thousands of us gathered in front of the Great Mosque [at Medan] and welcomed them with shouts of 'Banzai!'[15]

On Java, on the other hand, neither Islamic nor 'secular' nationalist elements seem to have organized active resistance to the very short-lived Dutch military operations against the invader. The fall of the colonial government left a bewildered, if to some extent expectant, political vacuum. The prevalent attitude was aptly expressed by a nationalist editor, Dr. Ratu Langi, two days after the fall of the capital city:

> The question now arises..., what is awaiting us, ...the Indonesian people? This people, in its entirety, has lived through this war passively. It would be wrong to assume that the millions of the 'silent masses' in the towns, hamlets and villages ... have been actively interested in the present conduct of the war... The same can be said of the majority of the intellectuals ...And [even] the politically organized groups... have [not] had part in the conduct of the war[16].

It is true that the population in many parts of Java enthusiastically greeted the invading troops with Indonesian and Japanese flags dropped from Japanese 'planes[17]; but this reception was by no means universal, nor was it to any marked degree tinged with Muslim fanaticism.[18] One of the most famous and revered

of Sumatran reformists, Dr. Amrullah, who lived in Dutch-imposed exile at Sukabumi in Western Java, neither indulged in a cordial welcome to the invader, nor did his release result in Islamic, pro-Japanese demonstrations.[19] Thus while the attitude of some Muslims on Java – or at least of some of their leaders – may have contained a grain of benevolent expectation, they shared their general lack of enthusiasm for Nippon, as well as their unpreparedness for the new regime, with the majority of Indonesian officials and nationalist leaders.[20]

Before we proceed to discuss the developments which marked the beginnings of the new and important chapter in Indonesian Islam, an endeavor should be made to analyze its situational background. The coming of the Japanese suddenly confronted the Muslims on Java with colonial rulers actively interested in winning their support. The decades-old quasi-neutrality of the Netherlands had crumbled in the span of a few days only, to be replaced by immediate and insistent interference of a ruthless and victorious occupation army.

The rapid transition from Dutch rule to Japanese 'liberation' barely left time for the realization that henceforth the choice – for nationalist and Muslim leaders alike – would no longer be between cooperation and noncooperation. The issue of 'collaboration' was, by and large, decided by the mere presence of naked military power; to refuse such collaboration required unusual moral courage, while noncooperation under European rule had called only for prudence. Where once imprisonment or exile had been the worst punishments for radical agitation, now torture or death could be meted out to those suspect only of disobedience.

Although this sudden, iron reality confronted all Indonesian elite-groups alike, the Muslims on Java had at their disposal potentially greater defenses than had either *priyayi*, other Indonesian government officials or the non-religious nationalists. They had, first of all, a religious creed. It could be – and at times was – compromised by some of its believers, it is true; but it offered a moral refuge and became a source of strength

unlike any other Indonesian sentiment. In the eyes of the true believer, the Japanese remained in the final analysis barbarian idolators equipped with military force. The Muslims thus had a moral weapon at their disposal, and they could make cooperation conditional on respect for their religion. Whatever political or moral opinions concerning the Japanese other Indonesian individuals or groups might have held, they could not similarly use them as weapons against the new regime.

The second Islamic source of strength – closely linked to the first – lay in its wide popular support. Muslim leaders, that is, had bargaining power because they, rather than any other element in Indonesian society, represented a large and viable electorate. In contrast to the relatively small nationalist parties, reformist and orthodox organizations counted hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of adherents. In particular, Islam could still claim the allegiance of the *tani*. While in the eyes of the rural population even the administrative village heads, though locally elected, had remained officials and tax-collectors under colonial rule, the religious teachers and Koran expounders to be found in every hamlet had throughout colonial times remained their counselors and the educators of their children. Untainted by any connection with the gentile government, the man of God was yet the villagers' only link with the outside world. In many cases he had made the pilgrimage to Mecca and was thus the symbol of the distant overseas Muslim community living in their midst. To win the acquiescence and, beyond it, the active support from the mass of the Indonesian peasantry, the Japanese could thus be made to pay a price.

The military administrators obviously realized the importance of Islam as a power factor in the Indonesian village. Although lacking in the academic expertise and scientific apparatus of their predecessors, the Japanese came to Java with a blueprint of a policy aimed at winning Muslim support. This policy – in part a crude reversal of Dutch aims – was primarily concerned with the grass-roots level of the Islamic problem.

The deep-seated, centuries-old resentment against Christian rule was to be mobilized, at the outset to increase agricultural production for the benefit of the 'liberators and defenders of Indonesian Islam', later to defend religion and fatherland against the threatening return of the gentile rulers. This basic aim of their policy the Japanese hoped to achieve, as we shall see, with a fairly shrewd combination of flattery and pressure; but even though it was successful in many respects, its very success involved a *quid pro quo* in the form of Japanese recognition of the reality and strength of Islam which went well beyond the limits which the invader may have originally intended. And, successful though the policy was, it did not altogether prevent the recurrence of grass-roots disturbances in the later stages of occupation.

The Japanese blueprint gave far less consideration to Islam on the socio-religious level; in particular, it contained neither redress of the unfavorable balance between *adat*-law and religious jurisdiction, nor originally a great willingness to yield to some of the most insistent Islamic demands under Dutch rule. In other words, the occupation was to shift the Islamic movements on Java into new channels. Deprived of their relative freedom to agitate for the realization of an Indonesian *santri* civilization which they had enjoyed under Dutch rule, Muslim leaders were forced to operate within an entirely new framework laid down by the Japanese.[21] Nonetheless, in the course of the occupation some important concessions to Muslim demands were granted; these concessions were partly the result of Japanese policies toward the *priyayi* officials in general, and partly they were dictated by the increasing importance which the Islamic movement assumed when Allied invasion seemed impending.

The most interesting development occurred, finally, on the political level. As we shall presently see, the divorce of Islam from politics was to all intents and purposes as important a desideratum in the original Japanese blueprint as it had been to Snouck Hurgronje. Like their predecessors, the Japanese

therefore kept close control over Muslim organizations, in particular over Islamic education.[22] On the other hand, however, the new rulers not only provided greater representation of Muslim leaders in the new quasi-political organs than had existed in the colonial institutions which they replaced; more important still, in their endeavor to mobilize Indonesian Islam the military administration forged an unprecedentedly close link between the Islamic elite and its rural following. Ultimately, the Muslim organization thus became a political force *par excellence* and a serious rival to the non-religious nationalist movement.

Paradoxically, Muslim leaders on Java thus were able to approach their goal of obtaining greater influence, and of realizing the *santri* ideal, through Japanese policies. While their specific pre-war demands in the realm of socio-religious reform had been partly silenced by the military authorities, the Islamic community could in the end use its increased political bargaining power to press for these reforms in independent Indonesia.

Eager to rally all major anti-Dutch forces to their side from the very outset, the Japanese yet appear to have felt that to ensure Muslim goodwill was a matter of greater urgency than to satisfy the demands of the nationalist elite. In addition to their correct appreciation of the unique grass-roots importance of Islam, the Japanese may have singled out Muslim leaders as perhaps the most reliable and 'Eastern-oriented' element. Neither *priyayi* nor other government officials could, by comparison, as a group easily escape the stigma of their previous loyalty to the colonial government. Lastly, although the new masters may not have attached undue weight to the democratic and liberal principles loudly proclaimed by so many nationalists in the recent past, the ideological orientation of the Western-educated Indonesian intelligentsia may have originally rendered them allies of somewhat dubious reliability, and, more important still, of little political influence outside the few major urban centers.

With these important, if necessarily to some extent speculative,

factors in mind, we can now resume the examination of the available record.

The priority given to the Islamic problem by the occupying army was startlingly demonstrated as soon as Batavia had fallen into Japanese hands.[23] Long before the Army's *Barisan Propaganda* (Propaganda Corps) had started its first campaign, the 'invasion' of the Islamic world had commenced. Only a week after the fall of the capital city, worshippers in several Djakarta mosques were astonished to find Japanese Muslims in army uniform attending and participating in their services.[24]

A few days later, a Colonel Horie made his first appearance in the capital's Kwitang Mosque; he was accompanied by a Japanese Muslim, Muhammad Abdul Muniam Inada, and delivered an address in Japanese.[25] Towards the end of March, the Religious Affairs Office (*Shūmubu* in Japanese, *Kantor Urusan Agama* in Indonesian) was already reported to be operating, with Colonel Horie at its head; its first actions included the posting of signs, which appeared on all houses of Muslim worship, placing them under the control of the Dai Nippon Army.[26]

While contacts with the religious world were established,[27] all Indonesian political activity was almost immediately prohibited by a decree of Lt.-General Imamura, first Commander-in-Chief on Java.[28] This decree, forbidding "any discussion or organization . . . concerned with the political administration of the country," put an abrupt end to the hectic political speculations which had followed the entry of Japanese troops into the capital.[29] The interdict did not have the automatic effect of extinguishing the existing political parties,[30] but it condemned them to the fate of gradually 'withering away', until they were, one year later, supplanted by a new, Japanese-sponsored, unitary movement.

While the new rulers were for some months apparently content to leave the nationalist movement in general in a state of semi-dissolution, they made it clear that they would not tolerate the – in their eyes – unholy wedding of Islam and politics. Of all

political groups, Islamic political parties were singled out for explicit prohibition. The *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* announced the closing of its Djakarta head-office as of May 9 and ordered all branches to follow suit immediately.[31] On May 20, the reformists' *Partai Islam Indonesia* had to publish a similar announcement.[32]

This implementation of the political aspect of the new Islamic policy actually contained a goodly grain of retrospective irony with regard to the *Sarekat* leadership. In the first days of the occupation, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, the party's chairman, had understandably enough endeavored to reap the fruits of his obstinately 'non-cooperative' past, by prematurely offering his services as Indonesian premier to the 'liberators'.[33] Although on the political plane these hopes were speedily extinguished by the previously noted general ban on political activity, followed by the specific prohibition of Islamic political parties, Abikusno was for some time successful in exerting influence on such Muslim activities as the new rulers were eager to encourage.

These activities were planned to be part of the so-called 'Triple-A Movement', the first large-scale Japanese-sponsored organization, launched in early April.[34] The 'Triple-A Movement' was, in fact, a stop-gap measure devised by the Propaganda Corps, which took the initiative in seeking Indonesian support for the new regime. The new mass movement was intended to embrace all Asians, and to supplant all existing political, cultural, and religious organizations on Java. The leadership of 'AAA' – the Japanese propaganda-expert Shimizu and Samsuddin, a young *Parindra* leader – used the following months to organize intellectuals, religious groups, Muslim and Christian, government officials and *priyayi* in several meetings, while broadcasts and newspapers appealed for public support.[35]

Interestingly enough, while no separate organizational subdivision within the 'Triple-A Movement' was set up to house either nationalist groups or government officials, preparations were taken to create an all-embracing Muslim body which was to become a part of the new movement. Judging by the

available record, it would appear that this body was originally meant to supplant the M.I.A.I.. The Japanese may have wished to abolish the existing Islamic federation which was, like most pre-invasion organizations, tainted with an overtly anti-colonial record. Yet it was, as we shall presently see, to survive this first onslaught – a remarkable enough exception to what undoubtedly was a chief aim of Japanese policy.

In fact, the occupation army's Office of Religious Affairs had in early May established contacts with the M.I.A.I. executive.[36] These talks led to a tour of the main Islamic centers on Java by a three-man M.I.A.I. delegation, accompanied by Colonel Horie and Haji Inada, which culminated in an impressive meeting at Surabaya, allegedly attended by some ten thousand people.[37] This joint enterprise did not constitute official recognition of the Islamic federation; but the great prestige of its executive was skillfully used by the *Shūmubu* which, as it were, by this move identified itself with the national Islamic leadership while at the same time building a direct bridge with the local leaders of Indonesian Islam. This sudden and striking departure from Dutch aloofness, aided by the presence of the accompanying Japanese Muslims, could not fail to make a profound first impression, especially on the main targets of the official tour: the leading *ulama* and *kiyayi* of the smaller centers, who were invariably asked to attend the meetings in the cities.

As far as the Japanese were concerned, the task of M.I.A.I. was apparently terminated after this inspection and reconnaissance trip. It is not impossible that Horie, having established direct contact with the lower echelon leaders on Java,[38] was content to leave the task of establishing a new Muslim organization to Shimizu's initiative. At any rate, for several months M.I.A.I. suffered an eclipse, for reasons that were in part explained by the very name of the new Islamic organization, 'Preparatory [Committee] for the Unification of the Islamic Community' *(Persiapan Persatoean Oemmat Islam)*, which was a sub-division of the 'Triple-A Movement'. The intention was

clearly to mold Indonesian Muslims into one, unitary body which should take the place of the rather loose pre-invasion federation. Launched some time during July 1942, this new Japanese creation was housed in a rather impressive building in Djakarta.[39]

The new committee was headed by P.S.I.I.-chairman Abikusno Tjokrosujoso who, for a brief moment, acted as the Japanese-sponsored spokesman of Indonesian Islam on Java.[40] After several meetings, in which Inada and Ono participated,[41] the committee, in conjunction with the 'Triple-A' executive, called a three-day meeting of all Muslim leaders to be held at Djakarta between August 21-23.[42]

Some days before that first and important conference was to open, Abikusno explained its aims in a long address over Radio Batavia:

> Viewed in the light of the present era of change [Abikusno said], it is apparent that Indonesian Islam cannot be considered... to be united as long as there exist several organizations, even though a unifying center, M.I.A.I., may have been formerly established... This is the... reason why the word 'preparatory' [is used for this organization], in which many vacancies still exist...[43]

The conference of all leaders of the existing major Islamic groups on Java was called in the hope of filling these 'vacancies', and of proceeding with the setting up of a new, unified organization.

The difficulties of such a sudden merger were, however, greater than the Japanese had apparently realized. The ease with which the comparatively small nationalist parties with their few thousand, mostly urban, followers could be *de facto* abolished and accomodated in the 'Triple-A Movement' found no counterpart in the larger task of merging the organized reformist and orthodox Muslims. Abikusno recognized the problem, and advocated a carefully planned program of explanation to the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of members of the existing religious organizations[44] which were to lose their identity:

> If the Islamic groups are simply dissolved, their former members would be automatically deprived of their membership... With a view to this fact, the word 'abolition' must be taken to mean that such former members... will *eo ipso* become members of the *Persatoean*...; the executives could, perhaps, in their announcements concerning [their organizations'] abolition instruct their branches to transfer all their members to the *Persatoean*.[45]

If this was the original intention of the sponsors of the conference, it was never fulfilled. The meeting itself was, perhaps for technical reasons, delayed for a few days; preliminary discussions took place in late August, but the plenary session, attended by thirty leaders of Islamic organizations, officially opened on September 4 under the auspices of 'Triple-A' headquarters in the new building.[46] At the conclusion of the outwardly very successful three days' talks, the capital's first Muslim mass meeting was held, where thousands of Djakartans were introduced to the alliance between Java's religious leaders and their new overlords. This unprecedented spectacle for the capital's populace was paralleled by a similarly novel honor for the participating Muslim leaders, who were entertained by Colonel Horie in Batavia's world famous Hotel des Indes – an event undreamt of under Dutch rule.[47]

These signs of benevolence and cooperation signalled the end of the Preparatory Committee, and that of its chairman, Abikusno, as spokesman for Indonesian Islam on Java. Surprisingly enough, however, no new organization came into existence as a result of the conference. Instead of creating a monolithic *Persatoean*, the conference – after what must have been a fairly animated and by no means entirely subservient discussion – decided to retain M.I.A.I., and to vest it with the functions of central spokesman.[48] More surprisingly still, no real merger took place, since the participating groups, with the exception of the two dissolved Islamic political parties, retained their identity and continued their activities.[49]

The conference decided to move the organization's head office from distant Surabaya to the seat of the military administration,

Batavia. It also elected a new M.I.A.I. executive, if which W. Wondoamiseno became the chairman. The importance attached to the position of the new head of Indonesian Islam was emphasized by an audience granted to him by Lt.-Gen. Imamura, first Japanese Commander-in-Chief on Java, on September 9.[50]

The most significant aspect of this reconstituted Islamic federation was doubtless the victory of the radical P.S.I.I. leadership over that of the two largest Muslim organizations, *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama*. It was the latter who, as we saw, had taken the initiative in forming the M.I.A.I. in late 1937. Now, however, control was, temporarily at least, wrested from them in the first major Islamic development under the occupation. Abikusno's departure from the Islamic stage notwithstanding, the P.S.I.I. was thus seemingly reaping the benefits of its pro-Japanese leanings during the last stages of Dutch rule. The initial advantage enjoyed by this small group may have forced other Muslim spokesmen – especially those of *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama* – to accept, however grudgingly, Wondoamiseno's leadership in this early period.[51] When the new functionaries for the central organs were elected two months later, it is true that the two major organizations were represented by two members each on the executive committee; but two P.S.I.I. leaders occupied the decisive positions of chairman and secretary.

Twenty-two distinguished Muslims – including four Arabs – sat on the board of management.[52] While, finally, the handling of day-to-day affairs was thus outwardly entrusted to Indonesians, an Advisory Body *(Badan Penasehat)* – more accurately perhaps, a steering committee – was attached to the M.I.A.I., in which five of the most distinguished Muslims on Java were joined by three Japanese Muslim officials of the *Shūmubu*.[53]

By the end of 1942, then, an Islamic organization had been established. At that time, the 'Triple-A Movement', of which the *Persatoean* was to have become a part, had itself been abandoned by the authorities[54]; as a result, M.I.A.I. continued

as an 'independent' organization without any links to other movements. As we shall see, the military authorities never thereafter endeavored to undo this early separation.

While the Japanese had not succeeded in creating a new and unified organ, they had secured the collaboration of the Islamic leadership, eliminated Islamic political parties, and had placed Muslim affairs under their direct supervision at Batavia by attaching three Japanese officials to the controlling board of M.I.A.I., which presumably was in charge of determining overall policy. This arrangement seemed, by and large, to meet the requirements of Japanese policy in the first year of the occupation.

The re-establishment of M.I.A.I. antedated by six months the creation of the nationalist *Putera* movement. Originally planned to commence its activities in December 1942,[55] it was only inaugurated on March 8, 1943, because permission for this movement from Tokyo was delayed.[56]

An analysis of this movement and its importance during the early occupation period lies outside the scope of this study; but three brief comments should be added in connection with our main topic. First, the top-leadership of *Putera* consisted of the '*Empat Serangkai*' (the Four-Leaf Clover) which included the veteran political leaders Ir. Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, the beloved educator Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, chairman of the *Taman Siswa* organization, and, finally, Kiyayi Haji Mas Mansur, the highly esteemed former chairman of *Muhammadiyah*.[57] Thus, while organizationally M.I.A.I. and *Putera* remained distinct, one of Java's most prominent Muslims occupied a leading position in the nationalist organization; Mansur's importance was still further underlined when he temporarily became vice-chairman of M.I.A.I. in early 1943.[58]

Second, both organizations were officially under Indonesian management, but, like the M.I.A.I., *Putera* also had its Japanese 'advisers' in a 'shadow cabinet', the so-called Consultative Council *(Madjelis Pertimbangan)*, created in May 1943.[59]

Finally – and of greater significance still – M.I.A.I. and

Putera, as we shall see, ceased to exist at approximately the same time in late 1943; both, that is, came into being as the result of a policy dictated by early Japanese hopes of victory, and both were abolished when these hopes had to give way to material and psychological defense preparations on Java. While the new policy, as will be seen, diminished the scope of nationalist action, it enhanced the further growth of the Islamic movement.

One last, important, point of difference between the two movements should be added at this juncture. Since early in the occupation, the nationalist elite had been deprived of any publication of its own[60]; neither the 'Triple-A Movement' nor *Putera* were allowed to print their own periodicals. In spite of repeated requests, permission for a nationalist weekly was in fact only granted some three months before the collapse of Japanese rule.[61] By contrast, Indonesian Islam on Java possessed a bi-weekly magazine from January 1943 onwards, when the M.I.A.I.'s journal, *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, commenced publication. Thus the Islamic elite enjoyed an important advantage over other Indonesian groups from the outset.[62]

Japanese Muslim policy was, however, not exhausted with the creation of a central Islamic institution which, as we saw, even so retained more of its 'federal' characteristics than had to all intents and purposes been envisaged. For one thing, that policy went beyond the urban Islamic elite to the thousands of *kiyayi* and *ulama* on Java, who were to have joined the *Persatoean* according to the blueprint originally announced by Abikusno in August 1942.[63] In point of fact, the compromise solution of resuscitating the M.I.A.I. involved the continuation of the *status quo* of the existing Islamic organizations. The Japanese, therefore, sought to establish direct contact with the village-teachers and Koran expounders.

On December 7, 1942, thirty-two *ulama* from all over Java were honored by a reception by the C-in-C at the gubernatorial palace in Batavia – a move shrewdly calculated to impress these religious leaders with their own dignity and with the

military authorities' recognition of their importance.[64] This meeting – unprecedented and unthought of under Dutch rule – was arranged by the *Shūmubu*, without the intermediary of M.I.A.I., whose executive was, significantly, not in attendance at the reception. In an important address by the *Gunseikan* (Head of the Military Government),[65] Major General Okazaki, the government's intention of regarding the *ulama*, rather than the M.I.A.I., as the leaders of Islam, was clearly implied.[66] He concluded his address by confirming that his guests were "the leaders of religion, who are honored by the people."[67]

As the coming months were to show, the Japanese authorities carried this policy beyond the first representative group of distinguished Muslim leaders to the thousands of *ulama* in the villages, whose collaboration was later to be rewarded with important accretion of their local power and prestige at the expense of the *priyayi* officials. The direction of Japanese Islamic policy likewise foreshadowed the demise of M.I.A.I. as the central Islamic organ at Batavia.

Chapter Five

Indonesian Islam and the Spirit of Dai Nippon

The series of rapid Japanese victories in Southeast Asia, culminating in the lightning conquest of Java, had doubtless made a deep impression on most Indonesian leaders. Nippon's military might and the deadly blow it had struck at Western colonialism thus became two of the most important factors in the thinking of the Indonesian people, especially during the first two years of the Japanese occupation.

While it is difficult to gauge the depth and sincerity of pro-Japanese sentiment, fostered by a combination of admiration and fear, it would be misleading to underestimate its importance, particularly among the younger generation undergoing a new and dynamic experience. Post-occupation developments have, as we know, often shown the strength of this Japanese legacy. Again, the imprint of the Japanese conquest on many, if not most, members of the various Indonesian elite-groups should not be minimized. The great majority of these leaders lacked sophistication and political experience and were thus almost totally unprepared for the sudden change of colonial rulers. The negative role assigned to them under Dutch rule had only equipped them with the weapons of criticism, while they had been denied the indispensable schooling which only political responsibility could have provided.

These factors may, partly at least, account for the phenomenon of Indonesian 'collaboration' in which, as far as the writer can judge, most members of the political, administrative, and Islamic elites participated – be it with varying degrees of conviction and enthusiasm. It is probable that the Japanese were more successful among the often rootless, Western-educated intellectuals actively engaged in politics than they

were among the conservative and tradition-conscious aristocracy.

Against the background broadly sketched in these introductory comments, the attitude of the Islamic elite during the occupation and Muslim resistance to Japanese claims and policies must be viewed. If it may not unjustifiably be claimed that Japan's Islamic policy ultimately attained many of its chief objectives and that Muslim 'collaboration' was far from negligible, then it must also be kept in mind that Islamic resistance played an important part in the modification of some aspects of that policy, which may, in turn, have resulted in more willing Islamic cooperation.

It seemed, therefore, appropriate to devote a short chapter to an account of this resistance, before resuming our chronological study of the Islamic problem.

The at best partial success of the initial Japanese organizational efforts concerning the Muslims on Java during the first eight months of the occupation, discussed in the foregoing chapter, mirrored to a certain extent the difficulties which beset the execution of Nippon's Islamic policies during the first phase of the occupation. From the available documentary record it is easier to state that such difficulties were encountered than to list Muslim grievances in detail, and to show Japanese steps in meeting them. But in three specific fields – the clash between Japanization and Islam, the pan-Islamic problem, and education – it may be possible to delineate the nature and sources of long-lasting disagreement.

Ever since coming to Java, the new rulers had repeatedly proclaimed their intention of "respecting and esteeming Islam," and the record of their early concern with it leaves little doubt about the priority assigned to proper collaboration with Islamic forces in the country. Yet difficulties must have arisen almost from the outset, increasing in importance, if not in frequency, to a point which not only made Japanese admission necessary, but which – far more significant still – led to public Japanese apologies. Seen in the context of a ruthless occupation, bent on destroying every shadow of opposition by

brute force, these pronouncements are in themselves a testimony to the strength of Indonesian Islam.

In the preceding chapter we already mentioned the audience granted by Lt.-Gen. Imamura, highest Japanese dignitary on Java, to the then newly-elected M.I.A.I. chairman Wondoamiseno. Terminating the audience, His Excellency requested his visitor to communicate a message to his fellow-believers:

> Please ask the Muslim community [so Imamura concluded] to forgive any mistakes which the Dai Nippon Army might be unwittingly committing, in particular those touching on Islamic matters.[1]

In his address to the *ulama* assembled in the palace three months later, the *Gunseikan* specifically returned to the same theme when he commenced by saying,

> As you know, gentlemen, it has been one of our aims to protect and pay due respect to Islam. Yet, some problems have arisen as the result of mutual misunderstandings. The [Indonesian] people know too little about the customs of Dai Nippon, while we, on the other hand, are as yet insufficiently informed about the Islamic religion and way of life, because only a very few Muslims live in Nippon. We shall now [therefore] institute a thorough study of Islam, with a view to arriving at a better relationship...[2]

Doubtless the principal difficulty in the way of such a better relationship with Indonesian Muslims was the superiority which the Japanese claimed for their own culture and religion. Far from envisaging a partnership with Islam, they originally regarded it as a mere tool, capable of subjection to the 'Japanese Spirit', and of manipulation for Japanese ends. This assumption was, as events proved, as short-sighted as it was unwise. But only slowly and incompletely did the Japanese realize that Indonesian Islam was both sufficiently anti-Western and sufficiently powerful to be treated as an ally.

The Japanese concept of a Chosen Race, superior to all others, was difficult to accept for all Indonesians, who resented the racial superiority arrogantly exhibited by their 'liberators'. But the Japanese insistence on the divinity of the emperor in particular clashed head-on with the Islamic faith. Bowing in the

direction of the imperial palace was, therefore, widely resented, the more so since the deep bow – the *Saikeirei* – prescribed for this ceremony very closely resembled the prayer bow performed by Muslims.

Yet for many months the Japanese refused to subordinate their desire to Nipponize Indonesia to considerations of winning greater Islamic support, proclaiming the near-identity of the Japanese *Hakkōichiu* (World Brotherhood) ideal and Islam:

> The spirit of Dai Nippon and that of Islam (wrote one of the Japanese Muslims on Java) are very close to one another, and no small degree of identity prevails among the two. The Indonesian people must come to understand this point...[3]

In fact, Shintō and Islam do share certain similarities, since both are all-embracing creeds in which little or no distinction is made between the realms of religion and politics. But it was because of this very similarity that they were bound to clash as soon as the adherents of one of these universalistic systems endeavored to superimpose their beliefs and practices on those of the other. Distasteful though such dictation may have been, in the face of Japanese force few Muslims possessed the moral courage to oppose it openly at the outset. Once aroused, however, Islamic opposition became increasingly vocal and a source of grave concern to the Japanese.

As far as can be ascertained, the spiritual leader of that opposition was the venerated Minangkabau reformist, Dr. Abdul Karim Amrullah. Freed from Dutch-imposed exile in West-Java, he figured prominently in early Japanese Muslim propaganda, being appointed adviser to the *Shūmubu* soon after his liberation. It was Amrullah who fearlessly exposed the irreconcilability of emperor worship and Islamic monotheism when Col. Horie requested his opinion on an important book, explaining the Japanese spirit to Indonesians.[4]

The Japanese, having themselves promoted the author of such criticism to prominence, apparently dared not punish him and incur widespread Muslim disaffection, even when, in an act

of heroic daring, Amrullah openly challenged Dai Nippon and its emperor. In early 1943 a great meeting of fifty-nine *kiyayi* from all over Java was convened at Bandung, at which Horie and Amrullah were to preside.[5] Most important of all Muslims present, and the only Indonesian to be placed among Japanese officers on the tribune, Amrullah remained seated when all others rose to perform the *Saikeirei*.[6]

To judge by the available record, opposition to the ceremony must have become more widespread as a result of this impressive and indelible defiance. Again the Japanese preferred explanation, apology and admonition to the kind of drastic measures unhesitatingly meted out to other offenders. Instead of insisting on the similarity between *Hakkōichiu* and Islam, the difference between emperor-worship and that rendered by Muslims to Allah was now emphasized in the paternal advice of Haji Abdul Hamid Ono:

> I think that many [Muslims] are very reluctant to observe the [ceremony of] rendering honor. They believe that it is identical with the *ruku'*[7], which is part of the [Islamic] prayer. Such thoughts and doubts are altogether wrong. The honoring [of the emperor] is completely different from the *ruku'*, and in fact they have hardly anything in common at all. Honoring is not praying...

The Japanese did, however, not yet decide to abolish the ceremony for Muslims. The *Saikeirei* marked, for example, the opening session of the training courses for *kiyayi* and *ulama*[8] in July 1943, which will be discussed later in some detail.[9] The increasing Muslim resistance to this imposition, and official irritation at Islamic 'separatism' are well illustrated by a surprisingly free exchange of opinions during a meeting between Indonesian Muslims and Japanese officials of the Education Office, held at Djakarta in mid-1943, one day after the Allied air attack on the city of Surabaya, the first of its kind under the occupation of Java.[10] Opening the discussion, the leading Japanese speaker, professor Ozaki, blamed Muslims for "apparently wishing to occupy a special and unique position" in Indonesian society. He then added:

> In order to achieve final victory, can the Muslims not aid the Dai Nippon Army, even if there are certain points – in themselves not touching the essence of the Islamic religion – which, because of the extraordinary conditions prevailing, cannot be conceded [by the military government]?[11]

The answer to this probing question was startlingly simple and straightforward. Kiyayi Mas Mansur, the same man who had already pledged the Muslims' support for Nippon's war in the presence of the *Gunseikan* eight months previously,[12] now made their support conditional. He said that Indonesian Muslims,

> especially those who have a clear realization of all problems, hold that we can work together [with the Dai Nippon Army], but on condition that a way be used which does not offend religion. If [their] religion is, however, offended, then it should be realized that Muslims believe in defending their religion, wherever this may lead them, and this matter is understood by all [of them].[13]

Abdul Kahar Muzzakir, prominent *Muhammadiyah* youth leader, countered Japanization by reminding Ozaki that

> ...quite a few Nipponese have studied the principles of Islam... They must [therefore] know that it is not only a religion, but a whole way of life pervading all of society ... The struggle against Western imperialism has for long been known to us, so that we accept Nippon's aim of fighting it... [But] the principle which should be strictly observed in order to bring about this [desired] cooperation should be: '*We have our religion, you have yours*'. The difference between our two creeds need not stand in the way of our collaboration in wiping the Allies out of Asia, which is the home of all religions.[14]

Although Indonesian Islamic leaders could not, by the nature of this vexing problem, hope to achieve a decisive victory against Nipponization, they were at least successful in having Muslims ultimately freed from the performance of the humiliating *Saikeirei* during religious meetings. Muslim recalcitrance apart, Japanese willingness to compromise was obviously also the result of Tokyo's changing policies which were dictated by the unfavorable course of the Pacific War. Thus, shortly after Indonesian participation in the military government

had been promised by Premier Tōjo in the eighty-second session of the Japanese Diet,[15] the first Indonesian was appointed to a high position in the administration. It is significant that the first top-level position to be vacated by the Japanese was that of Head of the Religious Affairs Office; it was given to Dr. Hoesein Djajadiningrat, who followed Horie as the first Indonesian Head of the *Shūmubu* in October 1943.[16]

While the new *Shūmubu-chō* may have been given little executive power,[17] his insistence, as much as Mansur's earlier defiance, may have ultimately persuaded the Japanese to grant this, to Muslims all-important, concession. Shortly after assuming office, Djajadiningrat told a leading Muslim visitor from Sumatra:

> The Nippon Military Government has now realized that the *Keirei* militates against the Islamic belief. Consequently [it] is no longer required in meetings of Muslim believers.[18]

While it had, then, taken a relatively short time to win a partial Islamic victory over one aspect of Japanization in Java, it was far more difficult to overcome the deep-seated Japanese suspicion and fear of the spiritual, and thus partly ideological, links binding Indonesian Muslims to the center of their religion. In the eyes of the new rulers, Arab influence was as perturbing and alien as Dutch influence. Having successfully banned the latter, they embarked on efforts to sever the second, 'pan-Islamic' bond standing in the way of a 'New Java' under Nippon's aegis.[19]

The Japanese preoccupation with pan-Islam basically bore an unmistakable likeness to that of their predecessors. But where the Dutch had primarily sought to avert political influence from overseas Islamic centers, the Japanese military authorities – not threatened by this danger because of the war[20] – for a time apparently wished to change the very content of Islamic thinking and feeling and, if possible, to call into being an Asian-centered, 'Titoist' Islam. Doubtless the isolation from Arabia and Egypt imposed on Indonesian Muslims by

wartime conditions may have made the success of such a policy appear feasible.

For a while, moreover, the hoped-for conquest of the Islamic countries in the Near East by the European Axis-powers could be used to bolster the hopes of Indonesian Muslims for a speedy 'return to normalcy'. Foreign Minister Masayuki Tani, in an important address to the Japanese Diet, held out such hopes for the near future in early 1943.[21] Under these circumstances, it was even thought safe to promise an impressive gathering of prominent Muslims from Malaya and Sumatra at Singapore that ships for the Mecca pilgrimage would soon be provided by the Dai Nippon authorities[22]–a promise sooner still forgotten and buried.[23] The withering hopes concerning contact with the Holy City were accompanied by increased emphasis on the somewhat hollow substitute of Islamic unity within the Co-Prosperity Sphere.[24]

It is understandably rather difficult to find proofs of a coherent anti-Arab policy, but there are some indications of the areas of attack chosen by the Japanese. One concerned the use of the Arabic language, the other that of the Arabic script.[25] During the first year of the occupation, endeavors were made to ban the teaching of the language in all religious schools[26]; in particular, schools of the Arab community, using Arabic as the language of general instruction, were initially confronted with great difficulties. The Arab community, in turn, appears to have offered longer resistance to Japanese educational demands than did most Indonesian Muslims.[27]

By the end of 1942, the Japanese had apparently realized that it was impossible to deny Muslims the right of teaching the Koran in the Holy language. Admitting its use for purposes of religious instruction, they yet succeeded in making it conditional on the acceptance of their own standard curriculum in non-religious subjects and – more important still – on the teaching of their own language in addition to Arabic.[28] Thus, if Nippon had not altogether slain the pan-Islamic phantom, it had extorted a high price for its continued toleration.[29]

In fact, suspicion towards the Arabs took a much longer

time to abate; but when active Islamic support for the defense of Java urged the authorities to yet greater concessions during 1944, the military government suddenly granted Arabs equal status with Indonesians.[30] This regulation exempted them from the duty to register and from the payment of special registration fees imposed on 'aliens', thus making the Arabs the preferred foreign group on Java.[31] It was certainly no coincidence that this favor was accompanied – after years of fruitless pleading by Arab and Indonesian Muslims alike – by permission to use the Arabic script in the only official Muslim publication on Java.[32] Both measures, as will become apparent later in this study, formed part of an entirely new trend in Japanese Islamic policies on Java.

Japanese interference with the whole field of religions education – partly referred to in connection with the Arab and 'pan-Islamic' problem above – constituted perhaps one of the heaviest burdens imposed on Indonesian Muslims throughout the occupation era. Not only was education held to be a key to successful Japanization, but Islamic education deserved in Japanese eyes particular attention because of the potential dangers inherent in its grass-roots significance.

The problem of the control and supervision of Islamic education had two aspects, one administrative, the other educational. Java's Islamic leaders had no adequate defenses against the intrusion of the 'Japanese Spirit' into either Western-type religious schools or into orthodox village-*pesantren*; nor could they altogether prevent its spreading among the more unsophisticated *kiyayi* and other religious teachers. On the administrative level, by contrast, many of the burdens imposed on Islam were of far shorter duration. It may, therefore, be convenient to examine these developments first.

The logic of authoritarianism, particularly in the beginning of the occupation, demanded a tightening of supervision on all levels of Islamic education and propaganda. Understandably enough, the military administration thus never revoked the much resented Dutch Guru Ordinance of 1925, which was a ready-made tool for the control of Islamic village education.[33]

It is true that during the occupation religious schools did receive more material and financial aid than had been the case under Dutch rule. Yet in terms of educational and religious freedom such aid was dearly bought.

What made this strict and ever-present governmental interference ever more irksome to Islamic leaders, however, was the fact that the Djakarta authorities – both the *Shūmubu* and the Internal Affairs Department – initially continued to entrust *priyayi*-administrators with this supervisory function at the regional and local levels. Thus the tension between religious leaders, and village teachers in particular, on the one hand, and the native aristocracy, on the other, inherited from the colonial regime, not only continued during the early phases of the occupation, but the added strictures and prohibitions imposed by the Japanese increased *priyayi* surveillance and thus tended to sharpen the conflict.[34]

Doubtless fear of Japanese reprisals drove the *priyayi* corps to a far more literal interpretation of their responsibilities than ever before. Now, moreover, the holding of public – including religious – meetings was subject to their approval ever since the original prohibition had been lifted. Thus the use of mosques, public meeting places and buildings depended on permission from these officials.[35]

Though the *priyayi* were obviously acting on orders from a ruthless master, they were frequently attacked by Muslim leaders who could not dare to blame the originators of a cumbersome and irritating control machinery.[36] Japanese spokesmen, on the other hand, at times blandly joined in the chorus of accusation against the Indonesian administrative officials charged with controlling religious activities. Addressing the faithful in Djakarta's Kwitang Mosque on an important Islamic holiday, Haji Inada placed the blame squarely on the *priyayi* corps:

> The Government's appreciation of the Islamic religion and of the *ulama* has by now been clearly and openly established. But while this is a fact, many obstacles and difficulties are [still being] placed in the way of [that] religion, especially in areas far removed from Djakarta. Let me

> explain to you, brethren, that this is *in no way* the fault of Nipponese representing the Government in those areas, but entirely that of *Indonesian officials*. Apparently they have not as yet seen fit to abandon their Dutch ways of thinking and acting. This is certainly regrettable and disappointing.[37]

Unlike the educational problem proper, however, the vexing administrative tangle was ultimately resolved in favor of the Islamic movement during 1944. As a later chapter will show, its solution was part of a wider re-orientation of Japanese policies. It constituted a clear-cut victory for the Islamic movement, which gained influence at the expense of the aristocratic elite on Java. The subsequent readjustment of the power-structure within Indonesian society was one of the many important changes bequeathed to Indonesia from the rule of the Rising Sun.[38]

We must now briefly return to the educational problem as such, which has to some extent already been discussed in connection with Arab schools. Since all Islamic education on Java was non-governmental[39] – whether organized in Western-style schools or in the thousands of more or less primitive village establishments[40] scattered all over the island – Japanese control over it was confronted by a more complex problem than was presented by the public school-system which fell a relatively easy victim to Nipponization, often assured by the simple device of placing Japanese principals in charge of city schools.

For well over a year, no central regulation was announced to govern the administration of private schools on Java. Control over non-governmental education was decentralized, and permits for re-opening private schools had to be obtained from the education sections of Residency Offices. For Islamic schools, it is true, the central authorities – mainly, it would appear, motivated by their preoccupation with the teaching of Arabic – prescribed the acceptance of a unified syllabus as early as mid-1942.[41] But the fate of all private education remained uncertain for many months to come. Locally, many schools were allowed to re-open[42]; Indonesian Muslim schools seem, moreover on

the whole to have fared better than those of *Taman Siswa.*[43]

The pattern which gradually emerged made it clear that, while the Japanese would be content indirectly to control religious schools at the lower levels, they would reserve all secondary education, teacher training, and higher institutes of learning to their own and direct management. Thus it is significant that in May 1943, the authorities forbade non-obligatory religious instruction in governmental secondary schools.[44] In the same month, all Islamic teachers were organized in a new central body, the *Pergaboengan Goeroe Islam Indonesia* (Federation of Indonesian Islamic Teachers), and gradually more and more Islamic – and Arab – schools reopened their doors.[45]

On July 1, 1943 the military administration finally issued a decree regulating private education[46], explicitly limited to general primary teaching and to secondary business instruction in commercial schools.[47] The decree vested all control over the former in the Residents on Java, that over the latter in the *Gunseikan.* Both could veto curricula and dismiss personnel; full details, including yearly budgets and accounts, had to be submitted by principals of private schools. More important still, only officially recognized organizations were allowed to operate schools in the limited sphere assigned to private education under the new regulation. All institutions previously permitted to reopen by local Japanese authorities were provisionally allowed to carry on, but they had to file full particulars in accordance with the new rules within one month.

The era of the 'Wild Schools' had thus irrevocably come to an end; at the same time, the molding of the minds of Indonesian youth in general, and of Muslim youth in particular, beyond the primary school level was usurped by the teachers of the Rising Sun, who also played a far from insignificant part in those provinces still ostensibly left to private management. Muslim education on Java, especially the reformists' Western-style school system, had suffered a major defeat. Islamic resistance was, unfortunately, not powerful enough to rescue religious schools form the advancing wave of Japanization.

Chapter Six

The Consolidation of Japan's Islamic Policy During 1943

After the important confrontation between some fundamental Japanese aims and Islamic responses to them discussed in the previous chapter, we can now resume our chronological analysis of Islamic developments during 1943.

The first seven months of the new year witnessed continued Japanese preoccupation with the mobilization of Indonesian Islam at the grass-roots level. But in the second half of that year, the political significane of Islam came to the fore, largely as a result of the first concessions granted to Indonesians on Java. Muslims came to occupy a far from negligible part in the new political organs created by the military administration. Of still greater importance was the leading role which Muslims assumed in the newly created Indonesian defense forces. On the socio-religious level, finally, apart from some limited Japanese actions calculated to meet Islamic demands, the initiative stemmed in the main from the M.I.A.I. executive. As we shall see, its boldly conceived expansion of Islamic organizational activities was doomed to failure when the military administration abolished its Indonesian sponsor at the close of the year.

Nippon's preoccupation with the latent strength of Islam on Java was, in effect, an educational preoccupation on the grandest imaginable scale. Compared to this problem, the previously discussed control of private education was relatively insignificant, if for no other reason than the fact that school education in an organized, Western sense of the term had made lamentably limited progress in Indonesia under Dutch rule. In concentrating on the educators of the Indonesian peasant *par excellence*, the village *kiyayi* and *ulama*, the Japanese shrewdly reversed their predecessors' attitude of at best polite aloofness. They

recognized – and endeavored to utilize – the *ulama's* key position in the Indonesian community.[1]

The *Shūmubu* devoted considerable time and concerted effort to this central aim of Japanese policy from the beginning of the new year onwards. Many, if not most, of the objects of this unprecedented attention, unprepared for the unexpected onslaught and ill-equipped with any kind of knowledge beyond the limited sphere of their restricted religious training, fell a rather easy prey to Nippon's siren call.

In order to accomplish the task of turning the *kiyayi* and *ulama* into Japanese propagandists, it was, however, necessary to bring the village teachers out of their other-worldly isolation. The *Gunseikan*, in outlining the military government's recognition of the *ulama* as a leading element in Indonesian society during the reception in early December 1942, had formulated the new tasks to be assigned to them succinctly:

> While religions education is, of course, important, yet, viewed with regard to the progress and change wrought in the lives of our young [generation], it is also important to teach in accordance with the demands of the new era. Everything pertaining to the past must now be forgotten. At the moment, our most important task is that you *[ulama]* imbibe to the best of your ability the quintessence of Nippon's culture and become acquainted with the situation in that country; equipped with this knowledge you should then educate the youth, and make them willing to work for a Greater East Asia.[2]

This program of re-educating the educators the Japanese would, understandably enough, not entrust to an Indonesian Islamic organization. The village teachers, whom they had chosen as potential popular leaders, were moreover for the most part stubborn individualists, who had been neglected and even scorned by the Dutch no less than by the *priyayi* corps and 'secular' nationalists, if not also by some members of the urban Islamic elite.[3] Thus it was certainly intentional and in a way even logical that the M.I.A.I., inaugurated with considerable outward acclaim by the authorities, was powerless to act as a buffer or intermediary between the bewildered village teachers and their

dynamic tutors.[4] Instead, Horie and his Japanese assistants in the *Shūmubu* embarked on a tour of Java, holding a series of conferences with local *kiyayi* and *ulama*[5], soon after the *Gunseikan* had proclaimed Nippon's Islamic grass-roots policy, which was to make the Muslim scribes and teachers "leaders of the civilian front, charged with ensuring public peace and awareness."[6]

In early May 1943, the military administration announced the organizational measures taken to ensure the education of its chosen propaganda tools. In July, the first group of sixty *kiyayi* and *ulama* – selected from each of the seventeen Residencies *(Shū)*, the Djakarta Special Municipality, and the four Principalities *(Kōchi)* in Central Java – would undergo a one-month training course, styled *latihan kiyayi* in Indonesian, at Djakarta under the auspices and direct supervision of the *Shūmubu*.[7] In August and November further groups would follow, the aim being to extend these courses indefinitely until the most important *kiyayi* and *ulama* would have received a rapid dose of the 'New Spirit'.[8]

The trainees, most of them hitherto with varying degrees of thoroughness steeped in the study of the Koran and Islamic exegesis, were to be confronted with an impressive syllabus; it contained only two 'subjects' related to the Islamic faith, while ten courses in history, civics, gymnastics, and the Japanese language occupied most of the study program of the *latihan*.[9] In the two months before the first course was to commence, preparations were made for the important event. A preliminary conference between *Shūmubu*-officials and Islamic leaders was held at the capital's fashionable Hotel des Indes, at which the prospective Indonesian instructors were selected. It was indicative of the new policy that not a single member of the M.I.A.I. executive was considered for such an appointment.[10] Furthermore, two houses were readied as dormitories for the sixty 'students', and Japanese textbooks were being translated into Indonesian.[11]

On July 1, 1943, the first training course for *kiyayi* and *ulama* was opened with an impressive ceremony by Col. Kawasaki,

representing the *Gunseikan*; Col. Horie, Head of the *Shūmubu* and leader of the *latihan*, informed the assembled *kiyayi* that the aim of their training was

> to strengthen [your] understanding of the world situation, and to increase your spirit so that you will be able to give the fullest possible support to the Government.[12]

This was, then, the beginning of the Japanese administration's Islamic grass-roots policy, foreshadowed by the events of seven months ago; it was ultimately and lastingly to politicize Indonesian Islam at the village level far beyond its pre-occupation level. In their search for a reliable ally close to the millions of Indonesian peasants, the new rulers had shrewdly chosen the *kiyayi* and *ulama* as an entirely new element in the Indonesian political scene.[13] Bypassing the Islamic urban leadership at Djakarta, the Japanese had created a new – and, so they hoped, obedient – instrument, which they could use against the *priyayi* elite no less than against the 'secular' nationalist leadership.[14]

The effect of the training courses on the *ulama* is difficult to assess.[15] In themselves, they could hardly have sufficed for a thorough incubation of the 'Japanese Spirit', however well administered its doses may have been during the thirty days of the *latihan*. On the other hand, the shock of an entirely novel experience, coupled with a calculated blending of Japanese flattery and power-display, could not fail to leave a deep impression on the rather unsophisticated participants, many of whom had never even seen the capital city before.[16] Whatever the individual *kiyayi* and *ulama* may have taken back to his home, however, he was no longer allowed to seek refuge in his cloistered other-worldly aloofness. Nippon had forcefully moved him into the day-to-day life of the Indonesian community.[17]

If the politicization of the *ulama* was the most important aspect of Japanese Islamic policy in 1943, it was not its only feature. From the middle of that year onwards, concessions were made to Indonesian groups on Java, and in the new politico-

administrative configuration the Islamic elite obtained a greater and more conspicuous share than it had ever occupied under Dutch rule.

This is not to say that Japanese policy vis-à-vis Islamic political action proper had necessarily changed since the prohibition of the former Islamic political parties in the early months of the occupation. As we shall presently see, the concessions granted did not in the least involve a liberalization of political action. But Japanese endeavors to prepare the island for defense brought with them concomitant changes which, however limited in scope originally, did ultimately lead to a more vigorous political life. We shall now briefly examine these developments as they bore on the Islamic movement.

We have already referred to the spectacular appointment of an Indonesian, Dr. Hoesein Djajadiningrat, as Head of the Religious Affairs Office in October 1943. This was the first high position in the center of the military administration to be occupied by a non-Janapese[18], and as such it remained unique until the end of the occupation.[19] In itself, however, the honor thus conspicuously bestowed on Indonesian Islam did not signify a recognition of the prestige of the Islamic elite, since the appointee, though a noted Muslim scholar, was the scion of one of the oldest and most influential, Western-educated *priyayi* families. Standing outside the Islamic movement proper, the new *Shūmubu-chō* had at one time already held a similar position under Dutch rule, as Assistant Adviser on Native Affairs. Of perhaps even greater long-term significance was the fact that, simultaneously, another outstanding Muslim – Kiyayi Mas Mansur, in this instance recruited from the ranks of the Islamic movement – was attached to the *Shūmubu* in an advisory function.[20]

Dr. Djajadiningrat's appointment was, in effect, only one of the changes introduced after Premier Tōjo's aforementioned policy declarations, both in the Japanese Diet and during his visit to Java in July 1943.[21] It was the Japanese Prime Minister's promise of early Indonesian participation in the government of

Java, however, which had stirred the hopes of most Indonesian leaders[22], and which was actually being translated into effect a few months before Dr. Djajadiningrat assumed his new function.

On August 1, 1943, Lt.-Gen. Harada, Commander-in-Chief on Java[23], announced the Japanese administration's plans with regard to Indonesian participation in the military government.[24] First, a Central Advisory Council *(Chūō Sangi-in)* was to be created at Djakarta, and Regional Advisory Councils *(Shū Sangi-kai)* in the seventeen Residencies and in Djakarta Municipality. Second, top-level advisers *(Sanyo)*, to be appointed in all major departments of the central administration, were to insure outward Indonesian participation in policy decisions and execution. One month later, regulations setting up the councils and new positions were published[25], and one month later again, appointments of councilors[26] and advisers[27] were announced.

Within the context of this study, we cannot dwell on a detailed discussion of these doubtless disappointing concessions made to Indonesian participation in the management of political affairs in Java[28], or on the working of the new institutions. But we should note that, whatever grave misgivings Indonesian leaders in general may have had about the pale and impotent copy of the former *Volksraad* graciously offered to them by Dai Nippon, for Muslims the copy differed in one significant respect favorably from its predecessor. As we noted in an earlier part of this essay, only one spokesman had represented Indonesian Islam among the sixty members of the legislature under Dutch rule; by contrast, there were six prominent Muslims among the forty-three members of the *Chūō Sangi-in*.[29]

This important difference did not go unnoticed by Muslim commentators[30], who did not fail to note, moreover, that the new governmental machinery was inaugurated during the holy month of Ramadhan – perhaps with a view to courting Islamic approval.[31] Islamic representation was, furthermore, not limited to the Central Advisory Council, since Muslims occupied several seats in, and were not infrequently chairmen of, the regional *Shū Sangi-kai*.[32]

Another indication of the Japanese desire to place Islam in the forefront of public affairs on Java could not fail to impress Indonesian Muslims. In November 1943 three leading Indonesians were flown to Tokyo, where they were decorated by the Japanese emperor. The delegation consisted of Ir. Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta and *Muhammadiyah*-chairman Ki Bagus Hadikusumo; although the M.I.A.I. executive had again been by-passed, a leading Muslim had been symbolically linked with the outstanding nationalist leaders in an attempt to win Indonesian and Islamic support.[33]

Of far greater importance for the future of Indonesian political developments – and of Indonesian Islam in particular – was the creation of Indonesian military forces, in which Muslims played an outstanding role from the very beginning. The decision to take this crucial step[34] was taken in September 1943; it mirrored the deteriorating strategic situation in the Pacific War and Japanese anticipation of Allied landings on the island. On September 7, Gatot Mangkoepradja, an old friend and fellow-worker of Soekarno's, addressed a letter to the *Saikō Shikikan* in which he "respectfully requested" the setting up of an Indonesian volunteers' corps on Java.[35] Barely four weeks later the – obviously officially inspired – request was granted.[36]

The popular response was doubtless enthusiastic. Recruitment centers all over Java were, at the outset in particular, overwhelmed with volunteers, though it is difficult to estimate whether most of them were motivated by patriotism or by the prospect of relatively secure employment.[37] For our purposes, however, it is important to note that the appeal to enter the new army was conspicuously successful among Muslims on Java. In particular, the Indonesian officer corps, whose training commenced in late October 1943, contained a great number of *kiyayi*.[38] As far as can be ascertained, the new Indonesian military elite in effect drew its main strength from Muslim leaders and from members of the aristocracy[39], while the Western-educated intelligentsia, though welcoming and applauding the new army[40], did not conspicuously contribute to its leading personnel.

Muslim enthusiasm for military service had actually found additional expression at the time when the founding of an Indonesian volunteers' corps had first been mooted. Only three days after Mangkoepradja's letter, ten prominent Muslims – none of them, significantly, on the M.I.A.I. executive – affixed their signatures to a very similar letter to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, with a request to permit the founding of a separate Muslim Volunteers' Corps on Java.[41] The petitioners urged the calling of an *ulama* conference to discuss the prospective religious army, declaring that

> the history of Islam in recent times has been one of conflict with the evil machinations of England. Muslims all over the world should unite for a crusade to defeat the Americans and British who are the enemies of religion. It is very fortunate, indeed, that Java lives under the protection of the Dai Nippon Army. Let us, therefore, set up a Muslim volunteer corps on Java, so that it may become the trailblazer in the effort to destroy America and England...[42]

In spite of – if not because of – the apparent spontaneity of their request, Islamic leaders were not allowed to proceed with the formation of a military corps of their own at that time. It is at least probable that the reorganization of the Muslim federation M.I.A.I., which followed the creation of the Volunteer Corps within a matter of weeks, made the Japanese desist from authorizing a religious army. As we shall see in the next chapter, permission for such an army was finally granted in December 1944.

In the absence of a separate military unit, Muslims joined the *Peta* (*Pembela Tanah Air*, or Defender of the Fatherland), in whose officer corps, as we saw, they soon occupied an important, and perhaps even predominant, place. The *Peta's* senior Indonesian officer (*Daidan-chō*) was Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo, a Western-educated lawyer, teacher and *Muhammadiyah*-leader, who swore the corps' oath of allegiance to Dai Nippon on February 8, 1944.[43]

The connection between Indonesia's first army and Islam was not, however, limited to the province of its personnel. It is

doubtless true that in the course of time *Peta* soldiers, serving under officers of their own race – be it under Japanese overall supervision – became increasingly imbued with the spirit and slogans of Indonesian nationalism.[44] But it must be kept in mind that at the time of the founding of *Peta*, the propagation of nationalism enjoyed little official favor. *Putera*, launched with enthusiasm in March 1943 was, as we shall later discuss in some detail, doomed to extinction towards the close of the year, and Indonesian nationalism, as a propaganda vehicle with full Japanese support, suffered a serious eclipse until Nippon's promise of Indonesian independence in September 1944.[45]

This important consideration apart, however, it should not be forgotten that 'secular' Indonesian nationalism did not at that time as yet possess a grass-roots support even remotely comparable to that of Indonesian Islam. However great the appeal of *Putera* may have been even at the height of its officially sanctioned popularity, it had never been a political party proper with a registered membership, nor had it ever been allowed to establish local branches outside the main urban centers.[46] Founded, moreover, by a predominantly Western-trained, urban intelligentsia, it was and remained at a disadvantage against the two powerful Islamic organizations whose continued existence and activities, primarily in the countryside, had not been prohibited by the Japanese.[47]

It was therefore logical that in their search for an acceptable and meaningful symbol with which to endow the first Indonesian army, the Japanese authorities on Java should have intentionally turned to Islam. The *Peta's* flag (*Daidan-ki*), which its Muslim commander received at an impressive ceremony from the hands of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in early February 1944, did not display the Red and White of Indonesian nationalism, but the Islamic Crescent, superimposed on Dai Nippon's Rising Sun:

> The flag [read the official description] shows a green field, with a round sun in red in the center...; its... red beams radiate in all directions.

> Within this sun, a rising moon and a star appear in white, a symbol honored by the inhabitants of Java...[48]

The symbol aptly expressed the desired identification of Japan's war with a Holy War for the defense of Indonesian Islam against the Christian, imperialist West. The response to this appeal, directed at *ulama* and other Muslims, doubtless constituted the most important success of Japanese Islamic policy. It also showed that the *latihan* at Djakarta had yielded considerable results, once the general theme of Islamic enmity towards Western imperialism – often stressed in the preceding months[49] – gave way to the call to arms on Java.

As long as the enemy had remained distant, in other words, the identification of Greater East Asia and Islam had been difficult to achieve.[50] Thus Islamic support for Nippon's war effort, initially the sole aim of Japanese appeals[51], had lacked a coherent rationale. Now, however, the fate of Japan and that of Indonesian Islam could be shown to be closely linked.[52] The war of the Rising Sun against the West thus became a Holy War against the infidels. As *Daidan-chō* Kasman put it,

> The religion of the Indonesian people... orders them to become fighters... Remember that Muslims who die through participation in this war will die in a holy cause, who in the hereafter will forever live by the side of Allah, blessed with His favors.[53]

Thus, almost a year before Indonesian nationalism could reassert itself, Islam had not only been given a prominent and fateful place in the struggle against the return of Western colonialism, but its role in that struggle deepened the latent anti-Western sentiment of Indonesian soldiers and peasants to a significant degree.

The developments on the grass-roots and political levels during 1943 which we have so far examined owed their impetus almost entirely to Japanese initiative. It was left to the central Islamic organization to take tentative steps in the direction of socio-religious actions which we will discuss in the remaining part of this chapter. The story of these endeavors is, at the same time, the story of the fall of M.I.A.I..

Ever since its rebirth under Japanese rule, the Islamic federation had been forced to live in the background of Japanese Muslim policy. The grudging sanction given to its continued existence[54] was never amplified by a clearly circumscribed field of action. The Religious Affairs Office had frequently, as we saw, by-passed the M.I.A.I. in the major policy moves directed at winning Islamic support. Restricted to its Djakarta headquarters[55], with no proper membership of its own, and without influence among *kiyayi* and *ulama*, the central Islamic agency was patently ill-equipped for the task of unifying Indonesian Muslims. Perhaps the most telling proof of its decreed impotence lay in the fact that the M.I.A.I. executive endeavored in vain to call a general meeting during the one year of its existence. When a meeting was at long last permitted, it was – as will be seen – to announce the demise of the federation.[56]

It is, therefore, instructive to analyze the efforts of the M.I.A.I. leadership to transform the organization into a viable socio-religious instrument – efforts doomed to failure, since, on the one hand, they constituted an exceptional and almost unique display of private initiative, at variance with Nippon's Islamic policies; and on the other, because these Japanese policies had in the course of time won substantial support among leading Indonesian Muslims who helped to speed the downfall of the old federation. That the M.I.A.I. was, nonetheless, allowed to remain in existence until late in 1943 was probably due to the fact that Japanese preparations for a complete overhaul of the originally established Indonesian organizations only matured later in the year; furthermore, the direction of Muslim affairs, in particular, changed hands shortly before the end of M.I.A.I. was decreed.[57]

When the M.I.A.I. had commenced its activities under the aegis of Dai Nippon in September 1942, its main duties were to consist of "securing a proper place for Islam within Indonesian society." and of "harmonizing Indonesian Islam with the requirements of the changing times". Two months later, the federation announced its new constitution and a program

of action adapted to the demands of 'New Java';[58] yet that program significantly continued to place its main and most detailed emphasis on the attainment of Muslim socio-religious aims which had for decades formed the principal platform of Islamic congresses under Dutch rule.[59] M.I.A.I. thus remained in a way a private association pledged to aid the military government, yet pursuing its own objectives. As such the federation – itself stamped with a staunchly anti-colonial record – could not last, in spite of the ceremonial role assigned to it by the military authorities for many months.[60]

The first, immediate goal which the M.I.A.I. executive strove to attain concerned the organization of *ulama* all over Java under the roof of the central Islamic body in Djakarta. But, as we previously noted, the *Shūmubu* itself was to establish direct control over these, to the Japanese crucially important, Muslim leaders[61], so that the M.I.A.I., after one brief endeavor, had to abandon all hope of making itself the mediator between the army authorities and the village teachers – of securing, that is, a proper *raison d'être* for its continued functioning.[62]

At the same time, the leaders of the federation decided to concentrate on three more innocuous targets, all of them in the socio-religious realm, and therefore destined to a somewhat brighter – if limited – future. Their endeavors were to be directed, first, at the building of a Great Mosque, to stand as a worthy symbol of Indonesian Islam in Java's capital city; second, at the establishment of a Muslim University; and third, at instituting a central Islamic treasury for the receipt of religious tithes and their organized disbursement as relief to the poor and needy.[63]

Of these projects only the third will presently receive closer attention. The mosque was never built during the occupation, nor was the project ever given any subsequent publicity.[64] An Indonesian Islamic University, on the other hand, had, as we saw, been planned towards the close of Dutch rule; it also was one of Nippon's favorite promises to Indonesia's Muslims and had been mooted from the early weeks of the occupation of

Java onwards.[65] In spite of Japanese goodwill towards an Islamic institute of higher learning, the M.I.A.I.'s endeavors were as short-lived as they were fruitless. In the final chapter of this study, the setting up of an Islamic University, a few weeks before the Japanese surrender, will be discussed in some detail.

Rebuffed in its efforts to gain control over the *ulama*, as well as in its drive for the realization of the long-standing Muslim hopes regarding the Great Mosque and the University, the M.I.A.I. leadership undertook a vigorous campaign for the creation of an Islamic treasury, or *Bait al-Mal*.[66] In the measure that hopes for the attainment of the federation's other goals receded, this grandiosely conceived scheme came to take precedence over all the other activities of the M.I.A.I. executive[67], whose chairman even claimed that the *Bait al-Mal* was "the one and only way in which we Muslims can aid the efforts of the Dai Nippon Army behind the front-line".[68]

This proved to be a fateful exaggeration and a misinterpretation of the role assigned to Indonesian Muslims by the Japanese. But for many months M.I.A.I. efforts remained keyed to this central objective.[69] It was not surprising that the disappearance of the first central Islamic federation also signalled the end of Muslim endeavors to create an all-embracing social organization charged with the alleviation of Japanese-created misery among the people of Java.

The idea underlying the central treasury was simple; it envisaged a regularized collection of the religious tithes all over Java, primarily of the so-called *zakat*, payable either in money or in goods, and the distribution of these funds as aid to the needy, in support of unemployed, orphans, and old people.[70] What marred this simplicity, however, was the fact that the Muslims in most areas of Java had in the past been singularly lax in the fulfillment of this duty, notwithstanding the fact that it is one of the five tasks prescribed to the followers of Islam.[71]

Although the idea of a central treasury was not alien to Indonesian Islam, the initiative for the creation of a *Bait al-Mal*

as such did not stem from the M.I.A.I. executive, who actually adopted the scheme from a regional treasury under the same name founded by the Regent of Bandung, Wiranata Kusuma, in mid-1942[72], with a view to alleviating the distress caused by economic dislocation, which was particularly severe in the Priangan districts with their previously flourishing estate agriculture. The success of such a treasury in that region rested in the first place on the traditionally strict observance of *zakat*-payments, which had distinguished the Sunda-lands from the rest of Java for many decades.[73] Apart from this advantage, the enterprise doubtless owed its smooth functioning to the organizing talent of its originator.[74]

The success of the Bandung *Bait al-Mal* had apparently attracted the attention of the Islamic leadership at Djakarta.[75] In January, a preparatory *Bait al-Mal* Committee for the capital city was established.[76] As far as can be judged from the existing record, the M.I.A.I. executive then endeavored to bring the Bandung treasury under its control, and thereafter to extend the experiment to all the Regencies of Java. Its first objective was attained in mid-April 1943, when the first *Bait al-Mal* ceased to exist as an independent organization and became a branch of the projected M.I.A.I. *Bait al-Mal* Council.[77] Although no such All-Java organization was subsequently set up, a central *Bait ul-Mal* committee was founded at M.I.A.I. headquarters two months later.[78] In the intervening weeks, M.I.A.I. leaders had lost little time in expanding the establishment of treasuries all over the island.

The vigorous publicity campaign in the federation's journal, continued for several months, elicited – if we can trust published reports – an enormous response from many areas in Java, which hitherto had been at best lukewarm about the *zakat:*

> Every day people from outside [Djakarta] come to our office with inquiries concerning the *Bait al-Mal.* Twenty localities have already requested us to send them propagandists ... Letters keep streaming in... We are doing our best to cope with all inquiries...[79]

Under the motto, "Don't talk too much – set to work!", coined

by chairman Wondoamiseno[80], feverish activity was displayed at the head-office. In June, a training course for treasury-organizers was instituted at Bandung, and in the same month M.I.A.I. delegates travelled to Central and East Java to confer with regional and local religious leaders and administrative officials about the setting up of new *Bait al-Mal*. At the same time, uniform regulations for the new treasuries were published by the central committee.[81] In the span of a few months, *Bait al-Mal* had been established in thirty-five Regencies on Java.[82]

Then, as suddenly as it had started, the expansion of the new Islamic welfare organization ceased.[83] The sudden silence clearly indicated Japanese disapproval of M.I.A.I.'s efforts, and it furthermore was the harbinger of the federation's end. It is difficult to judge whether the decision to replace M.I.A.I. by a new organization was hastened by the vitality and initiative which the M.I.A.I. leadership had displayed in its apparently successful endeavors to build a network of Islamic welfare organizations under its own jurisdiction throughout Java.

It is more likely that the plans for the federation's replacement by a successor organization had gradually matured ever since the Japanese had sanctioned the M.I.A.I. by way of an early compromise. Moreover, the almost simultaneous abolition of *Putera*, to be briefly discussed in our next chapter, would suggest that the reorganization in the Islamic world formed part of an overall reconstruction of Japanese policy on Java.

On the other hand, the initial success of the *Bait al-Mal* agitation, as a spontaneous organizational effort of the M.I.A.I. leadership, without backing from the *Shūmubu*, may have seemed to threaten Nippon's Islamic policy, if not other policies as well, at that time.[84] For one thing, Wondoamiseno and his colleagues appear to have hoped to link the treasuries in each locality with local *ulama*-councils, which were allegedly to have served as advisory organs on points of religious law connected with welfare work.[85] If successful, however, such a plan would inevitably have challenged the *Shūmubu's* control over the village teachers.

In the second place, and potentially striking at policymakers beyond the Religious Affairs Office, the M.I.A.I. leadership apparently sought to build, without Japanese bidding, a network of Islamic cells on the island, in an endeavor to unite the people in the name of Allah, rather than that of *Tennō Heika*, the emperor. The *Bait al-Mal*, wrote the M.I.A.I. chairman,

> must reach into every village, every hamlet, up to the very mountain slopes, and create a spirit of unity... and a powerful fortress of Islam... We will use the [treasuries] to build a protective fence around the Muslims in the villages, against the spies of the Allies... Let all of us, administrators, *penghulu*, *ulama*, *kiyayi*, form one big family, as [was] ordained by Allah...[86]

Such a threatening arrogation of leadership could, it may be safely surmised, not be tolerated. For, as we shall presently see, it was exactly the task of unification under strict Japanese leadership that formed the focal point of Nippon's new policy in Java, which was inaugurated in early 1944.

The M.I.A.I. leaders were almost certainly aware of resistance to, or apprehension of, their intentions among the Japanese authorities at the center. Their plan of action in instituting the *Bait al-Mal* was to obtain cooperation from religious leaders and from administrative officials at the Regency level first, to be followed by regional authorization from the Japanese Residents.[87] Ultimately, general approval would thus have been required only to sanction a *fait accompli*[88], and, with it, a recognition of M.I.A.I.'s strength and importance, which had been ignored and undermined by all the major moves of Japanese Islamic policy in the past year.

The most important indication of Nippon's reaction to these efforts – even then foreshadowed by a long and perhaps studied silence on the issue of *Bait al-Mal* – came in early September 1943, when the military government announced that it had granted legal status to *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama* with all their branches on Java.[89] On the face of it, this recognition came only as the partial and very belated fulfillment of a

promise given to Muslims by the *Gunseikan* nine months previously. As such it did constitute the most important Japanese concession to Indonesian Islam,[90] the more significant still in that it again demonstrated the importance and viability of the two major pre-invasion Islamic organizations.

But of even greater and decisive importance was the fact that the *Shūmubu*, and in particular Inada's successor Suzuki, had increasingly allied itself with the leaders of these two organizations at the expense of the M.I.A.I. leadership, in particular of its 'radical' P.S.I.I. personnel. Thus this last development formed the culmination of the close contact between the Japanese and leading Muslims outside the M.I.A.I. executive which we have repeatedly noted in previous parts of this chapter.

The official recognition of *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama* automatically deprived all other Islamic organizations – and by ominous omission also the central Islamic federation – of legal status. Thus Nippon's decision had tipped the scales in what must have been a long, internal struggle among Indonesian Muslim leaders during the first eighteen months of the Japanese occupation of Java.[91] Barely six weeks after recognition had been extended to these two large Islamic associations, the M.I.A.I. executive was allowed to hold its first, and last, general meeting.[92] On October 24, 1943, chairman Wondoamiseno closed the first phase of Indonesian Islam under the aegis of the Rising Sun:

> This [the M.I.A.I. chairman said] is the most important date in the history of Indonesian Islam. This meeting holds the fate of the Muslims on Java in its hands...[93]

That fate, it soon became clear, involved a far more complete break with the pre-invasion past than the M.I.A.I. leadership had been willing to contemplate during the thirteen months of the federation's existence. The M.I.A.I. – since September 1937, and again since September 1942 – the spokesman of Indonesian Islam, thus had to cease to exist. As its chairman admitted, the M.I.A.I.'s objectives, as formulated after its rebirth, could not be attained.[94]

Muslim activities would henceforth have to be subordinated to the new rule envisaged for Indonesian Islam by its military rulers, who were confronted by the prospect of enemy attacks on Java. Thus, the birth of M.I.A.I.'s successor, *Masjumi*, signalled the death of the *Bait al-Mal*, up to that time the most ambitious undertaking in the field of socio-religious reform in the modern history of Indonesian Islam on Java.[95]

Chapter Seven

The Rise of Masjumi: November 1943 - September 1944

The closing months of 1943 opened an era of profound Japanese transformation of Indonesian public life. The birth of *Masjumi* marked the first important step in this re-ordering, which proceeded in early 1944 at an accelerated rate. When finally in March the new Japanese-imposed pattern of the 'New Java' crystallized, the balance of power among Indonesian elite groups had undergone significant changes, of which the strengthening of the Islamic leadership was, perhaps, of greatest long-term importance. In order to evaluate this importance, we shall commence with a brief examination of the new Islamic organization in the context of other contemporary changes on Java.

News of the abolition of the old Islamic federation apparently found the public in general, and many Muslims in particular, unprepared. In the words of one commentator,

> ...many people either said or thought that there was no reason to change to something new, seeing that the old [organization] had been well established and was widely known... But what is at stake is not only a change of name, but rather a change of activity and effort. M.I.A.I. was part and parcel of the old order, [and thus] it has become out-of-date now.[1]

In effect, the change signalled the end of Muslim endeavors centered around the decades-old preoccupations on the socio-religious level, which had been led by M.I.A.I. for the past six years. Its long list of objectives and demands had to give way to the *Masjumi's* only goal, that of "strengthening the unity of all Islamic organizations", and of "aiding Dai Nippon in the interests of Greater East Asia." This goal was announced by the new federation's most ardent spokesman, Kiyayi Haji

Mas Mansur[2], in a radio address to fellow Muslims in late November 1943:

> Although my comments concerning the birth of *Masjumi* have been very brief [Mansur concluded], I fervently hope that all followers of Islam on Java will fully understand this explanation... [and] receive our new organization with joy... I call on all Muslims to aid the Government with all their efforts.[3]

The creation of the new organization, *Madjlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia* (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), or *Masjumi*, which was granted legal status on the very day of its founding, no doubt represented a victory of Japanese Islamic policy.[4] The *Shūmubu* had succeeded in liquidating the shadow of an 'anti-colonial' federation which, under Dutch rule, had represented a wide variety of Muslim groups, and whose retiring chairman had, moreover, been a leading member of the P.S.I.I., the largest 'non-cooperative' Islamic political party in colonial times.

In its stead came an organization of a far less private character, which no longer represented Indonesian and Arab Islamic groups *pro tanto*. Membership in *Masjumi* only stood open to Muslim associations accorded legal status by the military government.[5] At the time of its founding, this had only been granted to *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama*, and it was from among the well-known leaders of these two organizations that the first *Masjumi* executive, nominally headed by the venerable orthodox leader, Hasjim Asj'ari, was exclusively recruited.[6]

Of equally great importance was the fact that individual *kiyayi* and *ulama*, whom the M.I.A.I. had for long unsuccessfully tried to organize, could likewise become members of *Masjumi* with the approval of the *Shūmubu*[7], which thus obtained complete control over the membership of the new federation. The significance of the close link between *Masjumi* and *kiyayi* was underlined in a reception of fifty prominent Muslims, including the entire *Masjumi* executive, by the Commander-in-Chief in Djakarta in early December 1943.[8]

While the M.I.A.I. had been grudgingly accepted as a

compromise solution by the Japanese in September 1942, the *Masjumi* was launched under the auspices of the military authorities. Moreover, as the central organ of the two largest Islamic associations on Java and as the organizational center of the thousands of village teachers directly influenced by the Religious Affairs Office, it enjoyed from its very inception far greater official prestige than its predecessor. Unlike the M.I.A.I., which had been reduced to a head-office at Djakarta, *Masjumi* had an impressive enough membership all over the island.

What added to the new federation's strength was the fact that it constituted a working agreement between *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama*, rather than an enforced merger of reformists and orthodox.[9] *Masjumi* continued to derive its main strength from these two majors pillars. The federation, in fact, only had to admit two other orthodox small groups which the Japanese sanctioned in February 1944.[10] Thus reorganization in the Islamic world had resulted in a powerful alliance of Java's two most important Muslim associations and many independent *kiyayi* closely linked to the *Shūmubu*. As we shall see, the strength of *Masjumi* continued to grow, while that of the nationalist leadership declined during the first nine months of 1944.

On the one hand, therefore, there was ample justification for nationalist resentment. On the other, the enforced exclusiveness of *Masjumi* with regard to all the other, non-recognized Islamic groups – notably Arab associations – tended to alienate the latter from the central, Japanese-supported federation. To these antagonisms must be added that of the *priyayi* corps, which from early 1944 onwards found itself at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the growing influence of *Masjumi*.

The major readjustment on the Indonesian scene, introduced at the beginning of the new year, actually increased the prestige of the *priyayi* at the expense of the nationalist elite. To judge by the printed record, *Putera* activities had virtually reached a standstill by the end of 1943, heralding a major change in Japanese policies. It was only after the reorganization of the old Islamic federation had been acomplished, however, that

steps were announced concerning the future of the nationalist movement. While the position of Indonesian Islam on Java had been strengthened with the creation of *Masjumi*, Indonesian nationalism was, organizationally at least, temporarily decreed out of existence when the Commander-in-Chief instructed the *Gunseikan* in early January 1944 to organize a new mass movement on the island.[11]

The new movement – the *Djawa Hōkōkai* (People's Service Association on Java), or *Himpunan Kebaktian Rakjat* in Indonesian – not only replaced *Putera* as well as the previously established Chinese Association on Java[12], but it also included a few representatives of the island's Eurasian and Arab communities. This multiracial character of the *Hōkōkai* in itself deprived the nationalist elite, in spite of the many nominally prominent positions assigned to it in the new movement's leading organs, of an exclusive nationalist forum. In addition, the *Hōkōkai* comprised all other organizations previously created by the Japanese, in particular women's and youth groups, in which nationalist control and influence were as yet rather weak.[13]

Two further features of the *Hōkōkai* demonstrated even more clearly the checks placed on Indonesian nationalism after the demise of *Putera*. In the first place, the Japanese shadow cabinet gave way to direct Japanese top-leadership in the *Hōkōkai's* intricate administrative machinery.[14] It should be added that this important deterioration stood in marked contrast to the all-Indonesian executive organs of the *Masjumi* which had, outwardly at least, been freed from Japanese codetermination.

In the second place, unlike *Putera*, the *Hōkōkai* was established as a mass organization proper, with branches reaching into all Residencies, Regencies, Districts and villages. This significant broadening of the new movement's scope brought with it the utilization of *priyayi*-personnel in leading functions on the widest scale. Barred from membership in *Putera*, this elite group thus now came to play a prominent role in the *Hōkōkai*.[15] The Japanese decision to rely on *priyayi* for local leadership was, in part at least, no doubt dictated by the consideration that outside

the urban centers no other literate and experienced Indonesian group of sufficient size could be found. To some extent, however, it must have been motivated by a desire to check the growing influence of the nationalist elite, who bitterly resented their loss of power.[16] But the nationalists were unable to prevent *priyayi* from assuming the direction of regional and local *Hōkōkai* affairs.[17] According to one commentator, they occupied virtually all local and regional executive posts, so that

> one can here and there still hear the opinion expressed that the position of the administrative corps in the *Djawa Hōkōkai* constitutes a victory for them, and it goes without saying that there are likewise many people who see in this situation a defeat for the members of the [nationalist] movement...[18]

Simultaneously with the creation of the new mass movement which was to radiate from an impressive, Japanese-directed center into all parts of Java, and as an underpinning for the new organization, the military authorities instituted a grass roots control apparatus – the so-called *Tonari Gumi* or Neighborhood Associations[19] – like the *Hōkōkai* itself an importation and imitation of a Japanese institution.[20] If the larger movement reduced the scope of nationalist activities, the vast and far-flung network of neighborhood associations came to supplant the *Bait al-Mal* created by the first Islamic federation, and now apparently doomed to atrophy.[21]

The *Tonari Gumi* doubtless constituted the most ambitious Japanese endeavor at penetrating to the Indonesian village, and of mobilizing the *tani* for the war effort. Hitherto only the *kiyayi*, the spiritual village leaders, had been drawn into the orbit of Japanese propaganda; now the military administration went one step further in organizing the population itself in small groups within the villages and townships, which were to become the lowest units in the governmental pyramid.

To ensure the smooth functioning of this cellular organism, the Japanese turned their attention to the lower-rank *priyayi* and to the elected village heads, or *lurah*, who became *ex officio* heads of the *Tonari Gumi* all over Java.[22] Thus, on the one hand,

the creation of the neighborhood associations further increased the importance of the *priyayi* elite. On the other, its members were simultaneously subjected to very stringent regulations[23] and to a training program very similar to that previously instituted for the Islamic village teachers.[24]

Likewise, the *lurah*, the lowest grade officials on Java, found themselves drawn into the era of the *latihan*[25], and at the same time severely controlled by the central government in a decree which[26], it was stated, wrought the most profound change in their status in two thousand years.[27] In these ways, Japanese control was fastened and deepened over the island's population at a time when the incessant demands for increased food production combined with an accelerated inflation, caused by the army's monetary policies, to render the *tani's* lot – in the villages or as forced laborer *(rōmusha)* – ever harder. As we shall presently see, agrarian unrest flared up in early 1944, in which the grass-roots significance of Indonesian Islam suddenly leaped to the fore.

One final comment should be made in connection with the Neighborhood Associations. Though local officials and lower-rank *priyayi* played outwardly leading roles in them, it is very likely that they also provided a unique training ground for the younger-generation Indonesians who were members of the various youth groups sponsored by the occupation army. Insofar as the tasks assigned to the *Tonari Gumi*, such as food and clothing distribution, required a modicum of literacy and political experience, and insofar as the Japanese may have felt it necessary to check traditional village leadership by persons of their own training, these younger men may have come to play increasingly important roles at the grass-roots level. Their position was bound to become politically significant once Japanese control gave way to Indonesian, especially nationalist, direction. Thus in effect the nationalist elite may have made long-term gains in spite of their temporary loss of influence in the *Hōkōkai* at the center.[28]

We may now return to a study of the *Masjumi's* place in the

newly created pattern of public life on Java. In this connection the most striking fact lay in the very existence of a separate and powerful Islamic organization, sponsored and cemented by the military authorities, who were at the same time bent on extinguishing all vestiges of non-religious, semi-private Indonesian associations.

Officially, it is true, *Masjumi*, like its predecessor, was pledged to abstain from political action of any kind.[29] Yet in the first place, the Japanese themselves had, as we saw, increased Islamic representation in the quasi-political organs established by them in the preceding months. Secondly, and more important still, the tasks assigned to the new Islamic association, and in particular those entrusted to its individual members, the thousands of *kiyayi* and *ulama*, at the village level, constituted to a large extent political work *par excellence*, which in fact assured unprecedented and lasting Muslim strength in the Indonesian political arena.

In the third place, *Masjumi* was given a prominent place in the central machinery of the *Djawa Hōkōkai*, without thereby losing its organizational independence. *Masjumi*-chairman Hasjim Asj'ari and Ir. Soekarno were appointed as the two leading Indonesian advisers *(Komon)* to the *Gunseikan*, who headed the *Hōkōkai*, while Mas Mansur shared with Mohammad Hatta responsibility for the management of general affairs at the center.[30] The federation's position within the new mass movement was thus quite unique in that its leaders, alone among the entire non-Japanese executive personnel in the *Hōkōkai*, represented an independent organization. Nor, it should be added, was *Masjumi's* participation in that movement restricted to the center.[31]

Looking at the overall picture which emerged from the reordering and regrouping instituted in early 1944, there can be little doubt that the Japanese had embarked, not only on an era of tighter, direct control of Indonesian life on Java, but also that they were in the process of perfecting the age-old device of *divide et impera*. They apparently sought to check the

nationalist elite by adding prestige and influence to both *priyayi* and Muslim leaders. This arrangement had, however, barely been made when new developments led to important modifications of the balance between administrators and the Islamic elite, to be followed by another readjustment in favor of the nationalists when Tokyo decided to promise Indonesian independence in the fall of 1944.

It is not without interest to note that the Japanese sought, and obtained, explicit Islamic sanctions for both the *Hōkōkai* and the Neighborhood Associations. Particularly in the case of the latter, this religious approval may have had some influence on the villagers' less reluctant acceptance of their new yoke. At an impressive gathering in the capital, the president of the Court for Islamic Affairs declared in May 1944 that the two organizations were in complete agreement with the teachings of Islam.[32]

The establishment of the *Tonari Gumi* did not, however, diminish Japanese interest in the grass roots importance of Islam. If all was said and done, the more stringent and minute supervision which formed the primary aim of the Neighborhood Associations could hardly endear their local leaders, the *lurah* or village heads, to the population. To make the increased demands on the *tani* more palatable, the government, having obtained explicit approval for its new measures from the central Islamic leadership in the capital, again turned its attention to the local propagators and teachers of the Muslim faith.

This renewed interest was almost certainly influenced by the spreading spirit of restiveness among the peasant masses on Java. For, as so often before in the modern history of Indonesia, it was the peasantry that had to bear the brunt of the colonial policies imposed upon the population by alien overlords. Not only had Japanese military rule brought with it a serious deterioration in economic well-being[33], but the propagandistic and organizational onslaughts with which the Japanese were deluging the *tani* must have contributed to a growing sense of helplessness and *malaise* in the villages. The danger of smoul-

dering agrarian discontent finding an outlet in outbursts of religious fanaticism must have haunted the Japanese for a long time. In spite of all propaganda efforts, *kiyayi* and *ulama* therefore as a group remained potentially dangerous.[34] Japanese apprehensions now found expression in unmistakable warnings to Islamic teachers; these warnings significantly accompanied the important concessions granted to them at the beginning of the new year.

The first move was made when the principals of all larger Islamic schools on the island had to attend a meeting sponsored by the Religious Affairs Office at Djakarta in mid-January 1944.[35] The primary, official aim of the conference was to standardize syllabi and teaching methods in the manifold Islamic schools outside the Western-style religious school system. Some initial steps towards this end were actually discussed, but of greater importance was the decision to extend training courses to Muslim school teachers. These new *latihan* were to commence in April at the *Shūmubu's* newly established permanent Islamic Training Center *(Kaikyō Kyōshi Kōshu-chō)* at Djakarta.[36] Addressing the assembled teachers, the *Gunseikan* made the first explicit reference to hostile rumors among the population, and added a pointed warning against committing "mistakes in [their] task of leading the young."[37]

Towards the end of January, the military authorities announced that a circular had been sent by the *Gunseikan* to the Residents *(Shūchōkan)* of all provinces of Java which contained an important concession to local *kiyayi* and *ulama*. Henceforth, religious leaders would be largely freed from direct control of administrative officials whose consent was no longer required for the holding of routine Muslim services or for religious meetings devoted to the propagation of government policy by Islamic teachers. The government also promised that permits for other meetings, while still required, would in the future be granted with a minimum of delay by local authorities. Finally, it ordered *priyayi* officials to render Muslim leaders all possible help in their efforts to aid the authorities in their drive for greater

production and general cooperation in the war effort.[38]

This liberalization of religious activities in the villages was not only a fulfillment of a long-standing Islamic demand. Its granting in effect constituted the first important reversal in the traditional balance in matters religious between *priyayi* and *ulama*, which had resulted from the whole direction of Dutch, and early Japanese, Islamic policy on the island.[39] Thus, while in the *Hōkōkai* and the Neighborhood Associations the hereditary aristocracy had been given increased influence and responsibilities, it almost simultaneously saw itself progressively deprived of the greater part of its supervisory role in Muslim affairs. We must note the rather perplexing, yet not illogical, fact that Nippon, though fearing grass-roots Islam, and notwithstanding harsh words, made ever greater concessions to its representatives in the face even of overt actions of disobedience. The Japanese, then, shared their predecessors' apprehensions regarding the Islamic faith, but they chose diametrically opposed means for achieving their aims.

The existence of such Japanese apprehensions was clearly expressed in a message to all *kiyayi* and *ulama*, appended to the circular freeing them from administrative control. In this message, the *Gunseikan* underlined the fact that the government, having removed a major cause of complaint[40], expected ever closer cooperation and a "positive attitude." The head of the Military Government concluded with an emphatic warning:

> It is [now] your duty to decide on the kind of aid you are prepared to render, and you must abstain from any talk which might obstruct the people's willingness to cooperate with the government... If, however, you go on criticizing present conditions and... the administration of the country, so that in the end the bond of unity between Army, Government, and the people is broken, then we will have to conclude that you, *ulama*, obstruct the achievement of final victory in this Sacred War, and ...that you are forgetting your proper task..., [by] opposing the Government of the Dai Nippon Army. We shall certainly be on our guard against any such developments...[41]

The *Shūmubu* lost little time in acquainting as many local

Islamic leaders as possible with both the contents of the circular and the strongly worded 'advice' of the *Gunseikan*. It significantly used members of the *Masjumi* executive as harbingers of the two messages. These embarked on a tour of the island, in the course of which they held prominently publicized meetings with religious leaders in all major centers.[42] The urgency of these measures was a clear indication that Japanese preoccupations were far from academic.

Discontent among the peasants must have been growing for several months. When, in 1944, the military authorities commenced with a ruthlessly enforced requisitioning of rice, this smouldering discontent, doubtless at the root of the *Gunseikan's* warnings, erupted in open rebellion. Not unlike a very similar event under Dutch rule in 1917, this violent outburst of peasant protest crystallized around local Islamic leadership.[43] On February 18, 1944, the population of the village of Singaparna, near Tasikmalaya in Priangan Residency[44], led by Kiyayi Zainal Mustafa, an influential orthodox teacher and *Nahdatul Ulama* member in that area, took up arms against the soldiers of the Rising Sun.

Once again in the history of Indonesian Islam, its grassroots power threatened the country's infidel rulers. Apparently the commotion was, moreover, of such magnitude that it had to be officially acknowledged: Three weeks after the revolt, the military authorites, having taken dreadful local vengeance[45], released a lengthy statement to the public.[46]

It is significant that the official version of the rebellion, although it bristled with righteous indignation and dire warnings to the people of Java, did not blame Islamic leaders in general for what had happened. Instead, Zainal Mustafa was officially declared 'insane'.[47]

> Of late, he frequently committed acts... at variance with the true Islamic religion. Therefore, Muslim believers no longer acknowledged [his authority], and the population came to regard him as a madman. In the end he proclaimed himself the representative of Allah, charged with the establishment of a [Muslim] society ordained by Him. In

order to achieve this aim, he spread false rumors, told lies to his pupils and to the villagers, until he assembled a following of some five hundred people; he also collected various kinds of weapons...[48]

The government's attitude towards Islam, the announcement concluded, remained unaltered:

We trust that each of you will [now] peacefully return to his work. It is our sincere hope that the true Islamic religion will continue to grow and develop in Java. But the most severe punishments will be meted out to those disturbing the peace and misleading the people.[49]

Masjumi emissaries were despatched to the Tasikmalaya region one day after the publication of the official report, obviously to demonstrate the government's trust in the leaders of 'true' Islam on Java, and to impress *ulama* with the good intentions of the authorities, while at the same time pacifying Muslim feelings in the area.[50] During March and April, *Masjumi* spokesmen, together with Japanese officials, held similar meetings with local Islamic leaders and the population in all parts of Java.[51] These missions proved to be only the first of several important measures, which, closely following on the rebellion, demonstrated the profound shock experienced by the Japanese in this bloody encounter with grass-roots Islam.

Towards the close of March, the *Shūmubu* announced that a special bi-weekly magazine would be published for distribution among *kiyayi* and *ulama*.[52] This new publication, *Sinar* (Light), appeared in Indonesian, Javanese and Sundanese, printed in the Arabic script.[53] Thus the great majority of local teachers who were incapable of reading the *Masjumi's Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, printed in Romanized Indonesian and primarily directed towards the educated Islamic urban intelligentsia, could be directly reached by the Office of Religious Affairs.

A far more epochal step had, in fact, been taken by the military authorities even before the official report concerning the Tasikmalaya risings was released. On March 5, the government decreed the creation of regional branch offices in charge of religious, *i.e.*, Islamic, affairs. Under this regulation, each

Residency, as well as Djakarta Municipality and the Sultanates, instituted a Religious Affairs Section *(Shūmuka)* in its Education Bureau.[54]

The purpose of this innovation was stated to be twofold. In the first place – and this betrayed the measure's relationship to the recent revolt – the regional offices were to establish closer contact with Muslim believers than could be maintained by the central agency at Djakarta. Thus it was hoped that the *Shūmuka* would put an end to the fact that

> ...the population in all corners of Java is as yet not [sufficiently] aware of...Dai Nippon's policy of honoring Islam, so that up to now quite a few people think or talk in a way out of harmony with the present condition of society; moreover, quite a few incorrect notions are still being held by many...[55]

The second purpose was, however, of a more crucial importance, and of more lasting and far-reaching consequences. Traditionally, so the official announcement went on, the supervision of Islamic affairs in Java, such as Muslim marriages and the collection of religious tithes, had rested with government officials, in particular with Regents and *penghulu*. This state of affairs had, as we have described in an earlier part of this essay, invariably led to frictions between *priyayi* and local Muslim leaders.[56]

In order to obviate a continuation of this age-old situation, the new office of *Shūmuka* would virtually grant 'home rule' to Muslims at the expense of administrative control. It would

> ...endeavor to protect and advance the Muslim religion, together with the religious leaders who are the foremost educators of the people... The persons to be appointed to this office will have to be sufficiently versed in Islamic law and Muslim customs and usages, in addition to showing a clear appreciation of the Dai Nippon Military Government... Therefore the heads of the new office *(Shūmuka-chō)* and at least two of their aides will be recruited from among leading Indonesian Muslims...[57]

Thus, apparently in response to Islamic grass-roots rebellion, the Japanese had decided on a major adjustment of the power relationship between the native aristocracy and the Islamic move-

ment on Java. This adjustment advanced Islam far beyond its colonial status to a position which was bound to affect subsequent developments to a marked degree. A separate governmental apparatus, entirely staffed by leading members of Muslim organizations[58], had been created by the military government. The Islamic movement, already well entrenched at the center, thus gained entry into the administrative system of the island, which it has ever since been able to retain.[59]

The losers in this re-ordering of religious affairs were, of course, the *priyayi* elite. The Tasikmalaya officials, and by implication the entire corps, were held responsible for the grassroots disorders of early 1944.[60] In announcing the creation of the office of *Shūmuka*, the government underlined this fact quite clearly:

> [We wish] Regents and all other officials who have in the past been connected with religious affairs to understand as clearly as possible... our aim in establishing the [new office of] *Shūmuka*, so that they will make every effort smoothly to carry out all governmental orders pertaining to the Islamic religion.[61]

Dissatisfaction with the *priyayi* corps was even more strongly expressed towards the end of April, when the authorities published a statement accusing some of the traditional bearers of local authority of disobedience:

> ...We very much regret to state that some of the most high-ranking officials... fall short in the fulfillment of their important task. They prefer to carry on in their usual way, and in the administrative routine of the former Dutch government... Consequently the government is now taking steps to deal with these [officials]..., and it will punish those who are inept and show lack of enthusiasm...[62]

Thus, on the one hand, the *priyayi* corps, as executors of harsh Japanese policies, had to bear the brunt of popular discontent.[63] On the other, its responsibilities in the local *Hōkōkai* and Neighborhood Associations forced them into ever closer contact with the Japanese – a vicious circle from which there was no escape.[64] We should parenthetically note that Regents and lower *priyayi* had seen their status decline since the very beginnings of the

occupation. Their salaries were sharply reduced from the ample emoluments of the Dutch administration[65], while other elite groups – in particular members of the central and local advisory councils[66], *Peta*-officers and, last but by no means least, some local Islamic leaders – became the equals, if not superiors, of the *priyayi* in rank, and in several instances also in pay.[67]

This broadening 'democratization' of the Indonesian elite structure was doubtless one of the most important achievements of Japanese rule on Java.[68] While a closer analysis of its effects would lead us beyond the limits of this study, the shifting balance between the hereditary aristocracy and Islamic leaders in mid-1944, at a time when the nationalist elite was relatively powerless, deserves our attention.

In the eyes of the villagers the waning *priyayi* prestige must have received a quite considerable blow when local religious affairs were largely removed from their control. To emphasize this loss, the Japanese next turned to the Regents' right hand men, the *penghulu*. In an endeavor to 'explain' the new order to these officials in actual charge of Muslim jurisdiction and ritual within the Regencies, the authorities called a conference of all the island's Chief-*Penghulu*, to be held at Djakarta in late May 1944.[69]

The most striking, and twice-repeated, feature of this in itself quite unprecedented event was to impress on the Cinderellas of Indonesian Islam that they must henceforth regard the *Shūmuka-chō* – in most cases the leading *ulama* of their district, now clothed with official rank and title – as their main font of authority.[70] This important message completed a definite break with a long past, in which governmental support had favored the *penghulu* against the *kiyayi* and *ulama*. The *Masjumi* leadership, in other words, had succeeded in subjecting the 'administrative branch' of the Islamic religion to the control of the Muslim elite.[71] The measure also re-emphasized, in this particular context, the diminished authority of the *priyayi* corps in matters Islamic. Compared to this central theme, the request of the assembled *penghulu* for reconsideration and alleviation of

their unenviable material, legal and social position received scant – and even then evasive – attention.[72]

Two further aspects of this conference aptly illustrated the changing character of Indonesian Islam. First, the most persistent socio-religious demand of the Islamic movement since 1937, the restoration of religious jurisdiction over inheritance matters, was again voiced on that occasion. But it was symptomatic that the demand, not openly voiced by the leaders of the movement since mid-1943[73], now came from the *penghulu* themselves, who had a personal, rather than an ideological, interest in a redress of the judicial balance. Their lonely plea went unheeded.[74]

In the second place – and no less indicative of the direction taken by the Islamic movement –, having been regaled with official, paternal admonitions regarding their own station in life under the new regulations, the *penghulu* were also addressed by *Masjumi* Vice-President, Wachid Hasjim, who repeated these admonitions and urged his listeners to abide loyally by the new rulings.[75] The Islamic movement had, then, not only gained predominant influence in the regional administration of Muslim affairs at the expense of *priyayi* and *penghulu*, it also became ever more closely identified with the central governmental leadership in matters Islamic. For the first time in Indonesian history, a leader of the Muslim movement had spoken to religious officials with the voice of authority.

History was, to all intents and purposes, in the making, and at a rate which kept accelerating in the following months. With the establishment of the regional *Shūmuka* the groundwork was laid for effective control of religious affairs throughout the island by representatives of the Islamic movement.[76] In addition, contact among these officials, and between them and the Religious Affairs Office at Djakarta, was regularly maintained.[77]

The new structure was finally completed when, on August 1, the Japanese authorities issued a five-point announcement concerning the reorganization of the Religious Affairs Office.[78]

In order to meet the wishes of Indonesian Muslims, so it read, important changes regarding both the structure and the personnel of the *Shūmubu* had been effected, which should

> ...facilitate and strengthen [its] activities, so that all matters connected with religion, which are steadily growing in importance in [Indonesian] society, can be expedited and more easily dealt with...

A crucial day for Indonesian Islam had arrived, for the brief introductory comment which we quoted prefaced the transfer of part of the central governmental apparatus charged with the administration and supervision of Islamic affairs to the leaders of Indonesian Islam. Dr. Djajadiningrat resigned as *Shūmubu-chō*[79], to be replaced by Java's best-know and most influential orthodox Muslim teacher, *Masjumi* President Hasjim Asj'ari.

The new head of the Religious Affairs Office, it is true, only lent his name to the office which he *de facto* did not occupy.[80] But his consent to serve as symbol was as important as the fact that his son, *Masjumi* Vice-President Wachid Hasjim[81], together with Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, a prominent *Muhammadiyah* leader, assumed top-ranking positions in the reorganized *Shūmubu*.[82]

The full significance of these appointments was emphasized in the last two points of the government's announcement[83], which read:

> As a consequence of this reorganization, the connection with the *Masjumi* will become ever closer... Now that the Religious Affairs Office has been changed, [and] the leaders of [Indonesian] Islam have been given their proper place [in it], let all Muslims stand squarely behind them and aid them in serving Islam in the interests of the common welfare.[84]

The *Masjumi*, in other words, had to all intents and purposes become part of the government itself.[85] Although Japanese direction was of course not eliminated in the reorganized *Shūmubu*[86], a serious endeavor had been made to identify this branch of the military administration with the Islamic movement itself, and to grant an increasing measure of 'home rule' to Indonesian Islam on Java.[87]

If, as is probable, this position was in a large measure the result of the Japanese response to the threat of Islamic grass-roots unrest, then one cannot fail to acknowledge the sagacity, and perhaps also the courage, of Suzuki and his superiors shown in securing the support of Muslim leaders. On the other hand, the very strength of Indonesian Islam had been at least equally deftly used by the Islamic elite in securing the substantial concessions which gave them a position of lasting importance in the Indonesian political scene.[88]

Within the context of overall Japanese policy on Java during the first eight months of 1944, these changes, moreover, stand out as an almost unique and autonomous achievement. The military administration's conspicuous concessions to Indonesian Islam were, that is, paralleled neither by the transfer of other high-ranking positions to Indonesians[89], nor by diminished Japanese control in other areas of public life.

So far, there was no indication of Tokyo's willingness to promise, however vaguely even, Indonesian independence.[90] As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the nationalist elite had been forced into the restrictive mold of the Japanese-sponsored and Japanese-directed *Djawa Hōkōkai*. Though it had been inaugurated with considerable publicity, the new mass movement to all appearances for many months remained inert. It is not unlikely that its Japanese creators were for some time too preoccupied with the rebellions of early and mid-1944 to breathe real life into the *Hōkōkai*. On the other hand, the abolition of *Putera* had apparently – and understandably – dampened the enthusiasm of many Indonesian intellectuals to collaborate in its cumbersome successor-organization.[91]

In marked contrast to the rapid development of the *Masjumi* and of Islamic affairs in general at that time, the inactivity of the *Hōkōkai* was so glaring that, in July 1944, its head-office felt obliged to issue an official appeal for patience:

> ...The *Djawa Hōkōkai* [it pleaded] has been in existence for only a few months; it is thus understandable that we have not as yet been able to achieve great results. We are, after all, making history! And what do

> a few months signify in history? It doesn't work in terms of months, but in terms of centuries... Not only we, but people all over the world, are – as our readers know – confronted by problems as big as Mt. Semeru...[92]

The contrasting picture which emerges in this, necessarily brief, confrontation leaves little doubt that, between January and August 1944, the Japanese had concentrated their efforts on the Muslim problem. During that period, the Islamic elite had conspicuously gained in influence, in particular at the expense of the *priyayi* corps, while the area of nationalist activity had been considerably narrowed.[93]

The next chapter of our study will follow Islamic developments in the closing era of the Japanese occupation, when the events following the promise of independence, gradually at first and then at an ever-accelerating rate, brought the nationalist leadership to victorious pre-eminence.

Chapter Eight

Towards Independence: September 1944 - August 1945

By the end of August 1944, thirty months had elapsed since the Dutch East Indies had ceased to exist, thirty months during which the clamor for Indonesian independence – after a short and brutally suppressed jubilation in the first few days of the occupation – had been silenced. In fact, the role assigned to the leaders of Indonesian nationalism after one year of Japanese rule on Java must have substantially dampened whatever hopes for the future the change of ruler may have raised in them at the outset.[1]

Deprived of an organization of their own towards the close of 1943, the nationalist elite occupied an unenviable secondary position in the leading ranks of a Japanese-controlled organization, which gave them little scope for independent action. The part played by Indonesians in nominally advisory positions in the organs of the military administration was likewise at best of a very limited nature. The Central Advisory Council at Djakarta and its regional counterparts were, in effect, far less adequate forums for nationalist activities and agitation than their predecessors had been under Dutch rule. The leaders of the nationalist movement had thus to all intents and purposes been forced to exchange their previous role of ineffectual critics for that of almost equally ineffectual 'collaborators'.

Yet Japanese rule had brought with it important change. While in terms of actual power the nationalist elite had gained very little by the end of August 1944, it had been given official, social prestige and prominence. From its existence on the barely tolerated fringe of public life and, in several instances, from political exile, in the colonial era it had rapidly moved to the center of attention during the military government's first thirty months on Java.

In spite of the fact that nationalist leaders were still barred from exercising political power, Japanese rule had been instrumental in forging them into a true elite group, a process which Dutch colonial policies from the 1920's onward had endeavored to thwart by all possible means. It is not impossible that the military authorities were well aware of the fact that they were creating such an elite group, and that for many months they tried to retard the process of its consolidation by means of the divide-and-rule tactics which we have discussed in earlier chapters.[2]

However limited the scope for independent action may have been, the members of this elite had nevertheless been allowed to assume official positions. It was nationalist spokesmen who tended to dominate what political life the new rulers allowed to Indonesians, and who invariably controlled the highest Indonesian functions in the quasi-representative bodies as well as in the various 'mass movements' created by the authorities.[3]

Of more far-reaching long term importance was the fact that the leading functions assigned by the Japanese to the 'secular' nationalist elite had significantly widened its potential electorate far beyond colonial confines. Not only did the Japanese propaganda machine bring the urban leadership closer to the countryside, but the organizational moves initiated by the occupation army called into being a politicized audience that sooner or later was bound to respond to Indonesian leadership rather than to that of the alien ruler.

The advantages of the inevitable identification of the majority of the Western-educated, political intelligentsia with the rule of Nippon was, to some extent at least, counterbalanced by the danger of alienation from the mass of the Indonesian people. In the measure that large-scale discontent with Japanese rule increased, this danger was bound to assume graver proportions. Indeed, growing disaffection with Japanese rule aided the growth of dissident elite groups who came to lead anti-Japanese underground forces. Among them, socialist and Communist leaders played a significant role.

Japanese policy up to the fall of 1944 had, moreover, resulted in a series of developments which were a potential challenge to the nationalist elite's claims to undisputed pre-eminence. In the first place, the *priyayi* corps, in spite of the vicissitudes of its position under the occupation, was as yet by no means reduced to impotence. As we have seen, it had been assigned an important role in the *Hōkōkai* and in the Neighborhood Associations. Quite apart from these new functions, local administration necessarily remained in *priyayi* hands. The Japanese had furthermore placed an impressive number of these aristocratic bearers of authority in the various advisory councils.[4]

The traditional friction between aristocratic ruler-officials and nationalists had thus far, then, not been resolved in favor of the latter, although, in terms of the general balance of prestige and influence, the *priyayi* elite was doubtless losing ground. In addition, being in closer contact with the population by virtue of its traditional function, it also incurred greater and more direct hostility from the exasperated and at times rebellious villagers than did the nationalist leaders at the distant center.

The second, and more serious, challenge to nationalist aspirations stemmed from the rise of the Islamic elite, which the preceding chapters have sought to trace. We shall presently return to a detailed discussion of its subsequent fate. In the present introductory survey it need only be added that these developments ranked among the most important events of the first thirty months of the occupation.

The manner in which the role of Islamic groups has been stressed in this study in some sense parallels the importance accorded to Islamic affairs in the Japanese policy of this period. Compared to other Indonesian elite groups, none had, perhaps, made more conspicuous gains by mid-1944 than the war-time leaders of Islam on Java. They owed this ascendancy largely to the fact that a genuine Islamic elite had, in fact, been in existence for many centuries, and that, at the village level in particular, this elite had traditionally occupied a central, if as yet largely unorganized, position. Yet to the extent that

Muslims, and in particular also many local Islamic leaders, had become government officials and spokesmen of the 'infidel' rulers, they may also partly have forfeited some of the villagers' traditional veneration for their religious leaders.[5] As we have seen, not all *ulama* had acquiesced in and benefited from 'infidel' overlordship, some having taken the lead in fomenting anti-Japanese rebellion.

Finally, although the era of Japanese rule had, historically speaking, barely begun, its impact on Indonesian life was already startling in many respects. Its significance was twofold. In the first place, the negative accomplishments of Nippon's rule in tearing down many of the traditional barriers inhibiting dynamic social growth acted as a catalyst. Second, in its positive achievements, Japanese policy gave a partly new direction to social and political evolution.

Even though the occupation was of too short duration to affect in any vital way the nature of Indonesian politics and the slow-moving pace of Indonesian life in general, Japanization[6] and militarization were bound to leave a deep impression, particularly on the younger generation. It was the young whom the Japanese had primarily wooed for support and for whom they had provided a great variety of organizational groupings, all designed to break down the seclusion of the Javanese village and to provide Nippon with eager collaborators. It was the young generation, consequently, that had most profoundly experienced the tidings of the new era – an era which had deluged the Indonesian countryside with a perplexing stream of propaganda measures, governmental decrees and power displays of all kinds.[7]

In the various youth organizations and in the even more important Indonesian army corps, a new type of leader – whether 'secular' or religious in basic orientation – was gradually coming to the fore. His emergence would assure Indonesia of a nucleus of well-trained military personnel, indispensable in the post-war struggle for independence. But control over this new elite group, which – as will be seen – in one unsuccessful attempt even

dared to challenge its Japanese masters, would prove a hard task for the older generation of Indonesia's political leaders. Already during the later stages of the occupation, the military claimed a measure of political codetermination.

The basic factor in this intricate pattern of evolving and changing power alignments up to September 1944, lay in the harsh reality of undisputed Japanese control. The Japanese alone held all the keys to ultimate power.

The competing Indonesian elite-groups were, therefore, if not creatures of Nippon's own making, almost entirely dependent on Japanese support. More than that, their competition for influence itself was largely the result of a shrewd Japanese policy of *divide et impera*. Because of their unique influence on the grass-roots level, Islamic leaders doubtless possessed a greater measure of inherent strength than the other groups, but in the final analysis, even they owed much of their newly-won position to the occupying power.

It was only when Indonesian independence "in the near future" was promised by Premier Koiso on September 7, 1944[8] that the Japanese policy-makers on Java had to contemplate a gradual – and ultimately, in the face of the imminent collapse, a fairly rapid – transfer of substantive power. With this promise, Indonesian nationalism, in a measure tolerated at first, then officially held at bay since the dissolution of *Putera*, was elevated to the highest official position. Thus this crucial decision, however vaguely and ambiguously worded originally, spelled the end of an era, and with it the virtual end of the carefully constructed system of 'checks and balances' by which the island's Japanese rulers had hitherto dominated Indonesian public life.

The irrevocable, and indeed inescapable, choice of the country's future leaders was made once the outward symbols of Indonesian nationalism were allowed to make their appearance[9], and once ultimate power had to be transferred to Indonesians capable of administering the modern state which these symbols represented. At long last, the nationalist elite was to benefit from the political schooling that it could rightfully claim as

a monopoly among its competitors. Even then it took another six months before this choice began to be translated into real fact. The 'divide-and-rule' policy, that is to say, came to an end only in March 1945.

The scene during the last seven months of the occupation was thus increasingly dominated by the victorious rise to ultimate pre-eminence of the Indonesian nationalist elite, and by the upsurge of the leaders of the young generation, who impatiently forced the hand of the older leadership in the last crucial days. The crowded story of this concluding phase, particularly that of its final stages, cannot be told in detail in these pages.[10] Occasional references to the swiftly changing configuration will have to suffice, in order to relate the Islamic developments to those larger happenings that marked the transition from the promise of Indonesian independence to its unexpected, sudden, and even bewildering implementation eleven months later.

Up to this point, we may with some justification have claimed that the subject of our study occupied a prominent, and at times indeed a unique, place in the brief history of the Japanese occupation of Java. Returning to it now within a far more complex setting, we must admit that, while several very important developments did take place during the period under discussion, the Islamic problem as such tended to lose much of its prominence amidst the advancing and accelerating tide of independence which swept across the island.

The last eleven months of Japanese rule in Java fall into two clearly distinguishable periods. The first dated from September to February, the second from March till August 1945. Premier Koiso's promise of Indonesian independence released an infectious enthusiasm, which marked the opening of the first phase. The Japanese calculation that the hope of speedy independence would further their major aim of identifying their own war with the struggle of the Indonesian leaders against the reimposition of Dutch rule proved – to judge by the available record – by and large correct. It is unlikely that the real strategic

situation confronting Japan in late 1944 was either known to, or its implications understood by, the great and decisive majority of these leaders. At any rate, they had no choice but to make Japan's war their own as the price for obtaining greater autonomy.[11]

Once the first wave of enthusiasm and celebration had subsided, it became clear that the promised independence was as yet rather distant.[12] In the meantime the military government could, and did, use that promise as a lever for exacting from Indonesian leaders ever greater efforts to prepare themselves and their countrymen for the coming struggle.[13] To the Japanese, that is, war came before independence. To the Indonesian leaders, the war could only be successfully waged *via* independence. During the latter stages of the first phase, the authorities' view prevailed; but gradually, in the measure that Japan's plight steadily worsened, and also in the measure that Indonesian bargaining power – implicitly bestowed in Koiso's very promise – improved, the pendulum began to swing in the other direction. This was the situation during the second phase.

On the eve of these new developments, the Islamic movement had, as we have seen, made considerable gains. A series of adjustments in its favor had been made, to a large extent no doubt set in motion by Muslim-led disturbances. In other words, events which had occurred on the grass-roots level had led to a sizable accretion of Islamic strength on the socio-religious plane. At the same time, this accretion was by its very nature bound to react on the political level. It was this level, moreover, which soon overshadowed the others in importance, when the Islamic elite had to adjust itself to the changes following from the promised grant of Indonesian independence.

Masjumi's answer to Koiso's declaration placed the Islamic movement squarely behind the goals of Indonesian nationalism. In mid-October, the federation's executive met at Djakarta and passed a three-point resolution, calling on its members

to prepare Muslims for the liberation of their country and their religion, and to make all sacrifices for the attainment of victory. The last point, equating Japan's war with the Holy War of Islam, read: "With Nippon we stand, with Nippon we fall, in the path of Allah, to destroy a tyrannous enemy."[14]

This program was further explained by *Masjumi* leaders at mass meetings in the capital and in all regional centers, in which they identified Islam with the cause of Indonesian nationalism, which Western colonialism had allegedly sought to divide:

> The result of this treacherous [Dutch] policy has been a kind of thinking widespread among us, namely, that in our country there are different groupings. There are Muslims (and you think of prayer coats), there are nationalists (and you think of Western-style trousers...), and there are *priyayi* (and you think of the traditional Javanese attire). Thus we have created mutually exclusive types. You could only be one or the other, not be a Muslim and [yet] love your country [etc.]... But actually we are all of us nationalists and patriots, and we all of us are also Muslims!...[15]

There can be little doubt that the goal of Indonesian independence was, as we said, shared by most Islamic leaders with the 'secular' nationalists. If this had at one time been truer of the majority of the reformists than of the thousands of orthodox *kiyayi* and *ulama*, we saw that the capable orthodox leadership – particularly its younger members – had already towards the end of Dutch rule moved ever closer towards the ideology of Indonesian nationalism.[16]

It was Japanese policies that had, in effect, continued and deepened the division between the Islamic and the nationalist elites, a division which had showed some signs of weakening when the outbreak of the war had led to repeated and united Indonesian demands for greater autonomy from the Netherlands. On the other hand, and in spite of the substantial advantages which had accrued to Muslim leaders in recent months, Japanese 'divide-and-rule' policies were no barrier against the wider allegiance to an all-inclusive nationalism which was now gradually being freed from Nippon's bondage.

Finally, whatever short-term dividends the politicization of

the mass of *kiyayi* and *ulama* may have paid the Japanese, it ultimately diminished the lethargic, other-worldly resistance to political change of the religious leaders in the countryside. Or, rather, where in colonial times social change had by and large occurred outside their orbit, Japanese rule had willy-nilly drawn them into the arena of public life and forced them to take a stand vis-à-vis the currents of change.

Some *ulama* had responded to this challenge positively, by availing themselves of the opportunities seemingly opened up by the occupation to establish their ideal, the *ummah*, or Islamic community, on the island. Others, however, had sought refuge from the unwarranted intrusions of alien 'idolators' in the traditional protests of Islamic super-orthodoxy and mysticism. Both groups may have shared a desire to be rid of all alien overlordship, even if their hankering for independence may have had little in common with the goals of Indonesian nationalism proper. Whether they desired to build the *ummah* or whether they desired to return to their old ways, most *ulama* probably wished to be masters in their own hearts, homes, and villages, again.[17]

This fairly general agreement on the ultimate objective of Indonesian independence did not, however, preclude either a difference of emphasis on the contents and contours of that independence, nor a contest for the part which would be assigned to the organized Islamic movement in its eventual realization. These differences were, as we saw, rooted in the colonial history of Indonesia, but Japanese rule and the prospect of independence brought them into sharper focus than ever before. In both areas of contention, but particularly in the latter, the developments of the first six months following Koiso's promise indicated that independence would be fraught with serious political problems.

One of the first Japanese post-declaration moves gave greater freedom to the Indonesian leadership in the *Hōkōkai*. During the third session of the Central Advisory Council in May 1944, the members had already requested the establishment of a special youth corps which should be placed under *Hōkōkai*

command.[18] Four months later, this request was granted when, in late September, the so-called *Barisan Pelopor* (Pioneer Corps) was established. Standing under direct nationalist, civilian control, this corps was originally a political organization, whose principal aim was to spearhead *Hōkōkai* – *i.e.*, increasingly nationalist – propaganda. Only at a later stage did this propaganda, as we shall see, embrace an appeal to guerilla warfare, in which the youthful pioneers were to play a decisive part.[19]

The nationalist elite was thus for the first time during the occupation given an organizational weapon of the first magnitude. It could now make a beginning at penetrating the Indonesian village, and at rallying to its cause the *abangan* elements that for decades had resisted *ulama* influence. Equally important, nationalist leaders could obtain a firm footing among the thousands of young Indonesians whom the Japanese military administration had afforded the first political schooling and who, as a result, had outgrown the traditional allegiances of the Indonesian peasantry, *abangan* as well as *santri*-oriented.[20]

Even then, however, it should be realized that this first organizational concession to the 'secular' nationalist elite may have been limited in scope. Thus, while nationalist propaganda was allowed to spread to the Indonesian army, the *Peta* cadres themselves, as far as could be ascertained, remained under Japanese command, without having direct contact with the nationalist elite.[21]

Very shortly after the creation of the *Barisan Pelopor* the military authorities gave evidence of their intention to counterbalance increased nationalist strength by renewed grants of support to the Islamic leadership. On December 8, during the celebrations marking the third anniversary of Pearl Harbor, the *Saikō Shikikan* announced that, "on the unanimous request of 400,000 Muslim youths"[22], the government would immediately set up a special Islamic volunteers' corps. While in September 1943 a similar Muslim request had, as was previously mentioned, met with silence[23], this belated 'compliance' – in fact, almost certainly a cloak hiding direct Japanese initiative

in the creation of the corps – seemed to indicate that the Japanese still placed greater hopes on rallying to their cause Muslim, rather than nationalist, enthusiasm.[24] Whatever interpretation is to be placed on this significant event, it is at least probable that the Islamic leaders were placed at an advantage vis-à-vis the nationalist elite in obtaining at least outward, direct control over an auxiliary fighting corps of their own.[25]

Hizbu'llah, 'Allah's Army', was founded shortly after the Commander-in-Chief's announcement.[26] It was planned as a reserve corps to the *Peta*, some of whose *kiyayi* officers were assigned to the training of the new forces. But the most crucial point of *Hizbu'llah's* elaborate constitution was the relationship between its members and the central Islamic leadership. 'Allah's Army' was, quite explicitly, the army of *Masjumi*, to whom its members had to swear unswerving allegiance.[27]

In mid-December, representatives of the Islamic federation already embarked on a tour of Java with the purpose of inspecting *Hizbu'llah* volunteers in all Residencies.[28] Only six weeks later, "somewhere in West Java" the first field training of five hundred Muslim fighters commenced, under the benevolent gaze of the *Gunseikan* and *Masjumi* Vice-Chairman Wachid Hasjim.[29] An important chapter in Islamic history on Java had commenced.

If the creation of the *Hizbu'llah* was the most spectacular event in the Islamic movement during the first phase, another, and entirely different, measure taken by *Masjumi* early in the new year showed that the leaders of the federation – doubtless responding to the political challenge of organized nationalist drives for support in the countryside spearheaded by the *Barisan Pelopor* – were girding themselves for the silent battle for the allegiance of the Indonesian peasant.[30] A closed meeting of the entire *Masjumi* executive, held at Djakarta between January 28 and 30, decided on a very detailed course of action directed at obtaining a secure Islamic foothold in the village Neighborhood Associations, or *Tonari Gumi*.

As a result of this meeting, a fourteen-point program was

circulated to all the branches of the four Muslim organizations linked in the federation.[31] It commenced by calling on these Islamic associations to organize, in the first place, a concerted membership drive:

> [We need] more members, the more, the better. It is true, of course, that members alone do not suffice, but an increased membership can be used to influence the thinking of the people... This action is [thus] not only urgent, it will not brook any delay! A nation can only advance, if an inner change takes place among its people...

The executive suggested that local Islamic work brigades *(Barisan Pekerdja)* of the most active members be set up, and proceeded – in the best Leninist tradition – to outline a method by which these 'agitator-propagandists' could seek to infiltrate the *Tonari Gumi:*

> The best way of achieving our aims lies in the utilization of the already existing Neighborhood Associations, for whose success we are [after all] also responsible. The work brigades should thus select and educate one person in each *Tonari Gumi*, who volunteers to spread among its members... the teachings of Islamic brotherhood, at the same time personally setting an example. In this way, and thanks to our endeavors, excellent results may be obtained in a very short time...[32]

The effectiveness of this program cannot easily be gauged. But even if, as is very likely, only part of its instructions were carried out, Islamic agitation among the Indonesian peasantry must have considerably increased. The *Masjumi*, spurred by political agitation of the 'secular' nationalist elite among the rural population, and realizing the significance of the Neighborhood Associations as competitors to *ulama* influence, thus as it were prepared its first election campaign in early 1945. It reaped a belated and partial harvest ten years later.[33]

On the whole, the period from September 1944 until the end of February of the next year remained from the Indonesian point of view disappointingly uneventful.[34] Government spokesmen, instead of stressing the early realization of independence, continued for several months to emphasize the need for more Japanization.[35] Apart from the somewhat greater

freedom of action granted to the *Hōkōkai* and the creation of the *Hizbu'llah*, the most important signs of change took place at the administrative level.[36]

Appointments of some new Indonesian mayors[37] in late 1944 were overshadowed in importance by the establishment of the office of Vice Resident, the appointment of additional Indonesian top-level advisers in government departments and an increased membership in the Central Advisory Council. A training institute for young leaders was likewise to come into being. These steps were announced by the Commander-in-Chief in early November. At the same time, he decreed that all advisers *(Sanyo)* were to form a permanent 'upper chamber', equipped with somewhat greater powers of inquiry and advice than had been granted to the *Chūō Sangi-in*.[38]

Not unexpectedly, the new regional positions were assigned mainly to highranking *priyayi*, whose promotion to all intents and purposes gave them a stake in the preservation of the new order created under Japanese auspices. Interestingly enough, one well-known orthodox *kiyayi* joined the ranks of the Vice Residents.[39] The additional advisory functions at the center of the military administration were, by contrast, primarily entrusted to nationalist leaders, who thus clearly emerged as the eventual beneficiaries of the ultimate transfer of political authority.[40]

Even then, however, the sum-total of these adjustments was not too impressive. While the area of Indonesian codetermination had been conspicuously widened, the springs of executive authority rested firmly in Japanese hands. Thus on balance the first phase did not result in a decisive increment of power to the nationalist elite, although towards its close – and prior to the rapid developments of the second phase – the *Hōkōkai* leadership obtained control over important financial resources in the 'War and Independence Fund', established on February 1, 1945.[41]

By the end of February the devolution of nominal control to the nationalist leadership was, then, not of such im-

portance that its undisputed control of the machinery of state was assured. Compared to the *Masjumi*, the *Hōkōkai* was at best an equal, and by no means a superior, when the first phase drew to its close.[42] In spite of recent elevations to the position of Vice Residents, the *priyayi* elite as a whole suffered a heavy, and very likely intentionally calculated, loss in prestige when the Japanese ordered their unprecedented humiliation in a series of training courses *(latihan)* for all the Regents of Java in late January.[43]

It is, of course, difficult to gauge the temper of Indonesian leaders during that first, frustrating phase of waiting. But it is likely that they – and many others, particularly among the younger generation – were no longer satisfied with the meek role of grateful recipients of minor favors so far assigned to them since Koiso's promise of 'ultimate' independence. Undiminished Japanese arrogance and harshness and rapidly progressing economic deterioration doubtless contributed to spreading restiveness, which found explosive demonstration in the revolt of a *Peta* detachment against Japanese officers at Blitar in mid-February[44], so far the most damaging challenge to the rule of the Rising Sun on Java.

Had such a challenge occurred at an earlier date, it could doubtless have led to far-reaching consequences. At this late stage, however, it was not used as an excuse for delaying the implementation of the previously promised measures. Nor did it apparently delay the beginning of the second phase, which rather dramatically opened with a governmental announcement only two weeks after the outbreak of the *Peta* rebellion.[45] Yet even before this important landmark was reached, it was quite obvious that Japanese control, far from being tightened on account of the Blitar events, was in effect at long last starting to soften its grip on Indonesian public life.

On February 21, the seventh session of the Central Advisory Council[46] commenced at the capital. It proved to be its most important, and least restrained, meeting up to that time.[47] The Council, in the first place, promulgated a thirty-three

point 'New Life Movement', designed to alert all layers of the population for independence. In itself nothing else than a collection of sonorous and unobjectionable, if somewhat Spartan, moral precepts, the program was remarkable for its complete disregard of Japanese slogans and ideas. For a few short weeks, and until more important events superseded it, the 'New Life Movement' became the most widely publicized propaganda tool in the hands of *Hōkōkai* and *Masjumi* alike, both organizations apparently competing for its leadership.[48]

Of greater significance were the requests which the Council addressed to the Japanese authorities. Indonesian leaders, after calling on the government to extend military training to the people, specifically requested the immediate release of consumer goods and the rapid improvement in the working conditions of labor. The military authorities were also asked to grant Indonesian associations permission to establish secondary, private schools.[49]

Finally the Council – dominated by the nationalist elite by virtue of numbers and leading positions – addressed itself to one of the most serious political problems which had been created by three years of Japanese rule. In the interests of a speedy unification of all organized endeavors aiming at Indonesian independence, so the last resolution read, the government should

> make every effort to unite the... *Djawa Hōkōkai* and *Masjumi*, who up to now have existed as separate organizations in spite of the fact that they are serving identical purposes.[50]

This was the first open and unmistakable warning to Muslim leaders that the exceptional role which Indonesian Islam had played under the aegis of Dai Nippon would be challenged by the nationalist leadership. The Islamic federation, the only independent and well-entrenched organization outside the *Hōkōkai*, with a separate military unit under its direct command – and with many members and sympathizers in the officers' corps of the regular *Peta* forces – was threatened with the loss

of its autonomy. The *Masjumi* executive, as well as the Japanese authorities, met this first suggestion with silence.[51]

When the nationalist onslaught on the Islamic federation's continued independence was carried one step further, Indonesian developments had entered the second phase. This phase opened with a governmental declaration issued by the Commander-in-Chief on March 1, 1945, the third anniversary of the Japanese landings on Java, in which definite steps towards the realization of Indonesian independence – a sign eagerly awaited for six months – were announced.[52] With the institution of the Study Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence and the establishment of the State Training Institute *(Kenkoku Gakuin)* for young leaders, both promised in March and inaugurated on April 29, the independence movement proper started on its ever-accelerating path.[53]

The landmarks of its fascinating course need not be recapitulated here.[54] We shall, instead, endeavor to follow the development of Indonesian Islam during these historic weeks. To see the position of its leaders during those crucial months in better perspective, we should perhaps reiterate that the attainment of Indonesian independence was an ideal shared by most of them with the 'secular', Western-educated, nationalist elite. A similar basic agreement existed, of course, with the younger leaders, including the 'Young Officers', whom the occupation – as well as the resistance movement – had brought into being. Of all Indonesian elite groups, only the attitude of the *priyayi* towards independence may be questionable, or at least more difficult to assess.

The actual problem which confronted *priyayi* no less than the Islamic elite or the younger leaders after March 1945 was, however, no longer that of loyalty to the idea of an independent Indonesia. Their problem was, rather, one of loyalty to their own, Indonesian rulers, because the impending transfer of real power shifted the center of political gravity from the military government to the nationalist leadership.

Up to that time, each of these elite groups – including the

nationalist leaders themselves – had been, as it were, sustained by separate grants of Japanese power, which had kept them in a changing state of equilibrium for over thirty months. Now three of these four groups found themselves progressively deprived of such direct and independent support. Instead, they were increasingly forced to rely on their own strength, and on whatever trust they could win from their future rulers, who were themselves entering the arena with the backing of the as yet all-powerful, if gradually abdicating, outside arbiter.

Thus the great change which was taking place during the last phase of the occupation marked the transition from the artificial balance centered around Japanese power to the free play of more or less self-generating social forces. This return to a measure of political dynamics and normalcy not only occurred in a climate quite unlike that prevailing in the last years of Dutch rule; it also witnessed a profoundly altered internal balance of power among Indonesian groupings.

The perhaps least perplexing issue facing the nationalist leadership after March 1945 was the position of the administrative elite. At no time in the past capable of wielding a substantial measure of independent influence, this group ultimately had no choice but to transfer its allegiance to the new governing elite. Islamic and military leaders, on the other hand, possessed 'countervailing power' of their own, largely as a result of Japanese policies in the past three years. Accepting the idea of independence with enthusiasm, nevertheless they, each group following a different path, posed serious problems to the veteran leaders of Indonesian nationalism. These problems, as we know, have continued to beset Indonesian politics to this very day.

Underneath the vastly accelerated waves of the mounting independence movement, the last phase of the occupation was, in effect, marked by two main, internal developments. On the one hand, the younger leadership forced its way into the councils of the older generation, appealed for national unity and central leadership, and in the end apparently unleashed the revolution in the face of their elders' hesitation after the Japanese surrender.[55]

On the other hand, nationalists and Muslims fought a stubborn battle concerning the place of Islam in the new state – or rather, concerning the subordination of the Islamic elite to the rule of their 'secular' brethren. The latter, urban-centered, by far superior in education and political expertise, challenged the Islamic leaders whom occupation policies had turned into a political force of unprecedented strength. It is the latter dispute of which we saw the first outward sign in the previously discussed appeal for a merger, which the nationalist leadership had unsuccessfully made in February. The closing pages of this essay will trace the available record of the final stages in this dispute under Japanese rule.

At long last, possessing a journal of its own[56], the nationalist leadership unmistakably took the initiative after March 1945. By the end of April, the *Hōkōkai* organized guerilla training for the island's population under the slogan 'Freedom or Death!' This training was entrusted to carefully selected teams of nationalists who were despatched to all corners of Java. The *Barisan Pelopor* was coming into its own.[57]

Control of grass-roots defense was, of course, of prime importance, if the nationalist elite wanted to translate its unmatched predominance at the center into actual political power reaching down to the village level. The discrepancy between nationalist urban strength, close to the springs of the governmental machinery, and its relative weakness outside these vital areas constituted, in fact, one of the main causes for disharmony between 'secular' nationalists and the leaders of the Islamic movements. The nationalist elite had, as we saw, in recent months taken vigorous action to counteract their rivals' advantages among the rural population. They were, at the same time, apprehensive of the accretion of Muslim strength and organizational autonomy, an autonomy which must have appeared to make inroads on 'secular' hegemony at the center.

While the battle had been joined in rural areas[58], it is highly probable that towards the close of the Japanese occupation the reformist and orthodox organizations linked in *Masjumi*

could command majority support among the Indonesian peasantry. Yet Islamic representation in the quasi-political organs created by the Japanese – though, as we saw, substantially larger than it had ever been under Dutch rule – lagged far behind this balance of support among the Indonesian peasantry. Whatever the occupation had done for Islam on Java, the net result of the past three years was, that the Japanese had furthered – if not actually called into being – organized Muslim political strength on the island, without, paradoxically, granting it the logical consummation of this strength at the apex of political control.[59] Muslim leaders were thus made to pay a fatal price for their decades-old political inexperience. Their organizational gains of the recent past notwithstanding, they could not prevent the Western-educated nationalist elite from grasping firm control of the administrative apparatus that was slipping from Japanese hands.

Now that the end of Japanese rule was in sight, the authorities did, as we shall see, virtually nothing to redress the balance on the political level. The last Japanese measures in support of Indonesian Islam, instead, clearly aimed at meeting some long-standing Muslim demands on the socio-religious level. Nippon, then, would not make Indonesia a Muslim State, but it would bequeath to its successors a more truly Islamic Java, a Java closer to the ideals of the *santri* civilization, than had existed in March 1942.[60]

These striking measures followed each other in rapid succession. As from May 1, 1945, the *Gunseikan* decreed Friday a half-holiday in all government offices.[61] One month later, the authorities made even more important Islamic history with the first printing of the Koran on Indonesian soil at Djakarta.[62] Finally, an Islamic University, one of the greatest hopes of Indonesian Muslims of the past decade – briefly but vainly aroused at an earlier stage of the occupation – opened its doors on July 8.[63] Three weeks later, it was followed by an Islamic Institute in the capital, the last gesture of generosity of the last infidel overlords to their Muslim subjects on the island.[64]

Had these important steps been taken only one year earlier, they would have called for analysis and a detailed assessment of the socio-religious gains of Indonesian Islam. In the rapid stream of events which marked the final phase of the occupation, they do not deserve more than the passing mention we have accorded them here. It is, however, not impossible that this last-minute strengthening of Islam constituted a calculated Japanese move to add badly needed weight to Muslim claims in the political arena. But political developments had by then acquired a momentum of their own, which temporarily at least relegated the socio-religious realm to relative insignificance. Indonesian Islam, as one of its proponents significantly wrote on the eve of independence, had – for good, we might add – entered the era of the political struggle.[65]

In the meantime, the military government had on May 15 clarified its own position vis-à-vis the place of Islam in the framework of an independent Indonesia. On that day, Nishimura, head of the General Affairs Department *(Sōmubu)*, delivered to the members of the Study Committee a lengthy, and subsequently published, statement concerning the course of external and internal developments.[66] Commencing with the former, Nishimura acquainted his listeners with the surrender of Germany and Japan's determination to fight on alone.

Having impressed on the Committee the need for careful deliberations concerning the new state's constitution, the *Sōmubu-chō* finally addressed himself to the problem of Islam, the very problem which his own colleagues had helped to accentuate in the span of the last thirty-odd months:

> As far as the position of religion in the new government is concerned [Nisimura said], let me say that the attitude of the Military Administration with regard to this matter could be compared to a sheet of white paper. While we very clearly appreciate the bonds which exist between the Indonesian people and Islam, the Dai Nippon authorities have not the slightest blueprint or plan concerning the place which the Islamic religion should occupy in the government, or what the relationship should be between Islam and other religions. As I already explained to you, gentlemen, the Indonesian people must realize its own ideals in estab-

> lishing its new state – Nippon will only lend its aid in these endeavors... I believe that the Indonesian people itself fully understands and thoroughly appreciates what, in this connection, best suits and accords with the situation on Java...and all over Indonesia at this time.[67]

This, clearly, was the irrevocable end of Japanese control in one of the most crucial, and most hotly-debated, issues in the Indonesian balance of power. Henceforth, the Muslim leaders could no longer successfully appeal for direct Japanese support in furthering their claims to a "greater share of responsibility in the establishment of the new government of Free Indonesia", which one outstanding Muslim – too late – urged the *Masjumi* leadership to secure from the military authorities.[68]

In their public utterances, the Islamic leaders themselves drew the consequences of this situation. *Masjumi* Vice-Chairman Wachid Hasjim, perhaps the most prominent representative of Indonesian Islam at the close of the Japanese era, announced his position with regard to the place of Islam in independent Indonesia:

> Our past history [he argued] has shown that we have not yet achieved unity. In the interests of this unity, which we most urgently require in our endeavor to establish our Indonesian State, in our minds the most important question is not, 'What ultimately shall be the place of Islam [in that state]?' The important question should rather be, 'By what means shall we assure the place of [our] religion in Free Indonesia?' I therefore once again repeat: What we need most of all at this time is the indissoluble unity of the nation.[69]

In spite of the many vocal appeals of Muslim writers in those feverish weeks, and notwithstanding the most recent gains on the socio-religious level, Free Indonesia would, then, not be proclaimed an Islamic State.[70] That the problem itself had not been far from the minds of thousands of Muslims and their spokesmen is evident in Ir. Soekarno's address to the Preparatory Committee two weeks after the Japanese had declared their neutrality in the argument. That it, furthermore, had to be raised at the highest level and on that very occasion testifies to the enormous strength which Indonesian Islam had

attained in the most recent past. Turning to the Islamic leaders on the Preparatory Committee, Indonesia's future President outlined the first principle of the *Pantjasila*, the ideological basis he proposed for Free Indonesia:

> We will establish an Indonesian *national* state. I ask Ki Bagus Hadikusomo and other Muslims to excuse my using the word 'nationalism.' I too am a Muslim. But I request you, gentlemen, do not misunderstand me when I say that the first principle for Indonesia is the principle of *nationalism*...[71]

Chairman Soekarno returned to the same problem a few minutes later, when he proceeded to discuss the third of his principles, that of representative government:

> For Islam, this is the best condition for the promotion of religion... The House of Representatives, this is the place for us to bring forward the demands of Islam... If we really are an Islamic people, let us work hard so that most of the seats in the people's representative body we will create are occupied by Islamic delegates... Then the laws made by this representative body will naturally be Islamic laws, too...[72]

The discussion concerning the secular or Islamic basis of the state was, however, of secondary importance compared to the real problem of the political balance, not among ideologies or principles so much as among leaders. Islamic agreement on the principle of Indonesian independence almost certainly extended to the acknowledgment of the leadership of Soekarno and Hatta, who had doubtless emerged as the rallying points of the nation's aspirations during the occupation years. On the other hand, from the very outset many of the leaders of the nascent Indonesian state appear to have been bent on denying the Islamic leadership's claim to adequate representation at the center of political power.

For the last time in a short and far from illustrious history, the Central Advisory Council opened its eighth session at Djakarta on June 18.[73] By then, the war appeared to be approaching Java ever more closely[74], and the meeting, unlike its predecessors, mirrored the proximity of the anticipated struggle.[75] The entirely changed atmosphere which marked this brief session off from the far more orderly and docile course of

previous meetings is, however, only in part explained by these important happenings.

What lent the proceedings a unique character was the withdrawal of Japanese control. The relaxation of Nippon's iron grip allowed an approximation of free play to long-suppressed Indonesian social forces now erupting into revolutionary activity. Asked to advise the *Saikō Shikikan* on the measures best suited to prepare Indonesia for the test of battle and the fruits of independence, the Council's members recorded the answer which the pressure of the most vehement of these social forces appeared to dictate. All existing organizations on Java – so their answer read – were to be abolished and merged into a new unitary movement under one united leadership. In this new movement, furthermore, important positions were to be assigned to the spokesmen of the younger generation and to officers of the *Peta* corps.[76]

It is rather difficult to understand and interpret the internal developments which had led to the demands for decisive youth leadership by a chamber in which neither 'Young Officers' nor other youth leaders were themselves directly represented. On the one hand, it is not improbable that the mounting revolutionary fervor of the recently formed youth organization, *Angkatan Muda*, had exerted strong pressures on the not entirely unwilling, if not even intimidated, councillors. The call for the inclusion of youth and military leaders in the national leadership may, therefore, in part at least have been the genuine expression of a widely shared, growing Indonesian impatience, primarily caused by Japanese dilatoriness in transferring authority. The resolution may, in such an interpretation, have had the backing of the established, older leadership, constituting a direct challenge to the Japanese authorities.

On the other hand – and this appears to the writer more likely – the *Angkatan Muda's* claim to a prominent place in the nation's councils may not only have been intended as a challenge to continued Japanese authority, but, at the same time, as an equally emphatic challenge to the divided ranks of the

older leaders, 'secular' nationalist and Islamic alike. The Council's 'advice' to the Commander-in-Chief would, in that case, have been brought about by moves of which the established Indonesian leadership, in particular Soekarno and Hatta, had no knowledge, and which they had, therefore, not approved.[77]

Whatever the motivation and intent may have been, the Japanese response to the Council's request made it quite clear that the demands of the youth-leadership would not be accepted by the wielders of ultimate authority. Whether this Japanese answer be viewed as a forceful veto on a united Indonesian demand or as the intervention of an as yet all-powerful arbiter in a fierce struggle for supremacy, undertaken at the request of the older Indonesian leaders, it almost certainly stemmed the tide of militant challenge for several weeks. When finally Indonesia's youth forced its way to the forefront of the revolution, the Empire of the Rising Sun had ceased to be master over the archipelago.[78]

The Japanese reply to the recommendations of the Central Advisory Council was published on July 2, when the military government announced its approval of the immediate creation of an Indonesian united front, bearing the somewhat uninspiring designation 'New People's Movement'.[79] While its belated formation to some extent accorded with the publicly and vociferously expressed desire for Indonesian unification, in particular with the nationalist aspirations to central leadership, the young generation's claim to a decisive and controlling role in a united Indonesian front was bluntly ignored, if not explicitly rebuffed.

The *Gunseikan* appointed four Indonesian representatives to head the provisional preparatory committee of the 'New People's Movement', and to select its membership. Soekarno and Hatta, representing the nationalist elite and the *Hōkōkai;* Wachid Hasjim, Vice-Chairman of *Masjumi;* and lastly, and perhaps unexpectedly, an outstanding *priyayi*, R. A. A. Wiranata Kusuma, former Regent of Bandung.[80] Shortly after the establishment of the new movement had been officially announced, the Japanese

head of the General Affairs Department, Nishimura, presented these leaders with a nine-point elucidation of the scope and aims of the new organization.[81]

In this important message the *Sōmubu-chō* not only warned them against "continued internal discord in the face of the approaching enemy", but specifically reserved ultimate control over youth organizations to governmental – *i.e.*, Japanese – agencies. The leaders of these bodies should, indeed, be "represented on the preparatory committee", together with other leading Indonesians, but the reins of authority would remain with the civilian, old-generation representatives appointed by the *Gunseikan*, in "closest cooperation with [central and regional] governmental bodies", and in particular with Japanese "experts".[82]

The new movement, it is important to note, did not constitute a merger into one monolithic organization. In effect, it centered around the federation of *Hōkōkai* and *Masjumi*, both of which retained their independence.[83] And, while ultimately a closer degree of unification of the nationalist and Islamic organizations was anticipated, it is significant that the government explicitly provided that even if and when such a unification would take place at a later date, an "independent supreme committee in charge of religious affairs, standing outside the [new] movement, and placed in sole charge of problems directly related to the Islamic religion" was to be established.[84] Thus, though unification spelled a balance decidedly unfavorable to the Islamic elite[85], it had, no doubt with considerable Japanese backing, sought to forestall a total merger, in which its claims to independent leadership threatened to be submerged by its victorious competitors.[86] It was therefore fortunate for the Islamic movement that this threat to its autonomy came too late to prevent the *Masjumi* from entering the era of Indonesian independence as a distinct, and immensely powerful, organization.

With the prospect of an uneasy compromise between nationalist and Muslim leaders we have reached the last discernible stage in the development of Indonesian Islam under the

Japanese occupation. We may surmise that this compromise was a Japanese, rather than an Indonesian, interim solution, which at any rate could not have been entirely satisfactory to many 'secular' nationalists. As such, it was no doubt part of a detailed plan which the military government must have been in the process of preparing for the gradual and orderly transfer of power to Indonesian authorities following the formal grant of independence.

That plan, however, had been conceived in terms of months, if not years.[87] Moreover, to judge by precedents elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the plan had doubtless provided for a fair measure of Japanese codetermination in a nominally independent Indonesia, which might, in turn, have continued to affect the balance of power between the competing elite groups on Java, in particular providing limited support for the Islamic leadership.

These cautious blueprints of the local Japanese authorities were buried in the whirlwind of developments which accompanied the defeat of the Empire of the Rising Sun. On August 7, the Japanese Southern Areas Supreme Command took the initiative out of the hands of the Djakarta authorities by decreeing the immediate establishment of a new Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence.[88] When that Committee was finally convened[89], Japan had already signed the instruments of surrender to the Allied Forces. Ten days after permission for the Preparatory Committee had been granted, the Indonesian Republic was born. Indonesian Islam, after centuries of infidel rule, and after the most eventful forty months in its modern history, suddenly faced a new era and new problems.

Retrospect

The foregoing pages have sought to trace the development of Indonesian Islam and its growing political stature in the first four decades of the twentieth century. There can be little doubt that the rise of modern Muslim movements belongs among the most important landmarks in the political history of Indonesia, and that it will continue to be of prime significance in the political destiny of the young Indonesian Republic. It may, then, be useful to survey this development in a few concluding pages.

Traditionally, Dutch colonial policy rested on support of the indigenous nobility and the Javanese *priyayi* class of ruler-officials. Although the authority and prestige of this class had suffered from the progressive encroachments which were the inevitable concomitants of modern colonial administration and the penetration of Western economic forces, the alliance between the Netherlands and the traditional Indonesian elite was to mark the entire period of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, with the exception of a very short interval. If anything, this alliance was strengthened as a result of twentieth-century developments which seemed to threaten the colonial *status quo* from two directions.

The first of these stemmed from vigorous political agitation spearheaded in the main by Islamic spokesman in the first two decades of the present century. In fact, Islam had in centuries past been the principal political preoccupation of the native aristocracy and of Dutch colonial rulers, for fanatical Muslim leaders had frequently served as the rallying points of unrest and revolt against the powers-that-be in rural Indonesia. In the course of the nineteenth century Muslim-inspired revolts had assumed such proportions on Java and Sumatra that the Nether-

lands had been forced to formulate, for the first time, an Islamic policy proper, a task entrusted to the Dutch Islamologist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje in the late 1880's. After the turn of the century, Snouck's policy – neutrality in religious affairs combined with repressive vigilance vis-à-vis Islamic political agitation – succeeded in ending open hostilities, and even in partly reducing the age-old antagonisms between colonial rulers and Islamic leaders.

Shortly thereafter, however, Indonesian Islam, under the influence of new stirrings in the Muslim world abroad, started to undergo a renaissance of far-reaching religious and also political significance. It was the political aspect of the Islamic renaissance that constituted the first modern challenge to *priyayi* and Dutch control, for it fused traditional Muslim-led restiveness at the village level with an urban leadership which, for the greater part, drew its inspiration from Islamic reformism. After initial hesitation the Dutch authorities responded to this new challenge by suppressing Indonesian political radicalism whose leadership had, by the mid-1920's, largely slipped from Muslim hands to those of the young Indonesian Communist party.

In subsequent years, Islamic political agitation subsided, to be overshadowed in importance by the rise of socio-religious organizations. While these overtly non-political movements suffered far less from direct interference on the part of the colonial government, their growth was nonetheless impeded by the Netherlands' return to a policy of all-out support for the indigenous aristocracy – a policy which in many areas hampered the development of an Islamic civilization whose realization on Indonesian soil was the primary goal of the spokesmen of the Islamic renaissance. This negative Dutch attitude to Indonesian Islam did much to heighten tensions between Muslim leaders and the *priyayi* elite and the colonial authorities in the last two decades of Dutch rule.

The second challenge to the *status quo* stemmed from the rise of yet another Indonesian elite group in the twentieth century. Like most Asian colonies, Indonesia gave birth to a nationalist

movement, led in the main by Western-educated intellectuals, and drawing its inspiration from the libertarian and socialist ideologies of the West, as well as from the political upheavals that marked the 'Awakening of the East' in other parts of Asia.

This 'secular' nationalist leadership endeavored to place itself at the helm of the political radicalism bequeathed to it by Islamic and in part Communist leadership in the late 1920's, but it suffered the same rigorous suppression meted out to its predecessors. Exile and imprisonment deprived the nascent Indonesian nationalism of its most vehement – and most talented – leaders, and gradually forced it into less radical paths. Police surveillance combined with the strengthening of *priyayi* authority succeeded in barring political leaders – whether Islamic or 'secular' – from access to the peasantry, and thus rendered political agitation, centered in quasi-representative assemblies, relatively harmless in the years immediately preceding the second world war. The impotence imposed on nationalist leaders was reflected in increasing hostility to Dutch rule on the eve of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia.

Dutch colonial policy, then, by supporting the representatives of the traditional social system on the islands, had alienated both nationalist and Islamic leaders, and had forged a measure of unity between them. Even then, however, the unity of anti-colonialism had not sufficed to build a lasting bridge between the two new Indonesian elites, who were fundamentally separated in their ideological orientation and ultimate aims, and who, moreover, derived their support from different segments of the Indonesian population. 'Secular' nationalists were profoundly influenced by Western political ideals. Politically more conscious and better versed in waging the political battle against colonial domination, they were successful in attracting a potential electorate among Western-educated, urban Indonesians. Muslim leaders, by contrast, on the whole held aloof from Western ideologies and from political action in general. Their main strength lay in educational and welfare work, which affected a wide range of Indonesians. The Islamic elite could thus not only rely on the

traditional appeal of the faith in the countryside, but also on a following among urban strata of the population outside the orbit of Westernization, which had come under the influence of modern Islamic organizations.

Muslim and 'secular' nationalists consequently often found themselves divided and competing for support and influence. In the closing years of Dutch rule, common antagonisms cemented a measure of tactical unity between the contending elites, while their international orientation – predominantly pro-Allied on the part of many nationalists, neutral if not pro-Axis on the part of most Muslims – tended to underline their basic political incompatibility.

For just over forty months, from March 1942 until August 1945, the former Netherlands East Indies lived under Japanese occupation. In spite of its brevity, the Japanese interregnum was a traumatic episode that profoundly affected many aspects of Indonesian life. These crowded months witnessed both the temporary administrative dismemberment of the Indonesian islands and a rapid acceleration of Indonesian political life, culminating in the proclamation of Indonesian independence following the Japanese surrender in August 1945.

While the removal of the Western colonial ruling group from positions of economic and political control was doubtless the most important single factor in all the occupied areas of Southeast Asia – with the limited exception of French Indo-China – the effects of Japanese rule may have been more far-reaching in Indonesia than in other parts of the area. Both Burma and the Philippines, for example, had for some time before the second world war come to enjoy a far greater measure of autonomy under Western rule than had been the case in Indonesia, where a conservative Dutch colonial regime had sought to bar political maturation in the years preceding the war.

If the maintenance of the social and political *status quo* had been the primary goal of Dutch rule, the Japanese, while initially no less bent on assuring their lasting and uncontested supremacy in the islands, and on incorporating Indonesia into

Greater Japan and the Co-Prosperity Sphere, yet moved quickly to destroy the administrative legacy of their predecessors.

Where the Dutch, like other colonial Western powers in Southeast Asia, had been primarily motivated by economic desiderata, Japan, engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the Allies, had of needs to shape a flexible colonial policy predominantly dictated by short-term military and strategic considerations. Yet, while exploitation of the natural and human resources of Indonesia thus played the most conspicuous part in the early stages of the occupation, political questions – though initially accorded a subordinate place – were from the very outset far from neglected. In the latter stages of the occupation, when Japan's military position was steadily worsening, Japanese policy gradually shifted toward greater political concessions to Indonesian demands.

Japanese policies on Java – and, as far as can be judged, in other parts of Indonesia, too – betrayed surprising familiarity with the position and influence of competing Indonesian elite groups, and great sagacity in manipulating these groups in the interests of the occupying power. To a large extent, these policies constituted calculated reversals of Dutch administrative practice, without initially at least departing from the basic conservatism inherent in Dutch colonial control. In other words, the political status originally envisaged by the Japanese for Indonesia was even more colonial than that under Dutch rule; but Japanese colonialism was to be marked by a determined policy of divide-and-rule that resulted in a partial, but far-reaching, redistribution of the traditional balance between Indonesian social forces.

The first, and in a way most important, Japanese reversal of Dutch policy concerned the *priyayi* corps of administrator-rulers, the cornerstone of the Dutch colonial system for many decennia, if not centuries. Their administrative expertise and their prestige among the Indonesian peasantry – still unimpaired in many parts of the island – rendered the aristocracy indispensable to the new overlords, in assuring the proper functioning of civil

administration on the island. These considerations notwithstanding, Japanese rule brought about a serious diminution of their erstwhile authority. Shorn of some of their prerogatives and part of their lavish emoluments in Dutch times, the *priyayi* elite found itself under increasing attack from its two competitors, the 'secular' nationalist leaders as well as the spokesmen of Indonesian Islam, both of whom gained influence and power at the expense of the traditional ruling class.

The second and outwardly more conspicuous reversal of Dutch policy affected the leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement. After many years of partial suppression by the former colonial administration, including banishment of some of its outstanding leaders, the Western-educated 'secular' nationalist elite was from the very outset of Japanese rule accorded official recognition, appointments to posts in the military administration, and, above all, social prestige.

It is true that for many months these changes were not accompanied by the devolution of actual power to the future leaders of independent Indonesia, and that Indonesian nationalism even suffered a grave setback in the early stages of the occupation. The Japanese, though eager to utilize the prestige of the nationalist victims of Dutch rule, were yet afraid to place organizational power at the command of leaders whom they had good reason to suspect of Western ideological leanings and of a stubborn anti-colonialism. The military authorities must also have realized that, for all their political training, 'secular' nationalists had a relatively limited appeal among the peasantry.

In spite of these early inhibitions, however, the nationalist elite ultimately did benefit from its enhanced position as the recognized spokesman of Indonesian political life. Japanese rule was instrumental in bringing its leaders in ever closer touch with a potential electorate no longer limited to urban centers. It was, therefore, inevitable that it was these leaders who became the main beneficiaries of later Japanese concessions and the principal inheritors of political authority once Japanese control had collapsed.

Finally, Japanese policy vis-à-vis the Islamic leadership, the third major departure from Dutch practice, was of no less decisive influence for the future of Indonesian political life. Originally, the Japanese were no more, in fact perhaps even less, willing than their predecessors to allow free rein to Islamic political life. Like the Dutch, they were haunted by the fear of Muslim-led rebelliousness, by the specter of the 'Holy War' and above all by the fact that the center of Muslim allegiance lay in the Middle East. But whereas the Dutch had, for all their professed neutrality in religious affairs, endeavored to contain the influence of Islam within Indonesian society, the Japanese showed little hesitation in enhancing the stature of the Islamic faith and in endowing its spokesmen on Java, as elsewhere in Indonesia, with social, and implicitly political, prestige.

Doubtless their intensive interest in, and support for, Islam stemmed from a correct appreciation of the bonds of allegiance that have for centuries bound millions of Indonesian peasants to their Muslim leaders. The new rulers must also have taken into account the factor of anti-Westernism that in centuries past had so often played a prominent role in Indonesian Islam, and an international orientation of most Muslim leaders rather favorable to Japan. Thus instead of following the Dutch precedent of seeking a mere *modus vivendi* with Indonesian Islam, the Japanese set out to win allies among the Islamic leadership – urban and particularly rural – allies who, so it was obviously hoped, could persuade their followers to support and work for the new colonial regime.

For quite some time, the Japanese seemed in fact more ready to make concessions to Islamic, rather than to nationalist, let alone *priyayi*, demands. Alone among Indonesian elite groups, the Islamic leaders were at an early stage granted permission to publish a magazine of their own. It is, again, noteworthy that the first high-ranking position in the military administration to be at least nominally entrusted to an Indonesian was that of the head of the Office of Religious Affairs. And while the first incumbent of that office had very little real authority, his successor,

aided by an expanded staff, was able to wield greater influence in matters Islamic on Java.

Far more important were Muslim organizational gains of the occupation years. The *Masjumi*, an Islamic federative body created by the military authorities late in 1943, was allowed to retain its identity until the end of the occupation, having escaped the forced merger of all other organizations, including nationalist movements, into a Japanese-directed mass movement in 1944. Indeed, the leaders of that Islamic federation were eventually turned into government officials, and as such entrusted with some responsibility in the central and regional administration of Muslim affairs in the island. Last, but by no means least, Muslims not only came to play a prominent part in the officers' corps of the Indonesian army established under Japanese aegis, but the *Masjumi* itself was in addition allowed to organize a military arm of its own.

It was unavoidable that this conspicuous Japanese bolstering of the Islamic leadership should have accentuated the divisions between the contending Indonesian elite groups. Only fairly late in the occupation were concessions to the Muslim elite in fact paralleled, and ultimately overshadowed in importance, by increasing and decisive support to the 'secular' nationalists. This change in occupation policy was obviously dictated by the rapidly deteriorating strategic situation confronting Japan in the latter stages of the war, and by the projected transfer of at least the symbols of sovereignty to an independent Indonesian state. By that time, however, Indonesian Islam had been allowed to gain a position of unprecedented strength from which it could no longer be easily displaced by the nationalist leadership. The ensuing rivalry between Islamic and non-religious political forces not only marked the concluding stages of Japanese rule, it has survived as one of the young Republic's most significant legacies of the occupation era.

As far as the *priyayi* elite is concerned, its position suffered at the hands of Muslims and 'secular' nationalists alike. Islamic gains resulted primarily from the diminution of *priyayi* super-

vision of religious activities, in part rooted in prerogative and in part enhanced by Dutch – and, at the outset, also by Japanese – policies. Nationalist gains, delayed for many months by Japanese divide-and-rule policies which to some extent strengthened the position of the aristocratic ruling class vis-à-vis the nationalist elite, were the well-nigh inevitable concomitants of the transfer of power to Indonesian political leaders. In the end, the *priyayi* corps was thus forced to transfer its allegiance to the new rulers of the Indonesian Republic. It is not unlikely that in independent Indonesia *priyayi* and 'secular' nationalists have at times found common ground in opposing the political influence of Indonesian Islam.

The Japanese interregnum had thus affected the political stature of the three major pre-war Indonesian elite groups in a way which was to have lasting consequences. It is no less significant that it had also brought new claimants to political influence and power to the fore. Military leaders – not least among them dissident Muslim officers – as well as a whole generation of younger men, all of whom had received their first schooling in the occupation years, started to challenge the authority and prestige not only of the *priyayi* corps, but also of the Western-educated nationalist leadership and that of the Islamic movements. Clamoring for an increasing share in codetermination during the last weeks of Japanese rule, these new elite groups played a prominent role in the Indonesian revolution which followed in the wake of the Japanese surrender. For better or worse, their continued influence has helped to shape the course of political life in independent Indonesia.

If it is true that Indonesian politics have, since the proclamation of independence in 1945, outgrown the limitations of colonial times, it is no less true that contemporary developments are deeply rooted in Indonesia's colonial past. Among these, the history of Indonesian Islam under foreign domination provides one of the most interesting keys for an understanding of the present and future destiny of the Republic's citizenry. At long last freed from alien control, Muslim leaders – themselves no

longer united in the wartime *Masjumi* alliance are continuing their decades' old endeavors at remolding Indonesian society in the image of an Islamic community, if not ultimately of an Islamic state. Recent Indonesian history has amply reflected the notable gains that have accrued to Indonesian Islam in modern times, but it also indicates that Muslim leaders – divided among themselves – are not without serious competitors in the struggle for the political allegiance of the Indonesian people.

Notes

Notes to Chapter One

1 See F. W. Stutterheim, *Cultuurgeschiedenis van Indonesië* (Groningen/Djakarta, 1950), Vol. II, p. 33*ff*, and H. Kraemer, *Agama Islam*, 3rd ed., supplemented and edited by C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze (Djakarta, 1952), pp. 107-33.

2 See W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change* (The Hague/Bandung, 1956), p. 196, and Kraemer, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

3 Kraemer, *loc. cit.*.

4 See B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings* (The Hague/Bandung, 1955), Vol. I, p. 28.

5 See C. C. Berg, "Geschiedenis en geschiedschrijving van Mataram," *Indonesië* 8 (1955), p. 236, and C. Geertz, *The Development of the Javanese Economy: A Socio-Cultural Approach* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 87, for a detailed discussion.

6 See G. W. J. Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism," in C. E. Von Grunebaum (ed.), *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago, [1955]), pp. 287–88.

7 See C. C. Berg, "Indonesia," in H. A. R. Gibb (ed.), *Whither Islam? A Survey of Modern Movements in the Moslem World* (London, 1932), p. 254, and A. M. Brouwer, "De bronnen van Salatiga," *Het Gemenebest* 9 (1949), p. 330.

8 See Kraemer, *op. cit.*, pp. 262–64, and Brouwer, *loc. cit.*.

9 See B. H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago* (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), pp. 89–90. For an excellent sociological discussion, see also D. H. Burger, "Structuurveranderingen in de Javaansche samenleving," *Indonesië* 3 (1949/50), p. 8*ff*.

10 For two typical Indonesian comments, see Dr. Prijono's war-time essay, "Riwajat pendjadjahan Barat dan perlawanan Oemmat Islam," in *Beberapa penggalan dari sedjarah perdjoeangan Islam* (Djakarta, 2605 [1945]), pp. 73–89, and M. M. Daroesman and M. Djalal, "De Islam in Indonesië," in M. Ford-van Lennep and W. J. Ford (eds.), *Indonesiërs spreken* (The Hague, 1947), p. 61. Conversion to Islam may also have held out hopes of receiving military aid from powerful Muslim potentates abroad (Wertheim, *op. cit.*, p. 197). To mention but one example, in the 1640's Sultan Agung of Mataram endeavored to send an embassy to Mecca. See H. J. de Graaf, *Geschiedenis van Indonesië* (The Hague/Bandung, 1949), p. 157.

11 *Cf.* R. Hartmann, "Islam und Nationalismus," *Abhandlungen der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 1945-46,*

No. 5 (1948), p. 3. See also H. Kraemer, *De Islam als godsdienstig en zendingsprobleem* (The Hague, 1938), p. 17.

12 This analysis is based on C. Geertz, *op. cit.*, and the same writer's suggestive analysis, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Considerations," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 4 (1956), pp. 134–58.

13 See C. Snouck Hurgronje, "Over Panislaminisme" (1913), reprinted in his *Verspreide Geschriften* (Bonn/Leipzig, 1924), Vol. IV/1, p. 375, and G.-H. Bousquet, "Introduction à l'étude de l'Islam indonésien," *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* 2–3 (1938), p. 258.

14 See J. Prins, *Adat en Islamietische plichtenleer in Indonesië* (The Hague/Bandung, 1954), pp. 9–18. Brief treatments can be found in the same author's "Adatlaw and Muslim Religious Law in Modern Indonesia," *Welt des Islams* N.S., I (1951), pp. 283–300, and in H. Westra's earlier "Custom and Muslim Law in the Netherlands East Indies," *Transactions of the Grotius Society* 25 (1940), pp. 157–67.

15 See Berg, "Indonesia," *op. cit.*, p. 257.

16 See J. J. van de Velde, *De godsdienstige rechtspraak in Nederlandsch-Indië, staatsrechtelijk beschouwd* (Leiden, 1928), p. 5 *ff.* This influence was often attested to, if not vastly exaggerated, by Dutch visitors to Indonesian courts, who mistakenly termed these Muslim judges 'priests' or even 'popes'.

17 *Cf.* R. A. Kern's Introduction to Haji Hasan Moestapa's "Over de gewoonten en gebruiken der Soendanezen," *Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Land- Taal- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië* 5 (1946), p. vii.

18 See Wertheim, *op. cit.*, p. 200, and Schrieke, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

19 On the Islamic judge see Snouck Hurgronje, "Rapport over de Mohammedaansche godsdienstige rechtspraak" (1890), in *Verspreide Geschriften*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV/1, p. 97, and "Het Mohammedanisme," (1911), *ibid.*, Vol. IV/2, p. 211.

20 See Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior...," *op. cit.*, pp. 145–46. On the *ulama* see also C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, *Mens en vrijheid in Indonesië* (The Hague, 1949), p. 41, and the same writer's "Moslims leven en Indonesische levenssfeer," *Wending* 4 (1949), p. 142.

21 See W. J. A. Kernkamp, "De invloed van den Islam," in C.W. Wormser (ed.), *Wat Indië ontving en schonk* (Amsterdam, 1946), p. 95; K. P. Landon, *Southeast Asia: Crossroad of Religions* (Chicago, 1947), p. 150, and F. H. van Naerssen, *Culture Contacts and Social Conflicts in Indonesia* (New York, 1947), p. 12.

22 Snouck Hurgronje, "Rapport over de Mohammedaansche godsdienstige rechtspraak," *op. cit.*, p. 103.

23 See G. McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York, 1952), p. 7. A detailed discussion of the Culture System can be found in J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy* (Cambridge, 1944), pp. 115–47.

24 See Wertheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–61. On the *priyayi*-elite, see in particular B. Schrieke, "The Position of Regents from the Days of the Dutch East India Company to the Constitutional Regulation of 1854," in *Indonesian Sociological Studies, op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 201–21.

25 On this point, see P. A. A. Djajadiningrat, *Herinneringen van Pangeran Aria Achmad Djajadiningrat* (Amsterdam/Batavia, [1936]), p. 23.

26 See Snouck Hurgronje, "Brieven van een Wedono-pensioen," (1891–92), in *Verspreide Geschriften, op. cit.*, Vol. IV/1, p. 167 *ff* and p. 196 *ff*.

27 See Kernkamp, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

28 *Cf.* R. A. Kern, "De Javaan als Moslim," in J. Poortenaar and W. Ch. Coolhaas (eds.), *Onder Palmen en Waringins: Geest en godsdienst van Insulinde* (Naarden, [1945]), pp. 156–73, *passim*..

29 See e.g. G. W. J. Drewes, *Drie Javaansche goeroe's, hun leven, onderricht en messiasprediking* (Leiden, 1925), *passim*..

30 See Snouck Hurgronje, "Hadji-politiek?" (1899) in *Verspreide Geschriften*, Vol. IV/1, p. 360. Between 1852 and 1858, some two thousand Indonesians a year made the Mecca pilgrimage. Around the turn of the twentieth century their number increased to an annual average of 7,300. *Cf.* Snouck Hurgronje's "De hadji-politiek der Indische regeering," (1909), in *ibid.*, Vol. IV/2, p. 178 and p. 183, resp..

31 For a statistical survey of Indonesian pilgrims since 1878, see the official publication, *Indisch Verslag, 1941* (Batavia, 1942), Vol. II, p. 150. While it remained true that for the vast majority of hajis the pilgrimage was a social, rather than a profoundly religious, experience, the number of Indonesian pilgrims who spent long years of study in Mecca and were thus deeply affected by orthodox Islam rose significantly.

32 Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism," *op. cit.*, p. 291. See also J. M. van der Kroef, "The Arabs in Indonesia," *The Middle East Journal* 7 (1953), pp. 300–23.

33 Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior...," *op. cit.*, pp. 145–46.

34 See Drewes, *Drie Javaansche goeroe's, op. cit.*, pp. 188–95, and Berg, "Indonesia," *op. cit.*, pp. 276–77.

35 *Cf.* Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

36 On Diponegoro, see J. M. van der Kroef, "Prince Diponegoro; Progenitor of Indonesian Nationalism," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 8 (1949), esp. pp. 430–33.

37 For a good account of the Acheh War in English, see E. S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands East Indies* (Rotterdam, 1938), Vol. II, Chapter 16.

38 See van de Velde, *op. cit.*, p. 5 *ff*, and literature cited there. It was due to these misconceptions that anomalies such as the so-called 'priesterraad' (priests' council), used to designate religious judicial tribunals, stubbornly survived in Dutch official nomenclature until the end of the colonial regime.

39 In some missionary quarters these attitudes are apparently still being held today. For a recent re-statement, replete with misconceptions about both Indonesian Islam and Dutch Islamic policies, see A. Rétif, "Aspects religieux de l'Indonésie," *Etudes* (1954), pp. 371–81.

40 Wertheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 204–05. In fact, the colonial authorities, exercising the statutory right to determine the extent of missionary activities, barred Christian missionaries from areas known to be strongly influenced by Islamic fanaticism. Missionaries often clashed with the colonial administration over the implementation of the statute governing and restricting the admission and activities of missionaries. Since the issue was frequently debated in the Dutch parliament, the Ministry of Colonies, no less than colonial administrators, often faced the difficult task of balancing the ardor of Christian spokesmen at home against the dictates of a moderate policy aimed at not arousing Muslim sentiment in the colony. For a detailed historical account of governmental attitudes to missionary activities, coupled with a plea for a revision of existing restrictions, see J. M. J. Schepper, "Een pleidooi tot herziening van het toelatingsvoorschrift voor predikers van den Christelijken godsdienst (art. 177 I.S.) en zijn toepassing," *Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht* 141 (1935), pp. 1–60.

41 For a brief discussion, see de Graaf, *op. cit.*, p. 440 *ff.* Snouck Hurgronje's crucial contribution to the Dutch victory over Acheh, long overshadowed by the military achievements of General van Heutsz, later Governor General of the Indies, is emphasized in K. van der Maaten's well-documented study, *Snouck Hurgronje en de Atjeh Oorlog* (Leiden, 1948, 2 vols.).

42 The summary of Snouck Hurgronje's work in the text is based on his voluminous writings on Indonesian Islam, the greater part of which were reprinted in the two parts of Volume IV of his previously cited *Verspreide Geschriften* (Bonn/Leipzig/Leiden, 1924–26, 6 vols.). References are limited to points of special significance, while the broad outline is generally based on the following essays: "Over Panislamisme" (1910; Vol. I, pp. 364–80); "La politique musulmane de la Hollande" (1911; Vol. IV/2, pp. 225–306); and "De Islam in Nederlandsch-Indië" (1913; *ibid.*, pp. 361–91). For a recent selection of Snouck Hurgronje's scholarly writings, see G.-H. Bousquet and J. Schacht (eds.), *Selected Works of C. Snouck Hurgronje, Edited in English and French* (Leiden, 1957).

43 Snouck Hurgronje, "Over Panislamisme," pp. 372–73.

44 "Even in those parts of Java in which orthodox Islam has gained the least grip upon the population, ...the Hindu *pandit* would experience as great difficulties in communicating with simple peasants as would the Christian missionary; yet the Muslim *kiyayi* or... teacher, if he deigns to stoop to this lowly creature, is assured of a deferential hearing." Snouck Hurgronje, "Het Mohammedanisme" (1911), *Verspreide Geschriften*, Vol. IV/2, p. 206.

45 Snouck Hurgronje, "Advies over codificatie van het Adatrecht" (1893),

ibid., Vol. IV/1, p. 271. Snouck also noted that Islamic orthodoxy paradoxically appeared to thrive in the Central Javanese principalities and in Batavia, in spite of the fact that the former were the very center of the *priyayi* civilization, while European influence had been most profound in the latter. (*Ibid.*, p. 270). *Cf.* also C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, "Moslims leven en Indonesische levenssfeer," *op. cit.*, p. 140.

46 Snouck Hurgronje, "Over Panislamisme," *op. cit.*, p. 375.

47 For an elaboration of this problem, see Snouck Hurgronje's "De hadjipolitiek der Indische regeering," *ibid.*, Vol. IV/2, pp. 173–98.

48 "La politique musulmane de la Hollande," *op. cit.*, p. 279.

49 This policy of support for the secular *adat* authorities was the substance of Snouck Hurgronje's advice with regard to the situation in Acheh. For a brief summary, see his "Eene onbezonnen vraag" (1899), *Verspreide Geschriften*, Vol. IV/1, pp. 371–86. *Cf.* also A. J. Piekaar, *Atjèh en de oorlog met Japan* (The Hague/Bandung, 1949), p. 5. A fuller treatment can be found in Snouck Hurgronje's larger work, *The Achehnese* (Leiden, 1906), Vol. I, pp. xvi *ff.*

50 "La politique musulmane de la Hollande," *op. cit.*, p. 294.

51 *Ibid.*

52 Compare Snouck Hurgronje's observations in "Rapport over de Mohammedaansche godsdienstige rechtspraak" (1890), *Verspreide Geschriften*, Vol. IV/1, p. 102, with those in "La politique musulmane de la Hollande" (1911), *ibid.*, Vol. IV/2, p. 294. See also I. J. Brugmans, *Geschiedenis van het onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Groningen, 1938), pp. 6–7.

53 "La politique musulmane de la Hollande," p. 300.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 289 *ff.* While Snouck welcomed the educational work of Christian missions in Indonesia, he deplored their confessional bias, which rendered missionary education "with the Bible" unacceptable to most Muslims.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 301.

56 For an example of Indonesian Muslim leaders' resentment of what they felt to be Snouck Hurgronje's deprecation of Islam, see Haji Agus Salim's article, "De sluiering van de vrouw," written in 1926, and reprinted in *Djedjak langkah Hadji A. Salim: Pilihan karangan utjapan dan pendapat beliau dari dulu sampai sekarang* (Djakarta, 1954), p. 174. In this connection it is not without interest that Dr. G. F. Pijper, Adviser on Native Affairs in the period before the Japanese occupation, in a recent address asserted that Haji Salim "bore the spiritual stamp of Snouck Hurgronje." See his *Islam and the Netherlands* (Leiden, 1957), p. 20.

57 It is indicative of Snouck's prestige among Muslim scholars that in 1911 the University of Cairo offered him a chair in Arabic, which he declined. See van der Maaten, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 52 *ff*, for comments on Snouck's stature in the Near East.

58 One of the most scathing comments by a leading Indonesian Muslim

on Snouck's arbitrary division can be found in an article written by Mohammad Natsir in 1939. See "Oleh-oleh dari Algiers: Prof. Bousquet tentang 'Testamen Prof. Snouck Hurgronje dalam teori dan praktek,'" reprinted in his *Capita Selecta* (Bandung/The Hague, [1955]), pp. 164-65. Interestingly enough, a high Dutch official, while praising Snouck Hurgronje, indirectly expressed serious doubts about the feasibility of drawing a clear line of distinction between politics and religion in Islam. See Ch. O. van der Plas, "Mededeelingen over de stroomingen in de Moslimsche gemeenschap in Nederlandsch-Indië en de Nederlandsche Islampolitiek," Proceedings of the *Indisch Genootschap* (The Hague) of February 16, 1934, pp. 266 and 269, respectively.

59 See Wertheim, *op. cit.*, p. 65 *ff*, and Furnivall, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-37. Snouck Hurgronje played an important part in the expansion of Dutch power in the Outer Islands. He designed a short treaty – the so-called 'Korte Verklaring' – which facilitated the establishment of Dutch suzerainty over the territories nominally ruled by Indonesian potentates. See also J. M. Somer, *De Korte Verklaring* (Breda [1934]), p. 238 *ff*.

60 See Wertheim, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

61 On the occasion of Snouck's seventieth birthday, on February 8, 1936, the daily newspaper *Algemeen Handelsblad* carried the following appreciation: "There are few people in the Netherlands who have aroused such bitter enmity and such deep and warm friendship among their contemporaries and their compatriots." Quoted in van der Maaten, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 177. In the early years, his principal opponents were to be found among the political leaders of the clerical parties in the Netherlands parliament, who countered his ideas of cultural association by strenuous pleas for the Christianization of Indonesia. At times, conservative members also criticized Snouck for his 'idealistic' visions. See W. H. Vermeulen's chapter, "Oost-Indië in het Nederlandse parlement, 1891–1918," in W. J. van Welderen Rengers and C. W. de Vries, *Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland* (The Hague, 1955), Vol. IV, pp. 319–21 and 353–54, resp..

62 A full assessment of Snouck Hurgronje, not attempted in this essay, would have to concern itself with the man as much as with his work and influence. On the complexities of his personality, see, *e.g.* the obituary written on the occasion of Snouck's death in 1936 by J. H. Kramers, quoted in van der Maaten, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 184 *ff*.

Notes to Chapter Two

1 On the Culture System, see Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, *op. cit.*, Chapter V; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, p. 11 *ff*; and Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition*, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-62 and 91-92.

2 The Liberal Policy is treated in some detail by Furnivall, *op. cit.*, Chapter VII. See also Wertheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-95.

3 For an excellent discussion of the position of the *priyayi* under the Culture System and the Liberal Era, see B. Schrieke, "The Native Rulers," in *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–195.

4 On the Ethical Policy, see Furnivall, *op. cit.*, Chapters VIII and IX.

5 *Cf.* Schrieke, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

6 *Cf.* the statistical data quoted by Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 31–35.

7 See Snouck Hurgronje's criticism of this state of affairs in his article, "De Inlandsche bestuursambtenaren, vooral op Java," (1908) *Verspreide Geschriften*, Vol. IV/2, pp. 149–68. See also Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–49.

8 "I have never been able to understand the government's attitude towards Western-trained natives," reminisced a former Regent in later years. "Time and again, European administrative officials have asserted that... native officers have not yet attained [a proper stage of] development according to Western standards. For those natives, however, who in all respects equal the European administrators and who were only too willing to cooperate with native officials... there was no place in the native administrative corps." Djajadiningrat, *Herinneringen van Pangeran Aria Achmad Djajadiningrat*, *op. cit.*, p. 261. On the ambiguous results of 'de-tutelization', see in particular J. M. Pieters, *De zoogenaamde ontvoogding van het Inlandsch Bestuur* (Wageningen, 1932), pp. 131–35.

9 *Cf.* J. H. Ritman, "Eenige aanteekeningen over politieke partijen in Indië," *Koloniale Studiën* 21 (1937), p. 352. Another Dutch author interestingly enough argued that the creation of the *Volksraad* had marked the end, not only of association, but of the Ethical Policy itself. See H. Samkalden, "De Volksraad en de europeesche samenleving in Nederlandsch-Indië," *ibid.* 22 (1938), p. 330.

10 See J. Bijleveld, "De Saminbeweging," *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 12 (1923), pp. 10–24. This movement had started before the onset of the Ethical Era, but it had gained momentum in Central and East Java after 1890 (*ibid.*, p. 17) and was finally suppressed as late as 1917. Bijleveld stresses the uniqueness of the *abangan* orientation of Saminism, which "not only opposes the political and social *status quo* but [which] – and this is a rare phenomenon – is diametrically opposed to the existing religious [*i.e.*, Islamic] institutions." (*Ibid.*, p. 11).

11 *Cf.* Djamal Udin [pseud. for Adinegoro], "Zur Kulturpolitik Indonesiens," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* 5 (1928), pp. 258–64 and 317–25.

12 For a more detailed account of Indonesian political history, see Kahin, *op. cit.*, Chapter III and literature cited there.

13. *Cf.* Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

14 The discussion of *Sarekat Islam* is to a large measure based on the detailed and scholarly analysis of that movement in R. Van Niel's hitherto

unpublished doctoral dissertation, *The Development of the Indonesian Elite in the Early Twentieth Century* (Cornell University, 1954). The writer gladly records his gratitude for Dr. Van Niel's permission to make use of that work. On the *Sarekat Islam* see also Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 65 *ff*, and Wertheim, *op. cit.*, p. 211 *ff*.

15 See A. K. Pringgodigdo, *Sedjarah pergerakan rakjat Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1950), pp. 16–18.

16 For a contemporary analysis of this complex phenomenon, see G. S. S. J. Ratu-Langie, "Serikat Islam," in R. A. van Sandwick (ed.), *Onze Kolonien: Een serie monographieën* (Baarn [1913]), 34 pp.

17 See Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–69. On the difficulties encountered by the *priyayi* corps with the increasing hostility of *Sarekat Islam*, see Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*, p. 271, and Koesoemo Oetojo, "De Volksraad en de inheemsche samenleving." *Koloniale Studiën* 22 (1938), p. 336. Regents, in particular, had hopes of regaining their prestige, damaged by the virulent attacks of the *Sarekat Islam*, by membership in the *Volksraad*, to which some of them were appointed by the government.

18 The present writer has discussed these revolts in his article, "The Communist Rebellions of 1926–1927 in Indonesia," *The Pacific Historical Review* 24 (1955), pp. 139–52. See also J. Th. P. Blumberger, *De communistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Haarlem, 1935), pp. 70–103.

19 On Islamic reformism in general, see H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammendanism: An Historical Survey* (London, 1953), p. 177 *ff*, and especially the same author's *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago, 1947); D. S. Franck (ed.), *Islam in the Modern World* (Washington, D.C. [1951]), and A. Guillaume, *Islam* (Harmondsworth, 1954), Chap. IX. On India, see W. C. Smith, *Modern Islām in India: A Social Analysis* (London, 1946).

20 See the article on "Wahhabiya" in H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers (eds.), *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden, 1953), pp. 618–21.

21 The extent of the intellectual influence of Indian reformism – as distinguished from that of the *Ahmadiyah* movement – on Indonesian Muslims is difficult to ascertain. *Cf.* Berg, "Indonesia," *op. cit.*, p. 267. Mohammad Natsir does mention Aligarh and Delhi, together with Cairo and Mecca, as centers of Islamic scholarship for Indonesians. See his "Sekolah Tinggi Islam," in *Capita Selecta, op. cit.*, p. 71.

22 See Hartmann, "Islam und Nationalismus," *op. cit.*, pp. 25 and 41, resp..

23 This discussion is largely based on Gibb's *Modern Trends in Islam, op. cit.*, p. 33 *ff*.

24 *Cf.* B. Dodge, "Comments on Spiritual and Moral Aspects of Current Trends in Islam," in D. S. Franck (ed.), *Islam in the Modern World, op. cit.*, p. 13.

25 On Indonesian reformism, see G. H. Bousquet, *La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas* (Paris, [1938]), Chap. I. On *Muhammadiyah* see

J. Th. P. Blumberger, *De nationalistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Haarlem, 1931), pp. 90–101 and 339–47.

26 *Cf.* Ratu-Langie, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–13. For a debate on the anti-Christian tendencies of *Sarekat Islam*, in particular, in the Netherlands parliament, see H. A. Idema, *Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië, 1891–1918* (The Hague, 1924), p. 271. The Dutch elections of 1909 had returned a majority of 'confessional' parties, and as a result Christian missionary enterprise in the Indies gained fresh momentum, penetrating into the heartland of Islam in Central Java.

27 In the words of an Indonesian historian, "Many people felt attracted to [*Muhammadiyah*] because it did not propagate attacks on others, not even on Christians, or agitate against imperialism, restricting itself to protests against governmental interference in matters religious." Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

28 In 1923, *Muhammadiyah* counted 12 branches on Java, in 1927, 176; in 1932, 463; in 1935, 809; in 1936, 851; and in 1937, 913, well over half of them in the Outer Islands. See Bousquet, *op. cit.*, p. 16. *Cf.* also J. M. Pluvier, *Overzicht van de ontwikkeling der nationalistische beweging in Indonesië in de jaren 1930 tot 1942* (The Hague/Bandung, 1953), p. 70.

29 *Cf.* Wertheim, *op. cit.*, p. 207 *ff* and Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism," *op. cit.*, pp. 301–02.

30 See Brugmans, *Geschiedenis van het onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indië, op. cit.*, p. 354 *ff*, for some statistical data.

31 On the West Coast of Sumatra, this organized opposition to *adat* communalism dated back to the nineteenth century. See H. Bouman, *Enige beschouwingen over de ontwikkeling van het Indonesisch nationalisme op Sumatra's Westkust* (Groningen/Batavia, 1949), pp. 34–35. *Cf.* also J. Prins, *Adat en Islamietische plichtenleer in Indonesië, op. cit.*, pp. 122–123.

32 In the *Jong Islamieten Bond*, wrote its founder – significantly enough in the Dutch language – "we have at long last a youth organization... which in truth is oriented towards the peculiar essence of our people. For under the influence of Western dominance and Western education, our people, in particular the self-styled 'intellectuals'..., have been exposed to the suggestion of Western superiority. Even the 'resistance movements' and the endeavors to escape from the pressures of Western domination are following along lines traced out and directly or indirectly led by Westerners... The foundations of the *Jong Islamieten Bond* [gives expression to] a conscious orientation towards... the peculiar characteristics of our own people, the elevation of these characteristics in our own estimation and their defense against everything alien; this precludes Western influence and, above all, guidance from Westerners or other aliens... The banner of Islam will be raised high, a banner of which we will be justifiably proud." "De behoefte aan godsdienst," in *Djedjak langkah Hadji A. Salim, op. cit.*, pp. 158–59.

33 See W. J. A. Kernkamp, "De invloed van den Islam," in C. W. Wormser, (ed.), *Wat Indië ontving en schonk*, *op. cit.*, p. 107, and Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

34 See Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 111, and Bousquet, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

35 On the *Ahmadiyah* movement in India, see Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-302, and on its role in Indonesian Islamic affairs, see Blumberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-05 and in particular G. F. Pijper, "De Ahmadiyah in Indonesia," in *Bingkisan Budi: Een bundel opstellen aan Dr. Phillipus Samuel van Ronkel* (Leiden, 1950), pp. 247–54.

36 See Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, pp. 185–86. By 1935, *Nahdatul Ulama* counted 67,000 members, distributed over 68 branches. See Bousquet, *op. cit.*, p. 21, and E. Gobée's review of Bousquet's work in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 28 (1939), p. 330.

37 *Cf.* Gobée, *ibid.*, p. 328.

38 For a perceptive social and economic analysis of relations between rural and urban Muslims, see Geertz, "Religious Beliefs and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town," *op. cit.*, pp. 146–47.

39 Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 49. The delegates were Tjokroaminoto of the *Partai Sarekat Islam* and Kiyayi Mas Mansur of *Muhammadiyah*. Both were elected at the sixth al-Islam Congress (September, 1925) which constituted itself on that occasion the Indies' Branch of the Islamic World Congress. After the failure of the World Congress, this nomenclature was abandoned in favor of the original title in the fall of 1927. See Blumberger, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

40 *Cf.* E. Gobée, "Religieus en religieus-politieke bewegingen," in W. H. Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk (eds.), *Daar wèrd wat groots verricht* (Amsterdam, 1941), pp. 457–58; Blumberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 318–19; and Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

41 See Gobée's review in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift*, *op. cit.*, p. 327, and Ch. O. van der Plas, *Nationalism in the Netherlands Indies* (New York, 1942), p. 8.

42 See Gobée in *Daar wèrd wat groots verricht*, *op. cit.*, p. 458; Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 48 *ff*, and Blumberger, *op. cit.*, p. 82 *ff*.

43 For a brief history of the al-Islam Congresses, see Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, pp. 48, 54, and 140–41. *Cf.* also Taufiqurrachman, "Sekitar kisah perdjuangan Islam Indonesia," *Mimbar Agama* 1 (1950), pp. 29–32.

44 In December 1924 an extraordinary al-Islam Congress was convened to discuss an invitation to a Caliphate Conference in Cairo. Like Ibn Saud's plans, which it preceded by two years, this Cairo conference did not materialize. See Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49. For discussions of Muslim controversies regarding the resurrection of the Caliphate in the mid-1920's, see E. Gobée, "De hedendaagsche strijd over het Chalifaat," *Koloniale Studiën* 8 (1924), pp. 503-45, and C. Snouck Hurgronje, "The Caliphate," (1924), in *Verspreide Geschriften*, Vol. VI, pp. 434–52.

45 In that year, the *Sarekat* leadership forbade its members to belong to *Muhammadiyah*, imposing on that religious organization the same party-disciplinary excommunication which had expelled the Communists from the *Sarekat Islam* in 1924. See Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

46 *Cf.* the article on "Islam" in *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch Oost Indië*, ed. by S. de Graaf and D. G. Stibbe (The Hague/Leiden, 1918–1938), Vol. II, p. 172, and E. Gobée, "De Islam," in *Gedenkboek voor Nederlandsch-Indië ter gelegenheid van het regeeringsjubileum van H. M. de Koningin, 1898–1923* (Batavia, 1923), p. 295. For an interesting Indonesian comment, see Haji Agus Salim's "Onwelwillend, onbillijk, onwaar, maar niet onpartijdig," (1926), in *Djedjak langkah Hadji A. Salim, op. cit.*, pp. 97–98.

47 *Cf.* Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 88 *ff.*

48 For an analysis of the internal causes of this decline, see Haji Agus Salim's "Pergerakan politik di Indonesia," in *op. cit.*, p. 141.

49 See Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 182. A resolution adopted at a *Sarekat Islam* congress in 1928 read as follows:

"If the development of *Muhammadiyah* is allowed to proceed freely, it will bring in its wake a weakening of the national struggle... [and] of the nationalist spirit..." Quoted by van der Plas, "Mededeelingen over de stroomingen in de Moslimsche gemeenschap in Nederlandsch-Indië...," *op. cit.*, p. 263.

50 *Cf.* Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 87–88.

51 *Cf.* Drewes, *op. cit.*, pp. 302–03. On the political importance of Sumatran reformism, see Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 72 *ff*, and J. M. Pluvier, *Overzicht van de ontwikkeling der nationalistische beweging in Indonesië in de jaren 1930 tot 1942, op. cit.*, p. 76 *ff*. The part played by reformism in the Communist-led rebellions on Sumatra's West Coast in 1927 is analyzed by B. Schrieke, "The Development of the Communist Movement on the West Coast of Sumatra," in *Indonesian Sociological Studies, op. cit.*, pp. 157–58.

52 See Wertheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 140–41.

53 On this point, see G. E. Von Grunebaum, *Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition, Memoir* No. 81 of the American Anthropological Association (1955), pp. 127–36.

54 *Cf.* also W. C. Smith, "Islam Confronted by Western Secularism: Revolutionary Reaction," in D. S. Frank (ed.), *Islam in the Modern World, op. cit.*, pp. 19–30.

55 Among nationalist leaders in colonial times, Dr. Sutomo, founder of *Budi Utomo* and prominent in later nationalist organizations, was perhaps the best example of this limited group. He was also a member of the *Muhammadiyah* executive, but his criticisms of some Islamic social institutions, in particular in the field of the Islamic marriage, earned him at times bitter enmity from other Muslims. See *e.g.* Blumberger, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

56 *Cf.* Mohammad Natsir's scornful comments addressed to the Western-trained intelligentsia in "Sekolah Tinggi Islam" (1938), in *Capita Selecta*,

op. cit., p. 71. Natsir himself is a product of both Western and Islamic schooling.

57 An excellent example of Western-oriented criticism of the 'backwardness' of the *ulama* can be found in St. Takdir Alisjahbana's attack on Dr. Sutomo's defense of the *santri* civilization, in "Didikan barat dan didikan pesantren: Menudju ke masjarakat jang dynamisch," (1935), reprinted in A. K. Mihardja (ed.), *Polemik Kebudajaan* (Djakarta, 1951), pp. 62–64. In 1930, Ir. Soekarno – then living in Dutch-imposed exile – aroused Muslim hostility by an article in which he asserted that exile was preferable to a sojourn in Mecca. See Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

58 See Berg, "Indonesia," *op. cit.*, pp. 295–98. Ir. Soekarno raised this same point in his historic address to the Indonesian Preparatory Committee shortly before the end of the Japanese occupation. See *Lahirnja Pantjasila (The Birth of Pantjasila): An Outline of the Five Principles of the Indonesian State* ([Djakarta, 1952]), p. 22.

59 As late as 1940, the fifteenth *Nahdatul Ulama* Congress made the joining of the Indonesian youth federation *Persipi* by its own youth group, *Ansor*, conditional on the federation's deletion of Indonesian nationalism from its statutes. See Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

60 *Cf.* the very illustrative citations from Islamic reformist sources in Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–54. In 1931 the *Jong Islamieten Bond* had refused to join an all-Indonesian youth organization after the latter had declared itself neutral in religious matters. See Berg, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

Notes to Chapter Three

1 *Cf.* Blumberger, *De communistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië, op, cit.*, pp. 118–19; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, op. cit.*, pp. 86 and 91 *ff*, and Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition, op. cit.*, pp. 71–72.

2 See *e.g.* B. Schrieke, "Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra," in *Indonesian Sociological Studies, op. cit.*, p. 144 *ff*. Originally, this essay formed part of the report submitted by the commission of inquiry set up by the colonial government after the Sumatran revolt. For an unofficial, equally sober, analysis, see H. Kraemer, "Beschouwingen met betrekking tot de Inlandsche beweging," *Koloniale Studiën* 11 (1927), pp. 1–15.

3 See *e.g.* J. J. Schrieke, *De Indische politiek* (Amsterdam, 1929), pp. 16–18; M. W. F. Treub, *Het gist in Indië* (Haarlem, 1927), pp. 21–68; D. J. Hulshof Pol, Sr., "Het communistisch gevaar in Indië en de adat hoofden," *De Indische Gids* 49 (1927), pp. 19–27; P. de Roo de la Faille, *Het Sumatra's Westkust Rapport en de adat* (The Hague, 1928), p. 61 *ff*.

4 This accusation is embodied in one of the most vehement denunciations of the Ethical Policy, written by Dr. H. Colijn, leading spokesman of the Antirevolutionary Party, head of the Netherlands cabinet and Colonial Minister between 1933 and 1937, *Koloniale vraagstukken van heden en morgen*

(Amsterdam, 1928), Chapter 1. For a carefully documented rebuttal of the charge that education had fostered communism in the colony, see W. M. F. Mansvelt, "Onderwijs en communisme," *Koloniale Studiën* 12 (1928), pp. 203–25. Snouck Hurgronje's attack on Colijn is contained in a pamphlet, *Colijn over Indië* (Amsterdam, 1928). Snouck's condemnation of the new course is well expressed in a letter dated May 8, 1927: "Unless our [colonial] system undergoes radical change and unless it proves in all its manifestations that it aims at the termination of *domination* [as such], the [present] evils will continue, even if all known enemies of the present order are deported to [the detention camp of] Boven Digul [in New Guinea]." Quoted by Bouman, *Enige beschouwingen over de ontwikkeling van het Indonesisch nationalisme op Sumatra's Westkust, op. cit.*, p. 99. (Italics in original.)

5 *Cf.* Colijn, *op. cit.*, p. 57 *ff.*

6 See Furnivall, *Netherlands India, op. cit.*, p. 278 *ff.*

7 "If we fully understand... the essence of 'de-tutelization,'" the government spokesman told the *Volksraad* in 1938, "then the native [Western-trained] administrative corps will be affected by this [policy] only to the extent that its tasks will gradually have to devolve upon the traditional *[adat]* heads of the people." Quoted by H. van der Waal, "De ontvoogding in den Volksraad," *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 27 (1938), p. 698.

8 See Furnivall, *op. cit.*, p. 269, and also R. K. A. Bertsch, "Het Binnenlandsch Bestuur," in Helsdingen and Hoogenberk (eds.), *Daar wèrd wat groots verricht, op. cit.*, pp. 476–77. For a good summary of administrative reforms in general, see *Verslag van de commissie tot bestudeering van staatsrechtelijke hervormingen* [the so-called 'Visman Report'] (2nd ed., New York, 1944), pp. 134–56, and L. J. J. Caron, "De Bestuursvormen," in C. W. Wormser (ed.), *Wat Indië ontving en schonk* (Amsterdam, 1946), pp. 186–203.

9 *Cf.* W. H. van Helsdingen, "Het centraal en regionaal bewind," in *Daar wèrd wat groots verricht*, p. 469, where the identity of the new reforms with the old principle of indirect rule is specifically acknowledged. On administrative reforms in the Outer Provinces, see A. Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies: Its Government, Problems and Politics* (Berkley / Los Angeles, 1944), p. 126 *ff*, and R. Emerson, *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York, 1937), Chapter IX. See also A. Jansen, "Voortzetting van de bestuurshervorming," *Koloniale Studiën* 20 (1936), pp. 88–108, and the revealing analysis in D. W. M. de Boer, "Herstel van inheemsch bestel de kern der bestuurshervorming in de Buitengewesten," *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 25 (1936), pp. 151–59.

10 See Vandenbosch, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

11 In 1936, Governor General de Jonge declared in an interview that "since we [the Dutch] have worked in the Indies for some three hundred years, another three hundred will have to be added before they [the Indonesians] may perhaps be ready for some kind of autonomy." Quoted in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 25 (1936), p. 338.

12 On this point, see the critical comments by Bousquet in *La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas*, *op. cit.*, p. 105 *ff.* E. Gobée, one-time Adviser on Native Affairs, criticized the new policy as follows: "The government should not restrict itself to a refusal of what it, for the time being, considers to be unacceptable... It should at the same time show the path along which the desired goal can be attained." "Religieuse en religieus-politieke bewegingen," in *Daar wèrd wat groots verricht*, *op. cit.*, p. 456.

13 See Vandenbosch, *op. cit.*, p. 70, and "Utrecht contra Leiden," *Koloniale Studiën* 9 (1925), pp. 78–80.

14 It should be remembered that Snouck Hurgronje remained consultant to the Ministry of Colonies in The Hague until December, 1933, when his old foe, Dr. Colijn – at that time head of the cabinet and colonial minister – terminated the appointment. Van der Maaten asserts that "in the last years neither the home government nor that in the Netherlands Indies benefited from [the recommendations of] their salaried Adviser... Apparently his advice appeared to these gentlemen as being too ethical." *Snouck Hurgronje en de Atjeh Oorlog*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 55–56. See also E. Gobée's Introduction to *Ambtelijke adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje, 1889–1936*, ed. by E. Gobée and C. Adriaanse (The Hague, 1957), Vol. I, pp. xv–xvi.

15 Among van Vollenhoven's standard works are the monumental three-volume classic, *Het adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië* (Leiden, 1906–1933), and *De ontdekking van het adatrecht* (Leiden, 1928). See also B. ter Haar, *Adat Law in Indonesia*, transl. and ed. by E. A. Hoebel and A. A. Schiller (New York, 1948).

16 The importance of the Adat Law School in influencing Dutch colonial policy has so far not received adequate recognition in published works on Indonesia. For a good but brief analysis, see Vandenbosch, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 183, 185–86, resp.. The subject is treated in detail in Van Niel's dissertation, *Development of the Indonesian Elite*, *op. cit.*. The writer has benefited from the thorough analysis contained in that work. Most books fail to recognize the profound differences separating van Vollenhoven and Snouck Hurgronje (*cf. e.g.* Vlekke's *Nusantara*, *op. cit.*, p. 312 and van der Maaten, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 51). The writer has been told that these differences ultimately grew into personal animosity.

17 B. ter Haar, "Een keerpunt in de adatrechtspolitiek: Toekomstbeschouwingen," *Koloniale Studiën* 12 (1928), p. 245. This important article should be read in conjunction with its sequel, published eleven years later, "Halverwege de nieuwe adatrechtspraak," *ibid.*, 23 (1939), pp. 113–41.

18 See van Vollenhoven, *De ontdekking van het adatrecht*, *op. cit.*, pp. 106–10. Snouck had, in fact, coined the term 'adatlaw'.

19 *Cf.* Vandenbosch, *op. cit.*, p. 176 *ff.*

20 In the economic field, these assumptions found expression in the 'dualistic' theory of colonial economic life, developed by professor J. H. Boeke and

other Dutch scholars. See *e.g.* Boeke's *Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by Indonesia* (Haarlem, 1953). *Cf.* also Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, *op. cit.*, p. 460 *ff.* Boeke's views have been criticized by Dutch, and other, writers in recent years. For an American criticism, see B. H. Higgins, "The 'Dual Theory' of Underdeveloped Areas," *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia* 8 (1955), pp. 1–21.

21 Snouck Hurgronje left the colony reluctantly. "My work in the Indies," so he wrote in a letter to van der Maaten on September 11, 1907, "has for quite some time suffered from willful lack of appreciation and cooperation in the highest quarter [*i.e.*, from Governor General van Heutsz]." Quoted in van der Maaten, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 87. See also Gobée's Introduction to *Ambtelijke adviezen*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. xiv, and R. Van Niel, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje: In Memory of the Centennial of his Birth," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 16 (1957), p. 593.

22 *Cf.* G. F. Pijper, *Islam and the Netherlands* (Leiden, 1957), p. 20. Judging by the available record, neither the abandonment of Snouck's central thesis nor the problems which this abandonment posed with regard to Dutch Islamic policy seem to have been subjected to critical comment by the many Dutch officials and scholars writing on Indonesian Islam in colonial times. The only explicit and highly critical pre-war comment stems from a Frenchman, professor G. H. Bousquet, himself an ardent proponent of assimilation. See *La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas*, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–51 and 151-53.

23 On this point Furnivall's interpretation (*op. cit.*, p. 249) seems to come closer to historical fact than Kahin's (*op. cit.*, p. 70).

24 "It may sound paradoxical at this moment," Snouck wrote in 1916, "but before another quarter of a century will have passed, it will be a generally accepted truth that, in retrospect, ...the Sarekat Islam was one of the great rays of hope." "De Sarekat Islam in het crediet van koloniaal bestuur," *Verspreide Geschriften*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV/2, pp. 409–10.

25 *Cf.* the present writer's "The Communist Rebellions of 1926–1927 in Indonesia," *op. cit.*, pp. 144 and 148, resp.. See also Schrieke, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-53.

26 Benda, *ibid.*, p. 144.

27 In the words of a competent Dutch observer, "The very fact that the appearance [of Islamic reformism] and the founding of local branches... brought unrest with it sufficed to make *Muhammadiyah* appear undesirable in the eyes of the administration. Only after a long time...was this prejudice abandoned." E. Gobée, in a detailed review of Bousquet's previously quoted work on Dutch Islamic and colonial policy, in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 28 (1939), pp. 326–27.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 327.

29 See Schrieke, *op. cit.*, p. 153 *ff*, and Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

30 Schrieke, *op. cit.*, pp. 151–52.

31 *Cf.* Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 72 *ff*, and Pluvier, *Overzicht van de nationalistische beweging in Indonesië*, *op. cit.*, p. 75 *ff*. On the West Coast of Sumatra, *Muhammadiyah* in fact suffered a temporary decline when the movement's central leadership on Java urged it to abstain from political agitation. The P.S.I.I. and *Permi*, a locally rooted reformist organization, continued to be politically active until the mid-1930's, when several leaders of both movements were exiled to Boven Digul in New Guinea. (*Ibid.*, pp. 76–77).

32 For Snouck Hurgronje's warning, see his "Advies over codificatie van adatrecht," *Verspreide Geschriften*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV/1, pp. 271–72. The warning was emphatically repeated in professor Schrieke's report on the Communist revolts on the West Coast of Sumatra, re-printed in *op. cit.*, p. 146 *ff*, especially pp. 152 and 159. That some Muslim leaders were well aware of the fact that the new *adat*-policy militated against Snouck's recommendations is well demonstrated in Moh. Natsir's "Pertjaturan adat dan agama," (1939), re-printed in *Capita Selecta*, *op. cit.*, pp. 149–50, where he approvingly quotes Snouck's warnings.

33 The colonial government allowed two Indonesian delegates – Tjokroaminoto for the *Partai Sarekat Islam* and Kiyayi Haji Mas Mansur for *Muhammadiyah* – to attend the prospected world congress in Mecca. These delegates had been elected at the sixth al-Islam Congress in September 1925, which on that occasion constituted itself the Indies' branch of the world congress. Two years later, after the failure of that congress, the name al-Islam Congress was reinstated. See Blumberger, *De nationalistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, *op. cit.*, p. 318. See also Chapter Two, Note 39.

34 Where in 1925/26 only 3,474 Indonesian haji's had come to the Holy City, in the following year 52, 412 arrived in Mecca, the largest single contingent of overseas pilgrims who in that year totalled over 123,000. In subsequent years, the number of Indonesian pilgrims decreased slightly, and from 1929/30 onward, the depression caused a sharp decline, the year 1932/33 seeing only 2,260 haji's leaving the Indies. By 1938/39 the number had again climbed to over ten thousand. See D. van der Meulen, "The Mecca Pilgrimage and its Importance to the Netherlands East Indies," *The Asiatic Review* 36 (1940), pp. 588–97. *Cf.* also *Indisch Verslag 1941* (Batavia, 1942), Part II, p. 150, for statistical data on the *hajj*.

35 W. J. A. Kernkamp, "Regeering en Islam," in *Daar wèrd wat groots verricht*, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

36 The new control regulations of those years were contained in the so-called 'Pilgrims' Ordinances,' *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* 1927, No. 286 and 1932, No. 554, and in ordinances regarding the special passports issued to Mecca pilgrims, *ibid.*, 1927, No. 508 and 1930, No. 386. The ordinances were collected in a bi-lingual handbook published by the government, *Handleiding ten dienste van de inlandsche bestuursambtenaren* (Batavia, 5th ed., 1940), pp. 104–36.

37 *Cf.* the circular letter concerning pilgrims' passports from the First Government Secretary, No. 307 H, dated August 16, 1928, and another, concerning control of returning haji's, No. 241 X, dated June 15, 1928, reprinted in *ibid.*, pp. 58–68 and 82–88, resp..These detailed instructions clearly reveal the dilemma confronting the officials in the colony and in the Jiddah consulate in carrying out their new responsibilities. On the one hand, they were enjoined to exercise the strictest possible control in view of the "possibility that many undesirable elements will endeavor to get to Mecca, there to spread extremist propaganda among pilgrims." (p. 60). On the other, procedures were to be expedited in order to forestall "unnecessary restiveness with Dutch regulations and administration." (p. 66). For an Indonesian Muslim's reaction to these controls, see Haji Oemar's article, "El Hadjz," published during the Japanese occupation in *Pandji Poestaka* (Djakarta), 21 (1943), pp. 638–40.

38 Some Dutch circles were apparently even in the 1930's not convinced that Ibn Saud had for good forsaken pan-Islamic ambitions. See the controversy concerning this subject between professors H. J. Nauta and H. T. Damsté, fought out in the pages of *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 28 (1938), pp. 138–42, 372–77, and 378–81.

39 See Gobée in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift, op. cit.*, p. 330, for latter-day Egyptian criticism. The problem was, of course, of old standing. Thus in 1911, Snouck Hurgronje stated that "in the... Muslim press, the Dutch colonial government is depicted as the most tyrannical and irreconcilable European state, as far as Muslims are concerned." "Het Mohammedanisme," in *Verspreide Geschriften, op. cit.*, Vol. IV/2, p. 214. *Cf.* also Berg, "Indonesia," *op. cit.*, p. 261, and van der Meulen, *op. cit.*, p. 597. In part, Muslim hostility to the Netherlands also stemmed from governmental supervision of the Arab community in Indonesia.

40 According to van der Meulen, one-time Netherlands consul at Jiddah, Indonesian Mecca pilgrims spent a total of *Hfl.* 50 million in peak years. "Muslim Problems Connected with an Independent Indonesia," *The Moslem World* 37 (1947), p. 298.

41 See Gobée in *Daar wèrd wat groots verricht, op. cit.*, p. 457 and van der Meulen, "The Mecca Pilgrimage," *op.* cit., p. 590.

42 *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* 1925, No. 219.

43 See Kernkamp, *op. cit.*, pp. 204–05.

44 *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* 1923, No. 136; 1925, No. 260; 1932, No. 494.

45 On *Taman Siswa* see S. W. Riedhwan, "De strijd van Taman Siswa," *Cultureel Nieuws, Indonesië 1952*, No. 19, pp. 307–12; W. le Febre, "Taman Siswa en de nationalisatie van het onderwijs in Indonesië," *Oriëntatie* (1951) No. 43, pp. 318–20, and the same author's Indonesian booklet, *Taman Siswa* (Djakarta/Surabaya, 1952). In spite of official hostility, the so-called 'wild

schools' mushroomed during the depression years, when the educational expenditures of the government were substantially reduced. One of the few novels written by an Indonesian in Dutch in colonial times, Soewarsih Djojopoespito's *Buiten het gareel* (Utrecht, n.d.), gives an excellent and moving account of the hardships endured by many teachers in the 'wild schools'.

46 Natsir complained bitterly about these restrictions, as well as about the strict postal censorship which, he alleged, prevented the "entry of modern thoughts from Egypt in letters or newspapers." "Oleh-oleh dari Algiers," in *Capita Selecta, op. cit.*, p. 163.

47 Van der Plas, "Mededeelingen over de stroomingen in de Moslimsche gemeenschap," *op. cit.*, pp. 267–69.

48 For a comment on Western Sumatra, see Schrieke, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

49 *Cf.* Snouck Hurgronje, "Brieven van een Wedono-pensioen," *Verspreide Geschriften*, Vol. IV/1, p. 169 *ff*, and J. S. Thieme, "Voorgenomen wijziging van de godsdienstige rechtspraak," *De Indische Gids* 50 (1928), p. 312.

50 See Gobée in *Daar wèrd wat groots verricht, op. cit.*, p. 359; Pringgodigdo, *Sedjarah pergerakan rakjat Indonesia, op. cit.*, p. 132 *ff*; and Bousquet, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–29.

51 See Hamka [pseud. for Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah], *Ajahku: Riwajat hidup Dr. Abd. Karim Amrullah dan perdjuangan kaum agama* (Djakarta, 1950), pp. 106–10.

52 Kernkamp, *op. cit.*, pp. 204–05. Agitation against the Guru Ordinance continued until the end of Dutch rule. For a vigorous reformist attack, see *e.g.* the address of *Muhammadiyah's* secretary, Farid Ma'aruf, to the organization's twenty-seventh annual conference in 1940, reprinted in *Almanak Moehammadijah 1358 (1939–1940 M.)* (Djokjakarta, 1940), p. 49.

53 See Gobée in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift, op. cit.*, p. 327.

54 Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, pp. 109 and 182, resp. It should be noted that the leaders of the *Taman Siswa* movement refused to accept governmental subsidies and, as a result, remained at loggerheads with the authorities. See Brugmans, *Geschiedenis van het onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indië, op. cit.*, p. 366, and in particular Riedwhan, *op. cit.*, pp. 308–10.

55 During 1940, 115 private Muslim native-language primary schools received subsidies, compared to 2,470 similar Christian (1,803 Protestant and 667 Roman Catholic) schools. For Western-style 'Dutch-native' and for so-called 'link-schools', the figures were seven for Islamic institutions, forty for Protestant and twenty-one for Roman Catholic schools subsidized by the government. *Indisch Verslag 1941, op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 18–22. For Indonesian comments, see *i.a.* Dr. Subardjo, "The Muslims in Indonesia," *Mimbar Agama* 1 (1950), pp. 66–68 and Natsir's "Oleh-oleh dari Algiers," in *Capita Selecta, op. cit.*, p. 159, and "Perguruan partikelir Islam," *ibid.*, pp. 97–104.

56 Motions urging the government to withdraw Art. 177 of the Basic Law, governing the admission and work of Christian missions, were repeatedly

adopted at Islamic congresses during the 1930's. See Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–88 and Taufiqurrachman, "Sekitar kisah perdjuangan Islam Indonesia," *op. cit.*, p. 30. On the other hand, Christians often appealed to the home government to remove the statutory restrictions limiting missionary work in the colony. *Cf.* Schepper, "Een pleidooi tot herziening van het toelatingsvoorschrift van predikers van den Christelijken godsdienst," *op. cit.*, *passim*. In 1937, *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama* actually invited the colonial government to cease subsidizing all denominational schools, Islamic as well as Christian. See Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 186 and Gobée in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift*, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

57 Over a four-year period, the following subsidies were paid to religious worship:

Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië	*Protestant*	*Catholic*	*Muslim*
1936, No. 355 (pp. 25–26)	*Hfl.* 686,100	*Hfl.* 286,500	*Hfl.* 7,500
1937, No. 410 (pp. 25–26)	683,200	290,700	7,500
1938, No. 511 (pp. 27–28)	696,100	296,400	7,500
1939, No. 593 (p. 32)	844,000	335,700	7,600

58 This principle of Islamic policy was explicitly re-affirmed in Circular Letter No. 1635 A from the First Government Secretary, dated July 8, 1931, reprinted in *Handleiding ten dienste van de Inlandsche bestuursambtenaren*, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–68. In later years, it was partly abandoned. See Note 109, below.

59 This resentment was freely expressed during the Japanese occupation, in spite of the fact that the military government's agency in charge of Islamic affairs was until late in 1943 headed by Japanese 'infidels.' See Sanoesi Pané, "Islam dan zaman baroe," *Asia-Raya*, September 17, 1942, and A. Salam Yahja, "Islam dizaman Belanda," *Soeara M.I.A.I.* I, 16 (August 15, 1943), p. 10. In fact, an outstanding, Western-trained Indonesian Islamic scholar, Dr. Hoesein Djajadiningrat, had been appointed Assistant Adviser on Native Affairs in 1920, and was again to become titular head of the Japanese Office of Religious Affairs in 1943. But as a member of one of the most prominent *priyayi* families on Java his appointment carried little, if any, weight in the eyes of Muslim leaders.

60 See Wertheim, *op. cit.*, p. 72 and Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–94.

61 On the disruptive role played by the *Sarekat* leadership in wrecking the first major attempt at creating unity within the nationalist movement in the 1930's, see Blumberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-74 and Vandenbosch, *op. cit.*, pp. 229–30.

62 See Pluvier, *op. cit.*, p. 35. On the effects of the depression on the peasantry, *cf.* G. Gonggrijp, *Schets ener economische geschiedenis van Nederlands-Indië* (Haarlem, 1949), esp. pp. 215–23 and 240.

63 See Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 94*ff*. Salim's arguments can be found in his "Pergerakan politik di Indonesia," reprinted in *Djedjak langkah Hadji A. Salim*, *op. cit.*, pp. 123–51.

64 *Cf.* Bousquet, *op. cit.*, pp. ix-x.

65 See Kernkamp, *op. cit.*, p. 206 and Gobée in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift*, *op. cit.*, pp. 333–34.

66 *Cf.* Dr. Pijper's comment regarding Snouck Hurgronje's Advisership: "For the first time – *and the last* – we could speak about an Islamic policy of the Dutch government." *Islam and the Netherlands*, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20 (Italics added). Coming from the colonial government's last Adviser, this statement merits special attention.

67 Snouck Hurgronje's hitherto published works, both scholarly and scientific essays and policy recommendations, contained in the collection *Verspreide Geschriften* (6 vols., 1924–26) and in the first volume of *Ambtelijke adviezen* (1957), are limited to the early period of his activities. The first collection contains works on Indonesian Islam up to 1918, while the bulk of the other volume in devoted to Snouck's Advisership in the colony and the subsequent two years in the Netherlands (1907–08). A final judgment therefore has to be suspended pending the publication of the other two volumes of *Ambtelijke adviezen* which promise to include Snouck's recommendations up to the time of his death in 1936. See also Note 14, above.

68 Muslim protests against the *adat*-policy abound in the 1930's. See *e.g.* the extracts from Haji Salim's pamphlet. *Adat contra Islam* (1934), reprinted in *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 188–89, and the report of M. J. Anies to the twenty-second *Muhammadiyah* congress, reprinted in *Pemandangan 'Alam Islam dan Moehammadaijah 1932–1933* (Djokjakarta [1933]), pp. 29–31. *Cf.* also Note 32, above. It is interesting that the most vehement Western critic of Dutch Islamic policy, professor Bousquet, should have ignored this basic cause of friction; see *op. cit.*, pp. 28–29 and 53, resp. *Cf.* Gobée's comment on this aspect of Bousquet's work, in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift*, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

69 *Cf.* Snouck Hurgronje, "Rapport over de Mohammedaansche godsdienstige rechtspraak," (1890), *Verspreide Geschriften*, Vol. IV/1, pp. 90–110.

70 See the Commission's report, *Verslag van de commissie van advies nopens de voorgenomen herziening van de priesterraadrechtspraak, ingesteld bij Gouvernementsbesluit van 12 januari 1922, No. 54* (Weltevreden, 1926). The report is summarized in van de Velde, *De godsdienstige rechtspraak in Nederlandsch-Indië*, *op. cit.*, pp. 152–56. *Cf.* also Kernkamp, *op. cit.*, pp. 203–04. For a highly critical assessment of the report, see Thieme, *op. cit.*, p. 317 *ff.*

71 The Commission was headed by Dr. Hoesein Djajadiningrat, Assistant Adviser on Native Affairs; it included two Regents, two *penghulu* and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, chairman of the Djokjakarta branch of *Muhammadiyah*. Its only Dutch member, Dr. ter Haar, was also the only lawyer, but as a representative of the Adat Law School hardly a man sympathetic to the cause of Muslim law. In fact, the entire composition of the Commission must have caused grave misgivings among Muslim leaders.

72 The discussion in the text is largely based on the following sources:

H. Westra, "Custom and Muslim Law in the Netherlands East Indies," *op. cit.*, pp. 151–67; J. Prins, "Adatlaw and Muslim Religious Law in Modern Indonesia," *op. cit.;* B. ter Haar, "Halverwege de nieuwe adatrechtspraak," *op. cit.*, p. 127 *ff;* Kernkamp, *op. cit.*, p. 203 *ff;* and Thieme, *op. cit., passim.*

73 See Snouck Hurgronje, "Rapport over de Mohammedaansche godsdienstige rechtspraak," *op. cit.*, pp. 93–94, and "Het Mohammedanisme," *op. cit.*, p. 211.

74 Article 78 of the *Regeeringsreglement* of 1855, which was incorporated as Article 134 in the new constitution, the *Indische Staatsregeling*, of 1925. *Cf.* van Vollenhoven, "Het ontwerp op de Mohammedaansche rechtspraak in Nederlandsch-Indië," in *Het adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië, op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 771.

75 See *e.g.* Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

76 *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* 1929, No. 348.

77 See A. D. A. de Kat Angelino, *Staatkundig beleid en bestuurszorg in Nederlandsch-Indië* (The Hague, 1930), Vol. III, pp. 373–75.

78 *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* 1931, No. 53.

79 On this point, see ter Haar, "Halverwege de nieuwe adatrechtspraak," *op. cit.*, p. 133n.

80 The presidency of the Court had apparently been offered to Kiyayi Mas Mansur, chairman of *Muhammadiyah*, who, according to a biographical sketch which appeared during the Japanese occupation, turned the offer down. See *Asia-Raya*, December 26, 1942. The appointment subsequently went to Raden Haji Mohammad Isa, a *pesantren*-trained *priyayi* who had studied in Mecca. See the obituary notice which appeared in the Dutch daily, *Nieuws van den Dag* (Bandung) on January 7, 1941. The *Sarekat* leadership protested against the establishment of the appeals court, calling instead for the creation of an appellate bench by Islamic organizations. See Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, pp. 144–45.

81 *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* 1937, No. 116. In the same year the administration of religious law in Borneo underwent reform. See *ibid.*, 1937, No. 638, and J. Eisenberger, "De godsdienstige rechtspraak in de Zuider- en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo," *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 27 (1938), pp. 626–63.

82 In this vital respect, the new ordinance deviated from the recommendations of the 1922 Commission, which had envisaged the transferral of inheritance matters to regular native courts, but had stipulated that these courts were to base themselves on the religious law of inheritance. The transferral had thus clearly been based on considerations of the superior technical qualifications and probity of native courts as compared to the *priesterraden.* Significantly enough, ter Haar had apparently on this point dissented from the unanimous opinion of his colleagues on the Commission – only to emerge victorious in the end. *Cf.* van de Velde, *op. cit.*, pp. 152–56. Van Vollenhoven *(loc. cit.)* left little doubt as to the direction the Adat Law School wanted to

give to legal reform after the Commission had submitted its report in 1926.

83 "Muslim law has been further pushed back by the school of customary law," wrote Westra (*op. cit.*, p. 166) in 1940, significantly adding, "the question is whether the authorities have not gone too far along this road." It is not without interest to note that ter Haar misleadingly invoked Snouck Hurgronje's authority in the Adat Law School's successful attack on the Islamic law of inheritance. See his *Adat Law in Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, p. 27. In fact, Snouck had explicitly urged respect for the religious matrimonial, familial *and* inheritance law in Indonesia. See "La politique musulmane de la Hollande," *op. cit.*, p. 273.

84 *Cf.* J. Prins, *Adat en Islamietische plichtenleer in Indonesië*, *op. cit.*, pp. 122–23, and Thieme, *op. cit.*, pp. 323–24.

85 See *e.g.* Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

86 In Indonesia, Muslim law has absorbed traditional *adat* rulings which lend a measure of protection to the wife. The so-called 'conditional repudiation,' pronounced by the bridegroom during the wedding ceremony, grants the wife an automatic divorce, with legal claims against her spouse, if the latter fails to fulfill the obligations stipulated in the 'conditional repudiation'. See Snouck Hurgronje, "Rapport over de Mohammedaansche godsdienstige rechtspraak," *op. cit.*, p. 90, and Bousquet, "Introduction à l'étude de l'Islam indonésien," *op. cit.*, pp. 235–36.

87 Prins in his article in *Welt des Islams* (*op. cit.*, pp. 290–92) states that in the years 1929–1931 almost 60 per cent. of all Islamic marriages in Indonesia were ended by deliberate dissolution, *i.e.*, at the pleasure of the husband.

88 For a detailed account, see the illuminating article by the then Adviser on Native Affairs, G. F. Pijper, "De strijd om de monogamie," *Koloniale Studiën* 21 (1937), pp. 476–90.

89 See Kernkamp, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

90 See Pluvier, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

91 Thus *Nahdatul Ulama* boycotted the twelfth al-Islam Congress in May 1939 because of disagreements with *Muhammadiyah* over missionary work among Javanese colonists in Sumatra. See Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–88. As a result of P.S.I.I. pressure, Salim's dissenting *Sarekat* group had been barred from joining M.I.A.I.. See his "Pergerakan politik di Indonesia," *op. cit.*, p. 150.

92 The expulsion of Salim's faction – a total of thirty leading figures – from the *Sarekat* executive occurred in February 1937. It was followed by that of Kartosuwirjo in January 1940. See Pluvier, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–72 and 113–17, resp., and Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–49 and 166–67, resp. P.S.I.I. policies were henceforth determined by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and by his lieutenants, especially Wondoamiseno. Both Abikusno and Wondoamiseno were to play prominent roles in the early stages of the Japanese occupation.

93 See Pluvier, *op. cit.*, p. 116 and Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

94 The new party was headed by Dr. Sukiman, and prominent members of its executive included Wiwoho, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Wali al-Fatah and Farid Ma'aruf (Pringgodigdo, *loc. cit.*) The three last mentioned members continued to occupy leading positions in *Muhammadiyah*, whose chairman, Kiyayi Mas Mansur, held the post of adviser to the P.I.I. executive.

95 On non-Islamic Indonesian reactions in the 'battle for monogamy' of 1937, see Pijper, "De strijd om de monogamie," *op. cit.*, p. 485 *ff. Cf.* also J. M. van der Kroef, "Adat and Islam in Indonesian Nationalism," *United Asia* 4 (1952), pp. 315–20.

96 See Wertheim, *op. cit.*, p. 72, and R. M. Margono Djojohadikoesoemo, "De Parindra en haar economische organisatie," *Koloniale Studiën* 23 (1939), pp. 164–79.

97 On this point, see the highly critical remarks in Haji Agus Salim's "Pergerakan politik di Indonesia," *op. cit.*, p. 141.

98 It was, once again, the outsider, professor Bousquet, rather than most of the contemporary Dutch writers, who correctly assessed the political significance of Islamic reformism. See his *La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas*, *op. cit.*, p. 54. *Cf.* also Natsir's interesting comments on Bousquet in "Oleh-oleh dari Algiers," in *Capita Selecta*, *op. cit.*, p. 162 *ff.*

99 For critical comments on the twin elements of Westernism and 'Javanism,' see *e.g.* Haji Agus Salim, "De behoefte aan godsdienst," reprinted in *op. cit.*, p. 158, and Dr. Amrullah's criticism of *Taman Siswa* quoted by Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–49. *Cf.* also Berg, "Indonesia," *op. cit.*, p. 295 *ff.*

100 From the late 1930's on, younger and partly Western-educated men, notably Wachid Hasjim, were gaining influence in *Nahdatul Ulama*, thus providing orthodoxy with modern leadership.

101 *Cf.* Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism," *op. cit.*, p. 307.

102 Prins quotes Wiwoho who, in a *Volksraad* address in 1935, admitted that the conjugal and social rights of Muslim women were "an inexhaustible source of disputes" in the Indonesian Muslim world. Prins adds that the controversies have continued in independent Indonesia. "Adatlaw and Muslim Religious Law in Modern Indonesia," *op. cit.*, p. 292.

103 *Cf.* Pluvier, *op. cit.*, p. 133. It should be remembered that the Indonesian Christian community, totalling a million and a half, was represented by two members in the *Volksraad*. More important still, 'secular' nationalists were likewise far better represented than Muslims, who continued to be limited to one member. Islamic resentment of alleged official preferment of 'secular' nationalists is vividly expressed in Natsir's "Oleh-oleh dari Algiers," *op. cit.*, p. 160.

104 See Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 96 *ff* and Pluvier, *op. cit.*, p. 167 *ff. Cf.* also J. de Kadt, *De Indonesische tragedie: Het treurspel der gemiste kansen* (Amsterdam, 1949), Ch. I, and J. H. Mulder, "Van Nederlandsch-Indië tot Indonesië," in G. L. Tichelman and H. van Meurs (eds.), *Wordend Indonesië* (Haarlem, 1948), p. 24 *ff.*

105 An excellent insight into the political thinking of the Western-educated left wing of the Indonesian nationalist movement can be obtained from Soetan Sjahrir's *Out of Exile*, transl. by C. Wolf, Jr. (New York, 1949), esp. p. 217 *ff.*

106 These notions were of old standing. Bouman *(op. cit.*, p. 57) quotes a government report of the year 1916, whose author, van Ronkel, stated that after her victory over Russia in 1905 Japan was "dreamed of as a Muslim empire by many [Indonesians]." Sjahrir *(op. cit.*, p. 223) recorded the following observations during his exile on Banda Neira (Moluccas) in late 1941: "...Each evening I was vexed by the sentiments that the people voiced. The Moslems were for Hitler and anticipated the coming of the Japanese, while the Christians, though anti-Japanese, were often not opposed to Hitler."

107 For an interesting Dutch comment, see Gobée in *Daar wèrd wat groots verricht, op. cit.*, p. 459.

108 *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad* (Bandung), November 12, 1940.

109 *De Java Bode* (Batavia), November 4, 1940. *Hfl.* 8,000 per month were to be provided for this purpose. See Note 58, above. The Muslim community itself collected funds for needy pilgrims, but some of these monies were not remitted to Mecca in time. In late 1942, the Japanese authorities promised to have the balance transferred through the intermediary of the Swedish government. See *Asia-Raya*, October 26, 1942.

110 See the special issue, "Franco 'Amal Moehammadijah," of *Soeara Moehammadijah* 22 (1941), No. 7.

111 In a letter to the writer, dated October 20, 1956, Messrs. K. Kishi and S. Nishijima of Tokyo stated that the Japanese military authorities on Java were not only aware of these endeavors, but apparently considered them of such importance that they decided to counteract Dutch propaganda among *ulama* almost immediately after the landings on the island. On the other hand, Dr. G. F. Pijper, in a letter dated November 27, 1956, expressed doubts as to the effects which this belated effort on the part of a highly placed Dutch official, undertaken on his private initiative, might have had among Indonesian Muslim leaders. By then, so he writes, "it was already too late, and the Indonesian world had, by and large, determined its standpoint."

112 The writer owes this information to a personal communication received from Dr. Pijper in June 1955. See also Note 52, above.

113 See Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 96–97, and Pluvier, *op. cit.*, p. 134 *ff.*

114 See Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 97–100. In the *Kongres*, each participating group had been given one vote, irrespective of its size and membership. In the *Madjelis*, representation and voting were proportional to the number of registered branches. See *Nationale Commentaren* 4 (1941), p. 3827.

115 The executive committee of the *Madjelis Rakjat* consisted of the following members:

Representing *Gapi:* Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (P.S.I.I.), Sukardjo Wirjopra-

noto *(Parindra)*, Oto Iskandar Dinata *(Pasundan)*, Sartono *(Gerindo)*, and Kasimo (P.P.K.I.);

Representing M.I.A.I.: Wachid Hasjim *(Nahdatul Ulama)*, W. Wondoamiseno (P.S.I.I.), Dr. Sukiman (P.I.I.), Kiyayi Haji Mas Mansur and Umar Hubejsj *(Muhammadiyah)*;

Representing P.V.P.N.: Soeroso, Atik Soeardi, Mr. Hindromartono, Rooslan Wongsokusumo, and Drijowongso.

See Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p. 166. It is interesting to note that both Islamic political parties had joined M.I.A.I. as well as *Gapi*.

116 See *Verslag van de commissie tot bestudeering van staatsrechtelijke hervormingen*, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 107–10.

117 *Ibid.*, p. 112. For the full text of Queen Wilhelmina's broadcast of December 6, 1942, see *Wordend Indonesië*, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–64. For a rather misleading interpretation of political events on the eve of the Japanese occupation, *cf.* Vlekke's *Nusantara*, *op. cit.*, p. 369 *ff.*

118 See Ch. O. van der Plas, *Nationalism in the Netherlands East Indies*, *op cit.*, p. 14, and Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, pp. 166–67. For a confirmation by a leading *Sarekat* spokesman, see W. Wondoamiseno, "Sikap M.I.A.I. terhadap peroebahan djaman baroe," published during the Japanese occupation in *Pandji Poestaka* XX, 28 (October 17, 1942), p. 974. See also Note 61, above.

119 In an official publication released shortly before the invasion, the colonial authorities stated that a Muslim organization – very likely the P.S.I.I. – had been "approached" by Japanese agents. *Tien jaar Japansch gewroet in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Batavia, 1942), p. 25.

120 On this point, see Farid Ma'aruf's report to the twenty-seventh *Muhammadiyah* congress of 1940, reprinted in *Almanak Moehammadijah*, *op. cit.*, p. 43. Wondoamiseno *(loc. cit.)* actually asserted that not only his own party but the entire M.I.A.I. had boycotted the colonial government's invitation to the proposed conference.

Notes to Chapter Four

1 The writer has not been able to find references to Islam in Western-language Japanese periodicals of those years. The information in the text is largely based on the Netherlands Indies' government publication, *Tien jaar Japansch gewroet in Nederlandsch-Indië*, *op. cit.*, and on a typewritten wartime document, *Japanese Infiltration among the Moslems* (O.S.S. No. 18191 [1943?]). The writer is obliged to the Office of Intelligence Research of the Department of State in Washington, D.C., for making this document available to him. As of 1941, there were some 600-odd Muslims resident in Japan. Only three or four of these were Japanese converts to the faith, the majority being exiles

from Soviet Turkestan. One of these, Amin Islami, was in charge of the Tokyo mosque. *Cf. Asia-Raya*, June 16, 1942.

2 *Tien jaar Japansch gewroet...*, p. 24. The venture was financed by R. Uchida, leader of the 'Black Dragon Society.' In late 1939, two Islamic 'experts', Go Suzuki and Kobayashi, were attached to the Japanese consulate at Batavia *(ibid.*, p. 60). As will be seen, a 'Haji' Suzuki later played an important role in the planning and execution of Japanese Muslim policy on Java. The writer could not ascertain whether Haji Suzuki was the former consular employee.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 24, and *cf.* Haji Abdul Muniam Inada, "Agama Islam dan Nippon," *Pandji Poestaka*, XX, 28 (October 1, 1942), pp. 947–50. In this and all subsequent references to occupation sources, the Western calendar has been substituted for the Japanese year shown on the original. Thus 1942 appears as the year 2602 of the Sumera calendar *(i.e.*, 660 years have to be added to the Christian year, 660 B.C. being the date when the first *Tennō* according to Japanese mythology became emperor). While the Sumera year was the one generally used, official proclamations and decrees were usually dated by the respective year of the present emperor Hirohito's reign, which commenced in 1926. According to this system, introduced after the Meiji Restoration, 1942 was Year 17 of the *Shōwa* Era. The Christian and the Japanese year are in all other respects identical, having the same months and beginning on January 1. – Since the earliest days of the occupation the Japanese had also replaced Java Time by Nippon Time, advancing the local clock by $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours. See Decree No. 6, dated March 27, 1942, in the Djakarta daily *Berita Oemoem* of that day.

4 Hayashi became a convert to Islam at the age of thirty, after having become acquainted with that religion in Turkey. He died on February 4, 1943. See the biographical article and obituary notice in *Soeara M.I.A.I.* (Djakarta), I, 4 (February 15, 1943), pp. 3–5, and the long article on Hayashi in *Asia-Raya*, February 23, 1943. Prayers for the deceased were said in all mosques on Java, with a special service in Djakarta's Kwitang Mosque on February 12. *Ibid.*, February 13, 1943. The late general was only one of the sponsors of these Islamic enterprises; Vice Admiral Ogasawara and the pan-Asiatic leader M. Tōyama are mentioned as other active promoters. The government undoubtedly backed their efforts. Cf. *Tien jaar Japansch gewroet...*, p. 25.

5 *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (Bandung), October 3, 1939. *Cf.* also M. A. Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia* (The Hague, 1955), p. 202n.

6 The M.I.A.I. delegation consisted of H. Abdul Kahar Muzakkir (principal of a *Muhammadiyah* school), Ahmad Kasmat (P.I.I.), H. Machfud Siddiq *(Nahdatul Ulama)*, Farid Ma'aruf *(Muhammadiyah* and P.I.I.), and A. D. Almudi (?). *Cf.* Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 949. See also the detailed article, "Japans politiek en de Islam," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad* (Bandung), February 1, 1940,

for the program of the *Kaikyō Kyōkai* and for reports on the resolutions of the Congress, which was attended by 100 delegates.

7 See *Tien jaar Japansch gewroet*, p. 25.

8 The guests were lavishly entertained and welcomed by several cabinet ministers. No effort was spared to impress them with the industrial and military strength of the host county. Besides excursions to army and navy training grounds, government offices and factories, visits were, interestingly enough, also paid to places of Shintō worship. The visitors also bowed respectfully towards the Imperial Palace – a source of considerable consternation to Indonesian Muslims two years later.

9 Dr. G. F. Pijper, at that time Adviser on Native Affairs, informed the writer in a letter dated December 13, 1956, that Indonesian delegates interviewed by him on their return from Tokyo had expressed themselves in very skeptical terms about Japanese sincerity in matters Islamic.

10 On this point, see *Japanese Infiltration among the Moslems*, *op. cit.*, p. 4, and *cf.* Note 106 of Chapter Three of this study.

11 *Tien jaar Japansch gewroet*, p. 25.

12 *De Java Bode* (Batavia), January 7, 1941, carries an account of the police search in Thamrin's house, which for many months was the subject of heated discussion, particularly so when Thamrin died of heart-failure a week later, and while the investigation was still under way. Thamrin's alleged Eurasian accomplice, E. F. E. Douwes-Dekker, was exiled from the East Indies. On Thamrin's 'guilt' no consensus has yet been reached. *Cf.* Pluvier, *op. cit.*, p. 184. On January 15, 1944, three years after Thamrin's death, a memorial plaque to him was officially dedicated at Djakarta. *Asia-Raya*, January 16, 1942. The Dutch authorities had arrested some other Indonesians suspected of pro-Japanese leanings in late 1941.

13 See the article, "Pasoekan-mati Atjeh," in *ibid.*, June 2, 1942. For a detailed and well-documented account, see A. J. Piekaar's *Atjèh en de oorlog met Japan*, *op cit.*, esp. pp. 77, 175, and 245, resp.. In February 1943 the Japanese erected a memorial at Keniru to three Achehnese killed by the Dutch on the eve of the occupation, and on December 8, 1944, another monument to 153 Achehnese was dedicated at Kutaradja. See *Asia-Raya*, February 8, 1943, and *Pandji Poestaka*, XXIII, 24 (December 15, 1944), pp. 78–85.

14 For a description of these groups, see Ir. Soekarno's article, "Djiwa ksatria dan djiwa boedak," in the *Asia-Raya* commemorative booklet of September 1942. (Unpaginated.)

15 From a speech to the Japanese-sponsored Islamic Congress at Medan on June 20, 1943, given by Hamka: "Sikap dan kewadjiban kaoem Moeslimin dizaman baroe," reprinted in *Moeslimin Soematera Baroe* (Medan, 1943), p. 25. In mid-1943 the Japanese Governor for West Sumatra permitted the flying of the Islamic flag (the Crescent on a green field), side by side with Japan's

Rising Sun, on religious holidays. See the Dōmei report from Padang in *Asia-Raya*, June 15, 1943. Hamka became chairman of the newly formed Sumatran *Poesat Pimpinan Pergerakan Islam* (Central Leadership of the Islamic Movement) on December 6, 1943, according to a report in *ibid.*, January 15, 1944. Hamka's own, rather apologetic, account of his 'collaboration' with the Japanese military authorities can be found in Volume III of his autobiography, *Kenang-kenangan hidup* (Djakarta, 1951).

16 Editorial in *Nationale Commentaren*, V, 10 (March 7, 1942), pp. 1–2. This was the last issue of this Dutch-language nationalist weekly; it appeared as an emergency issue of very limited size owing to the dismantling of printing works by Dutch destruction squads prior to the fall of the city.

17 Cf. Roeslan Abdulgani, *Propaganda Djepang* (Djakarta?, n.d.), pp. 5–6.

18 Seeing that Japanese propaganda would have fully utilized the freeing of Muslim leaders jailed by the Dutch for pro-Japanese sentiments, it is significant that only one such incident was reported in the press. In July 1942, the military authorities released from prison at Banjumas Kiyahi Haji M. Zawawi and some of his friends, according to a Dōmei report in *Asia-Raya*, July 31, 1942. According to the same newspaper of August 17, however, six other persons implicated in the affair were still held for further examination.

19 A detailed story of his exile and release appeared in *Berita Oemoem* (Djakarta), April 8 and 10, 1942, and an interview was published in *Asia-Raya* of June 3, 1942. See also the very moving account in Hamka – Dr. Amrullah's son – *Ajahku*, *op. cit.*, p. 149 *ff*, one of the few Indonesian post-war accounts of Islam during the occupation of Java. The present writer has translated the part of this book dealing with the Japanese occupation into English. The translation appeared in J. M. Echols (ed.), *Indonesian Writing in Translation* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1956), pp. 38–51.

20 For a revealing comment on this Muslim attitude, written in the earliest days of the Japanese occupation, see Anwar Tjokroaminoto's article, "Sikap diam," in the Djakarta daily *Pemandangan* of March 25, 1942.

21 An excellent, though perhaps unwitting, illustration of this point can be found in Munawar Cholil's article, "Pemandangan sepintas laloe," in the commemorative issue of *Sinar Baroe* (Semarang) of July 1943. The author draws up seven points of indictment against Dutch rule and eight points of praise for Dai Nippon. The praise bestowed on Japan but rarely refers to amelioration of the adverse conditions specified in the indictment of Dutch rule. In fact, the *status quo* had not noticeably changed. – The issue of Islamic law was publicly discussed in Djakarta at a Muslim meeting attended by several Japanese in mid-July 1942. See *Asia-Raya*, July 14, 1942. The restoration of inheritance matters to religious law headed the list of M.I.A.I.'s offical aims as listed in the first issue of that organization's new publication, *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 1 (January 1, 1943), p. 19. The first part of an article devoted to this problem and written by Emohardjo, "Menggoegat hoekoem

waris Islam," appeared in the same journal (I, 3 [February 1, 1943], pp. 11–13); but two issues later the editors regretted that "because of certain circumstances, the continuation of this article cannot be published." *Ibid.*, I, 5 (March 1, 1943), p. 2.

22 Early Japanese apprehensions of Islam may have been responsible for the jailing of the venerable chairman of *Nahdatul Ulama*, Kiyayi Hasjim Asj'ari – later appointed head of the military administration's Religious Affairs Office – in the first few days of the occupation. This information was communicated to the writer in a letter from Dr. Pijper, dated March 9, 1957.

23 The capital city continued to be officially called Batavia until December 8, 1942, the first anniversary of the outbreak of the Pacific War. An announcement of the Military Administration stated three days later that approval for the change, long desired by Indonesians, had finally been received from the Tokyo authorities. See *Asia-Raya*, December 11, 1942. As of August 8, 1942, the city had been proclaimed the only Special Municipality *(Tokubetsu-Shi)* in Java which gave it a separate administrative status. *Ibid.*, August 13, 1942.

24 *Pemandangan* (Djakarta), March 12, 1942. This earliest report did not mention the names of the visitors. For later, similar reports, see *i.a. Berita Oemoem*, April 1 and 17, and *Pemandangan*, April 20 and May 16.

25 *Berita Oemoem*, March 16, 1942.

26 *Ibid.*, March 28. While Horie himself was not a Muslim, other staff-members included, next to Inada, Sayido Wakkaas, Haji Abdul Hamid Ono, Haji Muhamad Saleh Suzuki, Moh. Taufiqq and Abdul Munir Watanabe, all of whom introduced themselves as Muslims. See also Mas Slamet, *Japanese Machinations*, Part II, "The Holy War Made in Japan" (Batavia, 1946), p. 13. Six other Japanese were not listed as self-styled Muslism. The office *(Shūmubu* in Japanese, *Kantor Urusan Agama* in Indonesian) was divided into two sections. The first, *Shūmuka*, was in charge of studying religious activities and worship, and Islamic law and culture in particular. The second, *Kantokuka*, controlled places of worship and maintained contacts with religious leaders. *Cf.* A. A. Zorab, *De Japanse bezetting van Indonesië en haar volkenrechtelijke zijde* (Leiden, 1954), p. 105. Five Indonesians were originally appointed as officials to the *Shūmubu:* Dr. R. Prijono (lecturer in Indonesian languages in the Batavia Law School under Dutch rule); Raden Haji Husein Iskandar, Abdullah Aidid, and Mr. Subagio Djojowidagdo (all former officials of the Dutch Bureau for Native Affairs); and Mas Suwirjo. The appointments were partly made during 1942, but only published in late 1943. See *Kan Pō*, No. 28, (October 10, 1943), p. 41. The Indonesian officials taken over by the Japanese from the former Dutch agency may have rendered important services to their new masters in making information available to them. See C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze's *Japanese Islam Policy on Java, 1942–1945* (p. 8), which the writer was privileged to consult in manuscript.

27 Some attention was also paid to Indonesian Christians. The Christian movement under the occupation was at first headed by Amir Sjarifuddin, who had played a prominent part in that movement during the last months of Dutch rule. *Cf. Nationale Commentaren*, IV, 46 (October 15, 1941), pp.3958–59, and *Asia-Raya*, September 23, 1942. Later the movement was led by R. L. Tobing, a Batak Christian and government employee.

28 *Oendang-oendang* No. 3, dated March 20, 1942. See the collection of decrees in the official publication of the *Gunseikanbu* (Military Government Office), *Boekoe pengoempoelan oendang-oendang* (Djakarta, 1944) p. 8. By Decree No. 23 of July 15, 1942 *(ibid.*, pp. 22–23), social, sportive and cultural meetings were allowed, subject to prior registration. Failure to comply was punishable, and by *Osamu Seirei* (Decree of the C-in-C) No. 25, sec. 52, of May 10, 1944, life imprisonment could be imposed for non-compliance. *(Ibid.*, p. 170).

29 For a detailed discussion of early political and administrative developments, see the writer's article, "The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 15 (1956) pp. 541–560.

30 Thus on May 17, 1942, *Parindra* Head Office issued a circular to its branches specifying that the party's political action had to cease, including in such action the acceptance of new members, the issuance of membership cards and the sale of party insignia. See the news-item in *Pandji Poestaka*, XX, 8 (May 30, 1942), p. 281. By contrast, Indonesian political parties in Sumatra voted themselves "voluntarily" out of existence at a mass meeting in Medan on June 2, 1942. *Asia-Raya*, June 10. Sumatra stood at that time under the Japanese army command at Singapore.

31 *Asia-Raya*, May 12, 1942. Interestingly enough, Indonesian Christian parties do not seem to have been specifically prohibited.

32 This item did not appear in *Asia-Raya* until June 5. On June 1, the same newspaper had announced that P.S.I.-chairman Dr. Sukiman would leave Jogja and take up the position of adviser on religious affairs to the military government. This was either a misunderstanding or Sukiman refused the position, for he remained in the background of the Islamic movement throughout the occupation era.

33 The Djakarta daily *Tjaja Timoer* on March 13, 1942 – *i.e.*, eight days after the fall of the capital city – announced that Abikusno was 'premier-designate.' For a detailed discussion of this episode, see Benda, *op. cit.*, p. 550 *ff*, and P. Pakpahan, *1261 hari dibawah sinar Matahari Terbit* (Djakarta, 1946), pp. 9–10.

34 The 'Triple A's' were derived from the letter 'A' in 'Asia', used in the propaganda slogan, 'Nippon, the Leader of Asia, Nippon, the Protector of Asia, Nippon, the Light of Asia', which appeared for the first time in the Djakarta dailies *Berita Oemoem*, *Pemandangan* and *Tjaja Timoer* on April 2. For references to this movement, see M. A. Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism and*

Indonesia, *op. cit.*, pp. 209–212; W. H. Elsbree, *Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1942–45* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 79; Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 103; and Pakpahan, *op. cit.*, p. 13 *ff.*

35 *Cf.* Sutardjo's radio speech, "Prijaji-bestuur dan Gerakan 3-A," reprinted in *Berita Oemoem*, April 21, 1942. In early May unemployed intellectuals were asked to apply for jobs with the movement *(Asia-Raya*, May 4); in June, a meeting of its leaders with leading government officials and nationalists took place at Djakarta. *Ibid.*, June 11, 1942.

36 The delegation consisted of Kiyayi Mas Mansur (chairman of *Muhammadiyah)*, W. Wondoamiseno (P.S.I.I.), and Fachruddin al-Kahiri (an Arab Muslim, of the modernist *al-Irsjad* organization, also represented in M.I.A.I.). See *Asia-Raya*, May 8, 1942, and Wondoamiseno, *op. cit.*, p. 974.

37 *Asia-Raya*, May 21, 1942, and *Pandji Poestaka*, XX, 8, (May 30, 1942), p. 281. This meeting took place on May 17; the previous day, Horie had met with *ulama* and representatives of forty-six Islamic organizations.

38 Horie and his lieutenants paid repeated visits to Djakarta mosques and to places outside the capital in the following weeks. Horie was *e.g.* in Bandung on July 27. *Cf. Asia-Raya*, July 31, 1942.

39 The building, styled *Balai Permoefakatan Oemmat Islam*, had previously belonged to the 'Batavia Arts Circle.' An Islamic library was also established at Djakarta in August, to which Inada promised to contribute several hundred volumes. *Pandji Poestaka*, XX, 13 (July 4, 1942), p. 461. In mid-September, a "Christian Meeting House" *(Gedoeng Pertemoean Kaoem Kristen)* was opened under the auspices of the 'Triple-A Movement'. A Japanese Christian, Nomachi, of the Education Office attended the opening, together with Shimizu and Ir. Soekarno. See *Asia-Raya*, September 23, 1942.

40 It is interesting to note that Kiyayi Mas Mansur, chairmen of *Muhammadiyah*, remained at Jogja until September 1942. The military administration, very likely on the advice of Ir. Soekarno, called Mansur to Djakarta in August; he resigned from his chairmanship in late September, to be followed in that position by Ki Bagus Hadikusumo. See *Pandji Poestaka*, XX, 20 (August 22, 1942), p. 713, and *Asia-Raya*, October 3, 1942. Mansur, who later became a key figure in *Masjumi*, was thus temporarily removed from the Islamic movement.

41 The most important of these took place in the new building on July 13. On that occasion, Islamic hopes for a revision of Islamic jurisdiction were voiced, together with far-reaching proposals for its reorganization. For a report on the meeting, see *Asia-Raya*, July 14, 1942. A previous informal conference between *Shūmubu* officials and Muslim leaders was reported in *ibid.*, June 11 and 12, 1942.

42 *Ibid.*, August 13, 1942. The committee undertook to pay all travel expenses of the participants. The *Persiapan Persatoean* was an organization limited to Djakarta only, as was explained in Abikusno's radio address to

Java Muslims, reprinted in *ibid.*, August 13, 1942. Actually, the capital had never been the center of Islamic activities: M.I.A.I.'s headquarters and those of *Nahdatul Ulama* were established in Surabaya, while that of *Muhammadiyah* was at Jogja. This geographical factor may have been one of the reasons for the leading role assigned to Abikusno, who was domiciled at Djakarta, in the beginning.

43 See *Asia-Raya*, August 13 and 19, 1942.

44 Wondoamiseno estimated the total membership of the Islamic groups federated in M.I.A.I. at over five millions. See his article in *Pandji Poestaka*, *op. cit.*, p. 973. This figure may have been rather too high. A monitored Tokyo broadcast in Urdu on September 11, 1944 gave the combined membership of *Nahdatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah* as 1.7 million. See Office of Strategic Services, *Programs of Japan in Java and Bali* (Honolulu, T.H., 1945), p. 45.

45 *Asia-Raya*, August 14. All funds were to be transferred to the new organ, which was to make particular efforts at enrolling local religious teachers and Koran expounders, as well as mosque personnel, most of whom had remained outside the old Islamic organizations in Dutch times.

46 The conferees were, indeed, the most outstanding Islamic spokesmen on Java; among them were such orthodox leaders as K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari, Wachid Hasjim, Abdul Wahab Hasbullah, while the reformists were *i.a.* represented by Mas Mansur, Kasmat, Dr. Sukiman, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Farid Ma'aruf, and Moh. Natsir. P.S.I.I. leaders present included Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Harsono Tjokroaminoto and Wondoamiseno. For a complete listing see *Asia-Raya*, September 2, 1942.

47 See news-items in *Asia-Raya* of August 31 and *Pandji Poestaka*, XX, 21 (August 29, 1942), p. 749. The opening session was attended by Shimizu and Samsudin, Soekarno and the Japanese staff of the *Shūmubu*. For a full report on the public meeting see *Asia-Raya* of September 9, 1942.

48 Wondoamiseno, *op. cit.*, p. 975. M.I.A.I. was declared to be the Central Leadership of Indonesian Islamic Unity, and the following tasks were allotted to it: 1) To obtain for Islam its proper place within Indonesian society, and 2) to harmonize the position of Islam with the requirements of the changing times. For an interesting comment on the conference, see the editorial, "Pertemoean pemoeka Islam," in *Pandji Poestaka*, XX, 24 (September 19, 1942), p. 842.

49 As we shall see, the two most important Islamic organizations, *Nahdatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*, were given official recognition, and thus legal status as national organizations, as late as September 1943. *Cf. Djawa Baroe* (Djakarta), I, 19 (October 1, 1943), p. 10, and *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 24 (September 15, 1943), p. 861. But both had continued to function before that date, very often with permits issued by regional or even local authorities. Thus in October 1942, *e.g.*, the Japanese Head *(Shūchōkan)* of Djakarta Residency granted *Muhammadiyah* such a permit, as reported in *Asia-Raya* of

October 23, 1942. Again, the *Nahdatul Ulama* branch at Semarang (capital of Central Java) had been closed on August 1, only to be granted permission to re-open on October 7, 1942. See *Asia-Raya* November 27, 1942. For a similar report on *Nahdatul Ulama* in Banjumas Residency, see *ibid.*, April 10, 1943; the permit had actually been issued on October 30, 1942.

50 Wondoamiseno, *op. cit.*, p. 975. The audience was arranged by Shimizu and *Sendenbu*-chief Machida. It was granted to Wondoamiseno and Ir. Soekarno, in their respective capacities as religious and national leaders.

51 After the war, a Dutch observer ascribed the Japanese failure to establish one central Islamic organization to "disunity in Islamic circles in regard to religious principles." K. A. de Weerd, *The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands East Indies* ([Tokyo], 1946). p. 39. See also Note 66, below. Wondoamiseno, the new chairman, was not an Islamic scholar, but a Western-schooled accountant and typical party-man. He had apparently never made the pilgrimage to Mecca. *Cf. Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa* (Djakarta, 1944), p. 446.

52 The complete list can be found in *Asia-Raya* of November 16, 1942. Wondoamiseno was confirmed as chairman of the executive, with Harsono Tjokroaminoto (P.S.I.I.) as secretary and R.H.O. Djoenadi, (publisher of the daily *Pembangoen)* as treasurer, and Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo and Farid Ma'aruf *(Muhammadiyah)* and Machfud Siddiq and Wachid Hasjim *(Nahdatul Ulama)* as members. Included among the board members were *i.a. Muhammadiyah*-chairman Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Dr. Sukiman, and Raden Adnan, president of the Islamic High Court.

53 *Ibid.* Chairman of the *Badan Penasehat* was Kiyayi Mas Mansur; its members were Hasjim Asja'ri (an outstanding orthodox teacher in East Java); Dr. H. A. K. Amrullah (the reformist Minangkabau leader exiled by the Dutch to Java); Sayed Ali al-Habsji (half-Indonesian, half-Arab orthodox preacher of Djakarta's Kwitang Mosque); Sjech Achmad Soorkati (chairman of the reformist Arab organization, *al-Irsjad);* and Inada, Ono and Abdul Hasan of the *Shūmubu.*

54 The movement had been organized by 'civilians' in the army's Propaganda Corps on their own initiative, but had apparently not enjoyed the support of the military personnel proper. The military police was suspicious of its activities and finally seemed to have persuaded the C-in-C to abolish it. The writer owes his information to Mr. K. Kishi, who recently obtained his data from Mr. H. Shimizu, one-time organizer of the 'Triple-A Movement' on Java. Mr. Kishi's comments were contained in a letter to the writer dated June 19, 1957. On the demise of the 'AAA Movement' and the eclipse of its Indonesian head, Samsudin, see the daily editorial column, "Sambil laloe," in *Asia-Raya,* October 23, 1942.

55 The first official notice concerning the planned new movement appeared in *Asia-Raya* of November 21, 1942, where its inauguration on

December 8 – first anniversary of the outbreak of the Pacific War – was announced. "By now," so it was said, "the 'Triple-A Movement' may be said to have completed its work and to have acquitted itself of its task as pioneer or pathfinder in this era of change." At the impressive December 8 celebrations in Djakarta, Soekarno spoke as the leader of the new movement which, however, was still *in statu nascendi*; its preparatory committee was appointed on December 11. See *ibid.*, December 3, 9, 11 and 12, 1942, and *Djawa Baroe*, I, 1 (January 1, 1943), for biographical sketches of the members of that committee. Thereafter, nothing was published on the new movement until late February (*Asia-Raya*, February 23 and 26, 1943). For Soekarno's very interesting inaugural address as chairman of *Putera*, see *ibid.*, March 9, 1943.

56 *Cf.* Elsbree, *op. cit.*, p.82. No such permission was apparently required for the reestablishment of M.I.A.I.

57 For a brief comment on 'The Big Four,' see *Asia-Raya*, November 5, 1943. On Mansur, see the biographical sketches in *ibid.*, October 27, and December 12 and 26, and the interview by K. Tsutsumi in *Djawa Baroe*, I, 3 (February 1, 1943), p.6. Dr. Amrullah allegedly warned Mansur in forceful language of the dangers to Indonesian Islam inherent in close collaboration with the infidel Japanese. See Hamka's *Ajahku*, *op. cit.*, p.156.

58 *Asia-Raya*, January 20, 1943. In the light of later developments, this temporary appointment may have been intended as a check on Wondoamiseno's leadership; up to that time, Mansur had been a member of the Advisory Body of M.I.A.I. (See Note 53, above). He stepped down from the new post on March 10, 1943, perhaps because of disagreements with Wondoamiseno. *Ibid.*, March 11, 1943.

59 For a complete listing of the Council's membership, see *Asia-Raya* of May 27, 1943. It had 28 Indonesian and 6 Japanese members, including Shimizu and Myoshi, former Japanese vice consul at Batavia. Interestingly enough, *Putera*-chairman Soekarno officially 'appointed' these Japanese members himself – to the writer's knowledge, a unique occurrence.

60 On the fate of the Indonesian press after the invasion, see Benda, *op. cit.*, pp. 353–54.

61 *Cf.* the leading article in *Indonesia Merdeka* (Djakarta), I, 1 (April 25, 1945), p.2, where the (anonymous) editors say, "The birth of this journal... has been awaited for a long time. In fact, ever since the 'Triple-A Movement' and since Putera [came into existence], the publication of a journal has been eagerly anticipated, as a platform for our leadership..."

62 It must be borne in mind that no independent press was allowed, the few existing publications being produced by Japanese-sponsored and strictly controlled agencies. M.I.A.I. had not published a journal under Dutch rule.

63 *Cf.* Farid Ma'aruf's report to the twenty-seventh *Muhammadiyah*

congress, reprinted in *Almanak Moehammadijah*, Vol. XVI (1939/40), p. 43. During the occupation the *Soeara* replaced all the magazines previously published by Islamic organizations on Java.

64 The group included many leaders of orthodox and reformist organizations; among the former, Hasjim Asj'ari, Wachid Hasjim, Machfud Siddiq, Sayed Ali al-Habsji; among the letter, Mas Mansur (spokesmen for the group), Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and Junus Anies. For a complete listing with biographical data of each participant, see *Asia-Raya*, December 26, 28 and 31, 1942, and *Sinar Baroe* (Semarang), January 11 and 16, 1943. Orthodox participants – including those outside any organization – outnumbered reformist members or sympathizers by about two to one.

65 In the Japanese administrative pyramid, the Commander-in-Chief, or *Saikō-Shikikan*, delegated his governmental authority to the Chief of Staff, acting as *Gunseikan* or Head of the Military Government. The day-to-day governmental work was in turn delegated to the *Gunseikan's* deputy, the *Sōmubu-chō*, or Head of the General Affairs Department of the Military Administration. See also Zorab, *op. cit.*, p.33 *ff.*

66 The speech is fully reported in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 1 (January 1, 1943), pp.4–5. For a Dutch summary, see Zorab, *op. cit.*, p.106. Interestingly enough, an advance release published by Dōmei of an outline of this speech (*Asia-Raya*, December 7, 1942), varied significantly from the official text. The outline stated *i.a.* that the military government wished to end the differences between the various Islamic schools – orthodox and reformist – by uniting them in a central organ (the M.I.A.I.?) which would soon be given official recognition. In fact, Okazaki did say that it was "very difficult to unite them [the different schools], and we will not attempt to unite them during the war, as long as each of them will independently collaborate with Dai Nippon... Before long all religious organizations will be officially allowed to resume their activities..." *Op. cit.*, p.5.

67 *Ibid.*, p.5.

Notes to Chapter Five

1 Quoted by Wondoamiseno, "Sikap M.I.A.I. terhadap peroebahan djaman baroe," in *Pandji Poestaka, op. cit.*, p. 975.

2 *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 1 (January 1, 1943), p. 5; *cf.* Zorab, *op. cit.*, p. 106, and M. Slamet, "The Holy War, Made in Japan," *op. cit.*, p. 10. Addressing a mass meeting at Djakarta attended by 50,000 Moslems, *Sōmubu-chō* Col. Nakayama said on behalf of the *Gunseikan* on March 3, 1943,"..The Nippon Government promises that it will study the Islamic religion and the laws and customs of its believers with the utmost care and thoroughness, in order to enable the Government to pay the best possible attention to the wishes of the Indonesian people." *Asia-Raya*, March 3, 1943.

3 Haji Abdul Muniam Inada (Head of the *Shūmubu's* First Section), "Agama Islam dan Nippon," *Pandji Poestaka*, XX, 28 (October 17, 1942), pp. 947–50 and 954–55. See also the unsigned article, "Penindjauan Islam Hakkoitjioe...," *Asia-Raya*, May 7, 1942, and A. R. Baswedan's "Pengharapan Pemerintah terhadap para kijahi," *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 3 and 4 (February 1 and 15, 1943), pp. 6–7 and 11–12, resp.: "We have to search for points in our religion which coincide with the essence of Nipponese culture, so that we can find a compass to guide us in the fulfillment of the government's hopes..." (p. 11). *Cf.* Ahmad Jusuf, "Dasar perdjoeangan Moeslimin," *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 25 (October 1, 1943), pp. 867–68, for a similar statement.

4 *Cf.* S. Ozu, *Wadjah Semangat* and his later book *Djiwa Baroe* (Bandung, 1942 and 1943, resp.). Dr. Amru'llah's uncompromising criticisms of the first book were contained in a letter to Horie dated April, 1943. Copies of this ruthless exposition were privately circulated among Moslims; the writer is fortunate in possessing one of these. The letter appeared as an appendix in Hamka's biography of Dr. Amrullah, *Ajahku*, *op. cit.*, pp. 203–16. For a Dutch translation, see J. L. Swellengrebel (ed. & transl.), " 'God en de Keizer,' een fatwah van Dr. Abdul-Karim Hamrullah," *Indonesië* 6 (1952–53), pp. 77–92. On the incident itself see *Ajahku*, p. 153 *ff.*

5 *Cf.* the Dōmei announcement in *Asia-Raya*, January 23, 1943, listing Dr. Amrullah as a member of the *Shūmubu*. As far as the writer could ascertain, the press did not comment on the results of the meeting.

6 Hamka, *op. cit.*, p. 151. Hamka adds that after the incident the Japanese politely sent Amrullah back to Djakarta, instead of continuing the previously planned propaganda tour through Java with him as leader. Dr. Amrullah fell seriously ill a few months later and no longer appeared in public. He died during the occupation on June 2, 1945. The *Saikeirei*, obligatory at the commencement of every official Japanese function – including the daily brief morning ceremony in all government offices in Indonesia during the occupation – should not be confused with the 'ordinary' *Keirei*, or slight bowing, in use among the Japanese, and required of all inhabitants, free or jailed, vis-à-vis any Japanese.

7 On the *ruku'*, see the article on "Salat," in H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kraemers (eds.), *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leiden, 1953), p. 493.

8 See Ono's article, "Tentyo Setsu," in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 9–10 (March 8, 1943), p. 486. The same issue of this journal contains an unsigned, detailed and illustrated discussion of the different bows prescribed for the Japanese and Islamic rituals respectively. "Tentang Sai Keirei: Perbedaan antara sembahjang dan memberi hormat," *ibid.*, pp. 297–98. Another article, "Mengenali saudara toea," was written by Mr. Sudjono (*ibid.*, pp. 495–97); a Dutch-trained Indonesian lawyer who had taught at Tokyo, he had returned to Java as a Japanese officer with the first detachments in March 1942. He pleaded for Muslim understanding of the fact that

"...the people of Nippon love their country, and their love is based on the belief that the land of Nippon was created by gods and is ruled by their successors, the Emperors." It is interesting to note that these articles did not appear in the M.I.A.I. journal, which, in fact, never made any reference to the *Saikeirei*.

9 *Cf.* the report on the ceremony in *Asia-Raya* of July 1, 1943, and see also Note 12, Chapter Six, below.

10 A stenographic report of the July 23 meeting was reprinted in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 20–21 (August 1, 1943), pp. 731–38. The meeting was apparently convened by the Education Office; it was attended by its head, professor Ozaki, and three of his subordinates, by Ir. Soekarno (who remained silent most of the time), and by Kiyayi Mas Mansur, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Raden H. Adnan and Mrs. Sitti Nurdjannah, representing Islamic interests. Indonesian and Chinese merchants were also present, since the conference, attended by eleven journalists, was partly devoted to problems of industry and commerce.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 735. The discussion of Islamic problems takes up pp. 735–37 of the printed report – more space than is devoted to any other single topic.

12 See Mansur's reply to the *Gunseikan's* address of December 7, including the oath of loyalty and support to the Japanese Army, in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 1 (January 1, 1943), pp. 5–6.

13 Report of the meeting in *Pandji Poestaka*, *op. cit.*, p. 736.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 737. (Italics added). Muzakkir saw in the fight against the Allies a connecting link between *Hakkōichiu* and pan-Islam. The third Muslim speaker, Mrs. Nurdjannah, was far less aggressive, and Ozaki singled her out for thanks in his concluding comments, remarking that "although the answers of the various gentlemen are not quite clear yet, still they are worthwhile..." (*Ibid.*, p. 738).

15 For a report on Tōjō's speech of June 17 and the corresponding communication of the C-in-C to Indonesian leaders on the next day, see *Djawa Baroe*, I, 13 (July 1, 1943), pp. 3 and 10, resp.. The promise was repeated during Tōjo's brief visit to Djakarta on July 7; *cf. Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 20–21 (August 1, 1943), p. 691 *ff.* See also Elsbree, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–85. The Islamic part in the newly-created political organs will be discussed in the next chapter.

16 The appointment was dated October 1, 1943; it was published in the official gazette, *Kan Pō*, No. 28 (October 10, 1943), p. 45. A special article on Djajadiningrat appeared in *ibid.*, No. 31 (November 25, 1943), p. 4.

17 According to de Weerd, the two sections of the office were still headed by Japanese (*op. cit.*, p. 32); see also Zorab, *op. cit.*, p. 105. Hamka says that only Japanese Muslims remained in charge of the *Shūmubu* after Horie's return to Japan in mid-1943. See *Ajahku*, p. 154. The writer has been privately told that all official documents continued to be written in Japanese.

Djajadiningrat – who could not read that language – was thus, in part at least, reduced to the performance of ceremonial functions.

18 Quoted in Hamka, *Ajahku*, p. 155.

19 Dr. van Nieuwenhuijze has suggested to the writer that Japanese suspicions of the Arabs stemmed largely from their fears of the influence wielded by a racial minority among Indonesians, rather than from specific pan-Islamic apprehensions.

20 A good illustration of Japanese anxieties can be seen in a question asked by Ozaki (*Pandji Poestaka, op. cit.*, p. 738): "If Mecca were to be occupied by the anti-Axis powers, would [Indonesian] Muslims still wish to enter the *hajj?*" Muzakkir replied that he thought all Muslims would in that case join Dai Nippon in an endeavor to drive the Allies out of Arabia. – Iraq had declared war on the Axis powers on January 16, 1943. This act was greeted with vitriolic comment in *Asia-Raya* five days later. Premier Tōjō made caustic comments on it in his address to the 81st session of the Diet, reprinted in *ibid.*, February 2, 1943.

21 See the report of his speech, given on February 23, in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 5 (March 1, 1943), p. 14. The newly appointed Minister of Greater East Asian Affairs, Kazuo Aoki, on the same occasion made appeals for the collaboration of Asian Muslims. See Harsono Tjokroaminoto's enthusiastic comment on both speeches in *ibid.*, I, 8 (April 15, 1943), p.1. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, from his voluntary exile in Berlin, cabled his appreciation to Tani, and the M.I.A.I. executive thanked both ministers profusely for their statements by cable one day later. See the reports in *Asia-Raya* of February 26 and 27, resp.

22 The meeting took place on April 5–6. It was announced in a Dōmei report of April 3 which added that the gathering "will be of exceptional importance for all the Muslims of the Southern Regions." *Asia-Raya*, April 3, 1943. The promise regarding the pilgrimage was reported in *ibid.* of April 9.

23 Apparently at first Indonesian Muslims took the promise quite seriously. At a meeting of fifty *ulama* with Col. Horie at Djakarta later in April, Mas Mansur asked the *Shūmubu-chō* when the first ships to Mecca would sail. The answer was, of course, evasive. *Asia-Raya*. April 13, 1943. By July the impossibility of the *hajj* during war-time conditions had, however, already been accepted. See Muzakkir's statement at the meeting with Ozaki, in *Pandji Poestaka, op. cit.*, p. 737.

24 In early March 1943 an exchange of cables took place between Muslims in Java and Mongolia, in which each side sang the obedient praises of the joyful patronage extended to Islam by the Empire of the Rising Sun (*Asia-Raya*, March 3, 1943). A far more ambitious enterprise was a radio link-up between Muslims in Djakarta and Tokyo on June 17. Mas Mansur and Mrs. Nurdjannah spoke for the Muslims on Java, while from Tokyo N.

Shioda, a Japanese Muslim and leader of the Japanese Islamic Association was joined by an Indonesian (Omar Darak), an Indian (F. M. F. Karim, a university teacher), and by the Turkestan Muslim Amin Islami, the head of Tokyo's mosque. See *ibid.*, June 16 and 18, the latter issue carrying verbatim reports of the broadcasts.

25 The script was not only used for writing Arabic, but it had been used for writing the Malay language before the Dutch introduced Romanization. Most *ulama* and *kiyayi* had had no Western schooling, and thus still used the Arabic alphabet for writing Indonesian. As we shall see in a later chapter, in April 1944 the Religious Affairs Office itself commenced publication of a journal for *kiyayi* and *ulama* which was printed in Indonesian, Javanese and Sundanese, using the Arabic alphabet for all three languages.

26 Thus in September 1942 an order of the Education Office of the Djakarta Special Municipality *(Tokubetsu-Shi)* forbade the teaching of Arabic in all primary schools within its jurisdiction. See *Asia-Raya*, September 22, 1942. The gravity of the situation may have caused the M.I.A.I. executive to place the problem of education on the agenda of a closed meeting on November 14–15, 1942 (*ibid.*, November 11, 1942).

27 *Cf.* Slamet, *op. cit.*, p. 10, and van Nieuwenhuijze, *op. cit.*, for a good account. Arab schools, like all other private schools, had closed when the invasion began. On April 29, 1942 – the emperor's birthday – it was announced that private schools could reopen after obtaining a special permit; yet Arab schools were apparently among the last to obtain these permits, since special regulations regarding their issuance appeared in *Asia-Raya* as late as October 9, 1942. According to a news-item in the same paper of October 21, only seven Arab schools had by that date received opening permits.

28 *Asia-Raya* of October 30, 1942 carried an account of local Japanese approval for the re-opening of Arab and Indonesian Muslim schools in Djakarta Municipality, after assurances that general subjects as well as the Japanese language would be taught had been obtained from school principals.

29 It is not unlikely that efforts were also made to have Muslim prayers said in Indonesian or the local vernacular instead of in Arabic. While the reformists had already before the occupation advocated and practised partial adoption of such a change, it had always met stubborn orthodox resistance. Yet late in 1942, the venerable Ali al-Habsji for the first time read the prayer in Indonesian at Djakarta's Kwitang Mosque, in the presence of Japanese and Indonesian dignitaries, including Soekarno and Hatta as well as Mansur (*cf. Asia-Raya*, November 13 and 14, 1942). On the other hand, Wiranata Kusuma, Regent of Bandung, obviously to soothe orthodox protests, issued a public denial of having been charged with the enforcement of such a ruling on *kiyayi* in his Regency. See *ibid.*, January 19, 1943.

30 A special order of the *Gunseikan*, dated July, 1944, declared that "all Arabs in Java, in so far as they do not possess a foreign nationality, will be regarded as Indonesians [by the government]." See "Pengoemoeman Gunseikanbu," *Kan Pō*, No. 48 (July 10, 1944,) pp. 13-14. The writer does not know whether this regulation automatically enabled Arabs to acquire land which, according to Dutch legislation valid under the occupation, could not be alienated to non-Indonesians.

31 One of the earliest occupation decrees – *Oendang-oendang* No. 7 of April 11, 1942 – had ordered the registration of all adult 'non-indigenous' persons, and the payment of a registration tax of *fl* 150 and *fl* 80.– by European and Eurasian men and women, resp., and *fl* 100.– and *fl* 50.–, resp. by Asians. *Osamu Seirei* No 20 of May 1, 1944 exempted Eurasians and Chinese reaching the age of 17 years as per January 1 of that year from payment of the fee, while still subjecting them to registration. See *Boekoe pengoempoelan oendang-oengang*, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–13, and *Kan Pō*, No.42 (May 10, 1944), p.5.

32 *Cf. Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 13 (July 1, 1944), *passim*, and in particular H. M. Muchtar's editorial, "Hoeroef Alqoer'an dan bahasanja," *ibid.*, p.1. Contributors were given strict instructions to indicate clearly the exact Koran passage(s) quoted by them in Arabic. (*Ibid.*, p.5.) A whole article in Arabic, from the pen of *Masjumi*-president Hasjim Asj'ari, appeared in the same issue (pp.2–3).

33 See *ibid.*, II, 11 (June 1, 1944), pp.1–2, for a speech by Djajadiningrat on the continued validity of the ordinance. During 1944, some modifications in its application were, as we shall see, approved by the military authorities.

34 In this connection it is interesting to note that at the outset teachers of religious schools were required to submit testimonials from local *penghulu* in order to obtain permits for the reopening of schools. *Cf. Asia-Raya*, October 9, 1942. It will be recalled that these religious officials had often been the target of attacks from Muslim leaders, since they were suspect of being allied to the *priyayi*. Towards the end of 1943, however, the position was reversed. A *Shūmubu* Ordinance of November 26, 1943, (*Kan Pō*, No.33/1, [December 25, 1943], pp.11–12) required applicants for the position of *penghulu* to submit at least two testimonials from *ulama* in their place of residence. The change was indicative of the growing reliance on Muslim leaders, which six months later resulted in even more drastic readjustments.

35 *Cf.* the announcement of the Regent of Bandung in *Asia-Raya* of January 19, 1943, already referred to in Note 29, above. Educational administration was decentralized under the occupation; each Residency, or *Shū*, as well as the principalities *(Kōchi)* of Central Java, had an Education Service attached to them, whence orders were passed on to the corresponding Regency Offices. On *priyayi* control over Islamic education, see *e.g. Asia-Raya*, January 21, 1943 and *ibid.*, July 7, 1943.

36 Complaints against *priyayi* 'obstruction' of village teachers were voiced

in a Djakarta conference between local *ulama* and Col. Horie, as reported in *ibid.*, April 13, 1943. Such clear printed indictments are very rare, although allusions to friction can be found in many articles during the occupation. It is not unlikely, moreover, that oftentimes these complaints may have been justified to a certain extent.

37 Inada's address – a survey of Japanese Islamic policies during the first year of the occupation – appeared in *Asia-Raya* of April 3, 1943 (Italics in original). The speaker also reminded his listeners of the signal honor shown by Dai Nippon to Islamic leaders in December 1942: "Did a Dutch Governor General ever invite *kiyayi* and *ulama* to his palace? I don't think there was a single Indonesian who would have believed that the *kiyayi* would be honored in such a way by the Supreme Commander of Dai Nippon [on Java]."

38 *Cf.* [Soetan] Sjahrir, *Perdjoeangan kita* (Djakarta, 1946), p.3. For a very similar result of Japanese policies in the Acheh region of Northern Sumatra, see Piekaar's *Atjèh en de oorlog met Japan*, *op. cit.*, pp.274–86.

39 It is interesting to note that in the early stage of the occupation Sanoesi Pané had urged the abolition of *Muhammadiyah* and *Taman Siswa* schools, and their absorption into the governmental school system, arguing that the need for private schools had disappeared with the end of colonialism. *Asia-Raya*, May 22, 1942.

40 To appreciate the importance of the larger *pesantren*, it should be borne in mind that the orthodox training center Tebu Ireng, at Djombang in Eastern Java, counted approximately six thousand students at the time of the Japanese invasion. The writer owes this information to the late Haji Agus Salim. An official estimate at the beginning of 1943 placed the number of *pesantren* in Bandung Regency alone at 750. See *Asia-Raya*, January 12, 1943.

41 *Ibid.*, July 3 and August 5, 1943, resp..

42 Thus a short news-item in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 2 (January 15, 1943), p.18, mentioned that out of a pre-war total of 135 schools operated by *Muhammadiyah* in the Jogja principalities, 105 had by then been re-opened.

43 As on all negative aspects of Japanese policy, the record on this point is meager and far from clear; moreover, since school administration was decentralized, the Djakarta press does not provide an adequate picture. But to mention one interesting example, on June 17, 1943 *Asia-Raya* reported from Blitar that three private schools – one Catholic and two *Taman Siswa* institutions – had been taken over by the municipality, This left only one *Muhammadiyah* grade school in private hands, and it was officially declared that it would remain private as a "special school, because it is devoted to the teaching of the Islamic religion." On the difficulties encountered by the *Taman Siswa* organization during the Japanese occupation, see W. le Febre, *Taman Siswa*, *op. cit.*, pp.60–61, and Riedhwan, "De strijd van Taman Siswa," *op. cit.*, pp.310–11.

44 *Asia-Raya*, May 13, 1943. Apparently permission to resume such instruction – which had been allowed under Dutch rule – had been obtained only a few days before the ban was again imposed; it was stated that religious instruction was "not yet handled adequately, [so that] the matter is still being studied by the authorities concerned." Similar instruction in the primary schools in Djakarta Municipality was permitted somewhat later, according to the same newspaper of June 25, 1943.

45 On the founding of the federation, see *Asia-Raya*, May 21, 1943. On the re-opening of Islamic schools in Djakarta Regency *e.g.* see *ibid.*, July 2, 1943. Official statistics published in *ibid.*, July 5, 1943, show 24 such schools in that Regency and 14 in the adjacent Djatinegara Regency, including a new school opened in the presence of Horie and a M.I.A.I. representative on July 4.

46 *Osamu Seirei* No. 22, dated July 1, 1943. See *Boekee pengoempeolan oendang-oendang*, pp.81–83.

47 In April, 1944 home science instruction was added to the province of private schools in *Osuma Seirei* No.16, dated April 8, 1944. See *Kan Pō*, No. 40 (April 10, 1944), p.5.

Notes to Chapter Six

1 For a comparison between Dutch and Japanese attitudes toward the *kiyayi*, *cf.* H.R., "Kijaji dan zaman sekarang," *Asia-Raya*, January 23, 1943. The author concludes as follows: "Certainly the *kiyayi* occupies a most important place in Indonesian society. Not infrequently a single *kiyayi* has hundreds of students. In the neighborhood of the place where he teaches religion, he becomes [everybody's] counselor. The villagers come to him with their worries, revealing to him their inmost thoughts." For a similar statement, see *i.a.* Umar Said's "Ahli waris para Nabi," *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 11 (June 1, 1943), pp.9–10.

2 Okazaki's speech in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, *op. cit.*, p.5. The *Gunseikan* also promised to give graduates from *pesantren* equal opportunities with those of Western-type schools in government employment – a promise enthusiastically greeted by Muslim commentators. No data are available to the writer which would allow a checking of the military administration's recruitment policy vis-à-vis Muslims in subsequent years.

3 On this point, see *e.g.* Moh. Natsir's "Sekolah Islam Tinggi," in *Capita Selecta*, *op. cit.*, p.73. Van Nieuwenhuijze says that the *ulama's* "education and orientation are conservative and orthodox, and they are somewhat looked down upon by the Javanese *priyayi*-officials... Among modernists, the greater part of their education is often, and not unjustifiably, labelled by expressions of 'nec scolae nec vitae discimus'..." *Mens en vrijheid in Indonesië*, *op. cit.*, p.41.

4 The M.I.A.I. executive had apparently assumed that such a role would be assigned to it, as the central and officially sanctioned Islamic organization on Java. Thus at a M.I.A.I. meeting towards the end of January – while the execution of the policy announced by the *Gunseikan* a few weeks earlier was still a matter of speculation – it was decided to organize all *ulama* under the aegis of M.I.A.I.. See *Asia-Raya*, January 29, 1943. "The Dutch period," stated A. R. Baswedan, "has... weakened the spirit of many *kiyayi* [so that] it is difficult for them to aid in the awakening of [our] society... Thus it is good to have in the M.I.A.I. a mediator between the outside world and that of the *kiyayi*..." "Pengharapan Pemerintah terhadap para kijaji," *op. cit.*, p.7. A similar assumption can be found in Haji Agus Salim's "Choetbah perajaan Mauloed," a broadcast address reprinted in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 8 (April 15, 1943), p.3. This was one of the few of Salim's quasi-political speeches during the occupation. His later published comments were strictly limited to Islamic exegesis. According to Hamka, Dr. Amrullah had singled out this veteran leader for his integrity and anti-Japanese sentiments. *Cf. Ajahku*, p.162.

5 The trip commenced in Malang, where a meeting was arranged with *ulama* from all Eastern Java in late December 1942. *Cf. Soeara M.I.A.I.* I, 1 (January 1, 1943), p.16. An important meeting was held in Djakarta in mid-January, whence Horie went to other centers in western Java. See *Asia-Raya*, January 15, 23 and 28, 1943, and a news-item in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 3 (February 1, 1943), p.16. At these meetings, after prayers had been said for a speedy Japanese victory, the *Saikeirei* had to be performed, as reported in *Asia-Raya* of January 15.

6 This apt paraphrase occurs in H. A. Ambari's article, "Kewadjiban alim oelama dimasa peperangan," *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 10 (May 15, 1934), pp.9–10.

7 The announcement appeared in *Asia-Raya* of May 8, 1943, and was re-printed in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 10 (May 15, 1943), p.1. The Indonesian term for such courses, *latihan*, soon became a symbol, if not almost a synonym, for the Japanese occupation of Java, as an increasing number of Indonesian groups had to submit to this treatment in the course of time. Early in 1944, an Indonesian commentator gave expression to the significance of the *latihan:* "We are living in the era of the *latihan*, the era of militarization, and the era of the rejuvenation of the spirit. We realize that all this will have the greatest influence on the advancement of our country and our people in the future..." (*Asia-Raya*, January 29, 1944). See also W. Wondoamiseno's editorial, "Djaman latihan," *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 12 (Juni 15, 1943), p.1. For a brief reference, *cf.* Zorab, *op. cit.*, pp.107–07; de Weerd, *op. cit.*, pp.39 *f*, and especially van Nieuwenhuijze, *Japanese Islam Policy on Java*, *op. cit.*, p.18 *ff.*

8 As of February 1, 1944, a permanent training center for *ulama (Kaikyō*

Kyōshi Kōshū - chō in Japanese) was established at Djakarta, where *latihan* were given every month. See the official announcement in *Asia-Raya* of January 27, 1944. Thirteen training courses had been held by the end of April 1945, with a total of 949 participants. See the statistical survey, including a regional breakdown, in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 9 (May 1, 1945), p.20.

9 This is the official listing of subjects, as given in *Asia-Raya* of May 8, 1943:

1) Aim of the Greater East Asia War;
2) Short history of the Greater East Asia War;
3) Basic world history, especially that of Anglo-American imperialism;
4) Basic history of Nippon...;
5) Basic history of Java;
6) Policies and aims of the Dai Nippon Military Government;
7) The connection between religious science and general science;
8) The duties of the faithful in this [new] era;
9) Japanese language;
10) Islamic religious instruction;
11) Hygiene and sports instruction;
12) Excursions in order to gain useful knowledge and impressions.

10 According to a Dōmei report in *Asia-Raya* of May 19, 1943, the original list of instructors, discussed at that meeting, contained the following names: Mr. Subagio, Dr. Prijono, Husein Iskandar (all of them Indonesian employees of the *Shūmubu)*, Dr. Amrullah, and Dr. Hoesein Djajadiningrat (both at that time advisers to that Office); Haji Agus Salim, Abdul Halim, and Kiyayi Achmed Sanusi (one prominent reformist and two orthodox Muslims); Kiyayi Mas Mansur, who had left the M.I.A.I. executive on March 10 of the same year (*cf. Asia-Raya*, March 11, 1943); and Dr. R. M. N. Poerbotjaroko, professor of Javanese language and literature. When the first course opened on July 1, the following Indonesians were in fact lecturing: Haji Salim, Dr. Amrullah, Dr. Prijono, Haji Sanusi, Mr. Subagio and Husein Iskandar; they were joined by Mr. Sudjono, Col. Horie, and Miyamoto, Abiko and Tōgō from the Education Office; together with three other Japanese, they completed the 'faculty.' See *ibid.*, July 1, 1943.

11 *Asia-Raya*, June 17, 1943.

12 *Ibid.*, July 1, 1943. Again, the *Saikeirei* was performed at the beginning of the meeting; ironically enough, it took place at M.I.A.I. headquarters, though the courses themselves were given in the building of the Religious Affairs Office. A complete listing of the participants in the first *latihan* can be found in the same issue of *Asia-Raya.*

13 "The change in the position of the *ulama* has been very noticeable," commented an Islamic observer in mid-1943. "It has been rapid over the short span of time since the *Gunseikan's* address [of December 7, 1942]."

H[arsono] Tj[okroaminoto], "Alim-oelama menghadapi pendidikan ra'jat," *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 15, (August 1, 1943), p.1.

14 On the tension between *ulama* and *priyayi*, see Note 36, Chapter Five. Muh. Isa Anshary blamed Western colonialism for turning the Western-trained intellectuals against the *ulama*: "A very deep and wide gap [has] existed between these two leading [groups] of the people... The one pulled... towards the West, the other towards the East..." "Kewadjiban oelama dalam zaman baroe," *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 4 (February 15, 1943), pp.7–9. For a similar exposition, see H. Rasjidi, "Pengetahoean ahli agama doeloe dan sekarang," *Asia-Raya*, July 2, 1943. Wondoamiseno *(loc. cit.)* also referred to existing tensions, claiming that "a great many intellectuals and *priyayi* do not want to make a thorough study of their religion, which is also the religion of their people; as a result, differences often occur among [these groups]." The M.I.A.I. chairman therefore urged the authorities to institute *latihan* for these other elite-groups – a suggestion in part taken up by the Japanese much later.

15 The Japanese chief of the government publishing house *Balai Poestaka*, Kaneko, interviewed the participants before they left Djakarta. Not unexpectedly, an almost unanimous hymn of praise greeted him, the more so since Haji Inada of the *Shūmubu* was also present. Only five *ulama* ventured to utter some mild criticisms, which could be summed up as: 1) language difficulties, 2) overcrowded syllabus coupled with insufficient time, and 3) physical strain connected with sports and gymnastics. Meager though these comments are, they indicate that too much was being attempted too quickly, and with too little regard for what the trainees could be expected gladly to assimilate. Part of the interview was published in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 22 (August 15, 1943), pp.810–812.

16 The trainees were taken to such strange and worldly places as city schools, printing works and factories. See H. A. Musaddad, "Pendapatan selama latihan oelama," *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 17 (September 1, 1943), p.11. According to a short news-item, the visiting *kiyayi* were given cotton seeds, in order to make them serve as an example in the administration's much advertised drive to encourage cotton cultivation on Java. *Cf. Djawa Baroe*, I, 16 (August 15, 1943), p.9. On this point, see also P. M. Prillwitz, "The Estate Agriculture during the Japanese Occupation," *The Economic Review of Indonesia* 7 (1947), pp.13–17. On a previous occasion, Djakarta *ulama* had had to attend a performance of a Japanese propaganda film (*Asia-Raya*, March 6, 1943); but since religious prejudice frowned on this medium, the participants of the *latihan* were apparently spared a repetition. See in this connection K.R.'s article, "Hoekoem Islam terhadap seni memahat dan menggambar," in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 8 (February 20, 1943), p.221.

17 The *latihan*, says van Nieuwenhuijze (*op. cit.*, p.22) "served the Japanese as a source of information as well. Each participant was turned

into an informant on everything going on in his own surroundings..."

18 The *priyayi* elite was not forgotten in this first wave of Japanese generosity: On November 10, M. Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo was appointed *Shūchōkan*, or head, of Djakarta Residency, and Raden Mas T. A. Surio, Regent of Magetan, to the same position in Bodjonegoro Residency. *Cf. Kan Pō*, No. 31 (November 25, 1943), p.4, and for short biographical articles on the two dignitaries see *Djawa Baroe*, I, 23 (December 1, 1943), pp.8–9, and *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 28 (November 25, 1943), pp.995. Only one other Indonesian was made *Shūchōkan* during the occupation. On December 12, 1944, R. P. Suroso became Resident of Kedu. See *Pandji Poestake*, XXIII, 2 (January 15, 1954), p.57.

19 Two 'ministerial' appointments were actually announced after the surrender of Japan: As per August 27, 1945, R. A. A. Wiranata Kusuma (former Regent of Bandung) was appointed to the portfolio of Internal Affairs *(Naimubu)*, which he again occupied in the first Republican cabinet. Professor Supomo, later to become President of the University of Indonesia and Indonesian ambassador to the Court of St. James, was at the same time appointed *Shihōbū-chō*, or Minister of Justice, a post likewise retained in the first Republican cabinet. See *Kan Pō*, No. 74 (September 10, 1945), p.5.

20 Djajadiningrat had been made *Kōmon* (adviser) to the *Shūmubu* earlier in the year (*Asia-Raya*, March 26, 1943). This position was now assigned to Mas Mansur (*Kan Pō*, No. 28 [October 10, 1943], p.45). One month later, another leading figure of the Islamic movement – *Muhammadiyah*-member K. H. Muchtar – was for the first time appointed to an official position in the *Shūmubu*. *Cf. ibid.*, No. 30 (November 10, 1943), p.11.

21 Immediately following Tōjō's visit, an Indonesian delegation, consisting of twenty members – including three journalists – was sent on a visit to Japan. The delegation included professor Supomo, Dr. Buntaran Martoatmodjo and former *Parindra*-leader Sukardjo Wirjopranoto. Most of its other members belonged to the administrative and *priyayi* elites and two held positions in the *Putera*-executive. The delegation was led by Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo, and left Djakarta in early August, after an audience with the C-in-C on July 31. For a complete listing, see *Djawa Baroe*, I, 16 (August 15, 1943), pp.6–7. The group returned to Java on November 1. Interviews on their impressions can be found in *ibid.*, I, 22 (November 15, 1943), p.10. See also Parada Harahap (one of the three journalists in the group), *Nippon di masa perang!* (Djakarta, 1944), *passim*..

22 See e.g. Abdul Rasjid, "Perasaan pendoedoek aseli tentang koendjoengan P. M. Todjo di Djakarta," *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 20–21 (August 1, 1943), pp.703–704. This special issue of *Pandji Poestaka* is entirely devoted to the premier's visit.

23 Lt.-Gen. Kumakiti Harada had replaced Lt.-Gen. Hitoshi Imamura

as Commander-in-Chief on Java in May 1943. See Zorab, *op. cit.*, p.30 n.

24 *Kan Pō*, No. 24 (August 10, 1943), pp.10–11, and *Djawa Baroe*, I, 16 (August 15, 1943), pp.3–5. For a summary of Indonesian participation, see Elsbree, *op. cit.*, Chapter III, *passim.*, especially pp.85–88.

25 *Osamu Seirei* Nos. 36 and 37, and *Makloemat Gunseikan* No. 18, all dated September 5, 1943. See *Boekoe pengoempoelan oendang-oendang*, pp. 102–05 and 266, resp.. – In a government announcement dated November 15, it was stated that certain functions hitherto exercised by the central authorities would be surrendered to the rulers of the Central Javanese principalities (*Kan Pō*, No. 31 [November 25, 1943], p.5). No advisory councils were introduced in these areas *(Kōchi)* until May 1945. *Cf. ibid.*, No. 66 (May 10, 1945), pp.6–7.

26 For a complete list of the twenty-three appointees to the Central Council, see *Djawa Baroe*, I, 19 (October 1, 1943), p.6. The Council's complete membership was reached towards the end of October, when twenty more councilors were elected by the regional *Sangi-kai*. See *ibid.*, I, 21 (November 1, 1943), pp. 4–5. It is interesting to note that Section 13 of the decree setting up the *Chūō Sangi-in* stipulated that its members were to "receive the highest honor among the inhabitants of Java, with the exception of the ruling princes and government officials." *Boekoe pengoempoelan oendang-oendang*, p.103. Members of the Central Council were paid *fl* 3,600.– p.a., those of the regional bodies *fl* 2,400.– p.a., chairmen and vice-chairman receiving a far higher remuneration. These were impressive salaries by occupation standards. See *Osamu Kanrei* Nos. 5 and 7, both dated September 5, 1943, in *ibid.*, pp.191 and 193, resp..

27 Seven appointments of *Sanyo* were announced in *Kan Pō*, No. 28 (October 10, 1943), p.29. They included Ir. Soekarno, prof. Supomo, and Muhammad Yamin, together with four high-ranking civil servants.

28 The disappointment can be clearly seen in Soekarno's comments on the institution of the Central Advisory Council of which be soon became Chairman. See *Djawa Baroe* I, 18 (September 15, 1943), p.4. The importance of the *Volksraad*, in spite of its basic powerlessness, lay in the fact that its members could freely criticize the government and embarrass it by asking questions relating to virtually all aspects of colonial administration. The *Chūō Sangi-in* was denied these privileges. Instead of granting its members the right of interpellation, the military government itself furnished them with the 'questions' that alone constituted the agenda. *Cf.* Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, pp.220-21.

29 The six Muslim members were: Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (chairman of *Muhammadiyah*); K. H. A. Halim (a leading orthodox *ulama* from Tjirebon); Kiyayi Mas Mansur (at that time Adviser to the *Muhammadiyah* executive and member of 'The Big Four'); K. H. Wachid Hasjim (a *Nahdatul Ulama* leader, and elder son of the famous Tebu Ireng teacher and *Nahdatul Ulama*

chairman Hasjim Asj'ari); R. H. Fatchurachman (a *Muhammadiyah* leader from East Java); and M. A. Safwan (a prominent *Nahdatul Ulama* figure in West Java). While the first four councilors were appointed by the military government, the last two members were elected by Regional Councils.

30 *Cf. i.a.* H[arsono] Tj[okroaminoto], "Bangsa kita dalam oedjian," *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 21 (November 1, 1943), pp.8–9.

31 See the same author's "Sekitar Poeasa dan Lebaran," and W. Wondoamiseno's "Hari Raya loear biasa," both in *ibid.*, I, 18–19, pp.11–12 and 8–9, resp..

32 In the eighteen Residency councils, each composed of twelve members, Muslims occupied at least thirty-three places. For a complete listing of *Shū Sangi-kai* members, see *Almanak Soeara Asia 2604* (Surabaya, 1944), pp.190–93. This pattern of Islamic representation had no parallel in the pre-war Regency and Provincial Councils established by the Dutch.

33 The delegation left Java by air on November 10, and returned on December 3, 1943. See the report in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 29 (December 8, 1943), p.1070, and *cf.* also Kahin, *op. cit.*, p.107. The writer has not been able to ascertain why Hadikusumo was selected instead of Mas Mansur, who, with a view to his position in *Putera* alone, should have been the obvious choice. Hamka reports that his father cold-shouldered Hadikusumo on his return from Tokyo. *Cf. Ajahku*, p.155.

34 Indonesians had been recruited as auxiliary soldiers in the Japanese army since the end of 1942. According to a news-item in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 17 (September 1943), p.14, many *Muhammadiyah* pupils were joining the auxiliary *Heiho* corps in Jogja. – Two youth organizations, *Keibōdan* and *Seinandan*, had been created by the authorities in early 1943, the former serving as an auxiliary police corps, the latter as a 'boy-scout' movement with quasi-military training. The writer wishes to thank Col. A. G. Vromans for this elucidation. See also Zorab, *op. cit.*, pp.110–11.

35 The letter is reproduced in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXIII, 24 (September 15, 1943), p.845. A résumé appeared in *Djawa Baroe*, I, 18 (September 15, 1943), p.3. Mangkoepradja, a former member of the P.N.I. executive, was then a railroad official and a member of the Bogor *Shū Sangki-kai*. He was appointed to the Central Advisory Council on September 10, 1944. *Cf. Djawa Baroe*, II, 18 (September 15, 1944), p.29.

36 The Volunteers' Corps for the Defense of Java, *Pasoekan soeka-rela oentoek membela Tanah Djawa* – usually abbreviated as *Peta* – was created by *Osamu Seirei* No. 44, dated October 3, 1943. See *Boekoe pengoempoelan oendang-oendang*, p.122. A whole issue of *Djawa Baroe* (I, 20 [October 13, 1943]) was devoted to the inaugural ceremonies connected with the founding of *Peta*.

37 According to de Weerd, this response was limited to the first draft,

while "with the following levies it appeared that there was insufficient enthusiasm, so that with each new levy each Regency was told how many 'volunteers' were required..." *Op. cit.*, p.35. It should be recalled that a Dutch-created Indonesian militia in 1941 had likewise been flooded with applicants far in excess of the required number of recruits. *Cf.* Pringgodigdo, *op. cit.*, p.222.

38 In his weekly column, "Obrolan Sabtoe," the editor of *Asia Raya* somewhat ironically commented on the fact that so many *kiyayi* had become officers that the problem of addressing them properly had to be faced; he suggested the title of '*Dai dan-chō kiyayi*,' *i.e.* a combination of the Japanese term for officer with that of *kiyayi*. *Asia-Raya*, January 22, 1944. For other references to *ulama* as *Peta* officers, and also as members of Residency Councils, see *Pandji Poestaka*, XXII, 4 (February 15, 1944), and an interview with R. A. A. Hilman Djajadiningrat, Regent of Serang, in *Asia-Raya*, February 5, 1944.

39 No complete listing of *Peta* officers is available to the writer, so that this tentative conclusion is based on indicative, but not entirely conclusive, evidence. Thus an early article devoted to officer-training named four trainees: B. K. P. Purbonagoro, younger son of the Susuhunan of Solo, and graduate of Breda Military Academy in Holland; R. M. Surachmat, elder son of the Regent of Tjirebon and himself a high-ranking *priyayi* official; and two well-known *Muhammadiyah* leaders, K. H. Idris Iskandar and Junus Anies. See *ibid.*, XXI, 28 (November 15, 1943), p.991. A survey of one year of *Peta* developments specifically mentioned that "local leaders *[i.e., priyayi?]* and Islamic leaders flooded the recruitment centers for officers in October 1943." See *Djawa Baroe*, II, 20 (October 15, 1944), pp.6–7. In early 1944, a Muslim writer drew attention to Islamic participation: "Who are... the high *Peta* officers? Among them, as we know, there are many *kiyayi* from the *pesantren*, leaders of Islamic organizations and Muslim youths..." S. Wirohardjono, "Mengerahkan tenaga Moeslimin," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 2 (January 15, 1944), p.9. According to a report in *Asia-Raya* of October 28, 1943, many *ulama* had entered the officer-corps of *Peta* in Banten Residency, traditionally one of the most fanatically orthodox areas in Java.

40 In early November 1943, *Putera* in conjunction with the Propaganda Department *(Sendenbu)* organized a country-wide appeal on behalf of the new army. *Cf.* the news-item in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 27 (November 1, 1943), p.969.

41 According to the report released by Dōmei, the originator of the letter was Wali al-Fatah (a *Muhammadiyah* leader who had attended the World Islamic Congress in Japan during 1938). It was, in addition, signed by Mas Mansur, Mr. R. Muhammad Adnan (President of the Court for Islamic Affairs and member of the Djakarta Municipal Advisory Council),

Dr. Amrullah, K. H. Muchtar, and four orthodox *kiyayi*. See *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 24 (September 15, 1943), p.861. Hamka asserts that Dr. Amrullah consented to military training of Muslims, because there was no reason why they should not learn the arts of war from the idolators. See *Ajahku*, p.154.

42 *Djawa Baroe*, I, 19 (October 1, 1943), p.1.

43 *Kan Pō*, No. 37 (February 25, 1944), pp.10-11. Earlier in the same month, Kasman had presided at a conference between *Peta* officers, the staff of *Asia-Raya*, and the newly established Fighters' Aid Organization *(Badan Pembantoe Pradjoerit)*, headed by Oto Iskandar Dinata, former chairman of the Sundanese *Pasundan* Party and editor of the Bandung daily *Tjahaja* during the occupation. Of the seven other Indonesian officers present, four were *kiyayi*: K. H. Sam'un, K. H. Basjumi, K. H. Abdullah bin Nuh, and K. Ternaja; one was a *priyayi*, R. A. Latief Hendroningrat, while the identity of the last member, Mufrain Mu'min, could not be established. For a report on the meeting, see *Asia-Raya*, February 7, 1944.

44 On this point, see Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, p.109.

45 For a brief summary, see Elsbree, *op. cit.*, pp.87–88.

46 See a *Djawa Shimbun* interview with Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, reprinted in *Asia-Raya* of January 12, 1944, on the occasion of the founding of the *Djawa Hōkōkai*. Sukardjo also revealed that government officials had not been allowed to join the abolished nationalist movement.

47 On dissolving *Putera*, the Japanese stated that it had failed to penetrate to the *desa* population. (See *Asia-Raya* of January 5 and 9, 1944). Partly this may doubtless have been a pretext, as is *i.a.* suggested by de Weerd, *op cit.*, p.33, Elsbree, *loc. cit.*, and Kahin, *op. cit.*, p.110; but the grain of truth concerning the relationship between an urban-centered Asian nationalism and the rural population should not be lightly dismissed.

48 *Kan Pō*, No. 37 (February 25, 1944), p.11. It should be borne in mind that the Royal Netherlands Indies Army had been predominantly recruited from among Christian Indonesians. Japanese policy thus stood in sharp contrast to Dutch practice. The writer gladly acknowledges his indebtedness to Messrs. Kishi and Nishijima for having drawn his attention to this important fact.

49 See *i.a.* H. R.'s articles, "Islam dan perang sekarang," and "Agama jang positif," in *Asia-Raya* of October 16, 1942, and June 26, 1943, resp., and A. Salam Yahja, "Sekoetoe moesoeh Islam," *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 11 (June 1, 1943), pp.10–11. In a similar vein, M.I.A.I. chairman Wondoamiseno requested the Japanese authorities to call an Islamic congress to declare its enmity to the Allies: "Sikap M.I.A.I. menghantjoer-loeloehkan Inggeris dan Amerika," *ibid.*, I, 14 (July 15, 1943), p.2.

50 In early 1943, a sudden though short-lived outburst of officially inspired

anti-semitic propaganda was used by some Muslim writers in an endeavor to pin Jewish influence on alleged Allied, notably American, enmity towards Islam. This first wave of anti-semitism – followed by a second in mid-1944 – was inaugurated with a speech by Murase, a *Kempeitai* (Military Police) officer, at a meeting with propaganda officials and journalists at Djakarta on April 4. (See *Asia-Raya*, April 5, 1943); obedient echoes from nationalist leaders can *i.a.* be found in Sukardjo Wirjopranoto's "Bahaja Jahoedi," *ibid.*, April 10, 1943, and in particular in the long and detailed article "Judaisme" by Dr. Ratu Langie, in the (non-paginated) jubilee booklet of *Asia-Raya* of April 1943. Muslim contributors to this Japanese imitation of German models stressed the historical clash between Jews and Muslims, British policy towards Palestine, and the sinister influence of world Jewry on the alleged anti-Muslim attitude of the West. See, *e.g.*, H[arsono] Tj[okroaminoto], "Sekeliling bahaja Jahoedi!", *Soeara M.I.A.I.* I, 9 (May 1, 1943), p.3; Umar Said, "Jahoedi dan kejahoedian," *ibid.*, pp.8–9; and "Kaoem haloes," by Albahry, *ibid.*, pp.11–12.

51 Thus on January 13, 1943, Col. Horie had explained to an *ulama*-meeting at Djakarta that the prosecution of the war was the sole task of the Japanese army, the *ulama's* field of action being limited to religion proper. *Asia-Raya*, January 15, 1943; he later repeated this delineation of functions in Central Java (*ibid.*, February 8, 1943). On the occasion of Tōjō's visit to Java, an orthodox *kiyayi* wrote that "although we *kiyayi* do not participate in taking up arms against the Allies, we... recognize [our] duty in aiding Dai Nippon with prayers..." *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 20–21 (August 1, 1943), p.740.

52 See in particular Inada's appeal in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 25 (October 1, 1943), pp.875–76, and the article by the Head of the Internal Affairs Department *(Naimubū-chō)*, M. Hatakeda, "Selamat Lebaran dan selamat berdjoeang!..," *ibid.*, pp.865–66, in which he compared the Pacific war with that of the Prophet Muhammad against Mecca.

53 "Semangat keperdjoeritan!," *Asia-Raya*, January 29, 1944. For earlier comments on Holy War, see *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 29 (December 8, 1943), pp.1022–23, and in particular Mas Mansur's "Perang Asia Timoer Raja, perang Sabilallah!" (*Asia-Raya*, January 1, 1944), a forceful call to arms, in which Muslim and Japanese war aims are inextricably interwoven.

54 It is rather indicative that the Japanese refused permission to the holding of open-air Friday prayer-meetings which M.I.A.I. had attempted to organized after its inauguration. See *Asia-Raya*, December 15, 1942.

55 In mid-1943, the federation set up 'consuls,' or area representatives, in four centers, Surabaya, Tjirebon, Solo and Serang, "to bring unity to areas far from the center, and also to serve as local centralizing agencies." See *Asia-Raya* of July 2, 1943, and Wondoamiseno's report in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 21 (November 1, 1943), p.7, from which the quotation is taken.

56 Wondoamiseno, *loc. cit.*. A general meeting was scheduled to take place in mid-August 1943, but it did not materialize then. *Cf. Asia-Raya* of July 2, 1943, and *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 13 (July 1, 1943), p.16. On July 5, *Asia-Raya* carried an announcement to the effect that the meeting was "postponed until further notice." It significantly added that, when convened, the conference would not take place in Bandung, as originally planned by the executive, but in Djakarta – under the watchful eyes of the *Shūmubu*. The fateful conference was finally held in October 1943.

57 Haji Abdul Muniam Inada, the original chief of the *Shūmubu's* First Section under Horie, apparently returned to Japan together with his superior in the fall of 1943. Hoesein Djajadiningrat was Horie's successor, but Inada's important function was taken over by Haji Muhammad Saleh Suzuki. On Suzuki see Zorab, *op. cit.*, p.107 and Slamet, *op. cit.*, p.13.

58 See *Asia-Raya*, November 16, 1942. The program is reprinted in full in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 1 (January 1, 1943), p.19.

59 The M.I.A.I. program consisted of the following points:

a) Safeguard and maintain the dignity and advancement of the [Muslim] religion and its believers;
b) Propagate the 'new society' among Muslims;
c) Improve all matters of vital importance to believers, viz.
   (1) Marriage affairs
   (2) Succession and inheritance matters
   (3) Mosques
   (4) Religious endowments
   (5) Payment of religious tithes
   (6) Instruction and education
   (7) Publicity and propaganda
   (8) Social affairs (aid to the poor)
   (9) Mecca pilgrimage;
d) Aid the Dai Nippon Government and work for Greater Asia. See *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, *loc. cit.*.

60 M.I.A.I. played a conspicuous role in the celebrations of March 8, 1943, the first anniversary of the Dutch surrender on Java. A special committee was set up on February 19, and a public meeting at Djakarta took place on March 3. Prayers for a Japanese victory were said all over Java on the anniversary. *Cf. Asia-Raya*, February 20, 23 and 27 for detailed programs. Again, on the occasion of the Prophet's birthday on March 19, M.I.A.I. organized a large prayer-meeting, attended by Horie, Inada, Ono, the *Empat Serangkai*, and outstanding Indonesian Muslims. See *ibid.*, March 20, 1943. A similar meeting took place after Tōjō's promise of Indonesian participation in the government of Java; it is reported in full in *ibid.*, June 28, 1943.

61 On August 2, 1943, Horie invited several leaders, including Kiyayi

Mas Mansur, to his home and submitted a plan for monthly or fortnightly meetings of *ulama* in all Residencies and Regencies; the writer could not ascertain whether this proposal materialized, but it is significant that the *Shūmubu* did not consult the M.I.A.I. with regard to this plan. See the news-item in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 16 (August 15, 1943), p.14.

62 On January 29, 1943, the M.I.A.I. executive called a meeting with nine leading Djakarta *ulama*, only five of whom, however, attended. Plans for an Ulama Council, for the unification and organization of all *ulama* on Java within the federation, and for a great meeting of *ulama* and *kiyayi* at the capital were discussed, according to a report in *Asia-Raya* of January 29, 1943. (See also Note 4, above). None of these three projects materialized; in fact, the problematical relationship between M.I.A.I. and *ulama* again appeared on the agenda of the still-born M.I.A.I. conference referred to in Note 56, above.

63 These aims were decided upon at an important meeting of the M.I.A.I. executive, attended by several officials and three Regents, Islamic leaders outside the federation and nationalist leaders, on January 29, 1943. Three committees were set up to attain these goals, on which *priyayi* as well as intellectuals were represented. For a report on the meeting, see *Asia-Raya*, February 1, 1943. The members of the three committees are listed in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 4 (February 15, 1943), pp.5–7.

64 This was in a way surprising, since the Mosque Committee was headed by Ir. Soekarno, whose interest in such a project went back to the early 1930's. *Cf.* A. Vandenbosch, "Nationalism and Religion in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey* 21 (1952), p. 181.

65 On June 16, 1942, *Asia-Raya* carried a report according to which the Religious Affairs Office was planning the establishment of a Muslim University, modelled on Cairo's famous al-Azhar. In August of the same year, a 'Center of Islamic Literature and Culture' was opened at Djakarta, on which occasion the promise to set up a university was repeated. See *Pandji Poestaka*, XX, 28 (October 17, 1942), p.953. This institution was originally headed by an Indonesian Muslim, Zain Djambek, but on April 1, 1943 it was replaced by a more ambitious enterprise under the same name and under the directorship of a Japanese, N. Noguchi. The promise was again repeated. See *Asia-Raya*, March 27, and April 6, 1943, and *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 10 (May 15, 1943), p.11, and Asa' Bafagih, "Balai Perpoestakaan dan Keboedajaan Islam," *ibid.*, I, 9 (May 1, 1943), pp.4–5.

66 The Indonesian spelling of this word varies, but it is usually rendered as *Baitul-Mal*. On the historical development of this Islamic institution, which goes back to the early Caliphate, see C. H. Becker's article, "Bait al-Mal," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam: A Dictionary of the Geography, Ethnography and Biography of the Muhammedan Peoples*, ed. by M. Th. Houtsma *et. al.* (Leiden and London, 1913), Vol. I, p. 598 *ff.*

67 The only significant measures taken by the M.I.A.I. leadership consisted of the creation of Youth and Women's Councils *(Madjelis Pemoeda* and *Madjelis Kepoeterian)* in May 1943. See *Asia-Raya*, May 21, 1943. In early July of the same year, a three months' Islamic training course for women was organized by the federation; its opening session was attended by Horie. (*Ibid.*, June 19, July 2 and 5, 1943). The writer has not found any subsequent references to this training course, or to other activities sponsored by the two Councils.

68 W. Wondoamiseno, "Kemakmoeran dan kesedjahteraan rakjat," *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 7 (April 1, 1943), pp.1–2.

69 Discussion of the *Bait al-Mal* occupied by far the greatest amount of space in the pages of the M.I.A.I. journal between February and July 1943. Its first July issue (I, 13) was entirely devoted to this topic.

70 *Cf.* the article on "Djakat" in *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch Oost Indië*, Vol. I, pp.605–06. Apart from this regular tax, the treasury was also to collect the so-called *zakat fithrah*, a small head tax to be paid at the end of the Muslim fasts; lastly, it was intended as a receiving center for alms. And besides supporting the needy, funds were *i.a.* also to be used to grant advances to small entrepreneurs.

71 This was emphasized by Wondoamiseno, *loc. cit.*. "Of the five pillars of Islam," says Bousquet, "the *zakat* is doubtless the one most neglected by Muslims in general. In the Netherlands Indies it... has degenerated... and in the Javanese areas [of Java] it is rather neglected." "Introduction à l'étude de l'Islam indonésien," *op. cit.*, p.183.

72 See the speech of the originator of the Bandung *Bait al-Mal*, R. A. A. Wiranata Kusuma, to the M.I.A.I. conference on February 1, 1943, reprinted in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 4 (February 15, 1943), p.6. Unlike many Javanese aristocrats, this Sundanese *priyayi* is a devout Muslim who has made the Mecca pilgrimage; he is also the author of several works on Islam in Dutch and Indonesian. *Cf. Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa*, p.110. The 1938 al-Islam Congress had resolved to set up a *Bait al-Mal*. See Taufiqurrachman, *op. cit.*, p.30.

73 See the article on "Islam" in *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch Oost Indië*, Vol. II, p.170. *Cf.* also Bousquet, *op. cit.*, pp.183–84, and the same author's *La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas*, *op. cit.*, p.30, where he adds that the collection of religious tithes in the Priangan area was well organized by *penghulu* and their subordinates.

74 In 1940, Wiranata Kusuma had introduced a system of elective village-elders, or *Rois*, in Bandung Regency, each charged with welfare work among forty households. This system continued during the occupation. See the Regent's article, "Sikap Pangreh Pradja terhadap Baitoel-Mal," *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 13 (July 1, 1943), pp.10–11, and the unsigned article, "Perhoeboengan Baitoel-Mal M.I.A.I. dengan Rois," *ibid.*, p.10.

75 According to statistical data published in *ibid.*, I, II (June 1, 1943), p.11, over sixteen thousand people in the Regency received daily meals from the treasury, while it was claimed that more than 36,000 persons were receiving aid of various kinds. Detailed data concerning receipts and expenditures can be found in *ibid.*, I, 13 (July 1, 1943), pp.5–6 and 9. For an earlier report, see *Asia-Raya* of April 17, 1943.

76 This committee consisted of Ir. Sofwan, Dr. Abu Hanifah, and twelve other well-known Muslims, including one *penghulu* and three Arabs. See *Asia-Raya*, February 1, 1943.

77 The transfer took place on April 13, and was officially announced in *Asia-Raya*, April 17, 1943. It seems to have been the last act in a sustained effort to divest the founder, Wiranata Kusuma, as well as lower *priyayi* officials and *penghulu*, of control over the treasury. This can be inferred from the Regent's comments in his previously cited address, "Sikap Pangreh Pradja terhadap Baitoel-Mal," *loc. cit.*. At the time of the transfer, the Bandung treasury had already passed from *priyayi* control to that of *Muhammadiyah*-member Mohammad Sjafei.

78 It is interesting to note that when the plan for an All-Java *Bait al-Mal* was first mentioned, Mr. Samsuddin – at that time still head of the 'Triple-A Movement' – was to become its president (*cf. Asia-Raya*, April 14, 1943); but Samsuddin was not, for whatever reasons, included in the committee which was formed in June (*ibid.*, June 19, 1943). The new enterprise was headed by M.I.A.I. chairman Wondoamiseno, with Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo (later senior officer of the *Peta*), S. M. Kartosuwirjo (leader of the post-war *Dar'ul Islam*), Moh. Sjafei, K. Taufiqurrachman and Anwar Tjokroaminoto as committee members. Wiranata Kusuma became 'adviser' *honoris causâ*.

79 *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 11 (June 1, 1943), p.11.

80 *Ibid.*, I, 13 (July 1, 1943), p.2.

81 On the training course, see *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 11 (June 1, 1943), p.11; on the conferences, *ibid.*, I, 13 (July 1, 1943), pp.15–16. The regulations envisaged local managing committees, aided by advisory bodies composed of *ulama*, and supervisory organs consisting of the regional administrative *priyayi* officials. Detailed instructions concerning the kinds of aid to be disbursed were likewise announced. See "Peratoeran Baital-Mal M.I.A.I.," *ibid.*, pp.4–6.

82 For a complete listing of *Bait al-Mal* see "Berita Dewan M.I.A.I.," *ibid.*, I, 18–19 (October 1, 1943), p.21. At the time of the official establishment of the Military Government on August 8, 1942, Java consisted of 79 Regencies (*Ken*, in Japanese); but in mid-1943 a survey of the first year of the Japanese administration only showed 67 *Ken* (*Cf. Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 22 [August 15, 1943], pp.789–91). Thus *Bait al-Mal* existed in well over half of all Regencies toward the close of 1943; they were distributed

over fourteen of the seventeen Residencies, and in Solo, one of the native principalities in Central Java.

83 Between July 1943 – when a special issue of *Soeara M.I.A.I.* had been almost entirely devoted to the *Bait al-Mal* – and November 1943, only one short article concerning the welfare organization appeared in that journal. See *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 17 (September 1, 1943), p.1.

84 Doubtless the agitation, at least in its printed version, must have had the approval of several departments of the central military administration, at least that of the Propaganda Department, without whose *imprimatur* the M.I.A.I.'s journal could not have appeared. But administrative confusion was the rule rather than the exception on Java in those years.

85 See the *Bait al-Mal* constitution in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 13 (July 1, 1943), pp.4–6, and Note 81, above. For a special reference to the planned *ulama*-councils, see Wondoamiseno's farewell speech in *ibid.*, I, 21 (November 1, 1943), p.7.

86 See his address on the occasion of Premier Tōjō's promise of Indonesian participation in the government of Java, reprinted in *ibid.*, I, 13 (July 1, 1943), pp.2–3.

87 In at least two important West Java Residencies approval was, in fact, obtained before the central authorities put an end to the ambitious M.I.A.I. project. On May 14, Wondoamiseno, Kartosuwirjo and Sjafei went to Bandung, to thank Resident Aneha for permission to propagate and organize treasuries in all five *Ken* of Priangan Residency; up to that time, *Bait-al-Mal* activities had been restricted to Bandung Regency. See *Asia-Raya*, May 18, 1943, and *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 11 (June 1, 1943), p.11. In Bogor Residency, Japanese approval was only given in late October, according to a news-item in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 27 (November 2, 1943), p.970. In Bandung, original home of the *Bait al-Mal*, the treasury remained in existence even after the dissolution of M.I.A.I.. The writer has no evidence concerning the later fate of its sister organizations elsewhere on Java. The Banjumas treasury, however, is still mentioned in *Asia-Raya* of May 26, 1944.

88 These procedural steps were already outlined by Wondoamiseno in the early stages of the *Bait al-Mal* agitation. See his "Kemakmoeran dan kesedjahteraan rakjat," *op. cit.*, p.2. He repeated them again in his October address at the last meeting of the M.I.A.I.. See *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 21 (November 1, 1943), p.7.

89 The announcement was dated September 10. For a full report, see *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 24 (September 15, 1943), p.861; see also *Djawa Baroe*, I, 19 (October 1943), p.10. Recognition gave renewed vigor and impetus to these associations' activities. Though not previously banned, they had been hampered by the uncertainty of their status and the resultant vexations caused by regional or local interpretations concerning their legality. Now

this relationship with the authorities was placed on a firm basis, as can *i.a.* be seen in an order of the *Nahdatul Ulama* executive to its branches, reprinted in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, I, 2 (December 15, 1943), p.13.

90 Among minor Japanese concessions the following may be singled out for passing attention. Unlike the Dutch, the military authorities gave some financial aid to the religious tribunals, as well as incidental financial and material support to Muslim schools. *Cf.* news-items in *Asia-Raya* of December 17, 1942, June 15 and July 5, 1943. In September 1942 the C-in-C announced special monetary gifts and/or advances to all Muslims employed by the Japanese on the occasion of the Lebaran festivities. *Ibid.*, September 26, 1942. These religious ceremonies, attended by tens of thousands of believers, together with properly attired Japanese Muslims, were filmed and broadcast all over Java. *Ibid.*, October 14, 1942. Finally, the sirens were sounded daily during the entire month, to mark the beginning and end of the fasts. *Cf. Pembangoen* (Djakarta), October 10, 1942. The danger of Allied air raids caused the Japanese to withhold permission for the use of sirens one year later; this action was apparently resented, to judge by Muhamad Dimyati's plea for Muslim forbearance, "Poeasa sebagai latihan," in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 23 (September 1, 1943), pp.819. For similar appeals, see also *ibid.*, XXI, 22 (August, 15, 1943), pp.799–800 and 806, resp..

91 This was acknowledged by Wondoamiseno on the occasion of the last M.I.A.I. meeting on October 24, 1943. See *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 21 (November 1, 1943), p.6. The previously quoted and oft-repeated slogan, "Don't talk too much – set to work!", may also indicate that there had, in fact, been much talk, including rather vocal opposition, to M.I.A.I. initiative in Muslim circles. The existence of serious disagreements among Muslim leaders is also acknowledged in a short article in *Asia-Raya* of November 25, 1943. It is not unlikely that M.I.A.I. leaders had accumulated substantial funds through the *Bait al-Mal*, and that their Muslim opponents, as well as the Japanese authorities, were alarmed at this state of affairs.

92 See Note 56, above. The agenda can be found in *Asia-Raya* of October 20, 1943.

93 *Soeara M.I.A.I., loc. cit.*. Wondoamiseno resigned from the chairmanship and ceased to play any part in the Islamic movement during the remainder of the occupation. He apparently later became adviser to the Propaganda Department. See *Asia-Raya*, June 6, 1944.

94 Wondoamiseno, *loc. cit.*. The meeting lasted four days; the motion to dissolve M.I.A.I. was presented after a conference between Mas Mansur (in his capacity as Adviser to *Muhammadiyah*) and Abdul Wahab Hasbullah (chairman of *Nahdatul Ulama*). The name of the successor-organization was not immediately announced, but all M.I.A.I. officials resigned after dissolution had been decided on. See *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 28 (November 15, 1943), p.978, and *Asia-Raya*, November 2 and 23, 1943.

95 On November 11, 1943 *Asia-Raya* reported that, in spite of the abolition of M.I.A.I., the *Bait al-Mal* were to remain intact throughout the island. All archives – but apparently not the funds collected – had to be returned by the M.I.A.I. executive to the former *Bait al-Mal* headquarters in Bandung, which had originally stood under *priyayi* control. See also Note 87, above.

Notes to Chapter Seven

1 Rapy, "Patah-toemboeh, hilang-berganti," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia* I, 1 (December 1, 1943), p.13. For a similar explanation, see the official Military Government announcement, "Keterangan Pemerintah tentang pendirian Masjoemi," *ibid.*, pp.14–15. For brief references on the founding of *Masjumi*, *cf.* also Slamet, *op. cit.*, p.13, Zorab, *op. cit.*, p.107, and de Weerd, *op. cit.*, p.40.

2 Mansur, it will be recalled, had been M.I.A.I. vice-chairman between January 20 and March 10, 1943. Thereafter he continued to be one of the *Empat Serangkai* ('The Big Four') at the head of *Putera*, without occupying, officially, a leading position in the Islamic movement, until May, when he was made Adviser to the *Muhammadiyah* executive. *Cf.* the news-item in *Soeara M.I.A.I.*, I, 11 (June 1, 1943), p.14. In October, he was appointed Adviser to the *Shūmubu*. It is interesting that it was Mansur, officially an adviser, not *Muhammadiyah*- chairman Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, who had conducted the negotiations leading to the founding of *Masjumi* in October, 1943. Mansur assumed the editorship of the *Masjumi* journal, together with the vice-presidency of the new federation. (See *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, I, 1 [December 1, 1943], pp.3 and 18, resp.) See also Note 6, below.

3 Mansur's address is reprinted in full in *ibid.*, pp.15–16. For a résumé, see *Pandji Poestaka*, XXI, 29, (December 8, 1943), p.1036.

4 It also represented an internal victory of Mas Mansur and Abdul Wahab over Wondoamiseno and the M.I.A.I. leadership. *Shūmubū-chō* Dr. Djajadiningrat said that "all Muslims on Java owe [these two men] a debt of gratitude..." "Samboetan atas berdirinja Masjoemi," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, I, 1 (December 1, 1943), p.1.

5 The government urged all as yet unrecognized associations forthwith to apply for the granting of legal status. Recognition would go *pari passu* with joining *Masjumi*. See "Ketarangan Pemerintah tentang pendirian Masjoemi," *loc. cit.*. See also Note 10, below.

6 The names of the *Masjumi* executive can be found in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, I, 1 (December 1, 1943), p.18. Hasjim Asj'ari remained domiciled at Djombang; he only came to the capital for ceremonial occasions. Vice-presidents Mas Mansur and Hasjim Asj'ari's son, Wachid Hasjim, were in actual charge of *Masjumi*. The respective chairmen of *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama*, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and Abdul Wahab, were made

special advisers to the *Masjumi* executive, which consisted of eight members in addition to the two vice-presidents: K. H. Muchtar (N.U.), Zainul Arifin (N.U.), K. H. M. Sadie (N. U.), Farid Ma'aruf (M.), Abdul Mukhti (M.), T. Kartosudharmo (M.), K. M. Hasjim (M.), and Nachrawi-Thahir (N.U.). On January 25, 1944, Mas Mansur resigned as vice-president in connection with his political activities; he continued as member of the *Masjumi* executive. Abdul Mukhti took his place as vice-president, but he ranked below Wachid Hasjim who was, as of that date, charged with responsibility for the federation's affairs. *Cf. ibid.*, II, 3 (February 1, 1944), p.11, and *Asia-Raya*, January 6, 1944.

7 See Art. 5 of the *Masjumi* Constitution in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, I, 1 (December 1, 1943), p.17. According to Art. 11, however, it is not clear whether individual members were given voting strength in the federation's affairs; organizations of 100,000 members received ten votes, those of 50,000 members six, those of ten thousand three, and below ten thousand, one. The arrangement clearly favored small groups at the expense, in particular, of *Muhammadiyah*.

8 The reception took place on December 6. For a full report see *ibid.*, I, 2 (December 15, 1943), pp.1–3. It is interesting to note that on this occasion the *Gunseikan* again referred to "certain difficulties" which had in the past arisen between Muslims and Japanese authorities. *Ibid.*, p.2.

9 The problem of 'diversity in unity' may have puzzled a good many Indonesians. In late 1944, an anonymous commentator observed that "viewed from a distance, it may appear as if these...Islamic organizations... signified disunity among Muslims. But...if you look closely at their inside working, it will become clear that their different names and organizations are only used for their internal arrangements, while all their external actions are unified..." *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 21 (November 1, 1944), pp.4–5.

10 On February 1, 1944, official recognition was granted to the *Persatoean Oemmat Islam Indonesia* (formerly known under the Arabic name *al-Ittihaijjatul Islamiyah*), led by Kiyayi Achmad Sanusi in Sukabumi, and to the *Perikatan Oemmat Islam* of Kiyayi H. Abdul Halim in Tjirebon. Both organizations were reported to have accepted the aims of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in their constitutions. *Cf. Asia-Raya*, February 4, 1944. Sanusi was a member of Bogor Residency's Advisory Council, Abd. Halim of the central *Chūō Sangi-in*. Representatives of these two groups were officially accredited to *Masjumi* at its general meeting of May 25, 1944; Sanusi himself and Siddiq Zainuddin, representing the Tjirebon group, joined the federation's executive. *Ibid.*, May 19 and June 2 and 18, 1944.

11 The announcement appeared in a special Sunday edition of *Asia-Raya* on January 9, 1944. Four days earlier, an unsigned editorial declared that the time had come for a new popular movement to take the place of the

older, which, "as is understandable in an era of change, suffered from serious shortcomings..." *Ibid.*, January 5, 1944.

12 For an account of the Chinese under the occupation, see Elsbree, *op. cit.*, p.141 *ff.* The merger of the Chinese Association *Hoa Chiao Chung Hui* and *Putera* in the new movement was jointly announced by chairman Oey Tiang Tjoei and the *Empat Serangkai* in *Asia-Raya* of January 11, 1944.

13 The aims and statutes of the new movement, which will not here be discussed in any detail, were separately published in a booklet, *Peratoeran-peratoeran Djawa Hookookai, Himpoenan Kebaktian Rakjat* ([Djakarta], February 1944).

14 Japanese leadership, headed by the *Gunseikan*, was maintained in both the Preparatory Committee set up in mid-January (see *Asia-Raya* of January 12, 1944) and in the definitive top organs of the *Hōkōkai*, established in March and April (*Ibid.*, March 1 and 2, and April 5, 1944). The Japanese occupied either the highest posts in all the branches of the executive, or they served as 'advisers' or as 'vice-members' side by side with Indonesian leaders. As originally announced, Japanese civilians could also become members of the *Hōkōkai* (*Ibid.*, January 9, 1944). In early March, however, after the new movement had been inaugurated, a separate organization for Japanese citizens was established. This exclusiveness caused some Indonesians to send a number of inquiries concerning the status of Nipponese civilians to *Asia-Raya*, which ran a daily column on the *Hōkōkai*. See particularly the issues of March 14, 17 and 22, 1944. The column ceased to appear on March 25, perhaps because the authorities wished to terminate this unwarranted curiosity.

15 The prohibition of the participation of *priyayi* and other government officials in *Putera* was disclosed in Sukardjo Wirjopranoto's previously quoted interview with *Djawa Shimbun*, reprinted in *Asia-Raya* of January 12, 1944.

16 This resentment was openly voiced at a series of press conferences in February 1942, where i.a. Ir. Sofwan, Samsuddin, and in particular Ir. Soekarno forcefully expressed apprehensions concerning the leading role assigned to administrative officials in the new movement. See *Asia-Raya*, February 29 and March 1, 1944.

17 Very few *priyayi* occupied leading positions in the central executive of the *Hōkōkai* at Djakarta, and even at the Residency level they were not prominently represented. Other high-ranking Indonesian government officials shared the majority of these, decorative rather than executive, positions with nationalist – and Islamic – leaders (*cf. ibid.*, March 1, 2, 4 and 10, April 5 and May 23 for lists of appointees). In fact, the composition of the *Hōkōkai* executive at the center mirrored that of the Central Advisory Council. On the other hand, however, from the Regency *Hōkōkai* downward, the *priyayi* almost monopolized leading functions.

18 See A[nwar] Tj[okroaminoto]'s editorial, "Siapa menang?," in *Asia-Raya*, April 6, 1944. The author did his best to argue that, appearances notwithstanding, neither side had won – or should win: "There is neither loser nor victor in this matter..., because there is no antagonism between them. [If it exists, however, then] the only loser could be the fatherland." *Cf.* also "Hoeboengan Djawa Hōkōkai dengan Pangreh Pradja," *ibid.*, March 16. Professor Wertheim has suggested to the writer that, in spite of the accretion of official positions to the *priyayi* elite in the *Hōkōkai*, they may actually have suffered a further decline in their prestige, being held responsible by the population for the often onerous tasks, such as rice requisitioning, forced upon them. A French consular official stationed in Djakarta during the occupation wrote in a report to Jean Decoux, French High Commissioner in the Pacific at Saigon, dated December 1, 1944, that Japanese advisers were attached to all Regents at that time. The writer is indebted to the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation for placing this interesting document, entitled *Evolution de la politique nippone à Djawa*, at his disposal. (Document No. 4359B). *Cf.* also Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, p.18.

19 In Indonesian the new organization was called *Rukun Tetangga*. *Cf.* the official announcement of January 8, "Pengoemoeman Gunseikanbu tentang hal menjempoernakan soesoenan Roekoen Tetangga," *Kan Pō*, No. 34 (January 10, 1044), p.19. The organizational setup of the Neighborhood Associations can be found in *ibid.*, No. 35 (January 25, 1944), pp.13–14; it also appeared in *Asia-Raya* of January 12, 1944.

20 *Cf.* Elsbree, *op. cit.*, pp.126–27. The similarity between the *Hōkōkai* and its Japanese model, the *Taisei Yokusan-kai* (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) was stressed in a Dōmei report in *Asia-Raya* of January 25, 1944. Actually the Japanese organization only comprised the leaders of former political parties in the Diet; it was not a mass movement. Neighborhood associations on Java had been first instituted by the local Japanese authorities in the area of Bandung Municipality in March, 1943, one year before the scheme was universally adopted for the whole island. See Soedjati's account, "Setahoen Tonari Goemi di Bandoeng Si," *ibid.*, March 9, 1944.

21 A preliminary survey conducted by the *Naimubu* (Department of Internal Affairs) in mid-1944 showed a total of 508,745 Neighborhood Associations. See *Asia-Raya*, June 20, 1944.

22 Art. 2, Section 1 of the regulations setting up the *Tonari-Gumi*. *Cf.* *Asia-Raya*, January 12, 1944.

23 See *Makloemat Gunseikan* No. 8, dated February 11, 1944, "Peratoeran tentang kedoedoekan pegawai negeri di Djawa," *Kan Pō*, No. 37 (February 25, 1944), pp.6–8. This law made it extremely difficult for officials to resign, while it strictly circumscribed the causes for dismissals, temporary suspensions and 'administrative punishments.'

24 A twenty days' training course for administrators had already been

held in early 1943; *cf. Asia-Raya*, March 20 and 22, 1943, and *ibid.*, March 25-27 for lists of the participants. On January 12, 1944, a series of three-week *latihan* commenced for District-heads at Djakarta. When it was completed four months later, 177 of these officials from all over the island had received their dosage of the 'New Spirit.' For full particulars, *cf. ibid.*, January 14, March 9 and April 26, 1944.

25 See A[nwar] Tj[okroaminoto]'s editorial, "Koetjo," *ibid.*, February 4, 1944, in which the need for training the *lurah* (*Ku-chō* in Japanese) is explained; that official, writes the author, must cease to be tax collector only and become a "father of the people, being the man closest to them." The *lurah* already occupied the position of local leader of the youth organization *Keibōdan* (see Note No. 34, Chapter Six), and he was also in charge of food distribution in the villages. Tjokroaminoto alleged that, under Dutch rule, elections of these village heads had often been corrupt and engineered by the colonial government.

26 *Osamu Seirei* No. 7, dated February 16, "Tentang pemilihan dan pemetjatan Kutyoo," *Kan Pō*, No. 37 (February 25, 1944), pp.3–4, and see the government's elucidation of the decree, "Pokok tindakan oentoek memperbaiki sikap dan tabiat Koetjo," *Asia-Raya*, February 17, 1944. In the latter, intensive training courses for *lurah*, to be conducted in all Residencies, were announced. The central government started to pay a monthly salary to *lurah*, and it held out monetary and other rewards for faithful services.

27 See the unsigned editorial, "Loerah desa," in *Asia-Raya* of February 17, 1944. The comment refers to the fact that the new decree limited the *lurah* to a four-year term for the first time in the history of Java. While, furthermore, the office as such remained elective, tenure came to depend on strict conformity to the 'New Spirit' (Sections 6 and 7 of *Osamu Seirei* No. 7). Elections for new village heads in accordance with the new regulations are *i.a.* reported in *Asia-Raya* of April 21 and July 3, 1944, resp.. Candidates for these vacancies had to pass tests in the Three R's and give proof of their understanding of the problems confronting a *lurah* in the 'New Java.'

28 *Cf.* Wertheim, *op. cit.*, p.156, and see Note 18, above.

29 See Article 19 of the federation's constitution, reprinted in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, I, 1 (December 1, 1943), pp.17–18.

30 On these appointments, see *Asia-Raya*, March 1 and May 23, 1944, resp.. A Japanese member, Utada, was added to the advisers and another, Korematsu, to the General Affairs Bureau. On March 13, Hasjim Asj'ari visited Djakarta and was received by the *Gunseikan*, whom he thanked for the new office bestowed on him. *Ibid.*, March 20, 1944. Mas Mansur, as one of the 'Big Four,' had individually represented Indonesian Islam in the *Putera*. In the *Hōkōkai*, however, he appeared as a *Masjumi* delegate.

31 Islamic representation on the *Hōkōkai* executives in the Residencies was quite substantial, particularly in Bandung. *Cf. ibid.*, March 2 and 4

for some complete listings in the major centers. The prevailing pattern showed almost equal representation of nationalists, officials, and Muslims. Often also one Chinese, one Eurasian member, and one woman were added. All regional committees were headed by Japanese.

32 See the report in *Asia-Raya* of May 18, 1944. For earlier, if less authoritative, Muslim approval of the *Hōkōkai* and the Neighborhood Associations, see Muhammad Saleh Suaidy's "Roekoen Tetangga dalam pemandangan Islam," *ibid.*, January 28, 1944, and S. Wirohardjono, "Persiapan oemmat Islam oentoek 'Himpoenan Kebaktian Ra'jat,'" *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 4 (February 15, 1944), pp.10–11. *Cf.* also N. St. Iskandar, "Tali persaudaraan," *Pandji Poestaka*, XXII, 16 (August 15, 1944), pp.513–15.

33 Hundreds of thousands were impressed into forced labor batallions. According to Muhammad Dimyati *Sedjarah perdjuangan Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1951), p.86n, the Japanese officially admitted that 294,000 *rōmusha*, or forced laborers, had been sent to work outside Java, many of whom died abroad. The fourth session of the Central Advisory Council, held between August 11–14, 1944, solemnly bestowed the honorific appelation 'Hero of Labor' *(Pradjoerit Pekerdja)* on laborers of all kinds. *Cf. Djawa Baroe*, II, 17 (September 1, 1944), pp.306. Only as late as December 1, 1944 was an Aid Organization for Labor Heroes *(Badan Pembantoe Pradjoerit Pekerdja)* established under the chairmanship of Moh. Hatta; it apparently provided a modicum of relief to workers and their dependents in some areas. *Cf.* Hatta's detailed account in *Indonesia Merdeka* I, 2 (May 10, 1945), pp.5–6.

34 On the other hand, many *kiyayi* and *ulama* doubtless had become eager supporters of Dai Nippon, having profited socially and materially from Japanese Muslim policies. On the occasion of a visit to Java, the well-known Sumatran reformist Hamka drew attention to this state of affairs, when he accused some *kiyayi* of "becoming estranged from the people, and [thus] no longer knowing their hopes...in the desire of attracting the attention of people of repute and influence in the country. In this way we are forgetful of the needs of the common man who yet puts his trust in us." "Pemimpin dan ra'jat djelata," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 5 (March 1, 1944), pp.6–7.

35 The meeting took place at *Masjumi* headquarters on January 18–20. It was first announced in *Asia-Raya* of January 15, 1944. For detailed accounts, see *ibid.*, January 18 and 21, 1944, and *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 3 (February 1, 1944), p.2.

36 *Cf. Asia-Raya*, January 27, 1944, and see also Zorab, *op. cit.*, p.107. In this Center, training courses for *ulama* were regularized and speeded up.

37 The *Gunseikan's* speech is reprinted in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 3 (February 1, 1944), p.1. The warning is italicized in the text.

38 See the official announcement in *Asia-Raya*, January 26, 1944.

39 This is emphasized in S. Wirohardjono's article, "Keoentoengan dan kewadjiban penting," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 5 (March 1, 1944), pp.9–10.

40 Apparently neither the new edict, nor later steps, entirely succeeeded in putting an end to all friction between Islamic spokesmen and local officials. Thus, during the third session of the Central Advisory Council in early May, Mas Mansur called upon the government "adequately to explain its orders, particularly those relating to the Islamic religion, to administrative officials, so that they will clearly understand the aim and bearing of these orders, lest mistakes be committed in communicating them to the people." For a verbatim report, see *Asia-Raya*, May 9, 1944. A similar complaint concerning *priyayi* can be found in A[nwar] Tj[okroaminoto]'s editorial, "Oelama dan rakjat," in *ibid.*, July 1, 1944.

41 This section of the *Gunseikan's* speech was again printed in italics. See *Asia-Raya*, January 26, 1944.

42 For a report on the Djakarta meeting, led by Mas Mansur, and attended *i.a.* by Adnan and Ali al-Habsji, see *ibid.*, February 2; the Surabaya conference is reported in *ibid.* of February 22, that held at Solo in *ibid.*, January 31, 1944.

43 The comparison between the events of 1944 and the 1917 revolts, led by the so-called 'Afdeeling B' of the *Sarekat Islam*, stems from Dimyati, *op. cit.*, p.16.

44 Indicative of the gathering storm was a decree of the Priangan *Shūchōkan*, ordering the registration of *kiyayi* and *ulama* in the Residency. See the news-item in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 4 (February 15, 1944), p.14.

45 *Cf.* Slamet's "The Holy War, Made in Japan," *op. cit.*, pp.11–12.

46 The statement, "Keriboetan didaerah Tasikmalaja," appeared, without comment, in *Asia-Raya* of March 8, 1944; it can also be found in *Kan Pō*, No. 39. March 10, 1944), pp.28–30. Another local rising, not overtly tinged) with Muslim influence, occurred in late June of the same year in the village of Kaplongan, near Indramayu in Tjirebon Residency. The writer has not found any official, printed comments on these occurrences, but he possesses a copy of the typewritten report submitted by the local police officer. According to this document, the revolt followed upon the government's announcement that all paddy, including that set aside for planting and home consumption, had to be surrendered to the authorities. It is of interest that the village head *(lurah)* had on this occasion sided with his people, who had attacked Japanese and Indonesian policemen, as well as *priyayi* officials. Four villagers were killed, seven – including the *lurah* – were jailed by the *Kempeitai* (Military Police).

47 An innocuously playful piece of philosophizing on the kinds of madness, contained in the chatty editorial column, "Sambil laloe," of *Asia-Raya*, several weeks after the official release, may represent a cautious indication of Indonesian response to the government's declaration. The column appeared under the headline "Gila" [mad] in the issue of March 17, 1944.

48 *Asia-Raya*, March 8, 1944. The report also stated that repeated warnings

had been given to the villagers since August 1943, thus long before the actual fighting occurred. It had been prolonged by the rebels' refusal to surrender. Zainal Mustafa and several of his followers were captured and subsequently 'investigated' by the *Kempeitai*.

49 *Ibid.*, The report alleged that Zainal Mustafa had left the *Nahdatul Ulama* several months before the rebellion took place.

50 Between March 9 and 11 five meetings were held in the Regency, attended by some 1,500 *ulama*, according to *Asia-Raya* of March 28, 1944. Indicative of the Japanese desire to seek Muslim good will in the face of the revolt is a Dōmei interview with Hasjim Asj'ari in his famous *pesantren* at Djombang, published in *ibid.*, March 25, 1944.

51 See *e.g. ibid.*, March 28, April 4, 22 and 25, 1944, resp..

52 See the Dōmei report in *ibid.*, March 28, 1944.

53 According to an interview with Hamka in *Asia-Raya* of April 5, 1944.

54 The new system became operative on April 1. See the lengthy official announcement in *ibid.*, March 5, 1944. *Cf.* also Zorab, *op. cit.*, p.107; according to this source, Religious Affairs Sections were in the course of time also set up at the Regency and District levels.

55 *Asia-Raya*, March 5, 1944.

56 "The new system," declared a Tokyo broadcaster in English on March 7, 1944, "is expected to remove the friction which traditionally is apt to arise between Muslims and the prefectural chiefs *[sic]*, who have been handling Muslim preaching, financial affairs, and customs..." *Programs of Japan in Java and Bali, op. cit.*, pp.41–42. As was mentioned in Note 40, above, these frictions persevered for quite some time, even after the new regulations had come into effect.

57 *Asia-Raya*, March 5, 1944. It is difficult to assess the importance of these regional administrative centers for post-occupation events. The fact that in Banten Residency *ulama* virtually took over control from *priyayi* officials after the Japanese surrender is a development unparalleled in other parts of the island. (*Cf.* Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism," *op. cit.*, p.304). It may be causally connected to the *Shūmuka* in that area, but it may also stem from earlier historical roots. *Cf.* also the present writer's "The Communist Rebellions of 1926–1927 in Indonesia," *op. cit.*, p.143 and literature cited there. See also Chapter Eight, Note 57.

58 No complete listing of the new officials is available to the writer, but judging by those known to have been appointed in over half of the island's Residencies, it is obvious that, in the main, prominent local representatives of *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama* were made heads and subordinate officers in the *Shūmuka*. *Cf.* news-items in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 8 (April 15, 1944), p.16 (Besuki Residency); *ibid.*, II, 9 (May 1, 1944), p.15 (Djakarta Municipality and Djakarta, Bodjonegoro and Pekalongan Residencies); and in *Asia-Raya*, April 15 (Banjumas); April 27 (Semarang);

May 9 (Malang); May 12 (Madura); May 13 (Surabaya), and June 4, 1944 (Magelang).

59 The Religious Affairs Office called a meeting of all the newly appointed *Shūmuka-chō* at Djakarta on April 17–18. On that occasion, Dr. Djajadiningrat explained that they, in their capacity as *ulama*-officials, should regard themselves as 'mothers' of the people, assigning continued fatherhood to the *priyayi*. For a full report, see *Asia-Raya*, May 1, 1944.

60 The Regent of Tasikmalaya, R. T. A. Wiradiputra, together with three *Wedana* and two Assistant-*Wedana* in the Regency, were allowed to 'resign at their own request' – with forfeiture of income and pension – while the *Wedana* of Singaparna itself was punished and dismissed. See *Kan Pō*, No. 42 (May 10, 1944), p.31, and *ibid.*, No. 43 (May 25, 1944), p.44. Other *priyayi* replaced these functionaries. See also Note 62, below.

61 *Asia-Raya*, March 5, 1944.

62 *Asia-Raya*, April 29, 1944. For a nationalist nod of approval, see the editorial by S[umanan]g, "Pembersihan," in *ibid.*, May 2, 1944. *Cf.* also Elsbree, *op. cit.*, p.9, who quotes part of the statement, but without reference to the Tasikmalaya events. His conclusion that the Japanese followed their threat by "systematically comb[ing] the ranks of appointed native officials," and replacing them by nationalist or religious leaders, does not appear to be borne out by the available record. Elsbree's statement is based on a similar presentation in de Weerd, *op. cit.*, p.50, but de Weerd dates the 'combing' in February, 1945, after a rebellion of *Peta* soldiers had occurred in Blitar, claiming that one-third of the *priyayi* corps was replaced. The writer has checked all the personnel changes during the occupation, as recorded in the official gazette, *Kan Pō*. As far as could be ascertained, only very few nationalist leaders were given positions traditionally held by the native aristocracy. One well-known nationalist, Dr. M. Murdjani, a physician and *Parindra* leader, replaced a *priyayi*, R. T. A. Muh. Sediono, as Regent of Indramayu after the revolt in that area, already referred to in Note 46, above. This appointment was so unique that it is especially mentioned in Pakpahan's short history of the occupation (*op. cit.*, p.158). It is true that, from late 1944 onwards, resignations and dismissals of high-ranking *priyayi* increased, but they were almost always replaced by others. Only a few weeks before the Japanese surrender were some 'outsiders' appointed to positions of Regent and *Patih*. *Cf.*, *e.g.*, *Kan Pō*, No. 69 (June 25, 1945), pp.42–43. Nationalist and Islamic leaders did, of course, occupy many important positions in government departments and services. Local administration, on the other hand, appears to have by and large continued in *priyayi* hands. Col. A. G. Vromans has cautioned the writer against accepting the listings of administrative personnel in the official gazette as conclusive evidence concerning changes in the *priyayi* corps. He has suggested that the Japanese authorities may not have found it desirable to

publish wholesale dismissals. The French document previously quoted (see Note 18, above) contains the following interesting passage: "The democratization of the Regents' corps is continuing [in 1944]. Those overly compromised by masonic or liberal leanings are dismissed."

63 According to Pakpahan, the rebels at Tasikmalaya and at Indramayu had killed most of the local *priyayi* officials. See *op. cit.*, p.55. In this respect the similarity with the Communist-led rebellions of the mid-1920's is striking. *Cf.* Blumberger, *De communistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, *op. cit.*, pp.70–91.

64 On the difficulties confronting the voluntary resignation of officials, see Note 23, above, and M. Slamet, *Japanese Machinations*, *op. cit.*, Part I, "The Aftermath of the Japanese Occupation," pp. 4 and 5.

65 An early interim-decree of April 1, 1942 had stipulated a ceiling salary for private and government employees of *fl* 500.– per month. See *Berita Oemoem*, April 2, 1942. As per July 1, 1943, uniform salary scales were introduced in a government order, styled "Peratoeran tentang pengangkatan dan gadji pegawai negeri di Djawa," in which the highest monthly salary was set at *fl* 700.–. See *Boekoe pengoempoelan oendang-oendang*, pp.345–56. Under Dutch rule, Regents had drawn *fl* 1,150.– a month. *Cf.* Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, p.6.

66 On the salaries paid to Council members, see Chapter Six, Note 26.

67 *Cf.* Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, pp.13 and 15.

68 See also Elsbree. *op. cit.*, p.91, and Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition*, *op. cit.*, p.156.

69 The conference was first announced in *Asia-Raya* of May 6, 1944. It took place on May 23–25 in the building of the Central Advisory Council (the former *Volksraad* building). In June, the returning delegates held meetings with local *penghulu* and their subordinates. See, *e.g.*, *ibid.*, June 12, for the Djakarta Residency meeting, and *ibid.*, June 13, 1944, for its counterpart in Surabaya. Training courses for *penghulu* were another upshot of the conference, Malang Residency taking the lead on the initiative of the Malang *Shūmuka-chō*, H. M. Nachrawi Thahir. See *ibid.*, June 5, 1944.

70 A verbatim account of the opening addresses by the *Gunseikan* and by the *Shūmubu-chō*, Dr Djajadiningrat, can be found in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 11 (June 1, 1944), pp.1–2. The latter, especially, urged his listeners to establish immediate and close contact with the new Residency-officials.

71 Post-war developments provide an interesting comment on the changes wrought during the occupation. The Indonesian Republic, proclaimed on August 15, 1945, confirmed the new arrangement by a statute of 1946 which vested supervision of Islamic justice and the *penghulu* in the newly created Ministry of Religious Affairs. But in areas occupied by the Netherlands in the course of the two 'police actions' of 1947 and 1948 the colonial *status quo*, with control in the hands of *priyayi* officials, was temporarily

reintroduced. See "De godsdienstige rechtspraak op Java en Madura," *Mededelingen van het Documentatiebureau voor Overzees Recht* 3 (1953), pp.14–17. Legislation passed in 1954 gave effect to the 1946 statute. See *ibid.*, 5 (1955), pp.28–30, and also Prins, "Adatlaw and Muslim Religious Law in Modern Indonesia," *op. cit.*, pp.295–96.

72 For a report on these requests and Dr. Djajadiningrat's replies, see *Asia-Raya*, May 25, 1944. An article, "Kedoedoekan penghoeloe," in the same newspaper of the following day strongly supported the main request, advocating that the *penghulu* be turned into officials and properly salaried Islamic judges.

73 The restoration of the 'lost provinces' to Islamic jurisdiction had, it will be recalled, occupied a prominent place on the M.I.A.I. platform even under Japanese rule. It had, by contrast, no place on the *Masjumi* program. This deletion was no doubt dictated by Japanese unwillingness to undo the judicial balance forced upon Muslims by the Dutch authorities in 1937. It is in this connection instructive that in the course of the Indonesian revolution religious law tribunals in some areas of Java under military control proceeded to wrest inheritance matters from the purview of ordinary law courts. This fact seems to underline the strong Islamic influence in the Indonesian army shortly after the Japanese surrender – a legacy, no doubt, of such influence in the *Peta*. See *Mededelingen van het Documentatiebureau voor Overzees Recht* 3 (1953), p.15. On Java, the colonial *status quo* seems since then to have been restored, and there have even been endeavors to abolish separate religious tribunals. *Cf.* A. A. Schiller, "Indonesian Law," in *Studies in the Law of the Far East and Southeast Asia* (Washington, D.C., 1956), p.102. For a strong plea to revise existing regulations in favor of Muslim law, see *e.g.*, Hazairin, *Hukum baru di Indonesia* (Djakarta, [1951]), p.10. See also Chapter Eight, Note 60.

74 See *Asia-Raya*, May 25, 1944. It is significant that the issue of the *Masjumi* journal reporting the meeting does not contain a single supporting article.

75 Wachid Hasjim's speech is reprinted under the title "Melenjapkan jang kolot," in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 11 (June 1, 1944), p.3. It is interesting to note that anti-semitic propaganda, dormant since mid-1943, received a new impetus at that time. The theme occurred in Hasjim's speech, as well as in several articles in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia* from May 1944 onwards. *Cf.*, *e.g.*, M. Ibnu Ali's "Ketertiban dan keselamatan," in that journal, II, 10 (May 15, 1944), p.10. The Jews were also attacked in the third session of the Central Advisory Council, as reported in *Asia-Raya* of May 8. For a short mention, see Zorab, *op. cit.*, p.99. *Cf.* also Chapter Six, Note 50.

76 In some areas the new religious officials were not slow in making their presence felt. In the Residencies of Surabaya and Priangan, *e.g.*, they published

some important regulations regarding Muslim affairs. See *Asia-Raya*, April 27 and 28, and May 6, 1944, resp.. The first regional training course for *ulama* was instituted by the Banjumas *Shūmuka-chō* on May 15. The opening ceremony was attended by Indonesian *Shūmubu*-officials. *Ibid.*, May 24, 1944.

77 The *Shūmuka-chō* of West, Central and East Java held conferences on the progress of their work at Bandung (June 27), Solo (July 26), and Malang (July 7), respectively. See *Asia-Raya*, June 12 and July 4, 1944.

78 It is reprinted in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 16 (August 15, 1944), p.2.

79 De Weerd alleges (*op. cit.*, p.40) that the Japanese held Dr. Djajadiningrat responsible for the Tasikmalaya rebellion, and therefore forced him to resign. The time-lag between the two occurrences – February to August – makes this, however, appear unlikely. The writer inclines to the view that Djajadiningrat may have left under strong and prolonged *Masjumi* pressure. On August 31, 1945 – thus after the surrender of the Japanese had been officially announced – Djajadiningrat was again appointed to the *Shūmubu*, this time as Adviser, a position he had held before assuming the titular leadership of the Office. *Cf. Kan Pō*, No. 74 (September 10, 1945), p.12.

80 Hasjim Asj'ari came to Djakarta for his installation as Head of the Religious Affairs Office, but thereafter immediately returned to his school, Tebu Ireng, at Djombang. Although not permanently in the capital, he frequently appeared at public functions in the main centers of Java, delivering at times very important speeches.

81 The late Haji Agus Salim told the writer that Wachid Hasjim acted as his aged father's permanent deputy, at the latter's explicit request. Wachid Hasjim's influence on the overall direction of the office must have become increasingly important. His views at the time he assumed the new function are well expressed in an article, "Tjatjat kita," in *Djawa Baroe*, II, 16 (August 15, 1944), pp.3–5. Educated in religious as well as in Western schools, this capable *Nahdatul Ulama* and *Masjumi* leader maintained close contact with nationalist circles. In independent Indonesia, and before his untimely death in an automobile accident, Wachid Hasjim was Minister of Religious Affairs in the successive Natsir and Sukiman cabinets, from September 1950 to February 1952. *Cf.* G. McT. Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," in William L. Holland (ed.), *Asian Nationalism and the West* (New York, 1953), p.135 *ff.* Unfortunately Wachid Hasjim's comments on the Religious Affairs Office under the occupation do not shed additional light on developments between August 1944 and the declaration of independence and thereafter. *Cf.* his "Sekitar pembentukan Kementerian Agama R.I.S.," *Mimbar Agama* (Djakarta), 1 (1950), pp.5–6.

82 Muzakkir had studied Islamic education in Egypt, and had been a *Muhammadiyah* teacher and executive member of the *Partai Islam Indonesia*. He had also been one of the M.I.A.I. delegation sent to Japan in 1938. *Cf. Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa*, p.440. Muzakkir's appointment

may also indicate the eclipse of Mas Mansur's leading role in *Masjumi* affairs.

83 These appointments were included in the official announcement, reprinted in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, loc. cit.*. The Religious Affairs Office was at the same time moved to a larger and more impressive building, which in colonial times had housed the Education Department. On August 14, another prominent Muslim was appointed to the *Shūmubu, viz.* R. H. Muhammad Adnan, President of the Court for Islamic Affairs. *Kan Pō*, No. 50 (September 10, 1944), p.18.

84 *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, loc. cit.*.

85 This tendency had already been rather forcefully demonstrated at a series of impressive *Masjumi* meetings at Solo in late July. These included the federation's first general meeting since its foundation, and an *ulama*-conference with *Shūmubu* officials and the *Masjumi* executive. For full reports, see *ibid.*, II, 13 (July 1, 1944), *passim*.. Interestingly enough, the general meeting had originally been planned for late January, but very likely the deteriorating situation at Tasikmalaya had caused it to be postponed. See *Asia-Raya*, January 26, 1944.

86 Apparently Suzuki and Ono remained as section heads. This is implied by de Weerd, *op. cit.*, p.40. See also Zorab, *op. cit.*, p.105.

87 It is interesting to note that, while regional Religious Affairs Offices *(Shūmuka)* were also instituted in Sumatra in late 1944, no central Islamic movement existed on that island. Sjech Djamil Djambek, one of the leading Minangkabau Muslims, urged the creation of such a movement, modelled on the *Masjumi*, in an interview reprinted under the title, "Masjoemi dapat mendjadi teladan di Soematera," in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 2 (January 15, 1945), p.6.

88 It should be recalled that the use of Arabic and the Arabic script had been – as was mentioned in another context before – officially sanctioned in July 1944; at the same time, Arabs were granted equal status with Indonesians.

89 Such appointments were made in rapid succession once Indonesian independence had been promised by the Tokyo government. The ramifications of these changes will be discussed in the next chapter.

90 The loss of Saipan in June, 1944 caused the fall of the Tōjō cabinet on July 18. Four days later, his successor, Koiso, assumed office. The new cabinet waited for almost two months before committing itself to further promises to Indonesia. On the background of these developments, see Elsbree, *op. cit.*, pp.50–57 and 88 *f*, resp..

91 See in this connection the editorial, "Himpoenan Kebaktian Rakjat dan kaoem terpeladjer," by S[umanan]g, in *Asia-Raya* of May 12, 1944. The article chides intellectuals for their lukewarm cooperation. For similar comments in connection with the negative attitude of intellectuals towards the Neighborhood Associations, see *ibid.*, May 5 and 8, resp..

92 "Sabar-sabarlah menoenggoe boeah," *Pandji Poestaka*, XXII, 14 (July 15, 1944), p.435. The appeal ended with the announcement of the organization's first great meeting at Djakarta, which took place on July 25. For a report, see *ibid.*, XXII, 15 (August 1, 1944), pp.469–70.

93 An excellent indication of Japanese attitudes towards nationalist leaders at that time can be gleaned from the condescending and haughty 'lectures' delivered by the *Gunseikan* to the members of the Central Advisory Council in reply to their resolutions. This is particularly true of his addresses marking the close of the second and third sessions of that body. On the former, see *Kan Pō*, No. 36 (February 10, 1944), pp.27–28, and *Asia-Raya*, February 2, 1944; on the latter, *Asia-Raya* of May 9 and 10, 1944.

Notes to Chapter Eight

1 Thus during his visit to Tokyo in November, 1943, Ir. Soekarno in vain asked Premier Tōjō for the promise of an early grant of independence. See Elsbree, *op. cit.*, p.49, who cites an official Japanese document in support of this statement. On the visit, see also Chapter Six, Note 33.

2 The writer gladly acknowledges his indebtedness to Dr. C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze for having suggested this analysis to him.

3 On official occasions, Ir. Soekarno was always styled 'Representative of the Indonesian People.' He was chairman *(Gi-chō)* of the Central Advisory Council and Head of the General Affairs Office – and thus chief Indonesian spokesman – of the *Hōkōkai*. In addition, he was Adviser *(Sanyo)* of the administration's key department, the *Sōmubu* (General Affairs Department). Similar combinations of lesser functions could be listed for other nationalist leaders. Of the original 'Big Four,' only Soekarno and Hatta retained prominence throughout the war. Mas Mansur, perhaps because of ill health, gradually withdrew from a leading position, while Ki Hadjar Dewantoro returned to Jogja in early 1944, where he again assumed leadership of the *Taman Siswa* school system. He was at the same time appointed chairman of the Jogja Sultanate's regional *Hōkōkai*. See *Asia-Raya*. April 8, 1944.

4 To mention one outstanding example, R. M. A. A. Koesoemo Oetojo, one of the best-known Javanese *priyayi*, at one time Regent of Ngawi and Vice-Chairman of the *Volksraad*, was again appointed Vice-Chairman of the *Chūō Sangi-in* by the Japanese. The Regent of Bandung, R. A. A. Wiranata Kusuma, also occupied several important functions during the occupation, as did Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo, who, unlike these two and most other *priyayi*, had joined the ranks of the nationalist elite under Dutch rule. Some *priyayi*, as well as several Western-trained Indonesian officials, also shared top-advisory positions with the nationalist elite in the various departments of the military administration.

5 *Cf.* also Chapter Seven, Note 34, and see van Nieuwenhuijze, *Mens en vrijheid in Indonesië, op. cit.*, p.27.

6 Japanese was taught in all schools, including Muslim *pesantren.* Prizes were awarded in annual competitions for school children. *Cf., e.g.,* the illustrated report on the 1943 winner in *Djawa Baroe,* I, 23 (December 1, 1943), p.3. Courses were also given to adults, who likewise competed in frequent examinations, since knowledge of the Japanese language was an important qualification for government employment. Thus in mid-December of 1943, over 19,000 persons participated in the fourth and fifth of these examinations; of these, 4,278 passed. The names of the successful candidates were published in a special edition of *Asia-Raya* on February 17, 1944. Another illustrative report in *Djawa Baroe,* II, 22 (November 15, 1944), pp. 14–15, mentions that at a recently held Regents' conference two participants had delivered their reports in Japanese.

7 *Cf.* Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, p.13 and *passim.*. For an indicative comment, see R.S.P. Atmosudirdjo, "Iets over de ontwikkeling van het recht in Indonesië," in *Sticusa Jaarboek 1953* (Amsterdam, 1953), p.59. The author there writes that the Japanese occupation gave the young generation "the taste for working and living for our own destiny. As far as the Japanese were concerned, we suffered no interference in this respect. On the contrary, they taught us how to work, they brought us, the young, [their]... fighting spirit and the courage to do things..." Atmosudirjo was a young administrator in rural Java at the time of the invasion and became a *Peta* officer immediately after the founding of the corps. He also is apparently a devout Muslim. (*Ibid.*, pp. 49–50).

8 The vague promise was made in the course of a policy declaration in the 85th session of the Japanese Diet. See the special 'Independence Issue' of *Djawa Baroe,* II, 18 (September 15, 1944), for a full pictorial review of the celebrations following Koiso's declaration on Java. On the day itself, the newspapers published separate pamphlets with the tidings, which had been communicated to Indonesian leaders summoned by the Commander-in-Chief to his palace for this purpose. *Cf.* also Pakpahan, *op. cit.*, p. 74 *ff.*

9 Immediately following Koiso's promise, the Indonesian flag and the national anthem, *Indonesia Raya,* were officially sanctioned. See *Makloemat Saikō Shikikan* No. 6 of September 8, 1944, in *Kan Pō,* No. 50 (September 25, 1944), p. 11. In this announcement, public buildings – with the exception of *Hōkōkai* offices – were not allowed to fly the Indonesian flag. Only seven months later, on the occasion of the emperor's birthday on April 29, 1945, permission was granted to schools and local and regional government agencies to display the Indonesian flag; at no time could it be displayed without Japan's Rising Sun, hoisted on its right-hand side. *Cf. Makloemat Saikō Shikikan* No. 2, and *Makloemat Gunseikan* No. 24, *ibid.*, No. 66 (May 10, 1945), pp. 9–11. On the same late date Indonesians ceased to be officially

styled 'natives' *(Genjūmin)*, their language ceased to be referred to as 'Malay' *(Marai-go)*, and their country, hitherto called *Tō-Indo (East Indies)*, at long last was christened Indonesia. *Cf.* the comment, "Perdjoeangan kita dari zaman kezaman," *Indonesia Merdeka*, I, 2 (May 10, 1945), p.18.

10 For summaries of these events, see Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, p. 121 *ff*; Elsbree, *op. cit.*, p. 89 *ff* ; Zorab, *op. cit.*, p. 112 *ff* and Pakpahan, *op. cit.*, esp. p. 92 *ff* and *passim*..

11 After careful perusal of the printed record, the writer finds it difficult to agree with Elsbree's assertion (*op. cit.*, p. 81) that, after September 1944, Indonesian spokesmen appeared to be less pro-Japanese in their public utterances. The contrary would seem to be nearer the truth. Among countless nationalist and Islamic speeches of that period, Soekarno's radio address, "Penggemblengan rakjat Indonesia kearah kemerdekaan kini dimoelai!," of December 8, 1944, and his speech of March 1945 contain exuberant praise of Nippon, together with specific attacks on Britain and the U.S.A., democracy and liberalism. See for the former, *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 23–24 (December 15, 1944), pp. 16–18, and for the latter, *Djawa Baroe*, III, 7 (April 1, 1945), p. 3. It must be borne in mind, however, that printed reports do not necessarily correspond to the speeches actually delivered, or that, even if they do, speakers were subject to rigid censorship. Thus the former *Gunseikan*, Moichiro Yamamoto, declared in an interrogation after the war that "Soekarno had little influence, because he was under a strict censorship of which he...complained several times in a bitter way." Yamamoto added that "Soekarno had no political power at all. He was allowed to deliver speeches and hold meetings..., but he had no power to issue rules [regulations] and to take measures. He felt his uneasy position very clearly and complained about [it]..." The writer is obliged to the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation in Amsterdam for permission to use and quote from this document (No. 873). See also Moh. Supardi's post-occupation comment, "Dibawah penindasan Djepang; perlawanan kita dipelbagai lapangan," in the jubilee booklet of the Djakarta daily *Merdeka* (February 17, 1946), pp. 103–04. In that article, a few guarded anti-Nippon passages in Soekarno's war-time speeches are quoted. *Cf.* on this point also Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–09 and 115, resp..

12 The spreading disappointment with the delay is *i.a.* apparent in an unsigned article, "Perdjoeangan Oemmat Islam," in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 21 (November 1, 1944), pp. 6–7, in which "people with little or insufficient knowledge" are reproached for asking why independence could not be granted immediately.

13 A special session of the Central Advisory Council had been hastily ummoned on September 7, with whatever members happened to be in he capital, to celebrate Koiso's announcement and to thank the home government. When the full membership assembled for the sixth session

(November 12–18) and proceeded to recommend a few measures aimed at increasing Indonesian codetermination, it was severely reprimanded by the *Gunseikan*. See *Kan Pō*, No. 55 (November 25, 1944), pp. 17–18. This session also promulgated the so-called '*Pantja Dharma*' (The Five Duties), a five-point declaration of basic principles and aims. These read, somewhat abbreviated, as follows:

1) We are in this war as allies in life and death of Dai Nippon...
2) We shall establish a free Indonesian state, fully respecting the meritorious help of Dai Nippon and continuing as a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere...
3) We shall endeavor to advance the highest morality...and our culture...
4) We shall serve with all our might our country and people, and render homage to God.
5) Based on the [Japanese principle of] *Hakkōichiu*, we fight for the establishment of everlasting peace.

Ir. Soekarno, interestingly enough, again briefly referred to these oft-repeated early principles in his speech before the Independence Preparatory Committee on June 1, 1945. On that occasion, he explicitly disavowed them in favor of the five new principles, the so-called '*Pantjasila*,' which since have become the accepted ideological basis of the Indonesian Republic. See *Lahirnja Pantjasila (The Birth of Pantjasila)*, [Djakarta, 1952], p. 29.

14 The resolution is reprinted under the title, "Berdjihad oentoek menegakaan agama Allah," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 20 (October 15, 1944), p. 2. It is also interesting to note that the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem had cabled Koiso from Berlin on the occasion of the latter's promise to Indonesia. The *Masjumi* executive decided to convey its thanks to that dignitary at the meeting.

15 From a circular of the *Masjumi* head-office to all branches, elucidating the previously quoted resolution, in the special independence issue of *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 21 (November 1, 1944), pp. 3–4. Similarly, Wachid Hasjim told the Djakarta gathering that "without sacrificing one iota of its nationalism, the Indonesian people can attain its independence with Islam... Thus we Indonesian Muslims, without in the least looking down on those who do not base themselves on our religion, have the duty of defending our fatherland." *Ibid.*, II, 18 (September 15, 1944), pp. 5–6. See also Muzakkir's similar speech in *ibid.*, II, 19 (October 1, 1944), pp. 2–3.

16 Thus in the short-lived *Madjelis Rakjat Indonesia* of 1941, the M.I.A.I. had, among others, been represented by Wachid Hasjim, who, as we saw, emerged as one of the most prominent Muslim leaders during and after the occupation. See also Chapter Three, Note 115 and Chapter Seven, Note 81.

17 *Cf.* van Nieuwenhuijze, *Mens en vrijheid in Indonesië*, *op. cit.*, p. 42. The writer has benefited from the reading of an as yet unpublished manuscript

by Dr. C. Geertz on the *kiyayi* in post-war Indonesia, in which these various tendencies are extensively discussed.

18 For a report on that session, see *Asia-Raya* of May 10, 1944.

19 Ir. Soekarno was made supreme commander *(Sōrengōtai Tai-chō,* in Japanese) of the corps, Oto Iskandar Dinata and R. Buntaran Martoadmodjo vice-commanders. Many well-known nationalists, including Dr. Muwardi, Mangkoepradja and Mr. Boediarto, were appointed to leading *Pelopor* positions in the Residencies. An advisory committee, consisting of one Japanese, Korematsu, and Hatta, Mas Mansur and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, was attached to headquarters. For a complete listing of the regional personnel, see *Djawa Baroe,* II, 20 (October 15, 1944), pp. 25–29. The official announcement concerning the setting up of the corps can be found in *Pandji Poestaka,* XXII, 17 (September 1, 1944), p. 540.

20 For an analysis of these factors in the first Indonesian elections, see H. Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1957), pp. 28–37.

21 On September 15, 1944, a special bi-weekly magazine, *Pradjoerit* (The Fighter), commenced publication at Djakarta. Its editorial and administrative staff, headed by Iskandar Dinata, apparently consisted entirely of Indonesians until May 1945, when a Japanese replaced editor Sjamsuddin St. Ma'mur. This magazine illustrates very interestingly the ideological diet of the Indonesian soldier. It consisted, right to the end of the occupation, of an about even mixture of Japanese indoctrination and Indonesian nationalism, very frequently enlivened by Islamic propaganda. For an early and typical example of the latter, see Musa Machfuld's historical article, "Perdjoeangan pahlawan Islam Djawa," *Pradjoerit,* I, 3 (October 15, 1944), pp. 19–20. *Cf.* also Elsbree, *op. cit.,* p.90.

22 The speech is reprinted in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia,* II, 23–24 (December 15, 1944,) p. 4. The C-in-C, stating that the war would only end with the Allies' unconditional surrender, also announced that 400 youths from Madiun Residency had volunteered for service in a suicide *(Jibaku)* squad. For a detailed report, see *Pandji Poestaka,* XXII, 24 (December 15, 1944), p. 784.

23 See Chapter Six, Note 41. For brief references to the Muslim army, see Aziz, *op. cit.,* p. 208, Kahin, *op. cit.,* p. 163n, Elsbree, *op. cit.,* p. 104 and Zorab, *op. cit.,* p. 114.

24 In part at least this preference may have been governed by the consideration that the arch-enemy of Indonesian nationalism, the Dutch, were of no military consequence to Japan, whose far more tangible adversaries were Britain and America. At any rate, anti-British propaganda for Muslim consumption frequently found its way into several magazines from early 1945 onwards. See, *e.g.,* M. Zain Djambek's, "Keradjaan-keradjaan pendjadjah Barat dan doenia Islam," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia,* III, 1 (January 1, 1945), p. 11, and a whole series of such articles in one single issue of *Pradjoerit,* I, 14 (April 15, 1945), pp. 19–20, 20–21, 23–25, and 27–29, resp..

25 On the island of Madura what appears to have been a separate Islamic corps was founded on December 26, 1944. This miniature *ulama*-army stood under the direct command of the local Japanese Resident. The writer has only found one brief reference to this perhaps short-lived enterprise, and can, therefore, not assess its significance. See the survey of events of the year 1944 in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXIII, 2 (January 15, 1945), p. 58.

26 In early January 1945, the members of the Central Executive Leadership of *Hizbu'llah* were announced by *Masjumi*. (See *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 2 [January 15, 1945], p. 12.) Its chairman was Zainul Arifin (one of the *Nahdatul Ulama* delegates in the *Masjumi* executive), with Mohammad Roem as vice-chairman, and ten other members: S. Surowijono, Sudjono, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, K. J. Zarkasji, Masjhudi, Mrs. Sunarjo Mangunpuspito, Jusuf Wibisono, Muhammad and R. H. O. Djoenadi, and Prawoto Mangkusasmita. With a few exceptions, these were younger men, some of whom had at one time been active in the *Jong Islamieten Bond* and in Haji Salim's dissident P.S.I.I. faction of 1936. In the same issue of the journal a new *Masjumi* executive was, without additional comment, announced. Among other changes, H. A. Mukhti was replaced as the federation's second vice-chairman by *Muhammadiyah*-member Farid Ma'aruf, while Mas Mansur's name disappeared from the list altogether. For a complete listing of the new committee, see *ibid.*, p. 13.

27 The constitution of the *Hizbu'llah* can be found in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 23–24 (December 15, 1944), pp. 24–26. *Masjumi* was charged with setting up the central and area commands; it was also entrusted with clothing, equipping and victualing its troops. They were to be trained for periods of three months, and then serve as local leaders of Muslim students in *pesantren*. The officially listed aims of *Hizbu'llah* significantly do not allude to either nationalism or independence. Needless to say, the creation of this Islamic army was greeted with loud approval, *i.a.* also by Dr. Sukiman, before the occupation chairman of the *Partai Islam Indonesia*, and later for a time Prime Minister of the Republic. To the writer's knowledge, Sukiman occupied no official position during the Japanese era. In his appreciation of *Hizbu'llah*, he specifically referred to the fact that "the leadership of *Peta* may be said to be [already] in the hands of Islamic youths, and the spiritual basis of our fighters is [thus] anchored in Islam." *Ibid.*, II, 1 (January 1, 1945), pp. 7–8.

28 *Ibid.* On this tour, the *Masjumi* also conducted a propaganda drive for the voluntary surrender of interest accruing from Post Office savings accounts. See the news-item in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXIII, 4 (February 15, 1945), p. 121.

29 *Ibid.*, XXIII, 6 (March 15, 1945), p. 201, and *cf. Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 5 (March 1, 1945), p. 16, where the uniform of the new unit is described in detail. See also the special reference to *Hizbu'llah* in *Pradjoerit*,

I, 11 (March 1, 1945), p. 39, and H. Tjokroaminoto's article, "Anak pesantren, pahlawan moeda," *ibid.*, I, 13 (April 1, 1945), p. 21.

30 *Hōkōkai*-leaders had perhaps taken the initiative in taking the message of independence to rural areas as far back as early October, 1944, when five Indonesians, including Mr. Sartono and Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, together with Shimizu, had made a tour of the island. See *Pandji Poestaka*, XXII, 21 (November 1, 1944), p. 690. By the end of the first phase, the *Hōkōkai* claimed a membership of over one million, according to a report in *Djawa Baroe*, II, 6 (March 15, 1945), pp. 7–9.

31 It is not without interest that this document was, hardly by coincidence, not published until some ten weeks later, in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 8 (April 15, 1945), pp. 19–20. The document itself is dated February 12 and bears the signature of Zainul Arifin.

32 *Ibid.* Another recommended course of action was aimed at invoking the aid of relatively well-to-do Muslims in lessening the misery of the poor, and of thus mitigating the dangers of social friction.

33 For an analysis of pertinent contemporary Indonesian developments, in particular of the results of some local elections, demonstrating the strength of *Masjumi* partly as a result of war-time developments, see the perceptive article by H. Feith, "Towards Elections in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 27 (1954), pp. 236-54, *passim.*. See also the same writer's detailed monograph, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, *op. cit.*, p. 57 *ff*, in which he has analyzed the votes cast for Islamic and non-religious parties in each region of the Republic.

34 Typical of that period are Moh. Hatta's sober appeals for hard work, patience, education of the people and amelioration of their suffering caused by the war. See, *e.g.*, "Kemenangan, kemerdekaan dan kemakmoeran," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 20 (October 15, 1944), p. 6, and his later article, "Pendidikan bagi rakjat oentoek mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka," reprinted from *Asia-Raya* in *ibid.*, III, 1 (January 1, 1945), pp. 9–10. On the causes of Japanese caution and inaction see the illuminating discussion by Elsbree, *op. cit.*, p. 90 *ff.*

35 Thus on November 7, the C-in-C appealed for increasing Indonesian efforts to imbibe the Nipponese spirit, and to learn the Japanese language. The appeal came rather typically at the end of a series of announcements enlarging the sphere of Indonesian participation in governmental affairs. (See Note 38, below). *Cf.* an interesting Islamic comment on this appeal, "Beladjar bahasa Nippon dilihat dari soedoet Islam," by H. Abubakar, in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXIII, 1 (January 1, 1945), pp. 7–8.

36 A conference of all Regents and mayors met at Djakarta on November 1, followed the next day by a rally dedicated to the purpose of demonstrating "the unity between *priyayi*, [nationalist] leaders, *ulama* and the people." *Cf. Pandji Poestaka*, XXII 22 (November 15, 1944), p. 720. For the prepared address of the then *Masjumi* Vice-President, Mukhti, at

the rally, see *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 21 (November 1, 1944), pp. 10–11. It is an interesting indication of the relationship between Muslim leaders and *priyayi* in the light of developments earlier in the year.

37 On November 2, R. Samsuddin, former *Parindra*-leader and head of the 'Triple-A Movement' under the occupation, was appointed mayor of Sukabumi. See *Kan Pō*, No. 55, (November 25, 1944), p. 26. Later in the month, a high-ranking civil servant became mayor of Blitar (*ibid.*, No. 56 [December 10, 1944], p. 14), and on December 23, a *priyayi* was appointed to that position in Madiun. *Ibid.*, No. 58 (January 10, 1945), p. 20.

38 For a brief reference, see Elsbree, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–91. The announcement can be found in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXII, 22 (November 15, 1944), pp. 697–98. For the decrees establishing Vice-Residents and the Chamber of Advisers, see *Osamu Seirei* No. 50 of November 12, 1944, and *Makloemat Gunseikan* Nos. 67 and 69 of November 23, in *Kan Pō*, No. 55 (November 25, 1944), pp. 5–6. Of the island's seventeen *Shū*, Djakarta and Bodjonegoro Residencies had been headed by Indonesian *Shūchōkan* since November 1943. On December 12, 1944 R. P. Suroso was appointed to this position in Kedu Residency. See also Chapter Five, Note 18.

39 Fourteen such appointments were made in the Residencies with Japanese chiefs between December and May. The names of the first group of eight appointees, including Haji Ahmad Sanusi (Bogor Vice-Resident), were published in *Kan Pō*, No. 56 (December 10, 1944), pp. 15–16. On April 29 – the emperor's birthday – the list was completed; see *ibid.*, No. 67 (May 25, 1945), p. 20. On June 23, the Vice-Residents were called for their first conference to Djakarta by the *Gunseikan*. *Djawa Baroe*, III, 13 (July 1, 1945), p. 20.

40 Nine advisers were appointed on December 1. They included: Mr. Sartono (Internal Affairs); Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (Education); Dr. Buntaran Martoatmodjo (Health); Oto Iskandar Dinata (Security); Sukardjo Wirjopranoto (Propaganda); and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (Labor). The remaining three functionaries were civil servants. *Cf. Kan Pō*, No. 56 (December 10, 1944), pp. 15–16. In June, 1945, the Regent of Bandung, R. A. A. Wiranata Kusuma, replaced Mr. Sartono. *Ibid.*, No. 68 (June 10, 1945), p. 25. On the first *Sanyo*, appointed in late 1943, see Chapter Six, Note 27.

41 As far as the writer could ascertain, information concerning this Fund only appeared in print five months after its founding. For its constitution and board of administrators, see *Indonesia Merdeka*, I, 6 (July 10, 1945), pp. 10–11. The latter mirrored the composition of the *Hōkōkai*-executive, but without its former Japanese preponderance. It was headed by Ir. Soekarno and its thirty-seven members included one Japanese, many outstanding nationalists, Wachid Hasjim, H. A. Sanusi and Djoenadi as *Masjumi* representatives, and one Chinese, one Arab and one Eurasian.

42 It appears likely that for quite some time many intellectuals kept aloof

from the *Hōkōkai*. On November 11, 1944, the *Hōkōkai* executive issued a special invitation to them, in order "to explain in detail" the movement's activities. See the news-item in *Pandji Poestaka*, XXII, 22 (November 15, 1944), p. 721. An identical appeal went out again on February 4, *Ibid.*, XXIII, 4 (February 15, 1945), p. 122.

43 See the official announcement in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 3 (February 1, 1945), p. 16. The Regents, in the words of Slamet, "were practically dragged through the mud, so that of their traditional and respected glory, for many of them connected with their ancient, aristocratic origin, nothing was left." *Japanese Machinations*, Part I, pp. 4–5. *Cf.* also Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

44 The lengthy official explanation of this revolt, in the form of a fatherly 'advice' of the C-in-C, was only released on May 19, in *Kan Pō*, No. 67 (May 27, 1945), pp. 10–14. For post-war Indonesian accounts, see *i.a.* Moh. Supardi's article, "Dibawah penindasan Djepang," *loc. cit.*, and Pakpahan, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–10. Islamic agitation, though probable among the Muslim personnel of *Peta*, does not appear to have played a role in this local rising.

45 No leniency was, however, shown to the mutineers themselves. While their leader, Suprijadi, disappeared and was not betrayed by the population, sixty-eight soldiers were tried by a court-martial at Djakarta, which was attended by Iskandar Dinata, Abikusno, Dr. Supomo, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, and two high-ranking *Peta* officers, Kasman Singodimedjo and Mas Sudiro. Eight of the accused were condemmed to death, two of them having their sentences later commuted by the C-in-C; twelve soldiers were set free. See Pakpahan, *loc. cit.*. As had happened in the two previous rebellions, the *priyayi*-officials were again held at least indirectly responsible for the rioting. The Regent of Ngandjuk, the mayor of Kediri city, and two *patih* were immediately "allowed to resign." *Cf. Kan Pō*, No. 61, (February 25, 1945), p. 13.

46 The membership of the *Chūō Sangi-in* had been increased by five appointees, including Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Mr. Sudjono and Gatot Mangkoepradja, on September 10, 1944. See *Djawa Baroe*, II, 18 (September 15, 1944), p. 29. Prior to the opening of the seventh session, fourteen further members were – as had been promised – added to the Council. Apart from some nationalists, like Muhammad Yamin and R. Sudirman, they included an additional Chinese member, one Amboinese, two Arabs and one Eurasian. For a complete listing, see *ibid.*, III, 6 (March 15, 1945), p. 4.

47 The session is reported in *ibid.*, pp. 4–6.

48 The Islamic federation devoted an entire issue of its journal to the propagation of the new movement, in which the executive called on all branches to "take the lead" in the new agitation; for this purpose, it supplied them with detailed instructions, together with apposite Koran quotations

in support of each of the thirty-three principles. *Cf. Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 8 (April 15, 1945), pp. 2, 3–5, and *passim*.. The same issue carries *i.a.* an approving article by Haji Agus Salim (*ibid.*, pp. 8–11). On a typical *Hōkōkai* drive under the 'New Life' banner, see *Djawa Baroe*, III, 1 (March 15, 1945), pp. 7–9.

49 *Ibid.*, pp. 4–6. Permission for the founding of such educational establishments was first granted to the *Hōkōkai* in *Makloemat Gunseikan* No. 25 of May 1, 1945, *Kan Pō*, No. 66 (May 10, 1945), pp. 11. Only three months later was it extended to *Taman Siswa* and *Muhammadiyah* in *Makloemat Gunseikan* No. 43 of August 1, 1945, *ibid.*, No. 72 (August 10, 1945), p. 8. It is quite indicative of the second phase that the nationalist leadership obtained preferential treatment in this crucial question.

50 *Djawa Baroe, loc. cit.*.

51 A report on the resolutions passed at the meeting appeared, as usual, in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 6 (March 15, 1945), pp. 7–8, but no *Masjumi* comment on this appeal to unity ever graced the pages of this, or subsequent, issues of the federation's journal. The only Islamic approval of the proposed merger found by the writer is of much later date. It stemmed from Mas Isjam, a relatively unknown *kiyayi* from Sukabumi, and appeared under the title, "Islam dan kemerdekaan Indonesia," in *Djawa Baroe*, II, 12 (June 15, 1945), pp. 8–9. For a brief reference to these developments, *cf.* Zorab, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

52 For the text, see *Djawa Baroe*, II, 6 (March 15, 1945), p. 1.

53 The Study Committee was set up by *Makloemat Gunseikan* No. 23 of April 29, 1944, in *Kan Pō*, No. 66 (May 10, 1945), pp. 9–10. Its membership can be found in *Indonesia Merdeka* I, 3 (May 25, 1945), p. 5. On the *Kenkoku Gakuin*, see *Makloemat Gunseikan* No. 8 of March 13, 1945, in *Kan Pō*, No. 63 (March 25, 1945), pp. 17–18, *Osuma Seirei* No. 18 and *Osamu Kanrei* No. 5, both dated April 3, 1945, in *ibid.*, No. 64 (April 10, 1945), pp. 17–18 and 20–23 resp.. In April, twelve prominent Indonesians were appointed as lecturers in the Institute; they included *i.a.* Moh. Hatta, Dr. Supomo, R. H. Muh. Adnan and Dr. Prijono. For a complete list, see *ibid.*, No. 65 (April 25, 1945), p. 15. Six further appointments – *i.a.*, Dr. Djajadiningrat, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, Muh. Yamin – followed one month later. *Ibid.*, No. 67 (May 25, 1945), p. 20.

54 These are vividly described in Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 121 *ff.* Elsbree, *op. cit.*, p. 93 *ff*, also relates the relevant discussions between the Japanese authorities on Java with the Area Command at Singapore, and those with Southern Regions H. Q. at Saigon. See also Zorab, *op. cit.*, p. 114 *ff*, and Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 236 *ff.*

55 One of the most striking incidents of the young generation's political initiative before the turbulent events of August 1945 was a meeting of two hundred representatives of the so-called *Angkatan Muda Indonesia* on May

16–18 at Bandung. It passed a resolution calling for a centralized national leadership of all Indonesian movements on Java and in the other islands. For a full report, see *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 12 (June 15, 1945), pp. 17–18. *Cf.* Abdullah's article, "Apa jang hendak diperdjoeangkan Angkatan Baroe Indonesia," *Djawa Baroe*, III, 12 (June 15, 1945), pp. 4–5. *Cf.* also Pakpahan, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–25. For an excellent and detailed description of later events, in particular the role played by *Peta*-members and underground fighters, see Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 113–20 and 134–37, resp..

56 The first issue of the *Hōkōkai*-journal, the bi-weekly *Indonesia Merdeka*, appeared on April 25, the last of this short-lived series appearing on July 25. The editorial staff of the new journal was kept a secret. With the publication of *Indonesia Merdeka*, the Balai Pustaka's *Pandji Poestaka* ceased to appear after twenty-three years of continued existence, which had only been briefly interrupted during the first six weeks of the occupation. See also Chapter Four, Note 61.

57 Exercises in guerilla warfare were held between May 3–13. The names of the regional *Hōkōkai* supervisors can be found in *Indonesia Merdeka*, I, 1 (April 25, 1945), pp. 6–7. For a report on the maneuvers, see *ibid.*, I, 3 (May 25, 1945), pp. 6–8. Most of these leaders already were *Barisan Pelopor* commanders. Former P.S.I.I. dissenter Kartosuwirjo, later to lead the *Dar'ul Islam* movement, was made training supervisor in Banten Residency. It will be recalled that he had played a prominent part in the organization of the M.I.A.I.'s ill-fated *Bait al-Mal* in mid-1943. After the dissolution of the first Islamic federation, Kartosuwirjo – and, among others, Wondoamiseno – ceased to be active in the Islamic movement. On his later activities, see C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Darul-Islam Movement in West Java," *Pacific Affairs* 23 (1950), pp. 164-84, *passim*.. On Banten, see also Chapter Seven, Note 57.

58 For an excellent discussion of the continuing battle in post-war Indonesia, see R. R. Jay, "Local Government in Rural Central Java." *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 14 (1956), pp. 218–20 and 226, resp..

59 The composition of the Study Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence continued this typical mal-distribution of votes. Its sixty-six members included seven Japanese, four Chinese, one Arab, and one Eurasian. Of its fifty-four Indonesian members, only six were *Masjumi* representatives: Sanusi, Abdul Halim, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, K. H. Masjkur, A. Kahar Muzakkir, and Wachid Hasjim. Haji Agus Salim and Abikusno were present as individuals rather than as spokesmen for the organized Islamic movement. Although leading *priyayi* and other high-ranking civil servants were also included, the nationalist elite predominated in numbers. Interestingly enough, no representative of the *Angkatan Muda* or *Peta* sat on this Committee.

60 This seems to be also true of other areas of Indonesia, especially Su-

matra. In many parts of that island, the Japanese occupation had *e.g.* aided the expansion of Islamic law tribunals. Religious judges in Sumatra appear to have successfully claimed jurisdiction in inheritance matters. See [F. R.] Böhtlingk, "De godsdienstige rechtspraak op Sumatra," *Mededelingen van het Documentatiebureau voor Overzees Recht* 5 (1955), pp. 26–28. For developments in Acheh during the occupation, see Piekaar, *op. cit.*, p. 278 *ff.* The situation in Western Sumatra is dealt with by J. Prins, "Rondom de oude strijdvraag van Minangkabau," *Indonesië* 7 (1953–54), pp. 320–29. For comments on Java, see Chapter Seven, Note 73.

61 *Makloemat Gunseikan* No. 22 of April 29, 1945, in *Kan Pō*, No. 66 (May 10, 1945), p. 9. For a typical Muslim comment, see Rapy, "Hak datang – bathal hilang," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 10 (May 15, 1945), pp. 14–15. From January onwards, considerable governmental subsidies had been made available to Islamic schools all over Java. For details, see, *e.g.*, *ibid.*, III, 2 (February 1, 1945), p. 16. Dōmei reported in mid-January that religious instruction in the higher grades of all government schools had been introduced in Banten Residency. See Asa Bafagih's comment in *ibid.*, p. 9.

62 The printing of the Holy Book had been promised as early as September of the previous year. See *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, II, 18 (September 15, 1944), p. 3. It actually commenced, in the presence of many Japanese and Muslims, on June 11. A full report, including interesting details concerning alleged pre-war plans for a similar venture, can be found in *ibid.*, II, 12 (June 15, 1945), p. 2.

63 A list of the professors and other academic personnel appointed to this University can be found in *ibid.*, pp. 13–14. The faculty included not only leading Muslims, but also many other Indonesian scholars. The opening ceremony is reported in *ibid.*, III, 14 (July 15, 1945), pp. 6–7. Abdul Kahar Muzakkir became first rector of the Islamic University, and has retained this position until this day. After the war, the University moved to Djokja.

64 The Institute was inaugurated on July 29. See *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 15 (August 1, 1945), pp. 8–9.

65 A[nwar] Tj[okroaminoto], "Oemmat Islam mengindjak perdjoeangan politik," *ibid.*, III, 16 (August 15, 1945), pp. 4–5.

66 "Tentang keadaan perang doenia jang berpoetar dengan tjepat," *Djawa Baroe*, III, 10 (May 15, 1945), pp. 4–5. The speech also appeared in *Asia-Raya* of the same date.

67 *Ibid.* There were apparently some Japanese who argued in favor of establishing an Islamic State on Java. In a letter dated December 3, 1957 Mr. K. Kishi informed the writer that Haji Suzuki of the *Shūmubu* had sought to influence the military government in this direction; having failed, he boarded the *Awa-maru* for Tokyo, where he hoped to present his plea to Imperial Head-

quarters. The ship, however, sank on its way home and Suzuki drowned.

68 This appeal stemmed from Dr. Abu Hanifah, a physician and Muslim scholar without official position in the Islamic movement. No doubt written before Nishimura's speech, Hanifah's letter to the *Masjumi* executive appeared in *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia,* III, 10 (May 10, 1945), pp. 13–14. The letter was also important for two other reasons. In the first place, it contained a plea for unifying all Islamic organizations, and thus putting an end to their mere federation in *Masjumi*. Second, the author called on the federation's leaders to open their ranks to the many leading Muslim spokesmen who had not, for whatever reasons, participated in the direction of *Masjumi* affairs during the occupation. The appearance of such frank statements in letters to the editors of the various journals after March 1945 is a good indication of increasingly relaxed Japanese censorship.

69 "Agama dalam Indonesia Merdeka," in *Indonesia Merdeka*, I, 3 (May 25, 1945), p. 3. On the same page an anonymous commentator on this article blames the Dutch – not, of course, the Japanese! – for dividing the nationalist fighters for independence from their Muslim colleagues. Wachid Hasjim was subsequently echoed by many *Masjumi* spokesmen. See *i.a.* A[nwar] Tj[okroaminoto], "Roemah Tangga Islam," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 11 (June 1, 1945), p. 6; "Persatoean jang boelat adalah salah satoe dasar pembangoenan negara baroe," by A. R. Baswedan, *ibid.*, pp. 6–7, and A. Bahry, "Memperbaiki nasib bangsa," *Indonesia Merdeka*, I, 4 (June 10, 1945), p. 16.

70 For some few examples of the limited number of such appeals which appeared in print, see in particular Muhammad Isa Anshary's "Kekoeatan negara," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 14 (July 15, 1945), pp. 7–8, and two letters, "Oedjoed Indonesia Merdeka," *ibid.*, p. 9, and "Indonesia Merdeka," in *ibid.*, III, 12 (June 15, 1945), pp. 15–16. These random selections betray a very vague notion of what an 'Islamic State' should be, apart from advancing the desideratum that all members of the central and regional governments be Muslims. Chapter XI, art. 29 of the Provisional Constitution of the Indonesian Republic merely declared, "the State shall be based upon the belief in the God of all Mankind," and guaranteed freedom of religion to all citizens. See *The Voice of Free Indonesia* (Djakarta), I, 1 (n.d.), p. 26. For post-war discussions, see *i.a.* Z. A. Ahmad, *Konsepsi negara Islam* (Bandung, 1952) and Mohammad Natsir, "Agama dan negara," in Isa M. Anshary, *Falsafah perdjuangan Islam* (Medan, 1951).

71 *Lahirnja Pantjasila, op. cit.*, p. 19. Italics in original. Soekarno himself later commented on the bitter rivalry between 'secular' nationalists and Muslims in a speech to the University of Indonesia in May 1953. "Anyone who consults our history, especially the period of July 1945... whosoever consults the history of our discussions, our debates, our mutual conflicts – at the time there were even feelings of hostility against each other – will

find that the Pantjasila is a compromise." The speech is reprinted in *Indonesian Affairs* 3 (1953), pp. 36–37, under the title, "National State and Ideals of Islam." *Cf.* J. M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World* (Bandung, 1956), Part II, pp. 198–261.

72 *Lahirnja Pantjasila*, p. 25.

73 A fairly detailed report on its proceedings and resolutions appeared in *Djawa Baroe*, III, 13 (July 1, 1945), pp. 4–9.

74 Morotai and Tarakan were at that time already in Allied hands, while bombing raids, particularly in Borneo and Celebes, kept increasing in frequency.

75 One of the resolutions passed at the meeting called for the preparation of all-out guerilla warfare. Dutch civilian administrations (N.I.C.A.) had been installed in areas occupied by the Allies. The battle-cry against the N.I.C.A., first uttered at this session, reverberated through the revolution after the Japanese surrender. It is, however, not impossible that anti-Japanese feeling and the expectation to fight against Nippon with the Allies may among many Indonesian anti-fascists have gone hand-in-hand with the desire to wage war on the Dutch. See on this point Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 129 *ff.*

76 *Djawa Baroe, loc. cit.*.

77 See on this question Pakpahan, *op. cit.*, p. 125: "As far as we know, the two leaders [Soekarno and Hatta] were at that time still very apprehensive of the intentions of the [spokesmen of the] young generation." *Cf.* also *ibid.*, pp. 136 and 138, resp. Hatta himself counters the interpretation which assigns to youth groups decisive influence at that time. See his *Verspreide geschriften* (Djakarta/Amsterdam, 1952), p. 330 *ff.*

78 For a detailed account of these events, see Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 135 *ff.*

79 See "Keterangan Gunseikan tentang mengadakan gerakan rakjat jang baroe," *Kan Pō*, No. 70 (July 10, 1945), p. 19. For a brief reference, see Zorab, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

80 The historical parallel with a similar representation of these three 'old' elites in the *Madjelis Rakjat Indonesia* of 1941 is worth mentioning. (See Chapter Three, Note 115). On the other hand, the contrast entailed in this confrontation – spanning a bare four years – is very striking.

81 This important elucidation was subsequently published under the title, "Sekitar Gerakan Rakjat Baroe. Hal-hal jang diharapkan oleh Gunseikanbu," in *Indonesia Merdeka*, I, 6 (July 10, 1945), pp. 6–7. The Japanese command at Djakarta made it clear that it intended to transfer power, if and when this was to take place, to the executive of this united movement, and therefore wished to integrate it with government agencies. (Points 6 and 7). The appointment of the Independence Preparatory Committee on orders from Saigon six weeks later to all intents and purposes altered this plan.

82 The personnel of the provisional committee of the 'New People's Move-

ment' was almost immediately announced. (*Ibid.*, p. 7.). It had a total membership of eighty, *viz.* eight Japanese (including Shimizu and also, significantly, one *Shūmubu* official), four Chinese, one Eurasian, one Arab, and sixty-four Indonesians, of whom four were women. Besides the leading figures in the nationalist movement and in the administration, six *Masjumi* members (including Wachid Hasjim), as well as two *Peta* officers (Abdul Kadir and Kasman Singodimedjo) and several leaders of youth groups (Sukarni, Sudiro, Adam Malik, and others), were included. For the first time, the younger elements were thus given representation. But the preponderance of older members within the committee and the inclusion of Japanese members pointed to the desire to prevent youthful 'exuberance.' Mr. Subardjo, protégé of the Japanese naval commander Maeda, who was soon to play an important part in the revolution, was also included in the committee. On his role under the occupation see Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 315–19.

83 One June 20, the Secretariat of the Central Advisory Council had released a statement according to which weekly consultative meetings between the executives of the two organizations had taken place since the beginning of April 1945, thus shortly after the inauguration of the 'New Life Movement.' To judge by the text of the statement, this closer contact had not led to even preliminary discussions of a merger. See *Kan Pō*, No. 69 (June 25, 1945), p. 27.

84 *Indonesia Merdeka*, *loc. cit.*. In this connection it is important to note the wholesale promotions of the entire Indonesian staff of the *Shūmubu* to higher official grades, which took effect on August 15. See *Kan Pō*, No. 73 (August 25, 1945), p. 17. On the last day of the same month, after the capitulation had been made public, Dr. Djajadiningrat was again appointed Adviser to that office. *Ibid.*, No. 74 (September 10, 1945), p. 12.

85 This became apparent as soon as the Working Committee of the new federation was announced on July 27. Although said to be "centered around *Hōkōkai* and *Masjumi*," its fifteen members in fact counted six nationalists (Soekarno, Hatta, Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, Oto Iskandar Dinata, Supeno and Dr. Muwardi), but only three Muslims (Wachid Hasjim, Mrs. Sunarjo Mangunpuspito, and Moh. Roem, the latter representing the *Hizbu'llah*). One spokesman for each of the two youth corps, *Seinendan* and *Keibōdan*, one *Peta* officer (Abdul Kadir), together with Dr. Subardjo, R. A. A. Wiranata Kusuma and Dr. Saleh completed the membership. See *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 15 (August 1, 1945), p. 2. See also *Djawa Baroe*, III, 15 (August 1, 1945), p. 20, for the program announced by the united leadership, of which Ir. Soekarno had by then been elected chairman. In the first Republican cabinet, formed on August 31, only one *Masjumi*-leader, Wachid Hasjim, was included as Minister of State without port-folio. See Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

86 In the light of later developments, this interpretation appears to be

well founded. Thus the absence of a portfolio of Religious Affairs in the first Republican cabinet, constituted before the surrender of Japan was officially announced on Java, is a significant indication of decreased Muslim bargaining strength following the transfer of power. Religious Affairs were originally entrusted to the Ministry of Education, but in November an unidentified member of the Central National Committee *(Komite Nasional Pusat)* protested against this arrangement, urging the reestablishment of an independent Islamic agency. He based his plea on two factors. First, such an agency would facilitate diplomatic contacts with Islamic countries abroad; second – and more important in the context of this study – only a separate office could cater for the demands of the "majority of our fighters [who] base their struggle on the teachings of Islam." See *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 20 (December 6, 1945), p. 7. *Cf.* also Chapter Seven, Note 73. The Republic's first Minister of Religious Affairs, Dr. Rasjidi, took office in the first Sjahrir cabinet, formed in November 1945. The new Ministry was inaugurated on January 3, 1946. For a comment, see *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, 1 (1946), p. 14.

87 *Cf.* Elsbree, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

88 "Pengoemoeman Nanpō Gun," *Kan Pō*, No. 72 (August 10, 1945), p. 11. The Saigon announcement was issued at noon; eight hours later, the *Gunseikan* broadcast its contents to the people of Java. The text of the message, "Dai Nippon menepati djandji," appeared in *ibid.*, pp. 13–15.

89 This second Preparatory Committee consisted of twenty members, eight of whom represented the Outer Islands. The twelve representatives for Java were, besides Ir. Soekarno and Hatta (chairman and vice-chairman, resp.): Dr. Radjiman, Oto Iskanda Dinata, Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo, Suroso, Dr. Supomo, Major Abdul Kadir *(Peta)*, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and Wachid Hasjim *(Masjumi)*, and Soerjohamidjojo and Poerbojo. The latter two delegates were high-ranking court officials representing the Central Javanese principalities. For a complete list of all delegates, see *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, III, 16 (August 15, 1945), p. 1.

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Pahlawan Nasional Indonesia

Abdoel Moeis (1883–1959)
Ki Hadjar Dewantara (1889–1959)
Raden Mas Soerjopranoto (1871–1959)
Mohammad Hoesni Thamrin (1894–1941)
K.H. Samanhoedi (1868–1956)
Raden H. Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1883–1934)
Dasoeki(r)dja Setiabudhi (1897–1950)
Raja Si Singamangaraja XII (1849–1907)
Dr. G.S.S.J. Ratulangi (1890–1949)
dr. Soetomo (1888–1938)
K.H. Ahmad Dahlan (1868–1923)
H. Agus Salim (1884–1954)
Jend. Gatot Soebroto (1907–1962)
Sukardjo Wirjopranoto (1903–1962)
Dr. Ferdinand Lumban Tobing (1899–1962)
K.H. Zainul Arifin (1909–1963)
Tan Malaka (1884–1949)
Mgr. Albertus Soegijapranata, S.J. (1896–1963)
Ir. R. Djuanda Kartawidjaja (1911–1963)
Dr. Sahardjo, S.H. (1909–1963)
Tjoet Nja' Dhien (1848–1908)
Tjoet Nja' Meutia (1870–1910)
Raden Adjeng Kartini (1879–1904)
dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo (1886–1943)
K.H. Fakhruddin (1890–1929)
K.H. Mas Mansoer (1896–1946)
Alimin bin Prawirodirdjo (1889–1964)
dr. Moewardi (1907–1948)
K.H. Abdul Wahid Hasjim (1914–1953)
Sri Susuhunan Paku Buwono VI (1807–1849)
K.H. Mohammad Hasjim Asj'arie (1875–1947)
RMT Arie Soerjo (1896–1948)
Jend. Besar Soedirman (1916–1950)
Jend. Oerip Soemohardjo (1893–1948)
Prof. Dr. Mr. Soepomo (1963–1958)
Dr. Sutomo alias Soeloeh Bendoeng Mataram (1888–1938)
Jend. Ahmad Yani (1922–1965)
Letjen R. Suprapto (1920–1965)
Letjen Mas Tirtodarmo Haryono (1924–1965)
Letjen Siswondo Parman (1918–1965)
Maryen Donald Isaac Pandjaitan (1925–1965)
Maryen Soesjo Siswoemihardjo (1922–1965)
Kapten Pierre Tendean (1939–1965)
Aipda Karel Satsuit Tubun (1928–1965)
Brigjen Katamso Darmokusumo (1923–1965)
Kol. Sugiono Mangunwijoto (1926–1965)
Soetan Sjahrir (1909–1966)
Laks. R. Edy Martadinata (1921–1966)
Raden Dewi Sartika (1884–1947)
Prof. Dr. Wilhelmus Zakaria Johannes (1895–1952)
Pangeran Antasari (1809–1862)
Sersan Usman alias Djoeaita bin H. Ali (1943–1968)
Kapral Harun alias Tohir bin Said (1947–1968)
Jend. Basoeki Rachmat (1921–1969)
Arie Frederik Lasut (1918–1949)
Martha Christina Tiahahu (1800–1818)
Maria Walanda Maramis (1872–1924)
Supeno (1916–1949)
Sultan Agung Tirtajasa (1631–1683)
Wage Rudolf Soegratnoo (1903–1938)
Nyai Hj. Siti Walidah Ahmad Dahlan (1872–1946)
K.H. Zainal Moestafa (1907–1944)
Sultan Hasanuddin (1631–1670)
Kapitan Pattimura (1783–1817)
Pangeran Diponegoro (1785–1855)
Tuanku Imam Bondjol (1772–1864)
Teuku Umar (1854–1899)
dr. Wahidin Soedirohoesodo (1852–1917)
Raden Oto Iskandar di Nata (1897–1945)
Robert Wolter Monginsidi (1925–1949)
Prof. Mr. Mohammad Yamin (1903–1962)
Laksda Josaphat Soedarso (1925–1962)
Prof. dr. R. Soeharso (1912–1971)
Marsda Prof. dr. Abdurrachman Saleh (1909–1947)
Marsda Mas Agustinus Adisutjipto (1916–1947)
Teuku Nyak Arief (1899–1946)
Nji Ageng Serang (1752–1828)
Hj. Rangkayo Rasuna Said (1910–1965)
Marsda Abdul Halim Perdanakusuma (1922–1947)
Marsma R. Iswahjudi (1918–1947)
Brigjen I Gusti Ngurah Rai (1917–1946)
Soerjadi (1923–1945)
Sultan Agung Anyokrokusumo (1593–1645)
Untung Surapati (1660–1706)
Tengku Amir Hamzah (1911–1946)
Sultan Thaha Syaifuddin (1816–1904)
Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin II (1767–1852)
Dr. Ir. H. Soekarno (1901–1970)
Dr. H. Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980)
Raden Pandji Soeroso (1893–1981)
Raden Intan II (1834–1856)
KGPAA Mangkunegara I (1725–1795)
Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (1912–1988)
Sultan Iskandar Muda (1593–1636)
I Gusti Ketut Jelantik (????–1849)
Frans Kaisiepo (1921–1979)
Silas Papare (1918–1978)
Martinus Indey (1912–1986)
Sultan Nuku Muhammad Amiruddin (1738–1805)
Tuanku Tambusai (1784–1882)
Syekh Yusuf Tajul Khalwati (1626–1699)
R.A. Hj. Fatimah Siti Hartinah Soeharto (1923–1996)
Roja Haji Fisabilillah (1725–1784)
H. Adam Malik (1917–1984)
Mayjen TNI (Purn.) Dr. Moestopo (1913–1986)
Jenderal Besar Dr. (H.C.) Abdul Haris Nasution (1918–2000)
Jend. GPH Djatikusumo (1917–1992)
Andi Djemma (1901–1965)
Pong Tiku alias Ne' Baso (1846–1907)
Prof. Mr. R. H. Iwa Koesoema Soemantri (1899–1971)
H. Nani Wartabone (1907–1986)
Maskoen Soemadiredja (1905–1986)
Andi Mappanyukki (1885–1967)
Raja Ali Haji bin Raja Haji Ahmad (1808–1873)
K.H. Ahmad Rifa'i (1786–1870)
Gatot Mangkoepradja (1898–1968)
Ismail Marzuki (1914–1958)
Kiras Bangun alias Garamata (1852–1942)
Roehana Koeddoes (1884–1972)
Dr. Mr. H. Teuku Mohammad Hasan (1906–1997)
R.M. Djokomono Tirto Adhi Soerjo (1880–1918)
K.H. Noer Ali (1914–1992)
H. Pajonga Daeng Ngalle (1901–1958)
Opu Daeng Risaju (1880–1964)
Ilyas Idris Deke (1913–1985)
Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono I (1717–1792)
H. Andi Sultan Daeng Radja (1894–1963)
Maryen dr. Adrian Kopen Gani (1905–1968)
Mr. dr. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung (1921–1999)
Maryen Prof. Dr. Moestopo (1913–1986)
Brigjen Ignatius Slamet Rijadi (1927–1950)
Dr. Mohammad Natsir (1908–1993)
K.H. Abdul Halim (1887–1962)
Soetomo alias Bung Tomo (1920–1981)
Laksda Jalja Daniel Dharma alias John Lie (1911–1988)
Prof. Dr. Ir. Herman Johannes (1912–1992)
Prof. Mr. R. Achmad Soebardjo (1896–1978)
Dr. Johannes Leimena (1905–1977)
Mayor Inf. Johannes Abraham Dimara (1916–2000)
Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911–1989)
K.H. Idham Chalid (1921–2010)
H. Abdul Malik Karim Abdullah (1908–1981)
Ki Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro (1904–1957)
I Gusti Ketut Pudja (1908–1977)
Sri Susuhunan Paku Buwono X (1866–1939)
Ignatius Joseph Kasimo Hendrowahono (1900–1986)
dr. KRT Radjiman Wedyodiningrat (1879–1957)
Lambertus Nicodemus Palar (1900–1981)
Letjen Tahi Bonar Simatupang (1920–1990)
Letjen Djamin Ginting (1921–1974)
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

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